permissions: derive config defaults as profiles

This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-04-26 22:19:35 -07:00
parent a6ca39c630
commit f858b35bc1
4 changed files with 243 additions and 142 deletions

View File

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ use codex_protocol::config_types::WebSearchToolConfig;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ReasoningEffort;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
@@ -641,15 +642,15 @@ pub struct GhostSnapshotToml {
}
impl ConfigToml {
/// Derive the effective sandbox policy from the configuration.
pub async fn derive_sandbox_policy(
/// Derive the effective permission profile from the configuration.
pub async fn derive_permission_profile(
&self,
sandbox_mode_override: Option<SandboxMode>,
profile_sandbox_mode: Option<SandboxMode>,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
active_project: Option<&ProjectConfig>,
permission_profile_constraint: Option<&crate::Constrained<PermissionProfile>>,
) -> SandboxPolicy {
) -> PermissionProfile {
let sandbox_mode_was_explicit = sandbox_mode_override.is_some()
|| profile_sandbox_mode.is_some()
|| self.sandbox_mode.is_some();
@@ -677,50 +678,72 @@ impl ConfigToml {
})
})
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut sandbox_policy = match resolved_sandbox_mode {
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
let workspace_write_unsupported = cfg!(target_os = "windows")
// If the experimental Windows sandbox is enabled, do not force a downgrade.
&& windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled
&& matches!(resolved_sandbox_mode, SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite);
let mut permission_profile = match resolved_sandbox_mode {
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => PermissionProfile::read_only(),
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite => match self.sandbox_workspace_write.as_ref() {
Some(SandboxWorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
}) => SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: writable_roots.clone(),
network_access: *network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: *exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp: *exclude_slash_tmp,
},
None => SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy(),
}) => {
let network_policy = if *network_access {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
};
PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
writable_roots,
network_policy,
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
)
}
None => PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),
},
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess => PermissionProfile::Disabled,
};
let downgrade_workspace_write_if_unsupported = |policy: &mut SandboxPolicy| {
if cfg!(target_os = "windows")
// If the experimental Windows sandbox is enabled, do not force a downgrade.
&& windows_sandbox_level == WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled
&& matches!(&*policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. })
{
*policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
}
};
if matches!(resolved_sandbox_mode, SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite) {
downgrade_workspace_write_if_unsupported(&mut sandbox_policy);
if workspace_write_unsupported {
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
}
if !sandbox_mode_was_explicit
&& let Some(constraint) = permission_profile_constraint
&& let Err(err) = constraint.can_set(&PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&sandbox_policy,
))
&& let Err(err) = constraint.can_set(&permission_profile)
{
tracing::warn!(
error = %err,
"default sandbox policy is disallowed by requirements; falling back to required default"
);
sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
downgrade_workspace_write_if_unsupported(&mut sandbox_policy);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::read_only();
}
sandbox_policy
permission_profile
}
/// Derive the legacy sandbox projection from configuration.
///
/// New callers should use [`Self::derive_permission_profile`] instead.
pub async fn derive_sandbox_policy(
&self,
sandbox_mode_override: Option<SandboxMode>,
profile_sandbox_mode: Option<SandboxMode>,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
active_project: Option<&ProjectConfig>,
permission_profile_constraint: Option<&crate::Constrained<PermissionProfile>>,
) -> SandboxPolicy {
self.derive_permission_profile(
sandbox_mode_override,
profile_sandbox_mode,
windows_sandbox_level,
active_project,
permission_profile_constraint,
)
.await
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(Path::new("/"))
.expect("legacy config-derived permission profile should be bridgeable")
}
/// Resolves the cwd to an existing project, or returns None if ConfigToml

View File

@@ -1965,8 +1965,8 @@ impl Config {
)
} else {
let configured_network_proxy_config = NetworkProxyConfig::default();
let mut sandbox_policy = cfg
.derive_sandbox_policy(
let mut permission_profile = cfg
.derive_permission_profile(
sandbox_mode,
config_profile.sandbox_mode,
windows_sandbox_level,
@@ -1974,24 +1974,23 @@ impl Config {
Some(&constrained_permission_profile),
)
.await;
if let SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } = &mut sandbox_policy {
for path in &additional_writable_roots {
if !writable_roots.iter().any(|existing| existing == path) {
writable_roots.push(path.clone());
}
}
let (mut file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
if matches!(permission_profile.enforcement(), SandboxEnforcement::Managed)
&& file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
)
&& !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
{
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&additional_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
}
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
&sandbox_policy,
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
);
let network_sandbox_policy = NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
(
configured_network_proxy_config,
permission_profile,

View File

@@ -404,55 +404,30 @@ impl PermissionProfile {
/// Managed workspace-write filesystem access with restricted network access.
pub fn workspace_write() -> Self {
Self::workspace_write_with(
&[],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
)
}
/// Managed workspace-write filesystem access with the legacy
/// `sandbox_workspace_write` knobs applied directly to the profile.
pub fn workspace_write_with(
writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
) -> Self {
let file_system = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::legacy_workspace_write(
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
);
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
entries: vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(".git".into())),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(".agents".into())),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(".codex".into())),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
],
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
},
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::from_sandbox_policy(&file_system),
network,
}
}

View File

@@ -418,7 +418,6 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
/// can preserve the active cwd binding until the policy is actually
/// resolved for a turn or command.
pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> Self {
let mut file_system_policy = Self::from(sandbox_policy);
let SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
@@ -426,15 +425,31 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
..
} = sandbox_policy
else {
return file_system_policy;
return Self::from(sandbox_policy);
};
Self::legacy_workspace_write(writable_roots, *exclude_tmpdir_env_var, *exclude_slash_tmp)
}
/// Filesystem policy matching legacy `WorkspaceWrite` semantics without
/// requiring callers to construct a legacy [`SandboxPolicy`] first.
pub fn legacy_workspace_write(
writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
) -> Self {
let mut file_system_policy = legacy_workspace_write_base_policy(
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
);
prune_read_entries_under_writable_roots(
&mut file_system_policy.entries,
&legacy_non_cwd_writable_roots(
writable_roots,
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
),
);
@@ -613,6 +628,44 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self
}
/// Add roots using legacy `WorkspaceWrite` behavior.
///
/// Unlike [`Self::with_additional_writable_roots`], this mirrors legacy
/// writable-roots semantics by adding exact roots even when they are
/// already writable through `:cwd`, and by adding the default read-only
/// protected subpaths for each new root.
pub fn with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(
mut self,
additional_writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
if !matches!(self.kind, FileSystemSandboxKind::Restricted) {
return self;
}
for path in additional_writable_roots {
if !self.entries.iter().any(|entry| {
entry.access.can_write()
&& matches!(&entry.path, FileSystemPath::Path { path: existing } if existing == path)
}) {
self.entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: path.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
path, /*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ false,
) {
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(
&mut self.entries,
protected_path,
);
}
}
self
}
pub fn needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(
&self,
network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
@@ -991,51 +1044,61 @@ impl From<&SandboxPolicy> for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
..
} => {
let mut entries = vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
}];
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
if !exclude_slash_tmp {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
if !exclude_tmpdir_env_var {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
entries.extend(
writable_roots
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}),
);
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries)
}
} => legacy_workspace_write_base_policy(
writable_roots,
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
),
}
}
}
fn legacy_workspace_write_base_policy(
writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
let mut entries = vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
}];
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
if !exclude_slash_tmp {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::SlashTmp,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
if !exclude_tmpdir_env_var {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
entries.extend(
writable_roots
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}),
);
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries)
}
fn resolve_file_system_path(
path: &FileSystemPath,
cwd: Option<&AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -2380,6 +2443,47 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots_protects_metadata() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let extra = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(temp_dir.path().join("extra"))
.expect("resolve extra root");
std::fs::create_dir_all(extra.join(".git")).expect("create .git dir");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}]);
let actual =
policy.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&extra));
assert_eq!(
actual,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::CurrentWorkingDirectory,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: extra.clone()
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: extra.join(".git")
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
])
);
}
#[test]
fn file_system_access_mode_orders_by_conflict_precedence() {
assert!(FileSystemAccessMode::Write > FileSystemAccessMode::Read);