## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18240 uses named MITM permissions config.
2. This PR wires managed MITM CA trust into spawned child processes.
## Why
When Codex terminates HTTPS for limited mode or MITM hooks, child HTTPS
clients need to trust Codex's managed MITM CA. Exporting proxy URLs
alone is not enough, but blindly replacing user CA settings would be
wrong: it can break custom enterprise/test roots, leak unreadable CA
files into generated bundles, or make the child env disagree with its
sandbox policy.
## Summary
1. Build immutable managed CA bundles under `$CODEX_HOME/proxy` that
include native roots, the managed MITM CA, and only inherited or
command-scoped CA bundles the child is allowed to read.
2. Export curated CA env vars alongside managed proxy env vars while
preserving user CA override semantics, including nested Codex
`SSL_CERT_FILE` precedence.
3. Thread generated CA bundle paths into child sandbox readable roots,
including debug sandbox execution, so the exported env vars work inside
sandboxed commands.
4. Remove only Codex-generated MITM CA bundle env when a child
intentionally drops managed proxying for escalation or no-proxy retry.
5. Document the managed CA bundle behavior and cover env injection,
per-child bundle generation, sandbox readable roots, and no-proxy
cleanup in tests.
## Validation
1. Ran `just test -p codex-network-proxy`.
2. Ran `just test -p codex-protocol`.
3. Ran `just fix -p codex-network-proxy -p codex-protocol`.
4. Tried focused `codex-core` validation, but the crate currently fails
to compile in `core/tests/suite/guardian_review.rs` because an existing
`Op::UserInput` initializer is missing `additional_context`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Eva Wong <evawong@openai.com>
## Summary
- set `NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY=1` when Codex applies managed network proxy
environment overrides
- keep the Node opt-in in the proxy environment key set used by
shell/runtime env handling
- cover the new env var in the focused network proxy env test
## Why
Codex already sets HTTP proxy environment variables for child processes
when the managed network proxy is active. Node's built-in network
behavior needs the `NODE_USE_ENV_PROXY` opt-in to honor those env vars,
so Node-based skill scripts can otherwise skip the managed proxy path
and fail under restricted network access.
## Validation
- `just fmt` in `codex-rs`
- `cargo test -p codex-network-proxy` in `codex-rs`
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Parent PR: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy request path.
3. This PR changes the user facing PermissionProfile TOML shape.
## Why
1. The broader goal is to make MITM clamping usable from the same
permission profile that already controls network behavior.
2. This PR is the config UX layer for the stack. It moves MITM policy
into `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` instead of exposing the flat
runtime shape to users.
3. The named hook and action tables belong here because users need
reusable policy blocks that are easy to review, while the proxy runtime
only needs a flat hook list.
4. This PR validates action refs during config parsing so mistakes in
the user facing policy fail before a proxy session starts.
5. Keeping the lowering here lets the proxy keep its simpler runtime
model and lets PermissionProfile remain the single source of network
permission policy.
## Summary
1. Keep MITM policy inside `[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm]` so the
selected PermissionProfile owns network proxy policy.
2. Use named MITM hooks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.hooks.<name>]`.
3. Put host, methods, path prefixes, query, headers, body, and action
refs on the hook table.
4. Define reusable action blocks under
`[permissions.<profile>.network.mitm.actions.<name>]`.
5. Represent action blocks with `NetworkMitmActionToml`, then lower them
into the proxy runtime action config.
6. Reject unknown refs, empty refs, and empty action blocks during
config parsing.
7. Keep the runtime hook model unchanged by lowering config into the
existing proxy hook list.
8. Preserve the #20659 activation fix for nested MITM policy.
## Example
```toml
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm]
enabled = true
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.hooks.github_write]
host = "api.github.com"
methods = ["POST", "PUT"]
path_prefixes = ["/repos/openai/"]
action = ["strip_auth"]
[permissions.workspace.network.mitm.actions.strip_auth]
strip_request_headers = ["authorization"]
```
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the core MITM config parsing and validation tests.
3. Ran the core PermissionProfile MITM proxy activation tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
7. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
---------
Co-authored-by: Winston Howes <winston@openai.com>
## Stack
1. Parent PR: #18868 adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. This PR wires runtime enforcement.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. After the hook model exists, the proxy needs a separate behavior
change that can be tested at the request path.
2. This PR makes hooked HTTPS hosts require MITM, evaluates inner
requests after CONNECT, mutates headers for matching hooks, and blocks
hooked hosts when no hook matches.
3. It also fixes the activation path so a permission profile with MITM
hook policy starts the managed proxy.
4. Keeping this separate from #18868 lets reviewers focus on runtime
effects, telemetry, and request mutation.
## Summary
1. Store compiled MITM hooks in network proxy state.
2. Require MITM for hooked hosts even when network mode is full.
3. Evaluate inner HTTPS requests against host specific hooks.
4. Apply hook actions by replacing request headers before forwarding.
5. Block hooked hosts when no hook matches and record block telemetry.
6. Treat profile MITM hook policy as managed proxy policy so the proxy
starts when needed.
7. Keep the duplicate authorization header replacement and query
preserving request rebuild in this runtime PR.
8. Add runtime tests and README guidance for hook enforcement.
## Validation
1. Ran the network proxy MITM policy tests.
2. Ran the hooked host CONNECT test.
3. Ran the authorization header replacement test.
4. Ran the core permission profile proxy activation test for MITM hooks.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Stack
1. This PR adds MITM hook config and model only.
2. Runtime follow up: #20659 wires hook enforcement into the proxy
request path.
3. User facing config follow up: #18240 moves MITM policy into the
PermissionProfile network tree.
## Why
1. Viyat asked for the original parent PR to be split so reviewers can
inspect the policy model before request behavior changes.
2. This PR gives the proxy a typed MITM hook model, validation, matcher
compilation, permissions TOML plumbing, schema support, and config
tests.
3. This PR deliberately does not change CONNECT or MITM request
handling.
4. Keeping runtime behavior out of this PR makes the review boundary
simple: does the policy model parse, validate, compile, and lower
correctly.
## Summary
1. Add the MITM hook config model and matcher compilation.
2. Validate hosts, methods, paths, query matchers, header matchers,
secret sources, and reserved body matching.
3. Add wildcard matcher support for path, query value, and header value
matching.
4. Add permissions TOML and schema support for flat runtime hook config.
5. Add config loader tests for MITM hook overlay behavior.
## Validation
1. Regenerated the config schema.
2. Ran the network proxy MITM hook unit tests.
3. Ran the core permission profile MITM hook parsing tests.
4. Ran the core config schema fixture test.
5. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the network proxy crate.
6. Ran the scoped Clippy fixer for the core crate.
## Notes
1. Runtime enforcement moved to #20659.
2. User facing PermissionProfile TOML shape remains in #18240.
