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codex/codex-rs/core/README.md
T
viyatb-oai bcff988bd1 Resolve Linux sandbox mode once before launching the helper (#62215)
## Why

Managed proxy routes require bubblewrap's network namespace even when
`features.use_legacy_landlock` is enabled. WSL1 compatibility checks and
helper arguments need to agree on the effective mode.

## What changed

Resolve bubblewrap or legacy Landlock once and use that mode for both the
WSL1 check and the `codex-linux-sandbox` arguments. Use Linux sandbox
naming for the shared launcher and CLI code, and preserve the published
analytics category for a missing helper executable.

## Testing

Unit tests exercise the production argument builder, including managed
network context serialization when legacy Landlock is requested. They
also cover which sandbox configurations WSL1 accepts and rejects.

GitOrigin-RevId: 619ab9d3eef965de6bc6cb13ff8a33132018abcf
2026-11-18 07:23:25 +00:00

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Markdown

# codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
## Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
`bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test`.
Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets
Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:
- `skip_if_target_windows!`: Windows target behavior.
- `skip_if_host_windows!`: Windows host constraints.
- `skip_if_remote!`: Local-only test behavior.
- `skip_if_no_remote_env!`: Remote-only test behavior.
- `skip_if_wine_exec!`: Wine-specific runner debt.
## Dependencies
Note that `codex-core` makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
### macOS
Expects `/usr/bin/sandbox-exec` to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping `.git` (directory or
pointer file), the resolved `gitdir:` target, and `.codex` read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
`SandboxPolicy`. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(`user-preference-read`) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
### Linux
Expects the binary containing `codex-core` to run the equivalent of `codex sandbox` when `arg0` is `codex-linux-sandbox`. See the `codex-arg0` crate for details.
The Linux sandbox accepts both legacy `sandbox_mode` configs and permission
profiles. Bubblewrap enforces filesystem restrictions and provides the network
namespace for managed proxy routes. A managed route selects bubblewrap even
when `features.use_legacy_landlock` is set. Without a managed route, the helper
rejects legacy Landlock if the policy restricts filesystem writes. With full
disk write access it can apply network restrictions in process.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first `bwrap` found on `PATH` outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If `bwrap` is present but
too old to support `--argv0`, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no-`--argv0` compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
`bwrap` is missing, it falls back to the bundled `codex-resources/bwrap`
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking `bwrap`.
### Windows
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` / `sandbox_mode` configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy `read-only` and `workspace-write` policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` behavior
- split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable
roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
`C:\Windows`, `C:\Program Files`, `C:\Program Files (x86)`, and
`C:\ProgramData`, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy `WorkspaceWrite` root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New `[permissions]` / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy `SandboxPolicy` model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (`none`) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
### All Platforms
Expects the binary containing `codex-core` to simulate the virtual
`apply_patch` CLI when `arg1` is `--codex-run-as-apply-patch`. See the
`codex-arg0` crate for details.
## Runtime authentication (experimental)
Runtime authentication is off by default. To enable it in `config.toml`:
```toml
[features.runtime_agent_instances]
enabled = true
mode = "dual_header"
```
`dual_header` sends the existing actor credential and a fresh agent assertion.
`assertion_only` sends only the assertion. The latter requires backend support;
registration failures do not fall back to credential-only requests. Non-OpenAI
providers and third-party MCP authentication keep their existing behavior.
The same table in `requirements.toml` pins enablement and mode. A conflicting
explicit mode is rejected. The older boolean `runtime_agent_instances = true`
still works and uses the default mode (`dual_header`) unless requirements pin it.
Deliver typed requirements only to client versions that understand them.
The harness owns the runtime and its memory-only signing key. Ordinary token
refreshes reuse it; a different credential source or actor context requires a new
runtime. When runtime authentication is selected, legacy `AgentIdentity`
credentials migrate to saved OAuth credentials for the same actor and remove the
persisted signing key. If no matching actor credential exists, a supported
sign-in is required. Ordinary credential loading does not perform this migration.
Cloud-config bundle and requirements fetches retain their endpoint-restricted
bootstrap authentication, including refreshes after runtime initialization.