## Summary
This PR makes Windows sandbox proxying enforceable by routing proxy-only
runs through the existing `offline` sandbox user and reserving direct
network access for the existing `online` sandbox user.
In brief:
- if a Windows sandbox run should be proxy-enforced, we run it as the
`offline` user
- the `offline` user gets firewall rules that block direct outbound
traffic and only permit the configured localhost proxy path
- if a Windows sandbox run should have true direct network access, we
run it as the `online` user
- no new sandbox identity is introduced
This brings Windows in line with the intended model: proxy use is not
just env-based, it is backed by OS-level egress controls. Windows
already has two sandbox identities:
- `offline`: intended to have no direct network egress
- `online`: intended to have full network access
This PR makes proxy-enforced runs use that model directly.
### Proxy-enforced runs
When proxy enforcement is active:
- the run is assigned to the `offline` identity
- setup extracts the loopback proxy ports from the sandbox env
- Windows setup programs firewall rules for the `offline` user that:
- block all non-loopback outbound traffic
- block loopback UDP
- block loopback TCP except for the configured proxy ports
- optionally allow broader localhost access when `allow_local_binding=1`
So the sandboxed process can only talk to the local proxy. It cannot
open direct outbound sockets or do local UDP-based DNS on its own.The
proxy then performs the real outbound network access outside that
restricted sandbox identity.
### Direct-network runs
When proxy enforcement is not active and full network access is allowed:
- the run is assigned to the `online` identity
- no proxy-only firewall restrictions are applied
- the process gets normal direct network access
### Unelevated vs elevated
The restricted-token / unelevated path cannot enforce per-identity
firewall policy by itself.
So for Windows proxy-enforced runs, we transparently use the logon-user
sandbox path under the hood, even if the caller started from the
unelevated mode. That keeps enforcement real instead of best-effort.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
`parse_tool_input_schema` and the supporting `JsonSchema` model were
living in `core/src/tools/spec.rs`, but they already serve callers
outside `codex-core`.
Keeping that shared schema parsing logic inside `codex-core` makes the
crate boundary harder to reason about and works against the guidance in
`AGENTS.md` to avoid growing `codex-core` when reusable code can live
elsewhere.
This change takes the first extraction step by moving the schema parsing
primitive into its own crate while keeping the rest of the tool-spec
assembly in `codex-core`.
## What changed
- added a new `codex-tools` crate under `codex-rs/tools`
- moved the shared tool input schema model and sanitizer/parser into
`tools/src/json_schema.rs`
- kept `tools/src/lib.rs` exports-only, with the module-level unit tests
split into `json_schema_tests.rs`
- updated `codex-core` to use `codex-tools::JsonSchema` and re-export
`parse_tool_input_schema`
- updated `codex-app-server` dynamic tool validation to depend on
`codex-tools` directly instead of reaching through `codex-core`
- wired the new crate into the Cargo workspace and Bazel build graph
Replaced ci.bazelrc and v8-ci.bazelrc by custom configs inside the main
.bazelrc file. As a result, github workflows setup is simplified down to
a single '--config=<foo>' flag usage.
Moved the build metadata flags to config=ci.
Added custom tags metadata to help differentiate invocations based on
workflow (bazel vs v8) and os (linux/macos/windows).
Enabled users to override the default values in .bazelrc by using a
user.bazelrc file locally.
Added user.bazelrc to gitignore.
Highlights:
- Trimmed down to just the repository cache for faster upload / download
- Made the cache key only include files that affect external
dependencies (since that's what the repository cache caches) -
MODULE.bazel, codex-rs/Cargo.lock, codex-rs/Cargo.toml
- Split the caching action in to explicit restore / save steps (similar
to your rust CI) which allows us to skip uploads on cache hit, and not
fail the build if upload fails
This should get rid of 842 network fetches that are happening on every
Bazel CI run, while also reducing the Github flakiness @bolinfest
reported. Uploading should be faster (since we're not caching many small
files), and will only happen when MODULE.bazel or Cargo.lock /
Cargo.toml files change.
In my testing, it [took 3s to save the repository
cache](https://github.com/siggisim/codex/actions/runs/23014186143/job/66832859781).
## Summary
Fail closed when the network proxy's local/private IP pre-check hits a
DNS lookup error or timeout, instead of treating the hostname as public
and allowing the request.
## Root cause
`host_resolves_to_non_public_ip()` returned `false` on resolver failure,
which created a fail-open path in the `allow_local_binding = false`
boundary. The eventual connect path performs its own DNS resolution
later, so a transient pre-check failure is not evidence that the
destination is public.
## Changes
- Treat DNS lookup errors/timeouts as local/private for blocking
purposes
- Add a regression test for an allowlisted hostname that fails DNS
resolution
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-network-proxy --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Why
This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.
Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.
Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.
## What changed
- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Summary
- move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
- move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
## Validation
- git diff --check
- skipped heavier local tests per request
Follow-up to #15791.
## Why
`codex-core` is already the largest crate in `codex-rs`, so defaulting
to it for new functionality makes it harder to keep the workspace
modular. The repo guidance should make it explicit that contributors are
expected to look for an existing non-`codex-core` crate, or introduce a
new crate, before growing `codex-core` further.
## What Changed
- Added a dedicated `The \`codex-core\` crate` section to `AGENTS.md`.
- Documented why `codex-core` should be treated as a last resort for new
functionality.
- Added concrete guidance for both implementation and review: prefer an
existing non-`codex-core` crate when possible, introduce a new workspace
crate when that is the cleaner boundary, and push back on PRs that grow
`codex-core` unnecessarily.
## Why
`SandboxCommand.program` represents an executable path, but keeping it
as `String` forced path-backed callers to run `to_string_lossy()` before
the sandbox layer ever touched the command. That loses fidelity earlier
than necessary and adds avoidable conversions in runtimes that already
have a `PathBuf`.
## What changed
- Changed `SandboxCommand.program` to `OsString`.
- Updated `SandboxManager::transform` to keep the program and argv in
`OsString` form until the `SandboxExecRequest` conversion boundary.
- Switched the path-backed `apply_patch` and `js_repl` runtimes to pass
`into_os_string()` instead of `to_string_lossy()`.
- Updated the remaining string-backed builders and tests to match the
new type while preserving the existing Linux helper `arg0` behavior.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just argument-comment-lint -p codex-core -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` currently fails in unrelated existing
config tests: `config::tests::approvals_reviewer_*` and
`config::tests::smart_approvals_alias_*`
## Why
`token_data` is owned by `codex-login`, but `codex-core` was still
re-exporting it. That let callers pull auth token types through
`codex-core`, which keeps otherwise unrelated crates coupled to
`codex-core` and makes `codex-core` more of a build-graph bottleneck.
## What changed
- remove the `codex-core` re-export of `codex_login::token_data`
- update the remaining `codex-core` internals that used
`crate::token_data` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- update downstream callers in `codex-rs/chatgpt`,
`codex-rs/tui_app_server`, `codex-rs/app-server/tests/common`, and
`codex-rs/core/tests` to import `codex_login::token_data` directly
- add explicit `codex-login` workspace dependencies and refresh lock
metadata for crates that now depend on it directly
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt --locked`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Notes
- attempted `cargo test -p codex-core --locked` and `cargo test -p
codex-core auth_refresh --locked`, but both ran out of disk while
linking `codex-core` test binaries in the local environment
## Problem
Codex already treated an existing top-level project `./.codex` directory
as protected, but there was a gap on first creation.
If `./.codex` did not exist yet, a turn could create files under it,
such as `./.codex/config.toml`, without going through the same approval
path as later modifications. That meant the initial write could bypass
the intended protection for project-local Codex state.
## What this changes
This PR closes that first-creation gap in the Unix enforcement layers:
- `codex-protocol`
- treat the top-level project `./.codex` path as a protected carveout
even when it does not exist yet
- avoid injecting the default carveout when the user already has an
explicit rule for that exact path
- macOS Seatbelt
- deny writes to both the exact protected path and anything beneath it,
so creating `./.codex` itself is blocked in addition to writes inside it
- Linux bubblewrap
- preserve the same protected-path behavior for first-time creation
under `./.codex`
- tests
- add protocol regressions for missing `./.codex` and explicit-rule
collisions
- add Unix sandbox coverage for blocking first-time `./.codex` creation
- tighten Seatbelt policy assertions around excluded subpaths
## Scope
This change is intentionally scoped to protecting the top-level project
`.codex` subtree from agent writes.
It does not make `.codex` unreadable, and it does not change the product
behavior around loading project skills from `.codex` when project config
is untrusted.
## Why this shape
The fix is pointed rather than broad:
- it preserves the current model of “project `.codex` is protected from
writes”
- it closes the security-relevant first-write hole
- it avoids folding a larger permissions-model redesign into this PR
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing seatbelt`
- `cargo test -p codex-exec --test all
sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation -- --nocapture`
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Why
Skill metadata accepted a `permissions` block and stored the result on
`SkillMetadata`, but that data was never consumed by runtime behavior.
Leaving the dead parsing path in place makes it look like skills can
widen or otherwise influence execution permissions when, in practice,
declared skill permissions are ignored.
This change removes that misleading surface area so the skill metadata
model matches what the system actually uses.
## What changed
- removed `permission_profile` and `managed_network_override` from
`core-skills::SkillMetadata`
- stopped parsing `permissions` from skill metadata in
`core-skills/src/loader.rs`
- deleted the loader tests that only exercised the removed permissions
parsing path
- cleaned up dependent `SkillMetadata` constructors in tests and TUI
code that were only carrying `None` for those fields
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-core-skills`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui
submission_prefers_selected_duplicate_skill_path`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Summary
- resolve system bwrap from PATH instead of hardcoding /usr/bin/bwrap
- skip PATH entries that resolve inside the current workspace before
launching the sandbox helper
- keep the vendored bubblewrap fallback when no trusted system bwrap is
found
## Validation
- cargo test -p codex-core bwrap --lib
- cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
- cargo clean
