fbb7c71db9be9a2a579fad4c374e23f662cdf432
14
Commits
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  grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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fbb7c71db9 |
feat(ui): the app shell: lock screen, sidebar, network switcher, status bar, settings
ci / gate (push) Successful in 9m14s
The frame every screen sits in. A lock screen fronts everything while the session is locked: pick a wallet file, type a password, and the password goes to Rust and nowhere else. Unlocked, a sidebar carries the sections, the network switcher and a lock button with the minutes until the idle rule fires; a status bar shows the chain in use, its endpoint, best and finalized heights and spec version, and says "connecting…" or the last error otherwise. Testnets are labelled in the switcher, the status bar and above their content, as on the observer: a balance on a testnet is not money and the chrome says so before the number does. Settings persist as JSON in the app-data directory, written atomically: network, idle lock, whether testnets are offered. Changing the network re-keys every query; changing the idle lock takes effect on the next check. The theme (system, dark, light) is a local preference applied before first paint from the entry point, because the CSP allows no inline script. Design tokens are the observer's, lifted whole so the wallet and the scoreboard read as one family. The accounts page shows spendable and total per account with the block the numbers were read at and how far that is from final, refreshed by Rust on every head; send, receive and history are placeholders naming their issues. Wide integers now cross the IPC typed as `number`: they are JSON numbers on the wire, which `bigint` cannot be serialised to, and none of them (block heights, seconds, nonces) approaches 2^53. Amounts still travel as strings. Closes #25 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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be2644f31b |
ci: a pinned quantus-node dev chain in the gate, and a script to run one locally
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
`script/dev-node.sh` fetches the v1.0.1 release binary once into `.cache/`, checks it against the sha256 the release publishes, and runs `quantus-node --dev` on a throwaway base path. The workflow starts it in the background, waits for `system_chain` to answer `Quantus DevNet`, and runs every ignored test whose name says `dev_node`: the send, reverse, cancel and named-failure path, and the scheme-by-era probe that found the mortality bug. Public-node tests stay ignored in CI. Rehearsed locally on a second node on port 9955: both tests pass in 15 s. Closes #24 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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95bcfe9ca4 |
feat(substrate): transfers prepared for review, priced, signed by the session, submitted and watched
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
`SubstrateAdapter` implements the chain-adapter port for Quantus. `prepare` builds the call from a chain-neutral intent, decodes it back from its own bytes through the runtime metadata into a summary a person can check (a 32-byte account renders as the chain's SS58 address, an amount in the token's units), prices it by assembling a full extrinsic with a zeroed signature of the right size and asking `TransactionPaymentApi_query_info`, and returns the signer payload for the session to sign. `submit` refuses if the runtime spec moved or the payload no longer matches, assembles with the session's signature, and streams statuses; a dispatch error is reported at inclusion, named `Pallet::Variant` where the chain names it, so nobody waits for finality to learn a transfer failed. Reversible transfers: `reversible_for` routes through `ReversibleTransfers::schedule_transfer_with_delay`; a high-security account is routed through the pallet's default-delay call whether it asked or not, since the chain's extension refuses a plain transfer from one. `pending_reversible` lists what is waiting with the execution block from the scheduler's lookup, whose task name is the tx id itself, and `CancelReversible` cancels. Three things the dev node taught, each now written into the code: - Mortality must be anchored at the *best* block. Finality on this proof-of-work chain trails the tip by a hundred blocks, and an era born at the finalized head names a birth block whose hash the runtime resolves differently: "Transaction has a bad signature", for both schemes, while immortal transactions from the same keys passed. Probed all four scheme-by-era combinations to isolate it. - Everything the UI shows is read at the best block, with the block number and the finalized height alongside so confirmations can be shown. subxt's `at_latest()` is the finalized block; the pending list read there showed the state of a hundred blocks ago while the chain's events showed every schedule landing. - subxt's runtime-update subscription died on this node with "header not found" after a reorg and took the connection with it. It is advisory now: on error the runtime version is polled every ten heads and a change forces a reconnect, which refetches metadata. Live, against `quantus-node --dev` with the funded dev accounts: a 3 DEV transfer from crystal_alice to crystal_bob is included and moves bob's balance; a reversible transfer with a 200-block window is scheduled, shows as pending with its execution block, and is cancelled; an overspend fails as `Token(FundsUnavailable)`. Fee for a plain transfer: 0.010157927 DEV. In the app: `transfer_prepare` (amount parsed from its decimal form in Rust), `transfer_submit` (signs through the session, emits `tx:status`), `transfer_discard`, `reversible_pending`, `reversible_cancel_prepare`. Closes #22 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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26559ee148 |
feat(substrate): balances, nonce and high-security status, refreshed on every finalized head
ci / gate (push) Successful in 6m43s
`account_info` reads `System::Account` and `ReversibleTransfers::HighSecurityAccounts` at the latest finalized block through subxt's dynamic storage API, so a number the UI shows cannot be reorganised away and no generated code has to track the runtime. An account the chain has never seen is zero and nonce zero, not an error; the live test reads the dev phrase's account on Planck and gets exactly that. The next nonce comes from `system_accountNextIndex`, which counts the pool. Spendable is free less frozen; total is free plus reserved. A high-security account carries its guardian and its delay, in blocks or milliseconds as the pallet stores it, so the send path (#22) can route it through the reversible-transfers pallet instead of a plain transfer the extension would reject. The connection manager now publishes finalized heads on a watch channel. `balances_watch` spawns one task per chain that re-reads every open account on each head and emits `balances:updated`; `balances` reads once. Both refuse with `Locked` when no wallet is open. Closes #21 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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78c06120f6 |
feat(substrate): a supervised connection per chain, failing over and following upgrades
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
`ChainManager::start(profile)` spawns a supervisor that tries the profile's endpoints in order, refuses a node whose genesis is not the profile's (by name, so a typo in an override file cannot quietly sign for the wrong chain), records the runtime version at connect, follows finalized heads, applies subxt's runtime updates as the chain upgrades, and on any failure rotates to the next endpoint after an exponential backoff with full jitter, capped at a minute. A head that fails to arrive for two minutes counts as a failure. `status()` reports the endpoint in use, spec and transaction version, finalized height, head age, the last error and the failure count. Backoff is a pure type with the schedule pinned in tests. The live test gives Planck's profile a dead first endpoint and the real second one: it connects to the second at spec 148 with zero failures, and mainnet's profile pointed at Planck's node is refused with "is not quantus". Supervisors start on demand from `chain_connect`, never at boot, because a profile whose endpoint does not exist yet (#53) would otherwise retry forever for nobody. `chain_status` reads without starting anything. Not yet exercised: a stream dropping mid-session and a runtime upgrade arriving while connected. Both go through the same loop and will be driven on the dev node in #24. Closes #20 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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1ca42fdbdf |
feat(substrate): a subxt config for quantus, and offline signing under the context
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
`QuantusConfig` is quantus-cli's `ChainConfig` with the signature enum
defined here: `DilithiumSignature { Dilithium87, Dilithium65 }`, variant
indices 0 and 1, each carrying signature-then-public-key as one raw array
because the account id is a hash of the key and the verifier needs the key
itself. Defining it locally keeps sp-core out of a desktop wallet.
subxt 0.44, deliberately: it is the version quantus-cli signs mainnet with,
and its extension resolver skips any extension whose type is empty, which
is how the chain's ReversibleTransactionExtension and
WormholeProofRecorderExtension are tolerated with the default set. A test
pins that both names are in the metadata and that building still works.
`sign_call` builds the v4 extrinsic offline from captured chain state,
takes the signer payload from subxt (blake2-hashed past 256 bytes, as the
runtime hashes when it verifies), signs it with a `wallet_core::Signer`
under the profile's FIPS 204 context, and hands the signature back to
subxt to assemble. The test decodes the result byte by byte: 0x84, Id
address equal to the signer's account id, the variant byte, the public key
riding with the signature, the extras, the call data as the tail.
Live acceptance against a1-planck.quantus.cat, from an unfunded account:
signed under QUANTUS_EXTRINSIC the node answers "Inability to pay some
fees", so the signature passed; signed under the empty context it answers
"Transaction has a bad signature". Ignored test, run by hand.
Metadata fixtures are live `state_getMetadata` from mainnet (spec 152) and
Planck (spec 148), 101 KB each, v14.
Closes #19
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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f0b3c26714 |
feat(profiles): chains as data, shipped in the binary and overridable by file
ci / gate (push) Successful in 6m18s
`wallet-core/src/profiles.toml` carries what runtime metadata does not: genesis hash, SS58 prefix, symbol and decimals, coin type, the endpoint list, block time, and the rule for when the FIPS 204 signing context applies. Three profiles ship: Quantus mainnet at spec 152 with QTC, Planck with PLK (in the wallet only to prove the multi-chain UX), and a local dev node with an empty genesis hash that means "do not check". Endpoints are the names decided on #20 and #53, one per chain; until those exist an override file points a dev run at the public nodes. The override file is the same shape with every field optional: a known id has fields replaced, an unknown id must be complete and is appended. A mainnet endpoint must be wss, a genesis hash must be 66 characters or empty, a context at most 255 bytes; anything else is refused with the profile named. Adding a fourth chain is a TOML entry and no Rust, which the test does. `signing_context_for(profile, spec)` and `genesis_matches(profile, hash)` are the two pure functions the adapter (#19, #20) will call at connect. The app loads `<app data>/profiles.toml` or WALLET_PROFILES and exposes `chains_list`. Closes #18 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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18caa2b81c |
feat(session): password in, signatures out, locked again after idling
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
`wallet_core::session::Session` is the only place decrypted key material lives between commands: one wallet open at a time, its signers and, when the file carried a phrase, its seed. Every signature goes through `Session::sign`, which applies the idle rule before it looks at the key, so a stale session refuses rather than signing one last time. Time is passed in, so the rule is tested at 59, 118 and 119 seconds without waiting. The seed is now a heap allocation behind a wiping box. Moving an inline 64-byte array through `Some(...)` and a function argument can leave copies in dead stack frames that no destructor visits; moving a box moves a pointer. A Linux test unlocks with a runtime-built seed and a signer whose secret is a second runtime-built pattern, locks, then reads every writable anonymous mapping in /proc/self/mem and asserts neither pattern is anywhere in the process. It passes in debug and release. The comparison copies are XOR-masked so the test cannot find itself. In the app: `unlock` opens a file, turns its phrase into a seed and drops the phrase; `lock` and `session_status` do what they say; a ticker thread applies the idle rule every five seconds and emits `session:locked` so the lock screen appears without a click. Ten minutes until settings exist. Closes #17 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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de55d1dfb9 |
feat(mnemonic): generate, validate, verify the backup, and the checkphrase
ci / gate (push) Has been cancelled
A new wallet's phrase is 24 words from OS entropy through the hdwallet crate, which wipes both the entropy and the phrase's own working buffers. Validation runs the same pinned bip39 the hdwallet crate stretches with, so a phrase that validates here derives there; it normalises case and whitespace and rejects the wrong count, an unknown word, and a bad checksum with an error a person can act on. The checkphrase is Quantus's human-readable address checksum through qp-human-checkphrase, with the 2048-word list vendored because the crate loads it from the working directory at runtime, which a desktop app cannot rely on. The value for the dev phrase's ML-DSA-65 account is pinned to what `quantus wallet view` prints. Creation is three commands so the webview sees a phrase exactly once: begin generates and holds it and returns the words with a four-word backup challenge; confirm passes the challenge or refuses, then derives at the scheme's conventional path and writes the file; cancel forgets. No command returns a phrase that already exists. Import from a phrase and from a CLI file, and listing, are the other commands. App state is a mutex around the pending creation; the keystore directory is the platform app-data directory unless WALLET_KEYSTORE_DIR says otherwise. Closes #16 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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5776cfd218 |
feat(keystore): read and write quantus-cli wallet files, byte for byte
ci / gate (push) Successful in 4m56s
`wallet_data::keystore` is the CLI's format: AES-256-GCM over the JSON of the wallet data, keyed by Argon2id under the frozen profile (m=19456, t=2, p=1) and a 16-byte salt, with the PHC string carrying the profile and salt and never the digest. A file whose PHC string does embed a digest is refused, as the CLI refuses it. On open the address is re-derived from the decrypted key and the file refused if it differs, so a file that lies about its address cannot be opened, let alone signed with. Legacy files with no `scheme` are ML-DSA-87; files with no `wallet_type` are hot. The directory rules are the CLI's too: a wallet name is a plain filename, writes go through an unpredictable temporary file and a no-clobber rename at mode 0600, and a symlink where a wallet should be is refused. Proof in both directions. Eight real files open here: six written by quantus-cli 2.2.2 for the dev phrase, one per scheme and path, and the two fixtures the extension fork tests against. A file written here lists in `quantus wallet list` with the expected address (ignored test, run with QUANTUS_CLI set). A test greps the written file for phrase words and secret key bytes and finds neither. `Keystore` is a port in wallet-core: list, open, create, import a file, export a file. Opening yields a `Signer` and, when the file carries one, the phrase in a wiping holder; neither leaves Rust. Closes #15 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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8015ca8212 |
feat(keys): ML-DSA key schemes, derived at a BIP44 path, signed under a context
ci / gate (push) Successful in 4m38s
`wallet_data::keys::MlDsa` implements the `KeyScheme` port for ML-DSA-65 and ML-DSA-87 on Quantus's own crates: hdwallet for the all-hardened `m/44'/189189'/account'/change'/index'` derivation, dilithium for FIPS 204 signing, poseidon for the account id the runtime derives from a public key. Signing is hedged with fresh OS randomness, and an empty context means "no context", the pre-spec-148 rule, rather than a zero-length one. The test vectors are six addresses produced by quantus-cli 2.2.2 for the polkadot-js dev phrase, three paths per scheme; two of them are also the addresses inside the extension fork's CLI-wallet fixtures. A signature made under `QUANTUS_EXTRINSIC` verifies, and the same signature under the empty context does not, which is the mistake that would otherwise reach mainnet as a cryptographically valid, chain-rejected transaction. `Signer` now requires `Debug`, so every implementation has to write one, and the one here redacts. The seed is a 64-byte wiping holder with a `Debug` that prints nothing. SS58 lives in `wallet_core::ss58`, blake2 and base58 only; decoding returns the prefix so a foreign address can be refused by name. Closes #14 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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d951ce07e7 |
feat(ui): a typed command client, and one file allowed to touch the IPC
ci / gate (push) Waiting to run
Commands now return `Result<T, WalletError>`; Tauri rejects the promise with the serialised error, and `ui/src/api/wallet.ts` is the one place that turns it back into a thrown `WalletError` with the same `kind` the Rust enum has. Anything that is not a `WalletError` is a bug on one side of the boundary and is rethrown untouched so it is loud. Screens never call `invoke` themselves. React Query holds what Rust knows, with retries off (a wallet must not silently retry a command that failed) and refetch-on-focus off. CI counts the files importing Tauri's IPC module and fails unless the count is exactly one. The first command is `app_info`, so the window shows a version that came across the boundary as a typed struct rather than a string. Closes #13 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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c9b623c438 |
feat(app): isolation pattern on, and a capability file that must say why
The IPC isolation pattern is on from the first command: every message from the main window passes through the sandboxed isolation application and is encrypted before Rust sees it, so a script injected into the webview can read what the UI shows but cannot forge a command. The hook passes everything through today; the point of shipping it now is that every later command is born inside the boundary. Both `tauri` and `tauri-build` need the `isolation` feature, and the build script refuses to proceed if either lacks it. Capabilities are TOML rather than JSON so each permission can carry the reason it exists on the line above it. `tests/capabilities.rs` makes that comment mandatory, requires a real description on every capability, and refuses to grant anything to a window other than `main`. A capability is the one place a plugin's reach into the system is widened, and it should not be possible to widen it quietly. Closes #11 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |
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grenadeandClaude Fable 5.1
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257b021066 |
feat: scaffold the workspace, the tauri shell and the webview
ci / gate (push) Successful in 4m24s
The house shape (architecture/generic.md §1): wallet-entities for the vocabulary and the IPC wire types, wallet-core for the four ports that are the architecture (KeyScheme, ChainAdapter, SwapProvider, FiatRamp), wallet-data for the adapters that will implement them, and wallet-app as a Tauri 2 shell whose commands are one-line shims. The webview is Vite + React + TypeScript and reaches Rust only through ui/src/api/wallet.ts, typed by what ts-rs exports from the entities crate on every `cargo test`. Amounts are integer base units plus decimals, serialised as strings, because the webview has no integer wide enough and a wallet that rounds is a wallet that lies. The webview never receives a secret; readme.md and CLAUDE.md say why and what will bite. Two things the scaffold learned: Tauri's `version` field takes a JSON file or a literal, never Cargo.toml, so the release workflow stamps it; and Prettier must skip the generated types, which carry ts-rs's own style. Placeholder icon; the mark comes later. CI targets the rust-gtk3 runner. Refs #1 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014ftBXYuba8ARhQeF74oUgW |