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Mask system SSH config drop-ins in the Linux sandbox (#61947)
## Why Host root-owned SSH config drop-ins can appear to belong to `nobody` inside the user namespace, causing OpenSSH to reject them and preventing SSH connections. ## What changed Mask `/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d` with an empty, read-only directory by default for filesystem-restricted commands. Preserve explicit read grants to drop-ins and overlapping write grants, and avoid masking through symlinks or unsafe ancestor directories. The main `/etc/ssh/ssh_config` and user configuration still apply. Settings in masked drop-ins, including `KnownHostsCommand`, are skipped. ## Testing Add an isolated SSH handshake regression test that verifies a connection succeeds with system drop-ins masked and that a changed host key is still rejected. GitOrigin-RevId: e8d9cd7a4bd29480d1b930efc96510362a88d3fc
This commit is contained in:
@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ commands that would enter the bubblewrap path.
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otherwise unrestricted networking still block `AF_VSOCK` sockets. All filter
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modes block `io_uring` to prevent bypassing socket-family restrictions.
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- When bubblewrap is active, the filesystem is read-only by default via `--ro-bind / /`.
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- Filesystem-restricted commands see an empty, read-only `/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d`
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by default. Host root-owned files can appear to belong to `nobody` in the user
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namespace, causing OpenSSH to reject them. SSH skips settings in the masked
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directory, including any `KnownHostsCommand` defined there. Settings in the main
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`/etc/ssh/ssh_config` and the user's SSH config still apply. Explicit grants
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to the drop-ins and overlapping write grants keep their configured access.
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- When bubblewrap is active, writable roots are layered with `--bind <root> <root>`.
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- When bubblewrap is active, protected subpaths under writable roots (for
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example `.git`,
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@@ -484,6 +484,14 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
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unreadable_roots.sort();
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unreadable_roots.dedup();
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let ssh_drop_ins = Path::new("/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d");
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let inherits_ssh_drop_ins = resolved.has_full_disk_read_access
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|| resolved.include_platform_defaults
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|| resolved
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.readable_roots
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.iter()
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.any(|root| ssh_drop_ins.starts_with(root.as_path()));
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let mut args = if resolved.has_full_disk_read_access {
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// Read-only root, then mount a minimal device tree.
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// In bubblewrap (`bubblewrap.c`, `SETUP_MOUNT_DEV`), `--dev /dev`
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@@ -756,6 +764,35 @@ fn create_filesystem_args(
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append_unreadable_root_args(&mut bwrap_args, &unreadable_root, &allowed_write_paths)?;
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}
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// OpenSSH rejects host root-owned includes when root is unmapped. An empty
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// directory makes its Include glob match nothing. Preserve explicit paths,
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// and avoid targeting a symlink that could redirect the mask elsewhere.
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if inherits_ssh_drop_ins
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&& !unreadable_roots
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.iter()
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.any(|path| ssh_drop_ins.starts_with(path))
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&& !allowed_write_paths
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.iter()
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.any(|path| ssh_drop_ins.starts_with(path) || path.starts_with(ssh_drop_ins))
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&& ssh_drop_ins.ancestors().all(|path| {
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fs::symlink_metadata(path).is_ok_and(|m| {
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m.is_dir() && (path == ssh_drop_ins || (m.uid() == 0 && m.mode() & 0o022 == 0))
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})
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})
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&& !file_system_sandbox_policy
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.entries
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.iter()
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.filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::Read)
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.any(|entry| {
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FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![entry.clone()])
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.get_readable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
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.iter()
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.any(|path| path.as_path().starts_with(ssh_drop_ins))
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})
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{
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append_empty_directory_args(&mut bwrap_args, ssh_drop_ins);
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}
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if options.mask_wslg_distro
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&& !unreadable_roots.iter().any(|denied| {
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let distro = Path::new(WSLG_DISTRO_ROOT);
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@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
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#!/bin/sh
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# Called in private mount, PID and network namespaces. The server and client use disposable keys.
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set -eu
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export PATH=/usr/bin:/usr/sbin:/bin:/sbin
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export LC_ALL=C
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skip() { echo "$*" >&2; exit 77; }
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for tool in ssh sshd ssh-keygen bwrap setpriv ip; do
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command -v "$tool" >/dev/null || skip "$tool is unavailable"
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done
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cd /
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as_client() { setpriv --reuid 1000 --regid 1000 --clear-groups "$@"; }
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as_client bwrap --unshare-user --unshare-pid --ro-bind / / --proc /proc -- /bin/true ||
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skip "the ordinary user cannot start a stock bubblewrap sandbox"
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mount -t tmpfs -o mode=0755 tmpfs /etc/ssh || skip "cannot mount private SSH configuration"
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mount -t tmpfs -o mode=0755 tmpfs /run || skip "cannot stage the private sshd runtime"
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ip link set lo up || skip "cannot enable isolated loopback"
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umask 022
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mkdir -p /run/sshd /etc/ssh/home /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d
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install -m 755 "$1" /etc/ssh/codex-linux-sandbox
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# Supply an unlocked account independently of the host's users and PAM configuration.
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{ echo 'codexssh:x:1000:1000::/etc/ssh/home:/bin/sh'; cat /etc/passwd; } > /etc/ssh/passwd
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mount --bind /etc/ssh/passwd /etc/passwd
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chown 1000:1000 /etc/ssh/home
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cd /etc/ssh
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ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f host_key
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ssh-keygen -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f client_key
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chown 1000:1000 client_key
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cat > sshd_config <<'EOF'
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ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
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Port 2222
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HostKey /etc/ssh/host_key
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PidFile /run/sshd.pid
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AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh/client_key.pub
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AuthenticationMethods publickey
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UsePAM no
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UseDNS no
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EOF
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"$(command -v sshd)" -t -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config
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"$(command -v sshd)" -D -e -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config >/run/sshd.log 2>&1 &
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sshd_pid=$!
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trap 'kill "$sshd_pid" 2>/dev/null || :' EXIT
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echo 'ServerAliveInterval 73' > ssh_config.d/site.conf
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cat > ssh_config <<'EOF'
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Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
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Host fixture.invalid
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HostName 127.0.0.1
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Port 2222
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User codexssh
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IdentityFile /etc/ssh/client_key
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IdentitiesOnly yes
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BatchMode yes
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ConnectionAttempts 5
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HostKeyAlias fixture.invalid
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StrictHostKeyChecking yes
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UserKnownHostsFile /etc/ssh/pinned_host
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GlobalKnownHostsFile none
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EOF
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pin() { { printf 'fixture.invalid '; cat "$1"; } > pinned_host; }
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profile=$2
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sandbox() { as_client /etc/ssh/codex-linux-sandbox --sandbox-policy-cwd / --permission-profile "$profile" -- "$@"; }
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as_client ssh -G -T fixture.invalid > /run/native
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grep -qx 'serveraliveinterval 73' /run/native
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pin host_key.pub
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sandbox ssh -T fixture.invalid 'id -u' > /run/remote
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grep -qx 1000 /run/remote
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sandbox sh -c 'test ! -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/site.conf'
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pin client_key.pub
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rc=0
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sandbox ssh -T fixture.invalid 'echo unexpected' > /run/wrong-key 2>/run/error || rc=$?
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test "$rc" = 255
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test ! -s /run/wrong-key
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grep -F 'REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED' /run/error
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@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ mod root_metadata_tests;
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#[path = "denied_files_tests.rs"]
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mod denied_files_tests;
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#[path = "ssh_config_tests.rs"]
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mod ssh_config_tests;
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// At least on GitHub CI, the arm64 tests appear to need longer timeouts.
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#[cfg(not(target_arch = "aarch64"))]
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@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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//! Masking system drop-ins must preserve host-key checks in the main SSH configuration.
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use super::codex_linux_sandbox_exe;
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use std::process::Command;
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#[test]
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fn ssh_masks_system_dropins_and_rejects_a_changed_host_key() {
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// The fixture stages root-owned files, then runs the client as UID 1000.
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if unsafe { libc::geteuid() } != 0 {
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eprintln!("skipping SSH handshake: root is required to create the two-owner fixture");
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return;
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}
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let profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
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&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::read_only(),
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NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
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);
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let fixture = codex_utils_cargo_bin::find_resource!("tests/fixtures/ssh_handshake.sh").unwrap();
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let output = Command::new("unshare")
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.args(["--mount-proc", "--net", "--pid", "--fork"])
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.args(["--propagation", "private", "--", "/bin/sh"])
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.arg(fixture)
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.arg(codex_linux_sandbox_exe())
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.arg(serde_json::to_string(&profile).unwrap())
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.output();
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let output = match output {
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Err(error) if error.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
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eprintln!("skipping SSH handshake: unshare is unavailable");
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return;
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}
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result => result.unwrap(),
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};
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if output.status.code() == Some(77)
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|| (output.stderr.starts_with(b"unshare:")
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&& String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).contains("Operation not permitted"))
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{
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eprintln!(
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"skipping SSH handshake: {}",
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String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
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);
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return;
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}
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assert!(output.status.success(), "{output:?}");
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}
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