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dev/kyleb/plugin-script-command-resolver
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
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d1aaf789ad |
[login] revoke existing auth before starting login (#27674)
## Why
`codex login` previously persisted newly issued OAuth credentials and
only then attempted to revoke the superseded refresh token. The old
credential must be revoked before a replacement browser or device-code
flow starts, and successful login must not perform any post-login
revocation attempt.
## What changed
- Revoke and clear existing stored auth before browser or device-code
CLI login begins.
- Remove superseded-token detection and revocation from the shared token
persistence path; successful login now only saves the new credentials.
- Read the raw configured auth store during CLI cleanup so
environment-provided auth cannot mask the stored refresh token.
- Preserve `auto` storage fallback semantics when keyring deletion fails
by clearing the fallback auth file.
- Add a process-level CLI regression test that requires the revoke
request to precede every device-login request and occur exactly once.
If replacement login is canceled or fails, the previous local
credentials have already been cleared. Remote revocation remains best
effort, matching explicit logout behavior.
## Validation
### Process-level before/after reproduction
I compiled the real `codex` CLI from the pre-fix parent (`14df0e8833`)
and from the PR implementation (`25c002f23b`; the login behavior is
unchanged at the current head), then ran the same device-code flow
against a local HTTP mock OAuth authority.
Each run:
1. Used a fresh temporary `CODEX_HOME` configured with
`cli_auth_credentials_store = "file"`.
2. Seeded that temporary home with managed ChatGPT auth containing
`old-access` and `old-refresh` tokens.
3. Pointed `CODEX_REVOKE_TOKEN_URL_OVERRIDE` at the mock `/oauth/revoke`
endpoint.
4. Ran the compiled CLI as:
```shell
CODEX_HOME=<temporary-home> \
CODEX_REVOKE_TOKEN_URL_OVERRIDE=<mock-issuer>/oauth/revoke \
<compiled-codex> login --device-auth --experimental_issuer <mock-issuer>
```
5. Recorded every request received by the mock authority. The mock
marked `new-access` valid when `/oauth/token` issued it and invalidated
it if `/oauth/revoke` arrived afterward, reproducing the observed
session-invalidating failure mode. After login exited, the harness also
verified the persisted refresh token and probed a protected endpoint
with `new-access`.
| Build | Observed request order | CLI/persistence result | `new-access`
probe |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pre-fix | `usercode → device token → OAuth token →
revoke(old-refresh)` | Exit `0`; `new-refresh` persisted | `401` |
| PR | `revoke(old-refresh) → usercode → device token → OAuth token` |
Exit `0`; `new-refresh` persisted | `200` |
The PR run therefore issued exactly one revocation request, before any
request that initiated the replacement login, and issued no revocation
after token exchange.
### Regression coverage
`codex-rs/cli/tests/login.rs::device_login_revokes_existing_auth_before_requesting_new_tokens`
runs the real first-party `codex` binary against a `wiremock` OAuth
server with an isolated temporary `CODEX_HOME`. It asserts:
- the exact request sequence is `/oauth/revoke`,
`/api/accounts/deviceauth/usercode`, `/api/accounts/deviceauth/token`,
then `/oauth/token`;
- there is exactly one revoke request and its body contains
`old-refresh` with the `refresh_token` hint;
- the completed login persists `new-refresh`.
Local validation:
- `just test -p codex-login` — 130 passed
- `just test -p codex-cli` — 280 passed, including the new process-level
regression test
- `just bazel-lock-check`
|
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b5f1bb75d4 |
[codex-rs] enforce PAT workspace restrictions (#27450)
## Summary - validate a hydrated personal access token's workspace against `forced_chatgpt_workspace_id` before persisting `codex login --with-access-token` - apply the same PAT-only check when restricted auth managers load environment, ephemeral, or persisted credentials - enforce PAT workspace restrictions in the existing central login-restriction path - leave Agent Identity and cloud bootstrap behavior unchanged ## Scope This is intentionally the small PAT-only change. It does not attempt the broader auth-manager/bootstrap unification; that needs separate design work. ## Validation - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/tmp/codex-pat-target just test -p codex-login -p codex-cli` (410 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 CARGO_TARGET_DIR=/tmp/codex-pat-target just fix -p codex-login -p codex-cli` - `just fmt` - `git diff --check` Context: https://openai.slack.com/archives/D0AUPLV03RQ/p1781138331548269 |
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df7818c7d1 |
[codex-rs] support v2 personal access tokens (#25731)
## Summary - add v2 personal access token support for `codex login --with-access-token` and `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` - classify opaque `at-` tokens separately from legacy Agent Identity JWTs - hydrate required ChatGPT account metadata through AuthAPI `/v1/user-auth-credential/whoami` - use PATs directly as bearer tokens while preserving existing ChatGPT account surfaces - expose PAT-backed auth as the explicit `personalAccessToken` app-server auth mode ## Implementation PAT auth is intentionally small and stateless. Loading a PAT performs one AuthAPI metadata request, stores the hydrated metadata in the in-memory auth object, and redacts the secret from debug output. Legacy Agent Identity JWT handling remains unchanged. The shared access-token classifier lives in a private neutral module because it dispatches between both credential types. PAT hydration fails closed when AuthAPI omits any required metadata, including email. Hydrated metadata is intentionally not persisted: startup performs a live `whoami` preflight so revoked tokens or changed account metadata are not accepted from a stale cache. ## Workspace restriction scope This change intentionally does **not** apply `forced_chatgpt_workspace_id` to PAT authentication. The setting is a client-side config guardrail, not an authorization boundary, and PAT does not currently require workspace-ID parity. The PAT login and `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` paths therefore validate through AuthAPI without threading workspace-restriction state through access-token loading. Existing workspace checks for non-PAT auth remain on their established paths. ## App-server compatibility The public app-server `AuthMode` is shared across v1 and v2, and PAT-backed auth reports `personalAccessToken` through both APIs. Following human review, this intentionally removes the temporary v1 compatibility mapping that reported PATs as `chatgpt`; the deprecated v1 API is kept in parity with v2 rather than maintaining a separate closed enum. Clients with exhaustive auth-mode handling in either API version must add the new case and should generally treat it as ChatGPT-backed unless they need PAT-specific behavior. The v1 auth-status response still omits the raw PAT when `includeToken` is requested because that response cannot carry the account metadata needed to reuse the credential safely. Persisted PAT auth also omits the new enum value so older Codex builds can deserialize `auth.json` and infer PAT auth from the credential field after a rollback. ## Validation Latest review-fix validation: - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-login` (126 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli` (263 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-cli stored_auth_validation_handles_personal_access_token` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-app-server-protocol` (226 passed) - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-models-manager refresh_available_models_uses_remote_only_catalog_for_chatgpt_auth` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just test -p codex-tui existing_non_oauth_chatgpt_login_counts_as_signed_in` - `CARGO_INCREMENTAL=0 just fix -p codex-login -p codex-app-server-protocol -p codex-models-manager -p codex-tui -p codex-cli` - `just fmt` - `git diff --check` The broader `codex-tui` suite previously compiled and ran 2,834 tests. Three unrelated environment-sensitive guardian/IDE-socket tests failed after retries; the PAT-relevant TUI coverage passed. |
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e5afe5bf8c |
[codex-cli] Refresh near-expiry ChatGPT access tokens before requests (#23546)
## Summary - refresh managed ChatGPT auth during auth resolution when its access token is inside ChatGPT web's five-minute near-expiry window - cover refresh-window decisions while preserving the existing expired-token refresh path ## Why Codex already resolves managed ChatGPT auth before outbound requests and refreshes expired access tokens there. This change adjusts the existing predicate to refresh a still-valid access token once it is within the same five-minute refresh window used by ChatGPT web, avoiding a request with a token about to expire. A cross-process serialization follow-up was explored in #24663 and closed for now; we do not currently suspect cross-process refresh races are a root cause of the refresh errors under investigation. External-token, API-key, and Agent Identity auth modes remain unchanged. ## Validation - `bazel test //codex-rs/login:login-all-test` - `just fmt` runs Rust formatting successfully, then its Python SDK Ruff step cannot install `openai-codex-cli-bin==0.131.0a4` on this Linux environment because no compatible wheel is published. |
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54ec99cb54 |
[login] revoke superseded auth tokens on relogin (#21747)
## Summary - revoke previously stored managed ChatGPT tokens after a successful re-login - keep the new login successful even when revocation is unavailable or fails - cover the shared persistence path used by browser and device-code login flows ## Why A new `codex login` currently overwrites existing managed ChatGPT credentials without attempting to revoke the superseded tokens, leaving old credentials valid longer than necessary. ## Validation - `just fmt` - `CARGO_HOME=/tmp/cargo-home cargo test -p codex-login` ## Notes - Initial local Cargo validation hit a corrupt existing crate cache in the default `CARGO_HOME`; rerunning with a clean temporary `CARGO_HOME` passed. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |