## What changed
- Add the `shellSnapshotV2` executor capability and an optional shell snapshot request to `ExecParams`.
- Capture and restore Unix shell state and profile exports from an in-memory, attachment-scoped cache for `bash`, `zsh`, and `sh`.
- Apply environment policies, runtime `PATH` entries, sandbox context, and live managed-proxy settings when preparing restored commands.
- Bound snapshot size, capture time, scope length, and cache capacity, and fall back to the original command when capture fails.
## Testing
- Cover local, remote, TTY, sandboxed, and supported-shell execution, plus environment filtering, proxy handling, in-memory reuse, and capture failure fallback.
GitOrigin-RevId: 624f747972c249c88c6f10f42cf0af97b75b5541
## What changed
- Add a best-effort `network/policyDecision` notification for final domain and non-domain policy decisions made by executor-local proxies.
- Validate notifications against the active process on the controller and emit audit events with controller-trusted session and execution metadata.
- Reserve outbound RPC capacity so audit notifications cannot block control messages, and expose valid `chatgpt-account-id` header values for audit attribution.
## Testing
- Cover notification serialization, proxy decision capture, executor-to-controller delivery, trusted metadata handling, and reserved RPC capacity.
GitOrigin-RevId: a39f96a6b3d9401c03d54eaef5b9a6d3fe0da78b
## Why
Managed networking implicitly selected the elevated Windows sandbox backend,
even when the sandbox was configured to use a restricted token.
## What changed
- Select the Windows sandbox backend solely from `WindowsSandboxLevel`.
- Reject managed networking with a restricted-token sandbox before spawning a
process, since managed networking requires the elevated backend.
- Cover the rejection through sandbox preparation, unified exec, and Windows
sandbox session tests.
GitOrigin-RevId: 308858652d7b629af623d22896dafde3a23d3758
## Why
Guardian review commands can run without the proxy-port environment used to
configure the parent session. Reconciling persistent Windows sandbox settings
for those commands can discard the parent's proxy configuration.
## What changed
- Add a session-level Windows sandbox proxy-settings mode and use `Preserve`
for guardian review sessions while keeping `Reconcile` as the default.
- Carry the mode through unified exec and the exec-server sandbox context to
Windows process launches.
- In preserve mode, reuse the proxy settings recorded by the existing sandbox
setup marker.
## Testing
Added coverage for guardian session configuration, exec-server transport, and
preserving an existing setup marker when proxy-port environment variables are
absent.
GitOrigin-RevId: 214655c6e6d97360906431773dc0de0fdda2db6e
## What changed
- Let `exec-server` issue JSON-RPC requests to its client and correlate responses, with bounded concurrency, timeouts, and connection cleanup.
- When `request_policy_decisions` is enabled, forward proxy policy requests with the process ID and network destination, then apply the client's allow, deny, or ask decision.
- Fail closed for invalid inputs, unavailable or malformed responses, timeouts, process shutdown, and disconnects. Keep callbacks active while inherited process streams keep the proxy alive.
## Testing
- Cover response correlation, request limits, timeouts, disconnect cleanup, validation boundaries, decision forwarding, and process lifecycle behavior.
GitOrigin-RevId: 60e658102c50036589ca9de844760a8bffaa53b0
## What changed
- Make the generated Linux proxy socket directory readable inside restricted
`bubblewrap` sandboxes so the proxy bridge can connect.
- Route `WS_PROXY` and `WSS_PROXY` through the Linux managed proxy bridge.
- Remove inherited proxy attribution tokens from unscoped executions while
continuing to replace them with the current token for scoped executions.
## Testing
- Exercise `WSS_PROXY` routing with a minimal filesystem policy.
- Cover attribution-token removal and replacement during environment setup.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2f14ddb26baab0147a786bc354d93eb5aad059f3
## Why
Elevated Windows sandboxes need stable managed-proxy ports while preserving the network policy and environment attribution of each sandboxed process.
## What changed
- Keep shared HTTP and SOCKS5 loopback ingress listeners alive across managed-proxy instances.
- Add a per-route restricting SID to elevated sandbox tokens and dispatch incoming connections to the matching proxy policy after attributing the client process.
- Reject connections without exactly one registered route, remove routes when their proxy handle is dropped, and keep unsandboxed Windows launches off the managed ingress.
- Provision the elevated sandbox with the configured proxy ports and local-binding setting, honoring the selected profile and CLI overrides.
## Testing
- Add Windows unit tests for TCP ownership attribution, route selection, restricting-token propagation, and setup settings.
- Add an end-to-end Windows test covering stable ports, isolated environment policies, HTTP and SOCKS5 routing, and route teardown.
GitOrigin-RevId: 783fac6e0f904dc9bb1955b75d4a5895e8bb9690
## Why
Sandbox wrappers replaced the process launch command and did not carry an
`ExecParams.arg0` override through to the inner process.
## What changed
- Route sandboxed Unix launches with a custom `arg0` through a helper mode that
re-execs the requested program with the override.
- Expose the helper executable to the filesystem sandbox and dispatch its mode
from Codex and exec-server test binaries.
## Testing
Add coverage for the prepared sandbox command and an end-to-end remote process
that verifies both the custom `arg0` and filesystem restrictions.
GitOrigin-RevId: c9f8eef3906d184e670184c2eeed250d5895a9ca
## Why
Sandboxed process launch through the exec server was unsupported on Windows.
## What changed
- Add a shared native process launcher that selects the Windows sandbox session backend when required and otherwise launches PTY or pipe-based processes.
- Pass Windows permission, workspace-root, proxy, filesystem-override, and desktop settings through exec-server process preparation.
- Preserve piped stdin and inherited file descriptors across the shared launch path.
## Testing
- Verify that a remote Windows sandbox process accepts stdin while blocking a write under a read-only policy.
- Enable workspace-root sandbox tests on native Windows while continuing to skip environments that cannot emulate Windows sandbox semantics.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6719ccbe87ad0d5a57af56503e3f23f894c60a71
## Why
Remote executions need managed-network proxy listeners in the executor so their
loopback proxy addresses are reachable by the launched process.
## What changed
- Add a capability-gated exec-server protocol field for executor-local proxy
launch configuration, including network policy, audit metadata, and execution
attribution.
- Start the proxy while preparing a remote process, replace inherited proxy
environment variables with its local addresses, and derive the sandbox
context from its listeners.
- Keep the proxy alive until inherited output streams close, then shut it down.
- Reject unsupported remote settings such as MITM and credential injection.
## Testing
- Cover configuration round trips and rejection of unsupported settings.
- Verify executor-local startup, blocked-domain enforcement, protocol
compatibility, and proxy lifetime through process closure.
GitOrigin-RevId: c984f54e3e600aa9ebcbf8cf4574046e2c199d11
## Why
Managed network configures commands to use local HTTP and SOCKS proxies.
For commands delegated to the exec server, the proxy environment and the
sandbox policy were prepared separately. On macOS, that meant a command
could receive `HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123` while Seatbelt still
denied access to port `43123`.
## What changed
`NetworkProxy` now prepares the command environment and sandbox context
together from the same runtime snapshot:
```text
Prepared managed network
├── command environment: HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123
└── sandbox context: allow outbound to 127.0.0.1:43123
```
That context travels with remote exec requests. The exec server
preserves the managed proxy and CA environment, and macOS Seatbelt
allows only the prepared loopback proxy ports without enabling broad
network access or local binding.
The protocol field is optional and the existing enforcement flag remains
in place, preserving compatibility with callers that do not send the new
context.
## Why
PR #29108 lets the orchestrator send sandbox intent with `process/start`
without wrapping the command for its own operating system.
This PR completes that boundary by making the executor interpret and
enforce the intent using its own filesystem paths and sandbox
implementation.
For example, a macOS TUI targeting a Linux devbox sends `/bin/bash -lc
pwd`. The Linux executor turns that into its own `codex-linux-sandbox
... /bin/bash -lc pwd` launch.
## What changes
- Keep `process/start` unchanged when no sandbox intent is present.
- Convert sandbox `PathUri` values into native paths on the executor.
- Bind symbolic `:workspace_roots` permissions to the executor's native
sandbox cwd.
- Select the sandbox implementation on the executor and wrap the
original command immediately before spawning it.
- Reject sandbox-required execution before spawning when the executor
cannot enforce the intent.
- Pass exec-server runtime paths into process creation so Linux can
locate `codex-linux-sandbox`.
The boundary is therefore:
```text
orchestrator executor
original argv + sandbox intent -> select and enforce local sandbox
```
This PR intentionally treats a denied remote command as an ordinary
command failure. Draft follow-up #29424 carries a semantic
`sandboxDenied` result back to unified exec for the existing approval
and retry flow.
## Platform scope
Linux and macOS use their existing direct-spawn sandbox transforms.
Windows sandboxed remote process launch is intentionally unsupported in
this PR. The current Windows direct-spawn wrapper does not correctly
preserve arbitrary argv, TTY behavior, or pass the full child
environment out of band. The executor rejects the request instead of
running it incorrectly or unsandboxed.
## Known follow-ups
- The transported permission profile can still contain
orchestrator-materialized helper or explicit paths. A `TODO(jif)` marks
where the executor boundary should receive pre-host-materialization
permission intent.
- The sandbox wrapper currently replaces a requested custom inner
`arg0`. A `TODO(jif)` marks where this must be preserved or rejected
explicitly.
- Draft PR #29424 contains the deferred sandbox-denial classification
and approval/retry behavior.
## Rollout assumption
This executor-sandbox stack is unreleased and its client and executor
are expected to move together. This PR does not add mixed-version
negotiation with older exec servers.
