Honor the configured Windows sandbox level for managed networking (#37875)

## Why

Managed networking implicitly selected the elevated Windows sandbox backend,
even when the sandbox was configured to use a restricted token.

## What changed

- Select the Windows sandbox backend solely from `WindowsSandboxLevel`.
- Reject managed networking with a restricted-token sandbox before spawning a
  process, since managed networking requires the elevated backend.
- Cover the rejection through sandbox preparation, unified exec, and Windows
  sandbox session tests.

GitOrigin-RevId: 308858652d7b629af623d22896dafde3a23d3758
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai
2026-08-10 19:57:40 +00:00
committed by copyberry
parent 46f5d6eba9
commit a603d7ca5c
9 changed files with 134 additions and 56 deletions
+3 -5
View File
@@ -406,10 +406,8 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
)
})
.map_err(CodexErr::from)?;
let use_windows_elevated_backend = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
exec_req.windows_sandbox_level,
exec_req.network.is_some(),
);
let use_windows_elevated_backend =
windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(exec_req.windows_sandbox_level);
exec_req.windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides = if use_windows_elevated_backend {
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
exec_req.sandbox,
@@ -665,7 +663,7 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
let command_path = command.first().cloned();
let sandbox_level = windows_sandbox_level;
let proxy_enforced = network.is_some();
let use_elevated = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(sandbox_level, proxy_enforced);
let use_elevated = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(sandbox_level);
let additional_deny_write_paths = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
.map(|overrides| overrides.additional_deny_write_paths.clone())
.unwrap_or_default();
+3 -9
View File
@@ -398,18 +398,12 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_read_only_profiles() {
}
#[test]
fn windows_proxy_enforcement_uses_elevated_backend() {
fn windows_sandbox_backend_honors_unelevated_configuration() {
assert!(!windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
/*proxy_enforced*/ false,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken
));
assert!(windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
/*proxy_enforced*/ true,
));
assert!(windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated,
/*proxy_enforced*/ false,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated
));
}
+39
View File
@@ -1028,6 +1028,43 @@ async fn unified_exec_short_lived_network_denial_emits_failed_end_event() -> Res
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(windows)]
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn unified_exec_rejects_unelevated_windows_sandbox_with_managed_network() -> Result<()> {
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let (test, permission_profile) = unified_exec_network_denial_test(&server).await?;
let call_id = "uexec-unelevated-managed-network";
let args = json!({
"cmd": "echo should not run",
"yield_time_ms": 1_000,
});
let responses = mount_unified_exec_network_denial_responses(&server, call_id, &args).await?;
submit_unified_exec_turn(
&test,
"run an unelevated managed-network command",
permission_profile,
)
.await?;
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
let output_item = responses
.last_request()
.expect("model should receive the rejected tool call output")
.function_call_output(call_id);
let output = extract_output_text(&output_item)
.expect("rejected tool call should include model-visible text");
assert!(
output.contains("managed networking requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend"),
"unexpected output: {output}"
);
Ok(())
}
async fn unified_exec_network_denial_test(
server: &wiremock::MockServer,
) -> Result<(TestCodex, PermissionProfile)> {
@@ -1070,6 +1107,8 @@ allow_local_binding = true
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(permission_profile_for_config)
.expect("set permission profile");
#[cfg(windows)]
config.set_windows_sandbox_enabled(/*value*/ true);
});
let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(server).await?;
assert!(
+2 -4
View File
@@ -248,10 +248,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn prepare_exec_request(
let windows_sandbox = if sandbox == SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken {
request.arg0 = params.arg0.clone();
let proxy_enforced = params.enforce_managed_network;
let use_elevated = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
proxy_enforced,
);
let use_elevated =
windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level);
let filesystem_overrides = if use_elevated {
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
sandbox,
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ use codex_sandboxing::landlock::CODEX_LINUX_SANDBOX_ARG0;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[cfg(windows)]
use test_case::test_case;
use tokio::io::AsyncReadExt;
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
use tokio::time::timeout;
@@ -379,8 +381,10 @@ async fn disabled_remote_proxy_config_is_rejected_before_exporting_ports() {
}
#[cfg(windows)]
#[test_case(WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken ; "unelevated is rejected")]
#[test_case(WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated ; "elevated is accepted")]
#[tokio::test]
async fn managed_network_selects_elevated_windows_spawn() {
async fn managed_network_honors_windows_sandbox_level(windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel) {
let cwd: AbsolutePathBuf = std::env::current_dir()
.expect("current directory")
.try_into()
@@ -393,7 +397,7 @@ async fn managed_network_selects_elevated_windows_spawn() {
permissions.clone(),
cwd_uri.clone(),
);
sandbox.windows_sandbox_level = WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken;
sandbox.windows_sandbox_level = windows_sandbox_level;
sandbox.windows_sandbox_proxy_settings_mode =
Some(codex_sandboxing::WindowsSandboxProxySettingsMode::Preserve);
let proxy_config = RemoteNetworkProxyConfig::from_effective_config(&NetworkProxyConfig {
@@ -417,32 +421,34 @@ async fn managed_network_selects_elevated_windows_spawn() {
network_proxy: Some(RemoteNetworkProxyLaunchConfig::new(proxy_config)),
};
let mut prepared = prepare_exec_request(
let prepared = prepare_exec_request(
&params,
HashMap::new(),
Some(&runtime_paths),
/*network_policy_decider*/ None,
)
.await
.expect("prepare sandboxed request");
{
let spawn = prepared
.windows_sandbox_spawn_request()
.expect("Windows sandbox spawn request");
.await;
assert_eq!(
spawn.windows_sandbox_level,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken
if windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken {
let error = prepared
.err()
.expect("managed networking must reject an unelevated Windows sandbox");
assert_eq!(error.code, -32602);
assert!(
error
.message
.contains("managed networking requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend")
);
assert!(spawn.proxy_enforced);
assert!(spawn.network_proxy_restricting_sid.is_some());
assert_eq!(
spawn.proxy_settings_mode,
codex_sandboxing::WindowsSandboxProxySettingsMode::Preserve
);
assert_eq!(spawn.permission_profile, &permissions);
assert_eq!(spawn.workspace_roots, std::slice::from_ref(&cwd));
return;
}
let mut prepared = prepared.expect("managed networking accepts an elevated Windows sandbox");
let spawn = prepared
.windows_sandbox_spawn_request()
.expect("Windows sandbox spawn request");
assert_eq!(spawn.windows_sandbox_level, WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated);
assert!(spawn.proxy_enforced);
assert!(spawn.network_proxy_restricting_sid.is_some());
prepared
.network_proxy_handle
.take()
+15 -7
View File
@@ -404,11 +404,20 @@ impl SandboxManager {
)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (
os_argv_to_strings(argv),
None,
Some(pending_sandboxed_request?),
),
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => {
if enforce_managed_network && windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated
{
return Err(SandboxTransformError::WindowsSandboxPreparation(
"managed networking requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend"
.to_string(),
));
}
(
os_argv_to_strings(argv),
None,
Some(pending_sandboxed_request?),
)
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (
os_argv_to_strings(argv),
@@ -524,8 +533,7 @@ fn wrap_windows_sandbox_exec_request_for_direct_spawn(
})
})
.transpose()?;
let use_elevated =
windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(request.windows_sandbox_level, proxy_enforced);
let use_elevated = windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(request.windows_sandbox_level);
let overrides = if use_elevated {
resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
request.sandbox,
+2 -8
View File
@@ -29,14 +29,8 @@ pub struct WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
pub additional_deny_write_paths: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
}
pub fn windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(
sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
proxy_enforced: bool,
) -> bool {
// Windows firewall enforcement is tied to the logon-user sandbox identities, so
// proxy-enforced sessions must use that backend even when the configured mode is
// the default restricted-token sandbox.
proxy_enforced || matches!(sandbox_level, WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated)
pub fn windows_sandbox_uses_elevated_backend(sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel) -> bool {
matches!(sandbox_level, WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated)
}
pub fn permission_profile_supports_windows_restricted_token_sandbox(
@@ -48,9 +48,7 @@ pub struct WindowsSandboxSessionRequest<'a> {
pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_for_level(
request: WindowsSandboxSessionRequest<'_>,
) -> Result<SpawnedProcess> {
if request.proxy_enforced
|| matches!(request.windows_sandbox_level, WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated)
{
if matches!(request.windows_sandbox_level, WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated) {
backends::elevated::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated_for_permission_profile(
request.permission_profile,
request.workspace_roots,
@@ -73,6 +71,9 @@ pub async fn spawn_windows_sandbox_session_for_level(
)
.await
} else {
if request.proxy_enforced {
bail!("managed networking requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend");
}
if request.network_proxy_restricting_sid.is_some() {
bail!("network proxy restricting SID requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend");
}
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
#![cfg(target_os = "windows")]
use super::WindowsSandboxSessionRequest;
use super::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_elevated_for_permission_profile;
use super::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_for_level;
use super::spawn_windows_sandbox_session_legacy;
use crate::WindowsSandboxCancellationToken;
use crate::ipc_framed::Message;
@@ -9,6 +11,7 @@ use crate::ipc_framed::read_frame;
use crate::run_windows_sandbox_capture;
use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_pty::ProcessDriver;
@@ -221,6 +224,43 @@ async fn collect_stdout_and_exit(
(stdout, exit_code)
}
#[test]
fn restricted_token_rejects_managed_network_before_spawn() {
current_thread_runtime().block_on(async {
let cwd = sandbox_cwd();
let codex_home = sandbox_home("restricted-token-managed-network");
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write();
let error = spawn_windows_sandbox_session_for_level(WindowsSandboxSessionRequest {
permission_profile: &permission_profile,
workspace_roots: &[],
codex_home: codex_home.path(),
command: Vec::new(),
cwd: cwd.as_path(),
env_map: HashMap::new(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
proxy_enforced: true,
network_proxy_restricting_sid: None,
proxy_settings_mode: crate::WindowsSandboxProxySettingsMode::Preserve,
timeout_ms: None,
read_roots_override: None,
read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
write_roots_override: None,
deny_read_paths_override: &[],
deny_write_paths_override: &[],
tty: false,
stdin_open: false,
use_private_desktop: false,
})
.await
.expect_err("managed networking must fail before spawning an unelevated sandbox");
assert_eq!(
error.to_string(),
"managed networking requires the elevated Windows sandbox backend"
);
});
}
#[test]
fn legacy_non_tty_cmd_emits_output() {
let _guard = legacy_process_test_guard();