## Why
Remote-control clients need to list and revoke controller-device grants
without enabling or enrolling the local relay. These are signed-in
account-management operations, so coupling them to websocket, pairing,
enrollment, or persisted relay state would prevent clients from managing
stale grants from the picker.
Related enhancement request: N/A. This adds the Codex app-server surface
for the planned upstream environment-scoped revoke endpoint.
## What Changed
- Added experimental app-server v2 RPCs:
- `remoteControl/client/list`
- `remoteControl/client/revoke`
- Added picker-oriented protocol types and standard generated schema
fixtures. The list response intentionally omits backend account id,
enrollment status, and location fields.
- Added `app-server-transport/src/transport/remote_control/clients.rs`
for environment-scoped GET and DELETE requests. It builds escaped URL
path segments, forwards optional pagination query fields, sends ChatGPT
auth plus `chatgpt-account-id`, converts RFC3339 `last_seen_at` values
to Unix seconds, accepts `204 No Content` revoke responses, and retries
once after a `401`.
- Extracted shared ChatGPT auth loading and recovery into
`app-server-transport/src/transport/remote_control/auth.rs` so
websocket, pairing, and client management use the same account-auth
boundary.
- Retained the configured remote-control base URL on
`RemoteControlHandle` and resolve management URLs lazily, preserving
deferred validation while relay startup is disabled.
- Registered list as `global_shared_read("remote-control-clients")` and
revoke as `global("remote-control-clients")`.
## Verification
- Added transport coverage proving list and revoke work while relay
state is disabled, IDs are escaped, picker-only fields are returned,
timestamps are converted, revoke accepts `204`, auth headers are
forwarded, `401` retries exactly once, `403` is not retried, and
malformed list payloads retain decode context.
- Added an app-server integration test proving both JSON-RPC methods
work before relay enablement and successful revoke returns `{}`.
- Regenerated and validated experimental and standard app-server schema
fixtures.
## Summary
Allow EDU ChatGPT workspaces to fetch cloud config bundles. The existing
cloud config eligibility gate only allowed business-like and enterprise
plans, which meant EDU admins could configure managed policies in the UI
but the Codex client would skip fetching them.
This keeps individual/pro and team-like usage-based plans excluded, and
adds service-level coverage for both `edu` and `education` plan aliases.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `just test -p codex-cloud-config`
- Built the Codex app locally, created a new EDU ChatGPT workspace, and
verified config bundles can be fetched and are properly applied.
## Disclaimer
Do not use for now
## Why
Extensions can already contribute prompt fragments and request same-turn
item injection, but there was no host-owned hook for contributing
structured `ResponseItem`s while Codex is assembling a new turn's
initial model input. This change adds that seam so extensions can attach
turn-local input that depends on the submitted user input and resolved
turn environments without routing through prompt text or late injection.
## What changed
- add `TurnInputContributor` to `codex_extension_api` and export the new
`TurnInputContext` / `TurnInputEnvironment` types it receives
- teach `ExtensionRegistry` to register and expose turn-input
contributors alongside the existing extension hooks
- call registered turn-input contributors from
`core/src/session/turn.rs` while building the initial injected input for
a turn, then append their returned `ResponseItem`s after the skill and
plugin injections
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is becoming the default way to represent Codex
permissions, but the implicit default behavior should stay the same for
now:
- trusted projects use `:workspace`
- untrusted projects also use `:workspace`
- roots without a trust decision use `:read-only`
- unsandboxed Windows falls back to `:read-only`
This keeps the existing sandbox semantics while making silent config
defaults observable as built-in permission profiles instead of treating
the legacy `SandboxPolicy` projection as the primary shape.
## What Changed
- Refactored legacy sandbox derivation to resolve the configured sandbox
mode once, then apply the implicit project fallback only when no sandbox
mode was configured.
- Preserved the existing trust-decision fallback: trusted and untrusted
projects default to workspace-write where supported.
- Added empty-config coverage asserting that an untrusted project
resolves to the built-in active permission profile (`:workspace` outside
unsandboxed Windows).
## Verification
- `just fmt`
- `just test -p codex-core 'config::'`
- `just test -p codex-config`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/25926).
* __->__ #25926
## Disclaimer
This is only here for iteration purpose! Do not make any code rely on
this
## Why
Skills still live behind `codex-core` discovery and injection paths, but
the extension system needs an authority-aware home before that logic can
move. This adds that boundary without changing current skills behavior,
and keeps host, executor, and remote skills distinct so future
list/read/search flows do not collapse back to ambient local paths.
## What changed
- Add the `codex-skills-extension` workspace/Bazel crate under
`ext/skills`.
- Define the initial catalog, authority, provider, and turn-state types
for authority-bound skill packages and resources.
- Register placeholder thread/config/prompt/turn lifecycle contributors
plus host, executor, and remote provider aggregation points.
- Capture the remaining extraction work as TODOs, including the missing
extension API hooks needed for per-turn catalog construction and typed
skill injection.
- Keep plugins outside the runtime skills model: plugin-installed skills
are treated as materialized host-owned skill sources once available.
## Verification
- Not run locally.
## Summary
- stop publishing Python runtime wheels as a side effect of Rust
releases
- publish runtime wheels from the Python SDK release workflow, either
explicitly before updating the SDK pin or immediately before a
`python-v*` SDK release
- resolve the runtime release from the requested version or the SDK
package's exact `openai-codex-cli-bin` pin
- build two musllinux-tagged wheels from the Rust-release Linux package
archives alongside the six existing runtime wheels
- validate SDK beta tags before any PyPI write
## Release configuration
- update the `openai-codex-cli-bin` PyPI trusted publisher to trust
`.github/workflows/python-sdk-release.yml` and the
`publish-python-runtime` job
## Pin update flow
- run the `python-sdk-release` workflow manually with the new runtime
version before opening or updating the SDK pin PR
- after the pin lands, a `python-v*` SDK tag republishes with
`skip-existing: true` before publishing the SDK package
## Validation
- ran `just fmt`
- validated the edited workflow YAML
- validated the embedded `publish-python-runtime` Bash with `bash -n`
- validated manual `0.136.0 -> rust-v0.136.0` mapping
- validated tag-driven `python-v0.1.0b3 -> 0.132.0 -> rust-v0.132.0`
mapping
- validated rejection of an invalid SDK tag before publication
- confirmed `rust-v0.136.0` contains the two required Linux package
archives
- CI will provide the full test signal
## Why
Standalone image generation remained top-level-only in code-mode
sessions.
## What changed
- Change imagegen exposure from `DirectModelOnly` to `Direct`.
- Keep direct-mode access while enabling nested code-mode access.
- Add a focused regression test for the exposure contract.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-image-generation-extension`
## Why
`profile_sandbox_mode` was left over from the old selected legacy
profile path. Production now always derives permissions without that
value, and legacy profile contents are ignored, so keeping a parameter
that is always `None` makes `derive_permission_profile` look like it
still supports a fallback that no longer exists.
## What Changed
- Removed the `profile_sandbox_mode` argument from
`ConfigToml::derive_permission_profile`.
- Updated the production caller and legacy sandbox-policy test helper to
match.
- Dropped the stale unselected legacy-profile sandbox test that only
protected the removed fallback shape.
## Verification
- `just test -p codex-config`
- `just test -p codex-core 'config::'`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/25943).
* #25926
* __->__ #25943
## Stack
1. #25850 - Key request-permission grants by environment: stores and
applies sticky permission grants per environment id.
2. #25858 - Add `environmentId` to `request_permissions`: lets the model
target a selected environment and resolves relative permission paths
against it.
3. #25862 - Propagate permission approval environment id: carries the
selected environment id through approval events, app-server requests,
TUI prompts, and delegate forwarding.
4. This PR (#25867) - Add remote request permissions integration
coverage: verifies the selected remote environment across request,
approval, grant reuse, and exec.
This PR is stacked on #25862 and should be reviewed after #25850,
#25858, and #25862.
## Why
The environment-scoped permission stack needs one end-to-end check that
exercises the CCA-shaped path, not only unit-level parsing. This
verifies that a model-sent `environmentId` on `request_permissions`
reaches the approval event, stores the grant under the selected
environment, and is reused by a later tool call in that same
environment.
## What Changed
- Adds a remote executor integration test for `request_permissions` with
`environmentId: remote` and a relative write root.
- Asserts the permission event reports the remote environment and cwd,
and that the normalized grant resolves under the remote cwd.
- Approves the grant, then runs a remote `exec_command` without explicit
per-call permissions and verifies it completes without another exec
approval and writes only in the remote filesystem.
## Verification
- Not run locally per instruction.
- `git diff --check`
## Why
`code_mode_only` moved ordinary runtime tools behind `exec`, but it also
hid hosted Responses tools. Hosted `web_search` and `image_generation`
do not have a nested `exec` runtime path, so code-only sessions lost
those capabilities entirely even when their existing provider, auth,
model, and configuration gates passed.
## What changed
- Keep hosted Responses tools top-level in `code_mode_only` sessions
after their existing gates pass.
- Preserve the existing nested-tool behavior for ordinary runtimes and
the direct-only behavior for multi-agent v2 tools.
- Add planner coverage for `code_mode_only` with default multi-agent v2
settings, hosted live web search, and hosted image generation.
## Verification
- Added focused regression coverage in
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/spec_plan_tests.rs`.
- Left execution to CI per repository workflow.
## Summary
- Splits the monolithic `codex-cloud-config` implementation into focused
modules.
- Keeps behavior unchanged from the preceding config bundle runtime
switch.
## Details
This is the reviewability follow-up after the lineage-preserving
migration PRs. The split separates backend transport, loader
construction, cache handling, metrics, validation, service
orchestration, and focused tests into named files.
Verification: `just fmt`; `just test -p codex-cloud-config`.
## Why
Guardian review turns already submit a read-only `PermissionProfile`,
which is the permissions model the runtime should honor. Passing the
equivalent legacy `SandboxPolicy` through `ThreadSettingsOverrides`
keeps two representations of the same read-only constraint alive on this
path and makes the guardian flow depend on compatibility plumbing that
is being phased out.
## What Changed
- Set `sandbox_policy` to `None` when the guardian review session
submits its child `Op::UserInput`.
- Keep `permission_profile: Some(PermissionProfile::read_only())` and
`approval_policy: Some(AskForApproval::Never)`, so the guardian review
remains read-only and cannot request approvals.
- Remove the now-unused `SandboxPolicy` import and redundant comment
from `codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs`.
## Verification
Not run locally; this is a narrow cleanup of redundant thread-settings
override state.
## Summary
- update the app-server image generation integration test to use
`TestAppServer`
- completes the test helper rename from #25701 for this newer test file
## Validation
- `cargo fmt -- --config imports_granularity=Item`
- `cargo check -p codex-app-server --test all`
Note: `just fmt` ran Rust formatting but failed on Python/SDK formatting
because the sandbox could not access the local `uv` cache.
## Summary
- Adapts the moved `codex-cloud-config` crate from the legacy cloud
requirements endpoint to the new config bundle endpoint.
- Switches runtime consumers from `CloudRequirementsLoader` to
`CloudConfigBundleLoader` so one shared bundle supplies cloud-delivered
config and requirements.
- Removes the legacy cloud requirements domain loader path.
## Details
This intentionally keeps `codex-cloud-config` monolithic for review
lineage: the previous PR establishes the crate move, and this PR shows
the behavior change against that moved implementation. A follow-up PR
splits the module back into focused files.
The new bundle path preserves the important cloud requirements loader
semantics where intended: account-scoped signed cache, 30 minute TTL, 5
minute refresh cadence, retry/backoff, auth recovery, and fail-closed
startup loading. The cached payload changes from a single requirements
TOML string to the backend-delivered bundle, and validation rejects
malformed config or requirements fragments before cache write/use.
