## Description
Enable pnpm's reviewed build-script gate for this repo.
## What changed
- added `strictDepBuilds: true` to `pnpm-workspace.yaml`
## Why
The repo already uses pinned pnpm and frozen installs in CI. This adds
the remaining guard so dependency build scripts do not run unless they
are explicitly reviewed.
## Validation
- ran `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- register flattened handler aliases for deferred MCP tools
- cover the node_repl-shaped deferred MCP call path in tool registry
tests
## Root Cause
Deferred MCP tools were registered only under their namespaced handler
key, e.g. `mcp__node_repl__:js`. If the model/bridge emitted the
flattened qualified name `mcp__node_repl__js`, core parsed it as an MCP
payload but dispatch looked up the flattened handler key and returned
`unsupported call` before reaching the MCP handler.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-tools
search_tool_registers_deferred_mcp_flattened_handlers`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
search_tool_registers_namespaced_mcp_tool_aliases`
- `git diff --check`
Select Current Thread startup context by budget from newest turns, cap
each rendered turn at 300 approximate tokens, and add formatter plus
integration snapshot coverage.
## Summary
- leave the default contributor devcontainer on its lightweight
platform-only Docker runtime
- install bubblewrap in setuid mode only in the secure devcontainer
image for running Codex inside Docker
- add Docker run args to the secure profile for bubblewrap's required
capabilities
- use explicit `seccomp=unconfined` and `apparmor=unconfined` in the
secure profile instead of shipping a custom seccomp profile
- document that the relaxed Docker security options are scoped to the
secure profile
## Why
Docker's default seccomp profile blocks bubblewrap with `pivot_root:
Operation not permitted`, even when the container has `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`.
Docker's default AppArmor profile also blocks bubblewrap with `Failed to
make / slave: Permission denied`.
A custom seccomp profile works, but it is hard for customers to audit
and understand. Using Docker's standard `seccomp=unconfined` option is
clearer: the secure profile intentionally relaxes Docker's outer sandbox
just enough for Codex to construct its own bubblewrap/seccomp sandbox
inside the container. The default contributor profile does not get these
expanded runtime settings.
## Validation
- `sed '/\\/\\*/,/\\*\\//d' .devcontainer/devcontainer.json | jq empty`
- `jq empty .devcontainer/devcontainer.secure.json`
- `git diff --check`
- `docker build --platform=linux/arm64 -t
codex-devcontainer-bwrap-test-arm64 ./.devcontainer`
- `docker build --platform=linux/arm64 -f
.devcontainer/Dockerfile.secure -t
codex-devcontainer-secure-bwrap-test-arm64 .`
- interactive `docker run -it` smoke tests:
- verified non-root users `ubuntu` and `vscode`
- verified secure image `/usr/bin/bwrap` is setuid
- verified user/pid namespace, user/network namespace, and preserved-fd
`--ro-bind-data` bwrap commands
- reran secure-image smoke test with simplified `seccomp=unconfined`
setup:
- `bwrap-basic-ok`
- `bwrap-netns-ok`
- `codex-ok`
- ran Codex inside the secure image:
- `codex --version` -> `codex-cli 0.120.0`
- `codex sandbox linux --full-auto -- /bin/sh -lc '...'` -> exited 0 and
printed `codex-inner-ok`
Note: direct `bwrap --proc /proc` is still denied by this Docker
runtime, and Codex's existing proc-mount preflight fallback handles that
by retrying without `--proc`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Eric Traut