The `rust-ci.yml` build appears to be a bit flaky (we're looking into
it...), so to save TypeScript contributors some noise, restrict the
`rust-ci.yml` job so that it only runs on PRs that touch files in
`codex-rs/`.
## Description
When `saveConfig` is called, the project doc is incorrectly saved into
user instructions. This change ensures that only user instructions are
saved to `instructions.md` during saveConfig, preventing data
corruption.
close: #576
---------
Co-authored-by: Thibault Sottiaux <tibo@openai.com>
As described in detail in `codex-rs/execpolicy/README.md` introduced in
this PR, `execpolicy` is a tool that lets you define a set of _patterns_
used to match [`execv(3)`](https://linux.die.net/man/3/execv)
invocations. When a pattern is matched, `execpolicy` returns the parsed
version in a structured form that is amenable to static analysis.
The primary use case is to define patterns match commands that should be
auto-approved by a tool such as Codex. This supports a richer pattern
matching mechanism that the sort of prefix-matching we have done to
date, e.g.:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/5e40d9d2211737f46136610497bcd9a8271009e0/codex-cli/src/approvals.ts#L333-L354
Note we are still playing with the API and the `system_path` option in
particular still needs some work.
Solves #510
This PR changes the `/bug` command to print the URL into the terminal
(so it works in headless sessions) instead of trying to open a browser.
---------
Co-authored-by: Thibault Sottiaux <tibo@openai.com>
Up-to-date of #78Fixes#32
addressed requested changes @tibo-openai :) made sense to me
though, previous rationale with passing the state up was assuming there
could be a future need to have a shared state with all available models
being available to the parent
I suspect this is why some contributors kept accidentally including a
new `codex-cli/package-lock.json` in their PRs.
Note the `Dockerfile` still uses `npm` instead of `pnpm`, but that
appears to be fine. (Probably nicer to globally install as few things as
possible in the image.)
##### What/Why
This PR makes it so that in Linux we actually respect the different
types of `--sandbox` flag, such that users can apply network and
filesystem restrictions in combination (currently the only supported
behavior), or just pick one or the other.
We should add similar support for OSX in a future PR.
##### Testing
From Linux devbox, updated tests to use more specific flags:
```
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_ping ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_getent ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::test_root_read ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::test_dev_null_write ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_dev_tcp_redirection ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_ssh ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::test_writable_root ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_curl ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_wget ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::sandbox_blocks_nc ... ok
test linux::tests_linux::test_root_write - should panic ... ok
```
##### Todo
- [ ] Add negative tests (e.g. confirm you can hit the network if you
configure filesystem only restrictions)
This exploration came out of my review of
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/414.
`run_in_container.sh` runs Codex in a Docker container like so:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd1c3deed9f4f103e755baa3f3a45e7a1c1a134b/codex-cli/scripts/run_in_container.sh#L51-L58
But then runs `init_firewall.sh` to set up the firewall to restrict
network access.
Previously, we did this by adding `/usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh` to
the container and adding a special rule in `/etc/sudoers.d` so the
unprivileged user (`node`) could run the privileged `init_firewall.sh`
script to open up the firewall for `api.openai.com`:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/31d0d7a305305ad557035a2edcab60b6be5018d8/codex-cli/Dockerfile#L51-L56
Though I believe this is unnecessary, as we can use `docker exec --user
root` from _outside_ the container to run
`/usr/local/bin/init_firewall.sh` as `root` without adding a special
case in `/etc/sudoers.d`.
This appears to work as expected, as I tested it by doing the following:
```
./codex-cli/scripts/build_container.sh
./codex-cli/scripts/run_in_container.sh 'what is the output of `curl https://www.openai.com`'
```
This was a bit funny because in some of my runs, Codex wasn't convinced
it had network access, so I had to convince it to try the `curl`
request:
As you can see, when it ran `curl -s https\://www.openai.com`, it a
connection failure, so the network policy appears to be working as
intended.
Note this PR also removes `sudo` from the `apt-get install` list in the
`Dockerfile`.
As stated in `codex-rs/README.md`:
Today, Codex CLI is written in TypeScript and requires Node.js 22+ to
run it. For a number of users, this runtime requirement inhibits
adoption: they would be better served by a standalone executable. As
maintainers, we want Codex to run efficiently in a wide range of
environments with minimal overhead. We also want to take advantage of
operating system-specific APIs to provide better sandboxing, where
possible.
To that end, we are moving forward with a Rust implementation of Codex
CLI contained in this folder, which has the following benefits:
- The CLI compiles to small, standalone, platform-specific binaries.
- Can make direct, native calls to
[seccomp](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/seccomp.2.html) and
[landlock](https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/landlock.7.html) in
order to support sandboxing on Linux.
- No runtime garbage collection, resulting in lower memory consumption
and better, more predictable performance.
Currently, the Rust implementation is materially behind the TypeScript
implementation in functionality, so continue to use the TypeScript
implmentation for the time being. We will publish native executables via
GitHub Releases as soon as we feel the Rust version is usable.
Michael Bolin