## Why
Elevated provisioning can apply ACLs beneath a user-supplied `CODEX_HOME`.
Following a directory junction or another reparse point could apply those ACLs
to a different directory than the one provisioning intended to secure.
## What changed
- Require provisioning paths to be absolute paths on a local Windows disk.
- In provision-only mode, open or create sandbox directories with
`OBJ_DONT_REPARSE` and keep the resulting handle open while applying ACLs
with `SetSecurityInfo`.
- Reject reparse points in both the final directory and its ancestors while
preserving the existing path-based behavior for full setup.
## Testing
Add Windows tests covering plain directory creation and rejection of junctions
at both the leaf and ancestor levels.
GitOrigin-RevId: d165b8b3685c89bc171e4d58c63c739fa9fb2cf9
iceweasel-oai
a4f37a5b7f