- introduces `ClientResponse` as the symmetrical typed response union to
`ClientRequest` for app-server-protocol
- enables scalable event stream ingestion for use cases such as
analytics
- no runtime behavior changes, protocol/schema plumbing only
## Why
`codex-tools` already owns the shared tool input schema model and parser
from the first extraction step, but `core/src/tools/spec.rs` still owned
the MCP-specific adapter that normalizes `rmcp::model::Tool` schemas and
wraps `structuredContent` into the call result output schema.
Keeping that adapter in `codex-core` means the reusable MCP schema path
is still split across crates, and the unit tests for that logic stay
anchored in `codex-core` even though the runtime orchestration does not
need to move yet.
This change takes the next small step by moving the reusable MCP schema
adapter into `codex-tools` while leaving `ResponsesApiTool` assembly in
`codex-core`.
## What changed
- added `tools/src/mcp_tool.rs` and sibling
`tools/src/mcp_tool_tests.rs`
- introduced `ParsedMcpTool`, `parse_mcp_tool()`, and
`mcp_call_tool_result_output_schema()` in `codex-tools`
- updated `core/src/tools/spec.rs` to consume parsed MCP tool parts from
`codex-tools`
- removed the now-redundant MCP schema unit tests from
`core/src/tools/spec_tests.rs`
- expanded `codex-rs/tools/README.md` to describe this second migration
step
## Test plan
- `cargo test -p codex-tools`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::spec::`
## Summary
This PR makes Windows sandbox proxying enforceable by routing proxy-only
runs through the existing `offline` sandbox user and reserving direct
network access for the existing `online` sandbox user.
In brief:
- if a Windows sandbox run should be proxy-enforced, we run it as the
`offline` user
- the `offline` user gets firewall rules that block direct outbound
traffic and only permit the configured localhost proxy path
- if a Windows sandbox run should have true direct network access, we
run it as the `online` user
- no new sandbox identity is introduced
This brings Windows in line with the intended model: proxy use is not
just env-based, it is backed by OS-level egress controls. Windows
already has two sandbox identities:
- `offline`: intended to have no direct network egress
- `online`: intended to have full network access
This PR makes proxy-enforced runs use that model directly.
### Proxy-enforced runs
When proxy enforcement is active:
- the run is assigned to the `offline` identity
- setup extracts the loopback proxy ports from the sandbox env
- Windows setup programs firewall rules for the `offline` user that:
- block all non-loopback outbound traffic
- block loopback UDP
- block loopback TCP except for the configured proxy ports
- optionally allow broader localhost access when `allow_local_binding=1`
So the sandboxed process can only talk to the local proxy. It cannot
open direct outbound sockets or do local UDP-based DNS on its own.The
proxy then performs the real outbound network access outside that
restricted sandbox identity.
### Direct-network runs
When proxy enforcement is not active and full network access is allowed:
- the run is assigned to the `online` identity
- no proxy-only firewall restrictions are applied
- the process gets normal direct network access
### Unelevated vs elevated
The restricted-token / unelevated path cannot enforce per-identity
firewall policy by itself.
So for Windows proxy-enforced runs, we transparently use the logon-user
sandbox path under the hood, even if the caller started from the
unelevated mode. That keeps enforcement real instead of best-effort.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we
still want to grant dynamically. Keeping
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only
approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no
longer want to expose.
## What changed
- Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from
`codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated
schema/TypeScript artifacts.
- Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded
`MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt
construction.
- Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed
read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable
profile extension.
- Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and
deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules.
- Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly
empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was
actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active
permissions.
## Why
`parse_tool_input_schema` and the supporting `JsonSchema` model were
living in `core/src/tools/spec.rs`, but they already serve callers
outside `codex-core`.
Keeping that shared schema parsing logic inside `codex-core` makes the
crate boundary harder to reason about and works against the guidance in
`AGENTS.md` to avoid growing `codex-core` when reusable code can live
elsewhere.
This change takes the first extraction step by moving the schema parsing
primitive into its own crate while keeping the rest of the tool-spec
assembly in `codex-core`.
## What changed
- added a new `codex-tools` crate under `codex-rs/tools`
- moved the shared tool input schema model and sanitizer/parser into
`tools/src/json_schema.rs`
- kept `tools/src/lib.rs` exports-only, with the module-level unit tests
split into `json_schema_tests.rs`
- updated `codex-core` to use `codex-tools::JsonSchema` and re-export
`parse_tool_input_schema`
- updated `codex-app-server` dynamic tool validation to depend on
`codex-tools` directly instead of reaching through `codex-core`
- wired the new crate into the Cargo workspace and Bazel build graph
Replaced ci.bazelrc and v8-ci.bazelrc by custom configs inside the main
.bazelrc file. As a result, github workflows setup is simplified down to
a single '--config=<foo>' flag usage.
Moved the build metadata flags to config=ci.
Added custom tags metadata to help differentiate invocations based on
workflow (bazel vs v8) and os (linux/macos/windows).
Enabled users to override the default values in .bazelrc by using a
user.bazelrc file locally.
Added user.bazelrc to gitignore.
Michael Bolin