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permissions: move workspace roots onto thread state

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This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-05-12 17:40:17 -07:00
parent c51c65ad09
commit 8bafd4f6a5
134 changed files with 2310 additions and 2787 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
codex-rs/Cargo.lock
Generated
+3
View File
@@ -2697,6 +2697,7 @@ dependencies = [
"codex-utils-cargo-bin",
"codex-utils-cli",
"codex-utils-oss",
"codex-utils-sandbox-summary",
"core_test_support",
"libc",
"opentelemetry",
@@ -3495,6 +3496,7 @@ dependencies = [
"codex-otel",
"codex-protocol",
"codex-state",
"codex-utils-absolute-path",
"codex-utils-path",
"codex-utils-string",
"pretty_assertions",
@@ -3687,6 +3689,7 @@ dependencies = [
"codex-protocol",
"codex-rollout",
"codex-state",
"codex-utils-absolute-path",
"codex-utils-path",
"pretty_assertions",
"serde",
codex-rs/analytics/src/analytics_client_tests.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -201,11 +201,11 @@ fn sample_thread_start_response(
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
})
@@ -257,11 +257,11 @@ fn sample_thread_resume_response_with_source(
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
})
codex-rs/analytics/src/client_tests.rs
+3 -9
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::ApprovalsReviewer as AppServerApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_app_server_protocol::AskForApproval as AppServerAskForApproval;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientRequest;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ClientResponsePayload;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfile as AppServerPermissionProfile;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RequestId;
use codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy as AppServerSandboxPolicy;
use codex_app_server_protocol::SessionSource as AppServerSessionSource;
@@ -29,7 +28,6 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnStartResponse;
use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnStatus as AppServerTurnStatus;
use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnSteerParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnSteerResponse;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile as CorePermissionProfile;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::test_support::PathBufExt;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::test_support::test_path_buf;
use std::collections::HashSet;
@@ -142,10 +140,6 @@ fn sample_thread(thread_id: &str) -> Thread {
}
}
fn sample_permission_profile() -> AppServerPermissionProfile {
CorePermissionProfile::Disabled.into()
}
fn sample_thread_start_response() -> ClientResponsePayload {
ClientResponsePayload::ThreadStart(ThreadStartResponse {
thread: sample_thread("thread-1"),
@@ -153,11 +147,11 @@ fn sample_thread_start_response() -> ClientResponsePayload {
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: Some(sample_permission_profile()),
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
})
@@ -170,11 +164,11 @@ fn sample_thread_resume_response() -> ClientResponsePayload {
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: Some(sample_permission_profile()),
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
})
@@ -187,11 +181,11 @@ fn sample_thread_fork_response() -> ClientResponsePayload {
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: AppServerAskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: AppServerApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: AppServerSandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: Some(sample_permission_profile()),
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
})
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/ClientRequest.json
Generated
+5 -69
View File
@@ -1850,31 +1850,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
@@ -1886,40 +1861,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -3133,13 +3074,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -3406,7 +3340,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -3817,7 +3752,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -4197,7 +4133,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns."
"description": "Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"description": "Override the service tier for this turn and subsequent turns.",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/codex_app_server_protocol.schemas.json
Generated
+8 -105
View File
@@ -5583,14 +5583,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -5598,31 +5590,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AddCreditsNudgeCreditType": {
"enum": [
"credits",
@@ -11710,31 +11677,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
@@ -11746,40 +11688,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -14403,13 +14311,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -15397,7 +15298,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -15473,7 +15375,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -16900,7 +16802,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -16965,7 +16868,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -17273,7 +17176,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -17942,7 +17845,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns."
"description": "Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"description": "Override the service tier for this turn and subsequent turns.",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/codex_app_server_protocol.v2.schemas.json
Generated
+8 -105
View File
@@ -143,14 +143,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -158,31 +150,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AddCreditsNudgeCreditType": {
"enum": [
"credits",
@@ -8259,31 +8226,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
@@ -8295,40 +8237,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -10952,13 +10860,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -13221,7 +13122,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -13297,7 +13199,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -14724,7 +14626,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -14789,7 +14692,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -15097,7 +15000,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
@@ -15766,7 +15669,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns."
"description": "Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"description": "Override the service tier for this turn and subsequent turns.",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/CommandExecParams.json
Generated
-7
View File
@@ -441,13 +441,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadForkParams.json
Generated
+2 -60
View File
@@ -64,65 +64,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"SandboxMode": {
"enum": [
"read-only",
@@ -212,7 +153,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadForkResponse.json
Generated
+1 -366
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
@@ -503,202 +470,6 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -937,135 +708,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Codex owns sandbox construction for this profile.",
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"managed"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"fileSystem",
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Do not apply an outer sandbox.",
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"disabled"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Filesystem isolation is enforced by an external caller.",
"properties": {
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"external"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"restricted"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"entries",
"type"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"unrestricted"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"enabled"
],
"type": "object"
},
"ReasoningEffort": {
"description": "See https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/reasoning?api-mode=responses#get-started-with-reasoning",
"enum": [
@@ -1160,13 +802,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -2605,7 +2240,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadResumeParams.json
Generated
+2 -60
View File
@@ -298,65 +298,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -1091,7 +1032,8 @@
{
"type": "null"
}
]
],
"description": "Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadResumeResponse.json
Generated
+1 -366
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
@@ -503,202 +470,6 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -937,135 +708,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Codex owns sandbox construction for this profile.",
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"managed"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"fileSystem",
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Do not apply an outer sandbox.",
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"disabled"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Filesystem isolation is enforced by an external caller.",
"properties": {
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"external"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"restricted"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"entries",
"type"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"unrestricted"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"enabled"
],
"type": "object"
},
"ReasoningEffort": {
"description": "See https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/reasoning?api-mode=responses#get-started-with-reasoning",
"enum": [
@@ -1160,13 +802,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -2605,7 +2240,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadStartParams.json
Generated
-59
View File
@@ -90,65 +90,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadStartResponse.json
Generated
+1 -366
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
@@ -503,202 +470,6 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemAccessMode": {
"enum": [
"read",
"write",
"none"
],
"type": "string"
},
"FileSystemPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"path"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "PathFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"pattern": {
"type": "string"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"glob_pattern"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"pattern",
"type"
],
"title": "GlobPatternFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"special"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPathType",
"type": "string"
},
"value": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSpecialPath"
}
},
"required": [
"type",
"value"
],
"title": "SpecialFileSystemPath",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileSystemSandboxEntry": {
"properties": {
"access": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemAccessMode"
},
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemPath"
}
},
"required": [
"access",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
},
"FileSystemSpecialPath": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"root"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "RootFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"minimal"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "MinimalFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"project_roots"
],
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "KindFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"tmpdir"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "TmpdirFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"slash_tmp"
],
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"kind"
],
"title": "SlashTmpFileSystemSpecialPath",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"kind": {
"enum": [
"unknown"
],
"type": "string"
},
"path": {
"type": "string"
},
"subpath": {
"type": [
"string",
"null"
]
}
},
"required": [
"kind",
"path"
],
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"FileUpdateChange": {
"properties": {
"diff": {
@@ -937,135 +708,6 @@
}
]
},
"PermissionProfile": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Codex owns sandbox construction for this profile.",
"properties": {
"fileSystem": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions"
},
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"managed"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"fileSystem",
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ManagedPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Do not apply an outer sandbox.",
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"disabled"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "DisabledPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
},
{
"description": "Filesystem isolation is enforced by an external caller.",
"properties": {
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"external"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfileType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"network",
"type"
],
"title": "ExternalPermissionProfile",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions": {
"oneOf": [
{
"properties": {
"entries": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/FileSystemSandboxEntry"
},
"type": "array"
},
"globScanMaxDepth": {
"format": "uint",
"minimum": 1.0,
"type": [
"integer",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"restricted"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"entries",
"type"
],
"title": "RestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
},
{
"properties": {
"type": {
"enum": [
"unrestricted"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissionsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"type"
],
"title": "UnrestrictedPermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions": {
"properties": {
"enabled": {
"type": "boolean"
}
},
"required": [
"enabled"
],
"type": "object"
},
"ReasoningEffort": {
"description": "See https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/reasoning?api-mode=responses#get-started-with-reasoning",
"enum": [
@@ -1160,13 +802,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -2605,7 +2240,7 @@
"$ref": "#/definitions/SandboxPolicy"
}
],
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime permissions."
"description": "Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`."
},
"serviceTier": {
"type": [
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/TurnStartParams.json
Generated
+1 -67
View File
@@ -114,65 +114,6 @@
],
"type": "string"
},
"PermissionProfileModificationParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootPermissionProfileModificationParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"PermissionProfileSelectionParams": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.",
"properties": {
"id": {
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/PermissionProfileModificationParams"
},
"type": [
"array",
"null"
]
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"profile"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParamsType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"id",
"type"
],
"title": "ProfilePermissionProfileSelectionParams",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"Personality": {
"enum": [
"none",
@@ -295,13 +236,6 @@
],
"title": "WorkspaceWriteSandboxPolicyType",
"type": "string"
},
"writableRoots": {
"default": [],
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -576,7 +510,7 @@
"type": "null"
}
],
"description": "Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns."
"description": "Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions profile."
},
"serviceTier": {
"description": "Override the service tier for this turn and subsequent turns.",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ActivePermissionProfile.ts
Generated
+1 -7
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { ActivePermissionProfileModification } from "./ActivePermissionProfileModification";
export type ActivePermissionProfile = {
/**
@@ -13,9 +12,4 @@ id: string,
* Parent profile identifier once permissions profiles support
* inheritance. This is currently always `null`.
*/
extends: string | null,
/**
* Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
* profile, if any.
*/
modifications: Array<ActivePermissionProfileModification>, };
extends: string | null, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ActivePermissionProfileModification.ts
Generated
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
export type ActivePermissionProfileModification = { "type": "additionalWritableRoot", path: AbsolutePathBuf, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/PermissionProfileModificationParams.ts
Generated
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
export type PermissionProfileModificationParams = { "type": "additionalWritableRoot", path: AbsolutePathBuf, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/PermissionProfileSelectionParams.ts
Generated
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { PermissionProfileModificationParams } from "./PermissionProfileModificationParams";
export type PermissionProfileSelectionParams = { "type": "profile", id: string, modifications?: Array<PermissionProfileModificationParams> | null, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/SandboxPolicy.ts
Generated
+1 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
import type { NetworkAccess } from "./NetworkAccess";
export type SandboxPolicy = { "type": "dangerFullAccess" } | { "type": "readOnly", networkAccess: boolean, } | { "type": "externalSandbox", networkAccess: NetworkAccess, } | { "type": "workspaceWrite", writableRoots: Array<AbsolutePathBuf>, networkAccess: boolean, excludeTmpdirEnvVar: boolean, excludeSlashTmp: boolean, };
export type SandboxPolicy = { "type": "dangerFullAccess" } | { "type": "readOnly", networkAccess: boolean, } | { "type": "externalSandbox", networkAccess: NetworkAccess, } | { "type": "workspaceWrite", networkAccess: boolean, excludeTmpdirEnvVar: boolean, excludeSlashTmp: boolean, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ThreadForkParams.ts
Generated
+6 -1
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,12 @@ model?: string | null, modelProvider?: string | null, serviceTier?: string | nul
* Override where approval requests are routed for review on this thread
* and subsequent turns.
*/
approvalsReviewer?: ApprovalsReviewer | null, sandbox?: SandboxMode | null, config?: { [key in string]?: JsonValue } | null, baseInstructions?: string | null, developerInstructions?: string | null, ephemeral?: boolean, /**
approvalsReviewer?: ApprovalsReviewer | null, /**
* Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a
* compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
* profile.
*/
sandbox?: SandboxMode | null, config?: { [key in string]?: JsonValue } | null, baseInstructions?: string | null, developerInstructions?: string | null, ephemeral?: boolean, /**
* Optional client-supplied analytics source classification for this forked thread.
*/
threadSource?: ThreadSource | null};
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ThreadForkResponse.ts
Generated
+1 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ instructionSources: Array<AbsolutePathBuf>, approvalPolicy: AskForApproval, /**
*/
approvalsReviewer: ApprovalsReviewer, /**
* Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
* should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
* permissions.
* should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
*/
sandbox: SandboxPolicy, reasoningEffort: ReasoningEffort | null};
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ThreadResumeParams.ts
Generated
+6 -1
View File
@@ -25,4 +25,9 @@ model?: string | null, modelProvider?: string | null, serviceTier?: string | nul
* Override where approval requests are routed for review on this thread
* and subsequent turns.
*/
approvalsReviewer?: ApprovalsReviewer | null, sandbox?: SandboxMode | null, config?: { [key in string]?: JsonValue } | null, baseInstructions?: string | null, developerInstructions?: string | null, personality?: Personality | null};
approvalsReviewer?: ApprovalsReviewer | null, /**
* Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a
* compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
* profile.
*/
sandbox?: SandboxMode | null, config?: { [key in string]?: JsonValue } | null, baseInstructions?: string | null, developerInstructions?: string | null, personality?: Personality | null};
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ThreadResumeResponse.ts
Generated
+1 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ instructionSources: Array<AbsolutePathBuf>, approvalPolicy: AskForApproval, /**
*/
approvalsReviewer: ApprovalsReviewer, /**
* Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
* should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
* permissions.
* should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
*/
sandbox: SandboxPolicy, reasoningEffort: ReasoningEffort | null};
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ThreadStartResponse.ts
Generated
+1 -2
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ instructionSources: Array<AbsolutePathBuf>, approvalPolicy: AskForApproval, /**
*/
approvalsReviewer: ApprovalsReviewer, /**
* Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
* should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
* permissions.
* should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
*/
sandbox: SandboxPolicy, reasoningEffort: ReasoningEffort | null};
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/TurnStartParams.ts
Generated
+3 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ approvalPolicy?: AskForApproval | null, /**
* subsequent turns.
*/
approvalsReviewer?: ApprovalsReviewer | null, /**
* Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns.
* Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a
* compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
* profile.
*/
sandboxPolicy?: SandboxPolicy | null, /**
* Override the model for this turn and subsequent turns.
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/index.ts
Generated
-3
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ export type { AccountLoginCompletedNotification } from "./AccountLoginCompletedN
export type { AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification } from "./AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification";
export type { AccountUpdatedNotification } from "./AccountUpdatedNotification";
export type { ActivePermissionProfile } from "./ActivePermissionProfile";
export type { ActivePermissionProfileModification } from "./ActivePermissionProfileModification";
export type { AddCreditsNudgeCreditType } from "./AddCreditsNudgeCreditType";
export type { AddCreditsNudgeEmailStatus } from "./AddCreditsNudgeEmailStatus";
export type { AdditionalFileSystemPermissions } from "./AdditionalFileSystemPermissions";
@@ -257,9 +256,7 @@ export type { PatchChangeKind } from "./PatchChangeKind";
export type { PermissionGrantScope } from "./PermissionGrantScope";
export type { PermissionProfile } from "./PermissionProfile";
export type { PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions } from "./PermissionProfileFileSystemPermissions";
export type { PermissionProfileModificationParams } from "./PermissionProfileModificationParams";
export type { PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions } from "./PermissionProfileNetworkPermissions";
export type { PermissionProfileSelectionParams } from "./PermissionProfileSelectionParams";
export type { PermissionsRequestApprovalParams } from "./PermissionsRequestApprovalParams";
export type { PermissionsRequestApprovalResponse } from "./PermissionsRequestApprovalResponse";
export type { PlanDeltaNotification } from "./PlanDeltaNotification";
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/common.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2272,11 +2272,11 @@ mod tests {
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd,
workspace_roots: vec![],
instruction_sources: vec![absolute_path("/tmp/AGENTS.md")],
approval_policy: v2::AskForApproval::OnFailure,
approvals_reviewer: v2::ApprovalsReviewer::User,
sandbox: v2::SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
},
@@ -2316,13 +2316,13 @@ mod tests {
"modelProvider": "openai",
"serviceTier": null,
"cwd": absolute_path_string("tmp"),
"workspaceRoots": [],
"instructionSources": [absolute_path_string("tmp/AGENTS.md")],
"approvalPolicy": "on-failure",
"approvalsReviewer": "user",
"sandbox": {
"type": "dangerFullAccess"
},
"permissionProfile": null,
"activePermissionProfile": null,
"reasoningEffort": null
}
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/permissions.rs
+50 -80
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalProtocol as CoreNetworkApprovalPro
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyAmendment as CoreNetworkPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyRuleAction as CoreNetworkPolicyRuleAction;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile as CoreActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification as CoreActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::AdditionalPermissionProfile as CoreAdditionalPermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions as CoreFileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions as CoreManagedFileSystemPermissions;
@@ -437,41 +436,6 @@ pub struct ActivePermissionProfile {
/// inheritance. This is currently always `null`.
#[serde(default)]
pub extends: Option<String>,
/// Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
/// profile, if any.
#[serde(default)]
pub modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum ActivePermissionProfileModification {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(rename_all = "camelCase")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfileModification> for ActivePermissionProfileModification {
fn from(value: CoreActivePermissionProfileModification) -> Self {
match value {
CoreActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
Self::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
}
}
}
impl From<ActivePermissionProfileModification> for CoreActivePermissionProfileModification {
fn from(value: ActivePermissionProfileModification) -> Self {
match value {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
Self::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
}
}
}
impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfile> for ActivePermissionProfile {
@@ -479,11 +443,6 @@ impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfile> for ActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: value.id,
extends: value.extends,
modifications: value
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(ActivePermissionProfileModification::from)
.collect(),
}
}
}
@@ -493,42 +452,10 @@ impl From<ActivePermissionProfile> for CoreActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: value.id,
extends: value.extends,
modifications: value
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(CoreActivePermissionProfileModification::from)
.collect(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum PermissionProfileSelectionParams {
/// Select a named built-in or user-defined profile and optionally apply
/// bounded modifications that Codex knows how to validate.
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(rename_all = "camelCase")]
Profile {
id: String,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
modifications: Option<Vec<PermissionProfileModificationParams>>,
},
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum PermissionProfileModificationParams {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(rename_all = "camelCase")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
@@ -607,14 +534,16 @@ pub enum SandboxPolicy {
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(rename_all = "camelCase")]
WorkspaceWrite {
#[serde(default)]
writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
#[serde(default)]
network_access: bool,
#[serde(default)]
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
#[serde(default)]
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing)]
#[schemars(skip)]
#[ts(skip)]
legacy_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
},
}
@@ -690,10 +619,10 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SandboxPolicy {
));
}
Ok(SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
legacy_writable_roots: writable_roots,
})
}
}
@@ -720,18 +649,60 @@ impl SandboxPolicy {
}
}
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
legacy_writable_roots: _,
} => codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: writable_roots.clone(),
network_access: *network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: *exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp: *exclude_slash_tmp,
},
}
}
pub fn legacy_writable_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf] {
match self {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
legacy_writable_roots,
..
} => legacy_writable_roots,
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
| SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. }
| SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => &[],
}
}
pub fn to_permission_profile_for_cwd(&self, cwd: &std::path::Path) -> CorePermissionProfile {
match self {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
legacy_writable_roots,
..
} if legacy_writable_roots.is_empty() => {
CorePermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&self.to_core(), cwd)
}
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
legacy_writable_roots,
} => CorePermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
legacy_writable_roots,
if *network_access {
CoreNetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
CoreNetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
},
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
),
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
| SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. }
| SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
CorePermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&self.to_core(), cwd)
}
}
}
}
impl From<codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy> for SandboxPolicy {
@@ -752,15 +723,14 @@ impl From<codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy> for SandboxPolicy {
}
}
codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
} => SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
},
}
}
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/tests.rs
+42 -8
View File
@@ -2019,17 +2019,16 @@ fn mcp_server_elicitation_response_serializes_nullable_content() {
#[test]
fn sandbox_policy_round_trips_workspace_write_access() {
let v2_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
};
let core_policy = v2_policy.to_core();
assert_eq!(
core_policy,
codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -2060,10 +2059,9 @@ fn sandbox_policy_deserializes_legacy_read_only_full_access_field() {
#[test]
fn sandbox_policy_deserializes_legacy_workspace_write_full_access_field() {
let writable_root = absolute_path("/workspace");
let policy = serde_json::from_value::<SandboxPolicy>(json!({
"type": "workspaceWrite",
"writableRoots": [writable_root],
"writableRoots": [],
"readOnlyAccess": {
"type": "fullAccess"
},
@@ -2075,14 +2073,38 @@ fn sandbox_policy_deserializes_legacy_workspace_write_full_access_field() {
assert_eq!(
policy,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![absolute_path("/workspace")],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
}
);
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_policy_deserializes_legacy_workspace_write_writable_roots_field() {
let writable_root = absolute_path("/workspace");
let policy = serde_json::from_value::<SandboxPolicy>(json!({
"type": "workspaceWrite",
"writableRoots": [writable_root],
"networkAccess": false,
"excludeTmpdirEnvVar": false,
"excludeSlashTmp": false
}))
.expect("workspace-write policy should accept legacy writableRoots field");
assert_eq!(policy.legacy_writable_roots(), &[writable_root]);
assert_eq!(
serde_json::to_value(policy).expect("policy should serialize"),
json!({
"type": "workspaceWrite",
"networkAccess": false,
"excludeTmpdirEnvVar": false,
"excludeSlashTmp": false
})
);
}
#[test]
fn sandbox_policy_rejects_legacy_read_only_restricted_access_field() {
let err = serde_json::from_value::<SandboxPolicy>(json!({
@@ -3389,9 +3411,6 @@ fn thread_lifecycle_responses_default_missing_optional_fields() {
assert_eq!(start.instruction_sources, Vec::<AbsolutePathBuf>::new());
assert_eq!(resume.instruction_sources, Vec::<AbsolutePathBuf>::new());
assert_eq!(fork.instruction_sources, Vec::<AbsolutePathBuf>::new());
assert_eq!(start.permission_profile, None);
assert_eq!(resume.permission_profile, None);
assert_eq!(fork.permission_profile, None);
assert_eq!(start.active_permission_profile, None);
assert_eq!(resume.active_permission_profile, None);
assert_eq!(fork.active_permission_profile, None);
@@ -3419,6 +3438,7 @@ fn turn_start_params_preserve_explicit_null_service_tier() {
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
environments: None,
cwd: None,
workspace_roots: None,
approval_policy: None,
approvals_reviewer: None,
sandbox_policy: None,
@@ -3436,6 +3456,20 @@ fn turn_start_params_preserve_explicit_null_service_tier() {
assert_eq!(serialized_without_override.get("serviceTier"), None);
}
#[test]
fn turn_start_permissions_uses_profile_id_string_shape() {
let params: TurnStartParams = serde_json::from_value(json!({
"threadId": "thread-1",
"input": [],
"permissions": ":workspace"
}))
.expect("turn start params should deserialize");
assert_eq!(params.permissions, Some(":workspace".to_string()));
let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&params).expect("params should serialize");
assert_eq!(serialized["permissions"], json!(":workspace"));
}
#[test]
fn turn_start_params_round_trip_environments() {
let cwd = test_absolute_path();
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/thread.rs
+48 -35
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,6 @@
use super::ActivePermissionProfile;
use super::ApprovalsReviewer;
use super::AskForApproval;
use super::PermissionProfile;
use super::PermissionProfileSelectionParams;
use super::SandboxMode;
use super::SandboxPolicy;
use super::Thread;
@@ -107,6 +105,11 @@ pub struct ThreadStartParams {
pub service_tier: Option<Option<String>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub cwd: Option<String>,
/// Optional workspace roots for this thread. Omitted uses the server's
/// configured roots, usually seeded from `cwd`.
#[experimental("thread/start.workspaceRoots")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
#[experimental(nested)]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
@@ -116,12 +119,11 @@ pub struct ThreadStartParams {
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub sandbox: Option<SandboxMode>,
/// Named profile selection for this thread. Cannot be combined with
/// `sandbox`. Use bounded `modifications` for supported turn/thread
/// adjustments instead of replacing the full permissions profile.
/// Named permissions profile id for this new thread's initial permissions.
/// Cannot be combined with `sandbox`.
#[experimental("thread/start.permissions")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub permissions: Option<PermissionProfileSelectionParams>,
pub permissions: Option<String>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub config: Option<HashMap<String, JsonValue>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
@@ -195,6 +197,11 @@ pub struct ThreadStartResponse {
pub model_provider: String,
pub service_tier: Option<String>,
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Workspace roots used to realize symbolic `:project_roots` permission
/// entries for this thread.
#[experimental("thread/start.workspaceRoots")]
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Instruction source files currently loaded for this thread.
#[serde(default)]
pub instruction_sources: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -203,14 +210,8 @@ pub struct ThreadStartResponse {
/// Reviewer currently used for approval requests on this thread.
pub approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer,
/// Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
/// should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
/// permissions.
/// should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
pub sandbox: SandboxPolicy,
/// Full active permissions for this thread. `activePermissionProfile`
/// carries display/provenance metadata for this runtime profile.
#[experimental("thread/start.permissionProfile")]
#[serde(default)]
pub permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
/// Named or implicit built-in profile that produced the active
/// permissions, when known.
#[experimental("thread/start.activePermissionProfile")]
@@ -264,6 +265,11 @@ pub struct ThreadResumeParams {
pub service_tier: Option<Option<String>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub cwd: Option<String>,
/// Optional replacement workspace roots for the resumed thread. Omitted
/// preserves the persisted or configured roots.
#[experimental("thread/resume.workspaceRoots")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
#[experimental(nested)]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
@@ -271,14 +277,16 @@ pub struct ThreadResumeParams {
/// and subsequent turns.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
/// Deprecated for resume. When present, the server treats this as a
/// compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
/// profile.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub sandbox: Option<SandboxMode>,
/// Named profile selection for the resumed thread. Cannot be combined
/// with `sandbox`. Use bounded `modifications` for supported thread
/// adjustments instead of replacing the full permissions profile.
/// Named permissions profile id for the resumed thread. Cannot be combined
/// with `sandbox`.
#[experimental("thread/resume.permissions")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub permissions: Option<PermissionProfileSelectionParams>,
pub permissions: Option<String>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub config: Option<HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
@@ -310,6 +318,11 @@ pub struct ThreadResumeResponse {
pub model_provider: String,
pub service_tier: Option<String>,
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Workspace roots used to realize symbolic `:project_roots` permission
/// entries for this thread.
#[experimental("thread/resume.workspaceRoots")]
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Instruction source files currently loaded for this thread.
#[serde(default)]
pub instruction_sources: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -318,14 +331,8 @@ pub struct ThreadResumeResponse {
/// Reviewer currently used for approval requests on this thread.
pub approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer,
/// Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
/// should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
/// permissions.
/// should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
pub sandbox: SandboxPolicy,
/// Full active permissions for this thread. `activePermissionProfile`
/// carries display/provenance metadata for this runtime profile.
#[experimental("thread/resume.permissionProfile")]
#[serde(default)]
pub permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
/// Named or implicit built-in profile that produced the active
/// permissions, when known.
#[experimental("thread/resume.activePermissionProfile")]
@@ -370,6 +377,11 @@ pub struct ThreadForkParams {
pub service_tier: Option<Option<String>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub cwd: Option<String>,
/// Optional replacement workspace roots for the forked thread. Omitted
/// preserves the source thread roots when available.
#[experimental("thread/fork.workspaceRoots")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
#[experimental(nested)]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
@@ -377,14 +389,16 @@ pub struct ThreadForkParams {
/// and subsequent turns.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
/// Deprecated for fork. When present, the server treats this as a
/// compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
/// profile.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub sandbox: Option<SandboxMode>,
/// Named profile selection for the forked thread. Cannot be combined with
/// `sandbox`. Use bounded `modifications` for supported thread
/// adjustments instead of replacing the full permissions profile.
/// Named permissions profile id for the forked thread. Cannot be combined
/// with `sandbox`.
#[experimental("thread/fork.permissions")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub permissions: Option<PermissionProfileSelectionParams>,
pub permissions: Option<String>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub config: Option<HashMap<String, serde_json::Value>>,
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
@@ -419,6 +433,11 @@ pub struct ThreadForkResponse {
pub model_provider: String,
pub service_tier: Option<String>,
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Workspace roots used to realize symbolic `:project_roots` permission
/// entries for this thread.
#[experimental("thread/fork.workspaceRoots")]
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Instruction source files currently loaded for this thread.
#[serde(default)]
pub instruction_sources: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
@@ -427,14 +446,8 @@ pub struct ThreadForkResponse {
/// Reviewer currently used for approval requests on this thread.
pub approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer,
/// Legacy sandbox policy retained for compatibility. Experimental clients
/// should prefer `permissionProfile` when they need exact runtime
/// permissions.
/// should prefer `activePermissionProfile` and `workspaceRoots`.
pub sandbox: SandboxPolicy,
/// Full active permissions for this thread. `activePermissionProfile`
/// carries display/provenance metadata for this runtime profile.
#[experimental("thread/fork.permissionProfile")]
#[serde(default)]
pub permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
/// Named or implicit built-in profile that produced the active
/// permissions, when known.
#[experimental("thread/fork.activePermissionProfile")]
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/turn.rs
+11 -7
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
use super::ApprovalsReviewer;
use super::AskForApproval;
use super::PermissionProfileSelectionParams;
use super::SandboxPolicy;
use super::Turn;
use codex_experimental_api_macros::ExperimentalApi;
@@ -64,6 +63,11 @@ pub struct TurnStartParams {
/// Override the working directory for this turn and subsequent turns.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub cwd: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Replace the workspace roots for this turn and subsequent turns. Omitted
/// preserves the current roots.
#[experimental("turn/start.workspaceRoots")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
/// Override the approval policy for this turn and subsequent turns.
#[experimental(nested)]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
@@ -72,16 +76,16 @@ pub struct TurnStartParams {
/// subsequent turns.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
/// Override the sandbox policy for this turn and subsequent turns.
/// Deprecated for turns. When present, the server treats this as a
/// compatibility spelling for selecting a matching named permissions
/// profile.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
/// Select a named permissions profile for this turn and subsequent turns.
/// Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`. Use bounded `modifications`
/// for supported turn adjustments instead of replacing the full
/// permissions profile.
/// Select a named permissions profile id for this turn and subsequent
/// turns. Cannot be combined with `sandboxPolicy`.
#[experimental("turn/start.permissions")]
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub permissions: Option<PermissionProfileSelectionParams>,
pub permissions: Option<String>,
/// Override the model for this turn and subsequent turns.
#[ts(optional = nullable)]
pub model: Option<String>,
codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ pub async fn run_main_with_transport_options(
});
}
if let Some(warning) =
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile.get())
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile_ref())
{
config_warnings.push(ConfigWarningNotification {
summary: warning,
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/command_exec_processor.rs
+15 -16
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
let started_network_proxy = match self.config.permissions.network.as_ref() {
Some(spec) => match spec
.start_proxy(
self.config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
self.config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*blocked_request_observer*/ None,
managed_network_requirements_enabled,
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
} else {
ExecCapturePolicy::ShellTool
};
let sandbox_cwd = if permission_profile.is_some() {
let has_request_permission_profile = permission_profile.is_some();
let sandbox_cwd = if has_request_permission_profile {
cwd.clone()
} else {
self.config.cwd.clone()
@@ -243,28 +244,20 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
);
self.config
.permissions
.permission_profile
.permission_profile_constraint()
.can_set(&effective_permission_profile)
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("invalid permission profile: {err}")))?;
effective_permission_profile
} else if let Some(policy) = sandbox_policy.map(|policy| policy.to_core()) {
} else if let Some(policy) = sandbox_policy {
let legacy_policy = policy.to_core();
self.config
.permissions
.can_set_legacy_sandbox_policy(&policy, &sandbox_cwd)
.can_set_legacy_sandbox_policy(&legacy_policy, &sandbox_cwd)
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("invalid sandbox policy: {err}")))?;
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&policy, &sandbox_cwd);
let network_sandbox_policy =
codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&policy);
let permission_profile =
codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&policy),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
let permission_profile = policy.to_permission_profile_for_cwd(&sandbox_cwd);
self.config
.permissions
.permission_profile
.permission_profile_constraint()
.can_set(&permission_profile)
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("invalid sandbox policy: {err}")))?;
permission_profile
@@ -283,10 +276,16 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
None => None,
};
let workspace_roots = if has_request_permission_profile {
vec![sandbox_cwd.clone()]
} else {
self.config.workspace_roots.clone()
};
let exec_request = codex_core::exec::build_exec_request(
exec_params,
&effective_permission_profile,
&sandbox_cwd,
&workspace_roots,
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_legacy_landlock,
)
codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
+14 -6
View File
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
let network_proxy = match config.permissions.network.as_ref() {
Some(spec) => Some(
spec.start_proxy(
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*blocked_request_observer*/ None,
managed_network_requirements_enabled,
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
command,
cwd.as_path(),
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
use_legacy_landlock,
allow_network_for_proxy(managed_network_requirements_enabled),
@@ -769,6 +769,16 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
fn workspace_write_policy_for_codex_home(
codex_home: &TempDir,
) -> codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
let memories_root = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(codex_home.path().join("memories"))
.expect("codex home tempdir should be absolute");
codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&memories_root))
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn debug_sandbox_honors_active_permission_profiles() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
@@ -947,8 +957,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
workspace_write_policy_for_codex_home(&codex_home)
);
Ok(())
@@ -980,8 +989,7 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
workspace_write_policy_for_codex_home(&codex_home)
);
Ok(())
codex-rs/config/src/config_requirements.rs
-4
View File
@@ -2144,7 +2144,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
let config: ConfigRequirementsToml = from_str(toml_str)?;
let requirements: ConfigRequirements = with_unknown_source(config).try_into()?;
let root = if cfg!(windows) { "C:\\repo" } else { "/repo" };
assert!(
requirements
.permission_profile
@@ -2154,7 +2153,6 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
.is_ok()
);
let workspace_write_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(root)?],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -2265,9 +2263,7 @@ allowed_approvals_reviewers = ["user"]
);
let requirements = ConfigRequirements::try_from(requirements_with_sources)?;
let root = if cfg!(windows) { "C:\\repo" } else { "/repo" };
let workspace_write_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(root)?],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
codex-rs/config/src/config_toml.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ impl ConfigToml {
SandboxMode::ReadOnly => PermissionProfile::read_only(),
SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite => match self.sandbox_workspace_write.as_ref() {
Some(SandboxWorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
writable_roots: _,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
@@ -771,7 +771,7 @@ impl ConfigToml {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
};
PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
writable_roots,
&[],
network_policy,
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
codex-rs/core/src/codex_thread.rs
+30 -6
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ pub struct ThreadConfigSnapshot {
pub permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
pub active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub ephemeral: bool,
pub reasoning_effort: Option<ReasoningEffort>,
pub personality: Option<Personality>,
@@ -68,11 +69,15 @@ pub struct ThreadConfigSnapshot {
impl ThreadConfigSnapshot {
pub fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let permission_profile = self
.permission_profile
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&self.workspace_roots);
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&self.permission_profile,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
self.permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
self.cwd.as_path(),
)
}
@@ -82,6 +87,7 @@ impl ThreadConfigSnapshot {
#[derive(Clone, Default)]
pub struct CodexThreadTurnContextOverrides {
pub cwd: Option<PathBuf>,
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
pub approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
pub approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
pub sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
@@ -241,8 +247,26 @@ impl CodexThread {
&self,
overrides: CodexThreadTurnContextOverrides,
) -> ConstraintResult<()> {
let updates = self.turn_context_updates_from_overrides(overrides).await;
self.codex.session.validate_settings(&updates).await
}
/// Apply persistent thread context overrides immediately.
pub async fn update_turn_context_overrides(
&self,
overrides: CodexThreadTurnContextOverrides,
) -> ConstraintResult<()> {
let updates = self.turn_context_updates_from_overrides(overrides).await;
self.codex.session.update_settings(updates).await
}
async fn turn_context_updates_from_overrides(
&self,
overrides: CodexThreadTurnContextOverrides,
) -> SessionSettingsUpdate {
let CodexThreadTurnContextOverrides {
cwd,
workspace_roots,
approval_policy,
approvals_reviewer,
sandbox_policy,
@@ -266,8 +290,9 @@ impl CodexThread {
.with_updates(model, effort, /*developer_instructions*/ None)
};
let updates = SessionSettingsUpdate {
SessionSettingsUpdate {
cwd,
workspace_roots,
approval_policy,
approvals_reviewer,
sandbox_policy,
@@ -279,8 +304,7 @@ impl CodexThread {
service_tier,
personality,
..Default::default()
};
self.codex.session.validate_settings(&updates).await
}
}
/// Use sparingly: this is intended to be removed soon.
codex-rs/core/src/config/config_loader_tests.rs
+3 -3
View File
@@ -527,9 +527,10 @@ writable_roots = ["~/code"]
let expected_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(home.join("code"))?;
match &config.legacy_sandbox_policy() {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } => {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
assert_eq!(
writable_roots
config
.workspace_roots
.iter()
.filter(|root| **root == expected_root)
.count(),
@@ -593,7 +594,6 @@ allowed_sandbox_modes = ["read-only"]
.permission_profile
.can_set(&PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
+62 -43
View File
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ use codex_model_provider_info::WireApi;
use codex_models_manager::bundled_models_response;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ServiceTier;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement;
@@ -100,6 +99,14 @@ use std::path::Path;
use std::time::Duration;
use tempfile::TempDir;
fn materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(config: &Config) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
config
.permissions
.permission_profile()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&config.workspace_roots)
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
}
fn stdio_mcp(command: &str) -> McpServerConfig {
McpServerConfig {
transport: McpServerTransportConfig::Stdio {
@@ -1364,7 +1371,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: memories_root.clone(),
path: memories_root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
@@ -1373,7 +1380,6 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![memories_root],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -1550,7 +1556,6 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_applies_runtime_roots_to_legacy_projection(
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![memories_root],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -1751,7 +1756,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_tabl
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
assert_eq!(
config
.permissions
@@ -1772,7 +1777,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_tabl
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications()
async fn default_permissions_read_only_records_additional_writable_roots_as_workspace_roots()
-> std::io::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
@@ -1793,18 +1798,18 @@ async fn default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modi
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected additional writable root to modify :read-only, policy: {policy:?}"
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
assert_eq!(
policy,
PermissionProfile::read_only().file_system_sandbox_policy()
);
assert_eq!(
config.workspace_roots,
vec![cwd.path().abs(), extra_root.clone()]
);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
Some(
ActivePermissionProfile::new(":read-only").with_modifications(vec![
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path: extra_root },
])
)
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(":read-only"))
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1835,7 +1840,7 @@ async fn explicit_builtin_workspace_profile_ignores_legacy_workspace_write_setti
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.network_sandbox_policy(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
@@ -1875,7 +1880,7 @@ async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_profile_for_trusted_project() -> std::
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
assert_eq!(
config
.permissions
@@ -1943,7 +1948,7 @@ async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_sandbox_workspace_write_se
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected implicit :workspace to preserve sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots, policy: {policy:?}"
@@ -1960,12 +1965,11 @@ async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_sandbox_workspace_write_se
);
match config.legacy_sandbox_policy() {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
} => {
assert!(writable_roots.contains(&extra_root));
assert!(config.workspace_roots.contains(&extra_root));
assert!(network_access);
assert!(exclude_tmpdir_env_var);
assert!(!exclude_slash_tmp);
@@ -2009,7 +2013,7 @@ async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_add_dir_metadata_carveouts
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let policy = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config);
let extra_root = extra_root.path().abs();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
@@ -2184,9 +2188,6 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_direct_write_roots_outside_workspace_root()
)
.await?;
let memories_root = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(std::fs::canonicalize(
codex_home.path().join("memories"),
)?)?;
assert!(
config
.permissions
@@ -2196,7 +2197,6 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_direct_write_roots_outside_workspace_root()
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![external_write_path, memories_root],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -2871,7 +2871,6 @@ trust_level = "trusted"
assert_eq!(
resolution,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![writable_root.clone()],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -2911,7 +2910,6 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
assert_eq!(
resolution,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![writable_root],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -2975,13 +2973,21 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
"case `{name}` should preserve network semantics from legacy config"
);
assert_eq!(
file_system_policy
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_policy, cwd.path())
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("case `{name}` should round-trip: {err}")),
sandbox_policy,
"case `{name}` should preserve its legacy compatibility projection"
);
let direct_legacy_projection =
file_system_policy.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(network_policy, cwd.path());
if name == "workspace-write" && !cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
direct_legacy_projection.is_err(),
"case `{name}` should require the compatibility projection for split workspace roots"
);
} else {
assert_eq!(
direct_legacy_projection
.unwrap_or_else(|err| panic!("case `{name}` should round-trip: {err}")),
sandbox_policy,
"case `{name}` should preserve its legacy compatibility projection"
);
}
match name.as_str() {
"danger-full-access" | "read-only" => {
@@ -3023,14 +3029,19 @@ exclude_slash_tmp = true
})
);
assert!(
file_system_policy
config.workspace_roots.contains(&extra_root),
"case `{name}` should store legacy writable roots as thread workspace roots"
);
assert!(
materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config)
.entries
.contains(&FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: extra_root.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
})
}),
"case `{name}` should materialize workspace roots into runtime write access"
);
for subpath in [".git", ".agents", ".codex"] {
assert!(
@@ -3773,14 +3784,15 @@ async fn add_dir_override_extends_workspace_writable_roots() -> std::io::Result<
}
} else {
match &config.legacy_sandbox_policy() {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } => {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
assert_eq!(
writable_roots
config
.workspace_roots
.iter()
.filter(|root| **root == expected_backend)
.count(),
1,
"expected single writable root entry for {}",
"expected single workspace root entry for {}",
expected_backend.display()
);
}
@@ -3840,13 +3852,16 @@ async fn workspace_write_always_includes_memories_root_once() -> std::io::Result
"expected memories root directory to exist at {}",
memories_root.display()
);
let expected_memories_root = memories_root.abs();
let expected_memories_root =
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(std::fs::canonicalize(&memories_root)?)?;
match &config.legacy_sandbox_policy() {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } => {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } => {
let writable_roots = materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy(&config)
.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(config.cwd.as_path());
assert_eq!(
writable_roots
.iter()
.filter(|root| **root == expected_memories_root)
.filter(|root| root.root == expected_memories_root)
.count(),
1,
"expected single writable root entry for {}",
@@ -7294,6 +7309,7 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_o3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -7741,6 +7757,7 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -7902,6 +7919,7 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_zdr_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -8048,6 +8066,7 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt5_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -9056,7 +9075,7 @@ async fn requirements_web_search_mode_overrides_danger_full_access_default() ->
assert_eq!(
resolve_web_search_mode_for_turn(
&config.web_search_mode,
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
),
WebSearchMode::Cached,
);
codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+129 -67
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ use codex_protocol::config_types::WebSearchConfig;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WebSearchMode;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ModelsResponse;
@@ -242,10 +241,10 @@ pub struct Permissions {
pub approval_policy: Constrained<AskForApproval>,
/// Canonical effective runtime permissions after config requirements and
/// runtime readable-root additions have been applied.
pub permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
/// Named or implicit built-in profile selected by config, rather than an
/// ad-hoc override.
pub active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
/// Effective network configuration applied to all spawned processes.
pub network: Option<NetworkProxySpec>,
/// Whether the model may request a login shell for shell-based tools.
@@ -267,6 +266,35 @@ pub struct Permissions {
}
impl Permissions {
/// Build permissions from the two constrained values that are required for
/// a minimal in-process configuration.
pub fn from_approval_and_profile(
approval_policy: Constrained<AskForApproval>,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
) -> Self {
Self {
approval_policy,
permission_profile,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: true,
}
}
/// Borrow the constrained canonical profile. This is for code that must
/// preserve or inspect the active requirements wrapper without mutating it.
pub fn permission_profile_constraint(&self) -> &Constrained<PermissionProfile> {
&self.permission_profile
}
/// Borrow the canonical effective runtime permissions without cloning.
pub fn permission_profile_ref(&self) -> &PermissionProfile {
self.permission_profile.get()
}
/// Effective runtime permissions after config requirements and runtime
/// readable-root additions have been applied.
pub fn permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
@@ -278,6 +306,45 @@ impl Permissions {
self.active_permission_profile.clone()
}
/// Replace the full constrained profile value and clear any profile-name
/// sidecar because the new constraint may no longer match that name.
pub fn replace_permission_profile_constraint(
&mut self,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
) {
self.permission_profile = permission_profile;
self.active_permission_profile = None;
}
/// Replace the full constrained profile value and preserve the active
/// profile sidecar when the caller has already validated both together.
pub fn replace_permission_profile_constraint_with_active_profile(
&mut self,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
) {
self.permission_profile = permission_profile;
self.active_permission_profile = active_permission_profile;
}
/// Record the active profile id only if it still describes the current
/// canonical profile.
pub fn set_active_permission_profile_for_current_profile(
&mut self,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
expected_permission_profile: Option<&PermissionProfile>,
) {
self.active_permission_profile =
match (active_permission_profile, expected_permission_profile) {
(Some(active_permission_profile), Some(expected_permission_profile))
if self.permission_profile.get() == expected_permission_profile =>
{
Some(active_permission_profile)
}
_ => None,
};
}
/// Effective filesystem sandbox policy derived from the canonical profile.
pub fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.get().file_system_sandbox_policy()
@@ -579,6 +646,10 @@ pub struct Config {
/// layer are resolved against this path.
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Absolute roots that define the writable project/workspace set for
/// symbolic `:project_roots` permission entries.
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Preferred store for CLI auth credentials.
/// file (default): Use a file in the Codex home directory.
/// keyring: Use an OS-specific keyring service.
@@ -1860,6 +1931,11 @@ fn apply_managed_filesystem_constraints(
}
}
fn dedupe_absolute_paths(paths: &mut Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>) {
let mut seen = HashSet::new();
paths.retain(|path| seen.insert(path.clone()));
}
/// Optional overrides for user configuration (e.g., from CLI flags).
#[derive(Default, Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ConfigOverrides {
@@ -1888,6 +1964,9 @@ pub struct ConfigOverrides {
pub ephemeral: Option<bool>,
/// Additional directories that should be treated as writable roots for this session.
pub additional_writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
/// Explicit workspace roots for this session. When set, this is the full
/// root list rather than an additive override.
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
}
/// Resolves the OSS provider from CLI override, profile config, or global config.
@@ -2169,6 +2248,7 @@ impl Config {
tools_web_search_request: override_tools_web_search_request,
ephemeral,
additional_writable_roots,
workspace_roots: workspace_roots_override,
} = overrides;
if sandbox_mode.is_some() && permission_profile.is_some() {
@@ -2257,11 +2337,10 @@ impl Config {
}
}
}))?;
let mut additional_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = additional_writable_roots
let requested_additional_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = additional_writable_roots
.into_iter()
.map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, resolved_cwd.as_path()))
.collect();
let requested_additional_writable_roots = additional_writable_roots.clone();
let repo_root = resolve_root_git_project_for_trust(fs, &resolved_cwd).await;
let active_project = cfg
.get_active_project(
@@ -2303,12 +2382,7 @@ impl Config {
};
let memories_root = memory_root(&codex_home);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&memories_root)?;
if !additional_writable_roots
.iter()
.any(|existing| existing == &memories_root)
{
additional_writable_roots.push(memories_root);
}
let internal_writable_roots = vec![memories_root];
let profiles_are_active = default_permissions_override.is_some()
|| matches!(
@@ -2318,6 +2392,31 @@ impl Config {
|| permission_config_syntax.is_none();
let using_implicit_builtin_profile =
permission_config_syntax.is_none() && default_permissions.is_none();
let should_seed_legacy_workspace_roots =
default_permissions.is_none()
&& matches!(
permission_config_syntax,
None | Some(PermissionConfigSyntax::Legacy)
);
let mut workspace_roots = match workspace_roots_override {
Some(workspace_roots) => workspace_roots
.into_iter()
.map(|path| {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, resolved_cwd.as_path())
})
.collect(),
None => {
let mut workspace_roots = vec![resolved_cwd.clone()];
workspace_roots.extend(requested_additional_writable_roots.clone());
if should_seed_legacy_workspace_roots
&& let Some(sandbox_workspace_write) = cfg.sandbox_workspace_write.as_ref()
{
workspace_roots.extend(sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots.clone());
}
workspace_roots
}
};
dedupe_absolute_paths(&mut workspace_roots);
let (
mut configured_network_proxy_config,
permission_profile,
@@ -2354,10 +2453,7 @@ impl Config {
);
if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&additional_writable_roots,
);
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -2408,28 +2504,8 @@ impl Config {
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
);
if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
file_system_sandbox_policy = if using_implicit_builtin_profile {
file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(
&additional_writable_roots,
)
} else {
file_system_sandbox_policy.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&additional_writable_roots,
)
};
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
} else if matches!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Managed { .. })
&& !requested_additional_writable_roots.is_empty()
{
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&requested_additional_writable_roots,
);
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
@@ -2446,22 +2522,7 @@ impl Config {
// when doing so would lose roots, network, or tmp settings.
None
} else {
let active_permission_profile = if !requested_additional_writable_roots.is_empty()
&& matches!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Managed { .. })
{
ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions).with_modifications(
requested_additional_writable_roots
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|path| {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
})
.collect(),
)
} else {
ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions)
};
Some(active_permission_profile)
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions))
};
(
configured_network_proxy_config,
@@ -2500,25 +2561,25 @@ impl Config {
}
let (mut file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
// `additional_writable_roots` is a legacy workspace-write knob. It
// only applies when the derived managed profile has workspace-style
// write access to the project roots; read-only, disabled, external,
// and future non-workspace profiles must not silently grow extra
// write access.
// Internal writable roots only apply when the derived managed
// profile has workspace-style write access to the project roots;
// read-only, disabled, external, and future non-workspace profiles
// must not silently grow extra write access.
let materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&workspace_roots)
.file_system_sandbox_policy();
if matches!(permission_profile.enforcement(), SandboxEnforcement::Managed)
&& file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
&& materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
)
&& !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& !materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
{
// Keep legacy behavior for extra writable roots while storing
// the result as the canonical permission profile. Explicit
// extra roots are concrete paths, so their metadata carveouts
// are also concrete rather than symbolic `:project_roots`
// entries.
// Keep Codex runtime write access while storing the result as
// the canonical permission profile. Workspace roots themselves
// are held separately on the thread.
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&additional_writable_roots);
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -3016,6 +3077,7 @@ impl Config {
model_provider_id,
model_provider,
cwd: resolved_cwd,
workspace_roots,
startup_warnings,
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: constrained_approval_policy.value,
@@ -3306,7 +3368,7 @@ impl Config {
pub fn managed_network_requirements_enabled(&self) -> bool {
!matches!(
self.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
self.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
PermissionProfile::Disabled
) && self
.config_layer_stack
codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ pub(crate) fn builtin_permission_profile(
BUILT_IN_READ_ONLY_PROFILE => Some(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
BUILT_IN_WORKSPACE_PROFILE => Some(match workspace_write {
Some(SandboxWorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
writable_roots: _,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
}) => PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
writable_roots,
&[],
if *network_access {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
codex-rs/core/src/context/permissions_instructions.rs
+30 -3
View File
@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ const SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS: &str =
const SANDBOX_MODE_WORKSPACE_WRITE: &str =
include_str!("prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/workspace_write.md");
const SANDBOX_MODE_READ_ONLY: &str = include_str!("prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/read_only.md");
const MAX_WRITABLE_ROOTS_IN_PROMPT: usize = 8;
const MAX_WRITABLE_ROOT_LABEL_CHARS: usize = 160;
static SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS_TEMPLATE: LazyLock<Template> = LazyLock::new(|| {
Template::parse(SANDBOX_MODE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS.trim_end())
@@ -256,17 +258,42 @@ fn writable_roots_text(writable_roots: Option<Vec<WritableRoot>>) -> Option<Stri
return None;
}
let total_roots = roots.len();
let roots_list: Vec<String> = roots
.iter()
.map(|r| format!("`{}`", r.root.to_string_lossy()))
.take(MAX_WRITABLE_ROOTS_IN_PROMPT)
.map(|r| {
format!(
"`{}`",
truncate_writable_root_label(&r.root.to_string_lossy())
)
})
.collect();
Some(if roots_list.len() == 1 {
Some(if total_roots == 1 {
format!(" The writable root is {}.", roots_list[0])
} else {
} else if total_roots == roots_list.len() {
format!(" The writable roots are {}.", roots_list.join(", "))
} else {
format!(
" The writable roots include {}, and {} more.",
roots_list.join(", "),
total_roots - roots_list.len()
)
})
}
fn truncate_writable_root_label(label: &str) -> String {
if label.chars().count() <= MAX_WRITABLE_ROOT_LABEL_CHARS {
return label.to_string();
}
label
.chars()
.take(MAX_WRITABLE_ROOT_LABEL_CHARS - 3)
.chain("...".chars())
.collect()
}
fn approved_command_prefixes_text(exec_policy: &Policy) -> Option<String> {
format_allow_prefixes(exec_policy.get_allowed_prefixes())
.filter(|prefixes| !prefixes.is_empty())
codex-rs/core/src/context/permissions_instructions_tests.rs
+40 -2
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use std::path::PathBuf;
fn renders_sandbox_mode_text() {
assert_eq!(
sandbox_text(SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite, NetworkAccess::Restricted),
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in `cwd` and `writable_roots`. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is restricted."
"Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in the configured writable roots. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is restricted."
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ fn builds_permissions_with_network_access_override() {
#[test]
fn builds_permissions_from_policy() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -106,6 +105,45 @@ fn builds_permissions_from_profile() {
assert!(text.contains(writable_root.to_string_lossy().as_ref()));
}
#[test]
fn writable_roots_text_limits_long_root_lists() {
let roots = (0..MAX_WRITABLE_ROOTS_IN_PROMPT + 2)
.map(|index| WritableRoot {
root: AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(format!("/tmp/root-{index}"))
.expect("absolute path"),
read_only_subpaths: Vec::new(),
protected_metadata_names: Vec::new(),
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let visible_root_labels = roots
.iter()
.map(|root| root.root.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
let text = writable_roots_text(Some(roots)).expect("writable roots text");
assert!(text.contains(&visible_root_labels[0]));
assert!(text.contains(&visible_root_labels[MAX_WRITABLE_ROOTS_IN_PROMPT - 1]));
assert!(!text.contains(&visible_root_labels[MAX_WRITABLE_ROOTS_IN_PROMPT]));
assert!(text.contains("and 2 more"));
}
#[test]
fn writable_roots_text_truncates_long_root_labels() {
let long_segment = "a".repeat(MAX_WRITABLE_ROOT_LABEL_CHARS + 20);
let root = WritableRoot {
root: AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(format!("/tmp/{long_segment}"))
.expect("absolute path"),
read_only_subpaths: Vec::new(),
protected_metadata_names: Vec::new(),
};
let text = writable_roots_text(Some(vec![root])).expect("writable roots text");
assert!(!text.contains(&long_segment));
assert!(text.contains("..."));
}
#[test]
fn includes_request_rule_instructions_for_on_request() {
let mut exec_policy = Policy::empty();
codex-rs/core/src/context/prompts/permissions/sandbox_mode/workspace_write.md
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in `cwd` and `writable_roots`. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is {{network_access}}.
Filesystem sandboxing defines which files can be read or written. `sandbox_mode` is `workspace-write`: The sandbox permits reading files, and editing files in the configured writable roots. Editing files in other directories requires approval. Network access is {{network_access}}.
codex-rs/core/src/context_manager/history_tests.rs
+2
View File
@@ -123,11 +123,13 @@ fn reference_context_item() -> TurnContextItem {
turn_id: Some("reference-turn".to_string()),
trace_id: None,
cwd: PathBuf::from("/tmp/reference-cwd"),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
current_date: Some("2026-03-23".to_string()),
timezone: Some("America/Los_Angeles".to_string()),
approval_policy: AskForApproval::OnRequest,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: "gpt-test".to_string(),
codex-rs/core/src/context_manager/updates.rs
+9 -2
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,14 @@ fn build_permissions_update_item(
}
let prev = previous?;
if prev.permission_profile() == next.permission_profile()
let prev_permission_profile = prev
.permission_profile()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&prev.workspace_roots);
let next_permission_profile = next
.permission_profile
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&next.workspace_roots);
if prev_permission_profile == next_permission_profile
&& prev.approval_policy == next.approval_policy.value()
{
return None;
@@ -57,7 +64,7 @@ fn build_permissions_update_item(
Some(
PermissionsInstructions::from_permission_profile(
&next.permission_profile,
&next_permission_profile,
next.approval_policy.value(),
next.config.approvals_reviewer,
exec_policy,
codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs
+34 -28
View File
@@ -99,11 +99,11 @@ pub struct ExecParams {
///
/// The elevated Windows backend consumes extra deny-read paths plus explicit
/// read and write roots during setup/refresh. The unelevated restricted-token
/// backend only consumes extra deny-write carveouts on top of the legacy
/// `WorkspaceWrite` allow set. Read-root overrides are layered on top of the
/// baseline helper roots that the elevated setup path needs to launch the
/// sandboxed command; split policies that opt into platform defaults carry
/// that explicitly with the override.
/// backend consumes explicit write roots and extra deny-write carveouts on top
/// of the legacy `WorkspaceWrite` shape.
/// Read-root overrides are layered on top of the baseline helper roots that the
/// elevated setup path needs to launch the sandboxed command. Split policies
/// that opt into platform defaults carry that explicitly with the override.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) struct WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
pub(crate) read_roots_override: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
@@ -296,6 +296,7 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
params: ExecParams,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
sandbox_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: &Option<PathBuf>,
use_legacy_landlock: bool,
stdout_stream: Option<StdoutStream>,
@@ -304,6 +305,7 @@ pub async fn process_exec_tool_call(
params,
permission_profile,
sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_legacy_landlock,
)?;
@@ -318,6 +320,7 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
params: ExecParams,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
sandbox_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: &Option<PathBuf>,
use_legacy_landlock: bool,
) -> Result<ExecRequest> {
@@ -379,6 +382,7 @@ pub fn build_exec_request(
enforce_managed_network,
network: network.as_ref(),
sandbox_policy_cwd: sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level,
@@ -612,11 +616,11 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
let additional_deny_read_paths = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
.map(|overrides| overrides.additional_deny_read_paths.clone())
.unwrap_or_default();
let elevated_read_roots_override = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
let read_roots_override = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
.and_then(|overrides| overrides.read_roots_override.clone());
let elevated_read_roots_include_platform_defaults = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
let read_roots_include_platform_defaults = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
.is_some_and(|overrides| overrides.read_roots_include_platform_defaults);
let elevated_write_roots_override = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
let write_roots_override = windows_sandbox_filesystem_overrides
.and_then(|overrides| overrides.write_roots_override.clone());
let spawn_res = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
if use_elevated {
@@ -631,10 +635,9 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
timeout_ms,
use_private_desktop: windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
proxy_enforced,
read_roots_override: elevated_read_roots_override.as_deref(),
read_roots_include_platform_defaults:
elevated_read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
write_roots_override: elevated_write_roots_override.as_deref(),
read_roots_override: read_roots_override.as_deref(),
read_roots_include_platform_defaults,
write_roots_override: write_roots_override.as_deref(),
deny_read_paths_override: &additional_deny_read_paths,
deny_write_paths_override: &additional_deny_write_paths,
},
@@ -648,6 +651,7 @@ async fn exec_windows_sandbox(
&cwd,
env,
timeout_ms,
write_roots_override.as_deref(),
&additional_deny_read_paths,
&additional_deny_write_paths,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
@@ -1075,12 +1079,18 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
.map(|root| normalize_windows_override_path(root.root.as_path()))
.collect::<std::result::Result<_, _>>()?;
if legacy_root_paths != split_root_paths {
let write_roots_override = if legacy_root_paths == split_root_paths {
None
} else if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. })
&& !split_root_paths.iter().any(|path| path.parent().is_none())
{
Some(split_root_paths.iter().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>())
} else {
return Err(
"windows unelevated restricted-token sandbox cannot enforce split writable root sets directly; refusing to run unsandboxed"
.to_string(),
);
}
};
for writable_root in &split_writable_roots {
for read_only_subpath in &writable_root.read_only_subpaths {
@@ -1102,22 +1112,18 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
let mut additional_deny_write_paths = BTreeSet::new();
for split_root in &split_writable_roots {
let split_root_path = normalize_windows_override_path(split_root.root.as_path())?;
let Some(legacy_root) = legacy_writable_roots.iter().find(|candidate| {
let legacy_root = legacy_writable_roots.iter().find(|candidate| {
normalize_windows_override_path(candidate.root.as_path())
.is_ok_and(|candidate_path| candidate_path == split_root_path)
}) else {
return Err(
"windows unelevated restricted-token sandbox cannot enforce split writable root sets directly; refusing to run unsandboxed"
.to_string(),
);
};
});
for read_only_subpath in &split_root.read_only_subpaths {
if !legacy_root
.read_only_subpaths
.iter()
.any(|candidate| candidate == read_only_subpath)
{
if !legacy_root.is_some_and(|legacy_root| {
legacy_root
.read_only_subpaths
.iter()
.any(|candidate| candidate == read_only_subpath)
}) {
additional_deny_write_paths.insert(normalize_windows_override_path(
read_only_subpath.as_path(),
)?);
@@ -1125,15 +1131,15 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
}
}
if additional_deny_read_paths.is_empty() && additional_deny_write_paths.is_empty() {
if write_roots_override.is_none() && additional_deny_write_paths.is_empty() {
return Ok(None);
}
Ok(Some(WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
read_roots_override: None,
read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
write_roots_override: None,
additional_deny_read_paths,
write_roots_override,
additional_deny_write_paths: additional_deny_write_paths
.into_iter()
.map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).map_err(|err| err.to_string()))
codex-rs/core/src/exec_tests.rs
+53 -9
View File
@@ -365,6 +365,7 @@ async fn process_exec_tool_call_preserves_full_buffer_capture_policy() -> Result
},
&permission_profile,
&cwd,
&[],
&None,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
@@ -470,7 +471,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_restricted_policies() {
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_allows_legacy_workspace_write_policies() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -528,7 +528,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_split_only_filesystem_policies() {
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -573,7 +572,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_root_write_read_only_carveouts() {
let docs = temp_dir.path().join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -619,7 +617,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_supports_full_read_split_write_read_carveouts() {
let docs = cwd.join("docs");
std::fs::create_dir_all(docs.as_path()).expect("create docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -677,7 +674,6 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
let blocked = cwd.join("blocked");
std::fs::create_dir_all(blocked.as_path()).expect("create blocked");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -719,6 +715,57 @@ fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_restricted_token_supports_extra_split_writable_root_override() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let cwd = dunce::canonicalize(temp_dir.path())
.expect("canonicalize temp dir")
.abs();
let extra_root = cwd.join("extra-root");
std::fs::create_dir_all(extra_root.as_path()).expect("create extra root");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Special {
value: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd.clone() },
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath::Path {
path: extra_root.clone(),
},
access: codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
assert_eq!(
resolve_windows_restricted_token_filesystem_overrides(
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken,
&policy,
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
&cwd,
WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
),
Ok(Some(WindowsSandboxFilesystemOverrides {
read_roots_override: None,
read_roots_include_platform_defaults: false,
write_roots_override: Some(vec![cwd.to_path_buf(), extra_root.to_path_buf()]),
additional_deny_read_paths: vec![],
additional_deny_write_paths: vec![],
}))
);
}
#[test]
fn windows_elevated_supports_split_restricted_read_roots() {
let temp_dir = tempfile::TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
@@ -764,7 +811,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_split_write_read_carveouts() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(&docs).expect("create docs");
let expected_docs = dunce::canonicalize(&docs).expect("canonical docs");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -822,7 +868,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_split_carveouts() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(&blocked).expect("create blocked");
let expected_blocked = dunce::canonicalize(&blocked).expect("canonical blocked");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -885,7 +930,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_supports_unreadable_globs() {
std::fs::create_dir_all(secret.parent().expect("parent")).expect("create parent");
std::fs::write(&secret, "secret").expect("write secret");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -942,7 +986,6 @@ fn windows_elevated_rejects_reopened_writable_descendants() {
let nested = docs.join("nested");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&nested).expect("create nested");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -1115,6 +1158,7 @@ async fn process_exec_tool_call_respects_cancellation_token() -> Result<()> {
params,
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
&cwd,
&[],
&None,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs
+6 -4
View File
@@ -895,9 +895,11 @@ pub(crate) fn build_guardian_review_session_config(
guardian_config.developer_instructions = None;
guardian_config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_only(AskForApproval::Never);
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile = Constrained::allow_only(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
);
guardian_config
.permissions
.replace_permission_profile_constraint(Constrained::allow_only(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
));
guardian_config
.permissions
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, guardian_config.cwd.as_path())
@@ -923,7 +925,7 @@ pub(crate) fn build_guardian_review_session_config(
guardian_config.permissions.network = Some(NetworkProxySpec::from_config_and_constraints(
live_network_config,
network_constraints,
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
)?);
}
for feature in [
codex-rs/core/src/guardian/tests.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2159,7 +2159,7 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_preserves_parent_network_proxy() {
}),
..Default::default()
}),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
)
.expect("network proxy spec");
parent_config.permissions.network = Some(network.clone());
@@ -2186,8 +2186,8 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_preserves_parent_network_proxy() {
Constrained::allow_only(AskForApproval::Never)
);
assert_eq!(
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile,
Constrained::allow_only(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint(),
&Constrained::allow_only(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
))
);
@@ -2226,7 +2226,7 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_uses_live_network_proxy_state() {
NetworkProxySpec::from_config_and_constraints(
parent_network,
/*requirements*/ None,
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
)
.expect("parent network proxy spec"),
);
codex-rs/core/src/personality_migration_tests.rs
+1
View File
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ async fn write_rollout_with_user_event(dir: &Path, thread_id: ThreadId) -> io::R
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: TEST_TIMESTAMP.to_string(),
cwd: std::path::PathBuf::from("."),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "test_originator".to_string(),
cli_version: "test_version".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::Cli,
codex-rs/core/src/rollout.rs
+4
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ impl codex_rollout::RolloutConfigView for Config {
self.cwd.as_path()
}
fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf] {
&self.workspace_roots
}
fn model_provider_id(&self) -> &str {
self.model_provider_id.as_str()
}
codex-rs/core/src/safety_tests.rs
+8 -13
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ fn test_writable_roots_constraint() {
// Policy limited to the workspace only; exclude system temp roots so
// only `cwd` is writable by default.
let policy_workspace_only = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -51,17 +50,16 @@ fn test_writable_roots_constraint() {
&cwd,
));
// With the parent dir explicitly added as a writable root, the
// outside write should be permitted.
let policy_with_parent = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![parent],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
// With the parent dir explicitly added as a workspace root, the outside
// write should be permitted.
let file_system_policy_with_parent =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: parent },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}]);
assert!(is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_outside,
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&policy_with_parent),
&file_system_policy_with_parent,
&cwd,
));
}
@@ -101,7 +99,6 @@ fn granular_with_all_flags_true_matches_on_request_for_out_of_root_patch() {
let outside_path = parent.join("outside.txt");
let add_outside = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&outside_path, "".to_string());
let policy_workspace_only = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -145,7 +142,6 @@ fn granular_sandbox_approval_false_rejects_out_of_root_patch() {
let outside_path = parent.join("outside.txt");
let add_outside = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&outside_path, "".to_string());
let policy_workspace_only = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -295,7 +291,6 @@ fn missing_project_dot_codex_config_requires_approval() {
let config_path = cwd.join(".codex").join("config.toml");
let action = ApplyPatchAction::new_add_for_test(&config_path, "".to_string());
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
codex-rs/core/src/session/handlers.rs
+4
View File
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ pub(super) async fn user_input_or_turn_inner(
items,
SessionSettingsUpdate {
cwd: Some(cwd),
workspace_roots: None,
approval_policy: Some(approval_policy),
approvals_reviewer,
sandbox_policy: Some(sandbox_policy),
@@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ pub(super) async fn user_input_or_turn_inner(
}
Op::UserInputWithTurnContext {
cwd,
workspace_roots,
approval_policy,
approvals_reviewer,
sandbox_policy,
@@ -195,6 +197,8 @@ pub(super) async fn user_input_or_turn_inner(
items,
SessionSettingsUpdate {
cwd,
workspace_roots: workspace_roots
.map(|roots| roots.into_iter().map(|root| root.to_path_buf()).collect()),
approval_policy,
approvals_reviewer,
sandbox_policy,
codex-rs/core/src/session/mod.rs
+7 -2
View File
@@ -615,10 +615,11 @@ impl Codex {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: environment_selections.to_selections(),
@@ -2581,9 +2582,13 @@ impl Session {
developer_sections.push(model_switch_message);
}
if turn_context.config.include_permissions_instructions {
let permission_profile = turn_context
.permission_profile
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&turn_context.workspace_roots);
developer_sections.push(
PermissionsInstructions::from_permission_profile(
&turn_context.permission_profile,
&permission_profile,
turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
turn_context.config.approvals_reviewer,
self.services.exec_policy.current().as_ref(),
codex-rs/core/src/session/review.rs
+1
View File
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ pub(super) async fn spawn_review_thread(
windows_sandbox_level: parent_turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
shell_environment_policy: parent_turn_context.shell_environment_policy.clone(),
cwd: parent_turn_context.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: parent_turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
final_output_json_schema: None,
codex_self_exe: parent_turn_context.codex_self_exe.clone(),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: parent_turn_context.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
codex-rs/core/src/session/rollout_reconstruction_tests.rs
+16
View File
@@ -61,11 +61,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_bare_turn_context_does_not_hydrate_previ
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -102,11 +104,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_hydrates_previous_turn_settings_from_lif
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -912,11 +916,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_turn_context_after_compaction_reestablis
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -990,11 +996,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_turn_context_after_compaction_reestablis
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -1021,11 +1029,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_aborted_turn_without_id_clears_active_tu
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -1136,11 +1146,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_unmatched_abort_preserves_active_turn_fo
turn_id: Some(current_turn_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: current_model.to_string(),
@@ -1250,11 +1262,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_trailing_incomplete_turn_compaction_clea
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -1402,11 +1416,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_resumed_replaced_incomplete_compacted_turn_clear
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
+66 -25
View File
@@ -75,6 +75,9 @@ pub(crate) struct SessionConfiguration {
/// execution sandbox are resolved against this directory **instead** of
/// the process-wide current working directory.
pub(super) cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Workspace roots used to materialize symbolic `:project_roots`
/// permission entries for this thread.
pub(super) workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Directory containing all Codex state for this session.
pub(super) codex_home: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Optional user-facing name for the thread, updated during the session.
@@ -112,12 +115,13 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
}
pub(super) fn sandbox_policy(&self) -> SandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile()
let permission_profile = self.materialized_permission_profile();
permission_profile
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(&self.cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = self.file_system_sandbox_policy();
codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
self.permission_profile.get(),
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
self.network_sandbox_policy(),
&self.cwd,
@@ -126,13 +130,21 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
}
pub(super) fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.get().file_system_sandbox_policy()
self.materialized_permission_profile()
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
}
pub(super) fn network_sandbox_policy(&self) -> NetworkSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.get().network_sandbox_policy()
}
fn materialized_permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
self.permission_profile
.get()
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&self.workspace_roots)
}
pub(super) fn thread_config_snapshot(&self) -> ThreadConfigSnapshot {
ThreadConfigSnapshot {
model: self.collaboration_mode.model().to_string(),
@@ -143,6 +155,7 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
permission_profile: self.permission_profile(),
active_permission_profile: self.active_permission_profile(),
cwd: self.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: self.workspace_roots.clone(),
ephemeral: self.original_config_do_not_use.ephemeral,
reasoning_effort: self.collaboration_mode.reasoning_effort(),
personality: self.personality,
@@ -223,6 +236,20 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
let cwd_changed = absolute_cwd.as_path() != self.cwd.as_path();
next_configuration.cwd = absolute_cwd;
if let Some(workspace_roots) = updates.workspace_roots.clone() {
let mut workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = workspace_roots
.into_iter()
.map(|path| {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
normalize_for_native_workdir(path.as_path()),
next_configuration.cwd.as_path(),
)
})
.collect();
dedupe_absolute_paths(&mut workspace_roots);
next_configuration.workspace_roots = workspace_roots;
}
if let Some(permission_profile) = updates.permission_profile.clone() {
let active_permission_profile =
updates.active_permission_profile.clone().or_else(|| {
@@ -253,26 +280,31 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
),
)?;
next_configuration.active_permission_profile = None;
} else if cwd_changed
&& file_system_policy_matches_legacy
&& file_system_policy_has_rebindable_project_root_write
{
// Preserve richer split policies across cwd-only updates; only
// rederive when the session is already using a structurally
// cwd-bound legacy bridge.
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_preserving_deny_entries(
&current_sandbox_policy,
&next_configuration.cwd,
&current_file_system_sandbox_policy,
);
next_configuration.permission_profile.set(
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&current_sandbox_policy),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
current_network_sandbox_policy,
),
)?;
} else {
if cwd_changed
&& file_system_policy_matches_legacy
&& file_system_policy_has_rebindable_project_root_write
{
// Preserve richer split policies across cwd-only updates; only
// rederive when the session is already using a structurally
// cwd-bound legacy bridge.
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_preserving_deny_entries(
&current_sandbox_policy,
&next_configuration.cwd,
&current_file_system_sandbox_policy,
);
next_configuration.permission_profile.set(
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&current_sandbox_policy),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
current_network_sandbox_policy,
),
)?;
}
if let Some(active_permission_profile) = updates.active_permission_profile.clone() {
next_configuration.active_permission_profile = Some(active_permission_profile);
}
}
if let Some(app_server_client_name) = updates.app_server_client_name.clone() {
next_configuration.app_server_client_name = Some(app_server_client_name);
@@ -306,9 +338,15 @@ impl SessionConfiguration {
}
}
fn dedupe_absolute_paths(paths: &mut Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>) {
let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
paths.retain(|path| seen.insert(path.clone()));
}
#[derive(Default, Clone)]
pub(crate) struct SessionSettingsUpdate {
pub(crate) cwd: Option<PathBuf>,
pub(crate) workspace_roots: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
pub(crate) approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
pub(crate) approvals_reviewer: Option<ApprovalsReviewer>,
pub(crate) sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
@@ -425,6 +463,7 @@ impl Session {
dynamic_tools: session_configuration.dynamic_tools.clone(),
metadata: ThreadPersistenceMetadata {
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_path_buf()),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
model_provider: config.model_provider_id.clone(),
memory_mode: if config.memories.generate_memories {
ThreadMemoryMode::Enabled
@@ -447,6 +486,7 @@ impl Session {
include_archived: true,
metadata: ThreadPersistenceMetadata {
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_path_buf()),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
model_provider: config.model_provider_id.clone(),
memory_mode: if config.memories.generate_memories {
ThreadMemoryMode::Enabled
@@ -769,7 +809,7 @@ impl Session {
let (network_proxy, session_network_proxy) = Self::start_managed_network_proxy(
spec,
current_exec_policy.as_ref(),
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
network_policy_decider.as_ref().map(Arc::clone),
blocked_request_observer.as_ref().map(Arc::clone),
managed_network_requirements_configured,
@@ -832,7 +872,7 @@ impl Session {
// setup is straightforward enough and performs well.
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
@@ -934,6 +974,7 @@ impl Session {
permission_profile: session_configuration.permission_profile(),
active_permission_profile: session_configuration.active_permission_profile(),
cwd: session_configuration.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: session_configuration.workspace_roots.clone(),
reasoning_effort: session_configuration.collaboration_mode.reasoning_effort(),
initial_messages,
network_proxy: session_network_proxy.filter(|_| {
codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
+95 -27
View File
@@ -1823,8 +1823,10 @@ async fn session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox() ->
};
let expected_sandbox_policy = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.permission_profile = codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
config.permissions.replace_permission_profile_constraint(
codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&sandbox_policy,
)),
);
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy)
@@ -1977,11 +1979,13 @@ async fn record_initial_history_forked_hydrates_previous_turn_settings() {
turn_id: Some(turn_context.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: turn_context.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: turn_context.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: turn_context.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: turn_context.current_date.clone(),
timezone: turn_context.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: turn_context.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
@@ -2578,10 +2582,11 @@ async fn set_rate_limits_retains_previous_credits() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: Vec::new(),
@@ -2682,10 +2687,11 @@ async fn set_rate_limits_updates_plan_type_when_present() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: Vec::new(),
@@ -2948,6 +2954,7 @@ async fn attach_thread_persistence(session: &mut Session) -> PathBuf {
dynamic_tools: Vec::new(),
metadata: ThreadPersistenceMetadata {
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_path_buf()),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
model_provider: config.model_provider_id.clone(),
memory_mode: if config.memories.generate_memories {
ThreadMemoryMode::Enabled
@@ -3155,10 +3162,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_configuration_for_tests() -> SessionConfigurati
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: Vec::new(),
@@ -3201,7 +3209,6 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_preserves_profile_file_system_policy_on_cwd
session_configuration.cwd = original_cwd.abs();
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -3235,9 +3242,15 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_preserves_profile_file_system_policy_on_cwd
.expect("cwd-only update should succeed");
assert_eq!(
updated.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
updated.permission_profile().file_system_sandbox_policy(),
file_system_sandbox_policy
);
let expected_materialized_file_system_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&updated.workspace_roots);
assert_eq!(
updated.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
expected_materialized_file_system_policy
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -3287,9 +3300,16 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_preserves_existing_deny_
expected_file_system_policy.glob_scan_max_depth = Some(2);
expected_file_system_policy.entries.push(deny_entry);
assert_eq!(
updated.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
updated.permission_profile().file_system_sandbox_policy(),
expected_file_system_policy
);
let expected_materialized_file_system_policy = expected_file_system_policy
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&updated.workspace_roots);
assert_eq!(
updated.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
expected_materialized_file_system_policy
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -3306,7 +3326,7 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_accepts_direct_write_roo
let file_system_sandbox_policy =
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: external_write_path.clone(),
path: external_write_path,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}]);
@@ -3330,7 +3350,6 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_permission_profile_accepts_direct_write_roo
assert_eq!(
updated.sandbox_policy(),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![external_write_path],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -3425,14 +3444,15 @@ enabled = false
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configuration_apply_rederives_legacy_file_system_policy_on_cwd_update() {
async fn session_configuration_apply_preserves_legacy_workspace_roots_on_cwd_update() {
let mut session_configuration = make_session_configuration_for_tests().await;
let workspace = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let project_root = workspace.path().join("project");
let original_cwd = project_root.join("subdir");
session_configuration.cwd = original_cwd.abs();
let original_cwd = original_cwd.abs();
session_configuration.cwd = original_cwd.clone();
session_configuration.workspace_roots = vec![original_cwd.clone()];
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -3451,20 +3471,61 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_rederives_legacy_file_system_policy_on_cwd_
let updated = session_configuration
.apply(&SessionSettingsUpdate {
cwd: Some(project_root.clone()),
cwd: Some(project_root),
..Default::default()
})
.expect("cwd-only update should succeed");
let expected_file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
&updated.sandbox_policy(),
&project_root,
);
let expected_file_system_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(std::slice::from_ref(&original_cwd));
assert_eq!(updated.workspace_roots, vec![original_cwd.clone()]);
assert!(
updated
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.is_semantically_equivalent_to(&expected_file_system_policy, &project_root),
"cwd-only update should rederive the legacy filesystem policy for the new cwd"
.is_semantically_equivalent_to(&expected_file_system_policy, original_cwd.as_path()),
"cwd-only update should preserve the existing workspace roots"
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configuration_apply_preserves_active_permission_profile_on_legacy_cwd_update() {
let mut session_configuration = make_session_configuration_for_tests().await;
let workspace = tempfile::tempdir().expect("create temp dir");
let project_root = workspace.path().join("project");
let original_cwd = project_root.join("subdir");
let original_cwd = original_cwd.abs();
session_configuration.cwd = original_cwd.clone();
session_configuration.workspace_roots = vec![original_cwd];
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
&sandbox_policy,
&session_configuration.cwd,
);
session_configuration.permission_profile = codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
SandboxEnforcement::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(&sandbox_policy),
),
);
let active_permission_profile =
codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile::new(":workspace");
let updated = session_configuration
.apply(&SessionSettingsUpdate {
cwd: Some(project_root),
active_permission_profile: Some(active_permission_profile.clone()),
..Default::default()
})
.expect("cwd and active permission profile update should succeed");
assert_eq!(
updated.active_permission_profile(),
Some(active_permission_profile)
);
}
@@ -3681,10 +3742,11 @@ async fn session_new_fails_when_zsh_fork_enabled_without_zsh_path() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: Vec::new(),
@@ -3790,10 +3852,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_and_context() -> (Session, TurnContext) {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: default_environments,
@@ -3837,7 +3900,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_and_context() -> (Session, TurnContext) {
let services = SessionServices {
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
@@ -4020,10 +4083,11 @@ async fn make_session_with_config_and_rx(
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: default_environments,
@@ -4123,10 +4187,11 @@ async fn make_session_with_history_source_and_agent_control_and_rx(
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: default_environments,
@@ -4774,6 +4839,7 @@ fn op_kind_distinguishes_turn_ops() {
final_output_json_schema: None,
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
cwd: None,
workspace_roots: None,
approval_policy: None,
approvals_reviewer: None,
sandbox_policy: None,
@@ -5169,6 +5235,7 @@ async fn shutdown_complete_does_not_append_to_thread_store_after_shutdown() {
dynamic_tools: Vec::new(),
metadata: ThreadPersistenceMetadata {
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_path_buf()),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
model_provider: config.model_provider_id.clone(),
memory_mode: if config.memories.generate_memories {
ThreadMemoryMode::Enabled
@@ -5510,10 +5577,11 @@ where
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
codex_home: config.codex_home.clone(),
thread_name: None,
environments: default_environments,
@@ -5557,7 +5625,7 @@ where
let services = SessionServices {
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
+17 -3
View File
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ pub struct TurnContext {
/// by the model as well as sandbox policies are resolved against this path
/// instead of `std::env::current_dir()`.
pub(crate) cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
pub(crate) workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub(crate) current_date: Option<String>,
pub(crate) timezone: Option<String>,
pub(crate) app_server_client_name: Option<String>,
@@ -103,7 +104,10 @@ impl TurnContext {
}
pub(crate) fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy()
self.permission_profile
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&self.workspace_roots)
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
}
pub(crate) fn network_sandbox_policy(&self) -> NetworkSandboxPolicy {
@@ -252,6 +256,7 @@ impl TurnContext {
thread_source: self.thread_source,
environments: self.environments.clone(),
cwd: self.cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: self.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: self.current_date.clone(),
timezone: self.timezone.clone(),
app_server_client_name: self.app_server_client_name.clone(),
@@ -312,6 +317,7 @@ impl TurnContext {
FileSystemSandboxContext {
permissions,
cwd: Some(self.cwd.clone()),
workspace_roots: self.workspace_roots.clone(),
windows_sandbox_level: self.windows_sandbox_level,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: self
.config
@@ -347,11 +353,13 @@ impl TurnContext {
turn_id: Some(self.sub_id.clone()),
trace_id: self.trace_id.clone(),
cwd: self.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: self.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: self.current_date.clone(),
timezone: self.timezone.clone(),
approval_policy: self.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: self.sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: Some(self.permission_profile()),
active_permission_profile: self.config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
network: self.turn_context_network_item(),
file_system_sandbox_policy: self.non_legacy_file_system_sandbox_policy(),
model: self.model_info.slug.clone(),
@@ -409,14 +417,19 @@ impl Session {
let config = session_configuration.original_config_do_not_use.clone();
let mut per_turn_config = (*config).clone();
per_turn_config.cwd = cwd;
per_turn_config.workspace_roots = session_configuration.workspace_roots.clone();
per_turn_config.model_reasoning_effort =
session_configuration.collaboration_mode.reasoning_effort();
per_turn_config.model_reasoning_summary = session_configuration.model_reasoning_summary;
per_turn_config.service_tier = session_configuration.service_tier.clone();
per_turn_config.personality = session_configuration.personality;
per_turn_config.approvals_reviewer = session_configuration.approvals_reviewer;
per_turn_config.permissions.permission_profile =
session_configuration.permission_profile.clone();
per_turn_config
.permissions
.replace_permission_profile_constraint_with_active_profile(
session_configuration.permission_profile.clone(),
session_configuration.active_permission_profile(),
);
let permission_profile = session_configuration.permission_profile();
let resolved_web_search_mode =
resolve_web_search_mode_for_turn(&per_turn_config.web_search_mode, &permission_profile);
@@ -550,6 +563,7 @@ impl Session {
thread_source: session_configuration.thread_source,
environments,
cwd,
workspace_roots: session_configuration.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: Some(current_date),
timezone: Some(timezone),
app_server_client_name: session_configuration.app_server_client_name.clone(),
codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/apply_patch_tests.rs
-2
View File
@@ -252,7 +252,6 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths_skip_dirs_already_writable_under_workspace_root()
let file_path = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(nested.join("file.txt"))
.expect("nested file path should be absolute");
let sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -274,7 +273,6 @@ fn write_permissions_for_paths_keep_dirs_outside_workspace_root() {
.expect("outside file path should be absolute");
let cwd_abs = cwd.abs();
let sandbox_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from(&SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_common.rs
+1
View File
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ pub(crate) fn apply_spawn_agent_runtime_overrides(
config.permissions.shell_environment_policy = turn.shell_environment_policy.clone();
config.codex_linux_sandbox_exe = turn.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone();
config.cwd = turn.cwd.clone();
config.workspace_roots = turn.workspace_roots.clone();
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(turn.permission_profile())
codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_tests.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3402,7 +3402,7 @@ async fn build_agent_spawn_config_uses_turn_context_values() {
turn.cwd = temp_dir.abs();
turn.codex_linux_sandbox_exe = Some(PathBuf::from("/bin/echo"));
let sandbox_policy = pick_allowed_sandbox_policy(
&turn.config.permissions.permission_profile,
turn.config.permissions.permission_profile_constraint(),
turn.config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
turn.cwd.as_path(),
);
codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs
+3
View File
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {
enforce_managed_network: attempt.enforce_managed_network,
manager: attempt.manager,
sandbox_cwd: attempt.sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots: attempt.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: attempt.codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_legacy_landlock: attempt.use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: attempt.windows_sandbox_level,
@@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {
enforce_managed_network: managed_network_active,
manager: &self.sandbox,
sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots: &turn_ctx.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: turn_ctx.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_ref(),
use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: turn_ctx.windows_sandbox_level,
@@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {
enforce_managed_network: managed_network_active,
manager: &self.sandbox,
sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots: &turn_ctx.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: None,
use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: turn_ctx.windows_sandbox_level,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch.rs
+1
View File
@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ impl ApplyPatchRuntime {
Some(FileSystemSandboxContext {
permissions,
cwd: Some(attempt.sandbox_cwd.clone()),
workspace_roots: attempt.workspace_roots.to_vec(),
windows_sandbox_level: attempt.windows_sandbox_level,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: attempt.windows_sandbox_private_desktop,
use_legacy_landlock: attempt.use_legacy_landlock,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/apply_patch_tests.rs
+2
View File
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ async fn file_system_sandbox_context_uses_active_attempt() {
enforce_managed_network: false,
manager: &manager,
sandbox_cwd: &path,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(&path),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: None,
use_legacy_landlock: true,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::RestrictedToken,
@@ -267,6 +268,7 @@ async fn no_sandbox_attempt_has_no_file_system_context() {
enforce_managed_network: false,
manager: &manager,
sandbox_cwd: &path,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(&path),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: None,
use_legacy_landlock: false,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/mod_tests.rs
+1
View File
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ async fn explicit_escalation_prepares_exec_without_managed_network() -> anyhow::
enforce_managed_network: false,
manager: &manager,
sandbox_cwd: &cwd,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(&cwd),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: None,
use_legacy_landlock: false,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs
+5 -1
View File
@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ pub(super) async fn try_run_zsh_fork(
windows_sandbox_level,
arg0,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
workspace_roots: attempt.workspace_roots.to_vec(),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: ctx.turn.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
use_legacy_landlock: ctx.turn.features.use_legacy_landlock(),
};
@@ -232,7 +233,7 @@ pub(super) async fn try_run_zsh_fork(
pub(crate) async fn prepare_unified_exec_zsh_fork(
req: &crate::tools::runtimes::unified_exec::UnifiedExecRequest,
_attempt: &SandboxAttempt<'_>,
attempt: &SandboxAttempt<'_>,
ctx: &ToolCtx,
exec_request: ExecRequest,
shell_zsh_path: &std::path::Path,
@@ -269,6 +270,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn prepare_unified_exec_zsh_fork(
windows_sandbox_level: exec_request.windows_sandbox_level,
arg0: exec_request.arg0.clone(),
sandbox_policy_cwd: exec_request.windows_sandbox_policy_cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: attempt.workspace_roots.to_vec(),
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: ctx.turn.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone(),
use_legacy_landlock: ctx.turn.features.use_legacy_landlock(),
};
@@ -753,6 +755,7 @@ struct CoreShellCommandExecutor {
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
arg0: Option<String>,
sandbox_policy_cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<PathBuf>,
use_legacy_landlock: bool,
}
@@ -923,6 +926,7 @@ impl CoreShellCommandExecutor {
enforce_managed_network: self.network.is_some(),
network: self.network.as_ref(),
sandbox_policy_cwd: &self.sandbox_policy_cwd,
workspace_roots: &self.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
use_legacy_landlock: self.use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: self.windows_sandbox_level,
codex-rs/core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs
+2
View File
@@ -385,6 +385,7 @@ pub(crate) struct SandboxAttempt<'a> {
pub enforce_managed_network: bool,
pub(crate) manager: &'a SandboxManager,
pub(crate) sandbox_cwd: &'a AbsolutePathBuf,
pub(crate) workspace_roots: &'a [AbsolutePathBuf],
pub codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<&'a std::path::PathBuf>,
pub use_legacy_landlock: bool,
pub windows_sandbox_level: codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel,
@@ -407,6 +408,7 @@ impl<'a> SandboxAttempt<'a> {
enforce_managed_network: self.enforce_managed_network,
network,
sandbox_policy_cwd: self.sandbox_cwd,
workspace_roots: self.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self
.codex_linux_sandbox_exe
.map(std::path::PathBuf::as_path),
codex-rs/core/tests/common/test_codex.rs
+2
View File
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ impl TestCodexBuilder {
load_default_config_for_test(home).await
};
config.cwd = cwd_override;
config.workspace_roots = vec![config.cwd.clone()];
config.model_provider = model_provider;
if let Ok(path) = codex_utils_cargo_bin::cargo_bin("codex") {
config.codex_self_exe = Some(path);
@@ -543,6 +544,7 @@ impl TestCodexBuilder {
for mutator in mutators {
mutator(&mut config);
}
config.workspace_roots = vec![config.cwd.clone()];
ensure_test_model_catalog(&mut config)?;
if config.include_apply_patch_tool {
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/approvals.rs
-4
View File
@@ -827,7 +827,6 @@ fn scenarios() -> Vec<ScenarioSpec> {
use AskForApproval::*;
let workspace_write = |network_access| SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -2047,7 +2046,6 @@ async fn approving_apply_patch_for_session_skips_future_prompts_for_same_file()
let server = start_mock_server().await;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnRequest;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -2803,7 +2801,6 @@ allow_local_binding = true
)?;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnFailure;
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -3083,7 +3080,6 @@ allow_local_binding = true
)?;
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::OnFailure;
let turn_sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/exec.rs
+1
View File
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ where
params,
&PermissionProfile::read_only(),
&cwd,
&[],
&None,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/permissions_messages.rs
+7 -3
View File
@@ -575,9 +575,13 @@ async fn permissions_message_includes_writable_roots() -> Result<()> {
let permissions = permissions_texts(&req.single_request());
let normalize_line_endings = |s: &str| s.replace("\r\n", "\n");
let exec_policy = load_exec_policy(&test.config.config_layer_stack).await?;
let sandbox_policy = test.config.legacy_sandbox_policy();
let expected = PermissionsInstructions::from_policy(
&sandbox_policy,
let permission_profile = test
.config
.permissions
.permission_profile()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&test.config.workspace_roots);
let expected = PermissionsInstructions::from_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
test.config.approvals_reviewer,
&exec_policy,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/personality_migration.rs
+2
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ async fn write_rollout_with_user_event(dir: &Path, thread_id: ThreadId) -> io::R
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: TEST_TIMESTAMP.to_string(),
cwd: std::path::PathBuf::from("."),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "test_originator".to_string(),
cli_version: "test_version".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::Cli,
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ async fn write_rollout_with_meta_only(dir: &Path, thread_id: ThreadId) -> io::Re
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: TEST_TIMESTAMP.to_string(),
cwd: std::path::PathBuf::from("."),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "test_originator".to_string(),
cli_version: "test_version".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::Cli,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/prompt_caching.rs
+6 -3
View File
@@ -436,9 +436,12 @@ async fn overrides_turn_context_but_keeps_cached_prefix_and_key_constant() -> an
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ true,
);
let sandbox_policy = permission_profile
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(config.cwd.as_path())
.expect("workspace profile should have legacy projection");
let sandbox_policy = codex_sandboxing::compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
);
codex
.submit(Op::OverrideTurnContext {
cwd: None,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/request_permissions.rs
-1
View File
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@ async fn expect_request_permissions_event(
fn workspace_write_excluding_tmp() -> SandboxPolicy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/resume_warning.rs
+2
View File
@@ -29,11 +29,13 @@ fn resume_history(
turn_id: Some(turn_id.clone()),
trace_id: None,
cwd: config.cwd.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots.clone(),
current_date: None,
timezone: None,
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.value(),
sandbox_policy: config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
file_system_sandbox_policy: None,
model: previous_model.to_string(),
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/sqlite_state.rs
+1
View File
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ async fn backfill_scans_existing_rollouts() -> Result<()> {
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: "2026-01-27T12:00:00Z".to_string(),
cwd: codex_home.to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "test".to_string(),
cli_version: "test".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::default(),
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/unified_exec.rs
+12 -7
View File
@@ -906,9 +906,11 @@ allow_local_binding = true
.enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never);
config.permissions.permission_profile = Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy_for_config),
);
config
.permissions
.replace_permission_profile_constraint(Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy_for_config),
));
});
let test = builder.build_remote_aware(server).await?;
assert!(
@@ -2752,10 +2754,13 @@ async fn unified_exec_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy() -> Result<()> {
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
});
config.permissions.permission_profile =
Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
config
.permissions
.replace_permission_profile_constraint(Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
));
});
let TestCodex {
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -344,11 +344,12 @@ async fn user_shell_command_does_not_set_network_sandbox_env_var() -> anyhow::Re
let server = responses::start_mock_server().await;
let mut builder = core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex().with_config(|config| {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
config.permissions.permission_profile =
config.permissions.replace_permission_profile_constraint(
codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
));
)),
);
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/windows_sandbox.rs
+2
View File
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ async fn windows_restricted_token_rejects_exact_and_glob_deny_read_policy() -> a
},
&permission_profile,
&cwd,
std::slice::from_ref(&cwd),
&None,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ async fn windows_elevated_enforces_exact_and_glob_deny_read_policy() -> anyhow::
},
&permission_profile,
&cwd,
std::slice::from_ref(&cwd),
&None,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
codex-rs/exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs
+1
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxRunner {
enforce_managed_network: false,
network: None,
sandbox_policy_cwd: cwd.as_path(),
workspace_roots: &sandbox_context.workspace_roots,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe: self.runtime_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.as_deref(),
use_legacy_landlock: sandbox_context.use_legacy_landlock,
windows_sandbox_level: sandbox_context.windows_sandbox_level,
codex-rs/exec/Cargo.toml
+1
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ codex-protocol = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-absolute-path = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-cli = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-oss = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-sandbox-summary = { workspace = true }
owo-colors = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = { workspace = true }
codex-rs/exec/src/event_processor_with_human_output.rs
+2 -88
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
use std::io::IsTerminal;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use codex_app_server_protocol::CommandExecutionStatus;
@@ -11,11 +10,9 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::ThreadTokenUsage;
use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnStatus;
use codex_core::config::Config;
use codex_model_provider_info::WireApi;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::num_format::format_with_separators;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SessionConfiguredEvent;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::canonicalize_preserving_symlinks;
use codex_utils_sandbox_summary::summarize_config_permission_profile;
use owo_colors::OwoColorize;
use owo_colors::Style;
@@ -434,13 +431,7 @@ fn config_summary_entries(
"approval",
config.permissions.approval_policy.value().to_string(),
),
(
"sandbox",
summarize_permission_profile(
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
),
),
("sandbox", summarize_config_permission_profile(config)),
];
if config.model_provider.wire_api == WireApi::Responses {
entries.push((
@@ -465,83 +456,6 @@ fn config_summary_entries(
entries
}
fn summarize_permission_profile(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile, cwd: &Path) -> String {
match permission_profile {
PermissionProfile::Disabled => "danger-full-access".to_string(),
PermissionProfile::External { network } => {
let mut summary = "external-sandbox".to_string();
append_network_summary(&mut summary, *network);
summary
}
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. } => {
let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let network_policy = permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy();
if file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
let mut summary = "workspace-write [/]".to_string();
append_network_summary(&mut summary, network_policy);
return summary;
}
let writable_roots = file_system_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd);
if writable_roots.is_empty() {
let mut summary = "read-only".to_string();
append_network_summary(&mut summary, network_policy);
return summary;
}
let mut summary = "workspace-write".to_string();
let writable_entries = writable_roots
.iter()
.map(|root| writable_root_label(root.root.as_path(), cwd))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
summary.push_str(&format!(" [{}]", writable_entries.join(", ")));
append_network_summary(&mut summary, network_policy);
summary
}
}
}
fn append_network_summary(summary: &mut String, network_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy) {
if network_policy.is_enabled() {
summary.push_str(" (network access enabled)");
}
}
fn writable_root_label(root: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> String {
if paths_match_after_canonicalization(root, cwd) {
return "workdir".to_string();
}
if paths_match_after_canonicalization(root, Path::new("/tmp")) {
return "/tmp".to_string();
}
if std::env::var_os("TMPDIR")
.filter(|tmpdir| !tmpdir.is_empty())
.is_some_and(|tmpdir| paths_match_after_canonicalization(root, Path::new(&tmpdir)))
{
return "$TMPDIR".to_string();
}
display_path_label(root)
}
fn paths_match_after_canonicalization(left: &Path, right: &Path) -> bool {
match (
canonicalize_preserving_symlinks(left),
canonicalize_preserving_symlinks(right),
) {
(Ok(left), Ok(right)) if left == right => true,
_ => display_path_label(left) == display_path_label(right),
}
}
fn display_path_label(path: &Path) -> String {
path.strip_prefix("/private/tmp")
.ok()
.map(|suffix| Path::new("/tmp").join(suffix))
.unwrap_or_else(|| path.to_path_buf())
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string()
}
fn reasoning_text(
summary: &[String],
content: &[String],
codex-rs/exec/src/event_processor_with_human_output_tests.rs
-81
View File
@@ -2,24 +2,14 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::ServerNotification;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ThreadItem;
use codex_app_server_protocol::Turn;
use codex_app_server_protocol::TurnStatus;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::test_support::PathBufExt;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::test_support::test_path_buf;
use owo_colors::Style;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use super::EventProcessorWithHumanOutput;
use super::final_message_from_turn_items;
use super::paths_match_after_canonicalization;
use super::reasoning_text;
use super::should_print_final_message_to_stdout;
use super::should_print_final_message_to_tty;
use super::summarize_permission_profile;
use crate::event_processor::EventProcessor;
#[test]
@@ -99,77 +89,6 @@ fn reasoning_text_uses_raw_content_when_enabled() {
assert_eq!(text.as_deref(), Some("raw"));
}
#[test]
fn summarizes_disabled_permission_profile_as_danger_full_access() {
assert_eq!(
summarize_permission_profile(
&PermissionProfile::Disabled,
test_path_buf("/tmp").as_path()
),
"danger-full-access"
);
}
#[test]
fn summarizes_external_permission_profile() {
assert_eq!(
summarize_permission_profile(
&PermissionProfile::External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled,
},
test_path_buf("/tmp").as_path(),
),
"external-sandbox (network access enabled)"
);
}
#[test]
fn summarizes_managed_workspace_write_permission_profile() {
let cwd = test_path_buf("/tmp/project").abs();
let cache_root = test_path_buf("/tmp/cache").abs();
let profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd.clone() },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cache_root.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
summarize_permission_profile(&profile, cwd.as_path()),
format!("workspace-write [workdir, {}]", cache_root.display())
);
}
#[test]
fn summarizes_managed_read_only_permission_profile() {
let profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(Vec::new()),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
);
assert_eq!(
summarize_permission_profile(&profile, test_path_buf("/tmp/project").as_path()),
"read-only"
);
}
#[test]
fn distinct_missing_paths_do_not_match_after_canonicalization() {
assert!(!paths_match_after_canonicalization(
test_path_buf("/tmp/codex-missing-left").as_path(),
test_path_buf("/tmp/codex-missing-right").as_path(),
));
}
#[test]
fn final_message_from_turn_items_uses_latest_agent_message() {
let message = final_message_from_turn_items(&[
codex-rs/exec/src/lib.rs
+77 -43
View File
@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::ConfigWarningNotification;
use codex_app_server_protocol::JSONRPCErrorError;
use codex_app_server_protocol::McpServerElicitationAction;
use codex_app_server_protocol::McpServerElicitationRequestResponse;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileModificationParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileSelectionParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RequestId;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ReviewStartParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ReviewStartResponse;
@@ -81,8 +79,8 @@ use codex_protocol::SessionId;
use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::config_types::SandboxMode;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewRequest;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewTarget;
@@ -211,6 +209,7 @@ struct ExecRunArgs {
prompt: Option<String>,
skip_git_repo_check: bool,
stderr_with_ansi: bool,
workspace_roots_explicit: bool,
}
fn exec_root_span() -> tracing::Span {
@@ -267,6 +266,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::Result
cwd,
add_dir,
} = shared;
let workspace_roots_explicit = !add_dir.is_empty();
let (_stdout_with_ansi, stderr_with_ansi) = match color {
cli::Color::Always => (true, true),
@@ -422,6 +422,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::Result
show_raw_agent_reasoning: oss.then_some(true),
tools_web_search_request: None,
ephemeral: ephemeral.then_some(true),
workspace_roots: None,
additional_writable_roots: add_dir,
};
@@ -550,6 +551,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::Result
prompt,
skip_git_repo_check,
stderr_with_ansi,
workspace_roots_explicit,
})
.instrument(exec_span)
.await
@@ -572,6 +574,7 @@ async fn run_exec_session(args: ExecRunArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
prompt,
skip_git_repo_check,
stderr_with_ansi,
workspace_roots_explicit,
} = args;
let mut event_processor: Box<dyn EventProcessor> = match json_mode {
@@ -692,7 +695,11 @@ async fn run_exec_session(args: ExecRunArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
&client,
ClientRequest::ThreadResume {
request_id: request_ids.next(),
params: thread_resume_params_from_config(&config, thread_id),
params: thread_resume_params_from_config(
&config,
thread_id,
workspace_roots_explicit,
),
},
"thread/resume",
)
@@ -747,7 +754,7 @@ async fn run_exec_session(args: ExecRunArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
event_processor.print_config_summary(&config, &prompt_summary, &session_configured);
if !json_mode
&& let Some(message) =
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile.get())
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile_ref())
{
event_processor.process_warning(message);
}
@@ -777,6 +784,7 @@ async fn run_exec_session(args: ExecRunArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
responsesapi_client_metadata: None,
environments: None,
cwd: Some(default_cwd),
workspace_roots: None,
approval_policy: Some(default_approval_policy.into()),
approvals_reviewer: None,
sandbox_policy: None,
@@ -940,7 +948,7 @@ fn thread_start_params_from_config(config: &Config) -> ThreadStartParams {
let permissions = permissions_selection_from_config(config);
let sandbox = permissions.is_none().then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.permission_profile_ref(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
});
@@ -948,6 +956,7 @@ fn thread_start_params_from_config(config: &Config) -> ThreadStartParams {
model: config.model.clone(),
model_provider: Some(config.model_provider_id.clone()),
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
workspace_roots: Some(config.workspace_roots.clone()),
approval_policy: Some(config.permissions.approval_policy.value().into()),
approvals_reviewer: approvals_reviewer_override_from_config(config),
sandbox: sandbox.flatten(),
@@ -958,51 +967,36 @@ fn thread_start_params_from_config(config: &Config) -> ThreadStartParams {
}
}
fn thread_resume_params_from_config(config: &Config, thread_id: String) -> ThreadResumeParams {
fn thread_resume_params_from_config(
config: &Config,
thread_id: String,
workspace_roots_explicit: bool,
) -> ThreadResumeParams {
let permissions = permissions_selection_from_config(config);
let sandbox = permissions.is_none().then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
});
ThreadResumeParams {
thread_id,
model: config.model.clone(),
model_provider: Some(config.model_provider_id.clone()),
cwd: Some(config.cwd.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
workspace_roots: workspace_roots_explicit.then(|| config.workspace_roots.clone()),
approval_policy: Some(config.permissions.approval_policy.value().into()),
approvals_reviewer: approvals_reviewer_override_from_config(config),
sandbox: sandbox.flatten(),
sandbox: None,
permissions,
config: config_request_overrides_from_config(config),
..ThreadResumeParams::default()
}
}
fn permissions_selection_from_config(config: &Config) -> Option<PermissionProfileSelectionParams> {
fn permissions_selection_from_config(config: &Config) -> Option<String> {
config
.permissions
.active_permission_profile()
.map(permissions_selection_from_active_profile)
}
fn permissions_selection_from_active_profile(
active: ActivePermissionProfile,
) -> PermissionProfileSelectionParams {
let modifications = active
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(|modification| match modification {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
PermissionProfileModificationParams::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
PermissionProfileSelectionParams::Profile {
id: active.id,
modifications: (!modifications.is_empty()).then_some(modifications),
}
fn permissions_selection_from_active_profile(active: ActivePermissionProfile) -> String {
active.id
}
fn sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
@@ -1062,7 +1056,7 @@ where
fn session_configured_from_thread_start_response(
response: &ThreadStartResponse,
config: &Config,
_config: &Config,
) -> Result<SessionConfiguredEvent, String> {
session_configured_from_thread_response(
&response.thread.session_id,
@@ -1074,20 +1068,21 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_start_response(
response.service_tier.clone(),
response.approval_policy.to_core(),
response.approvals_reviewer.to_core(),
response
.permission_profile
.clone()
.map(Into::into)
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.permission_profile()),
permission_profile_from_thread_response(
&response.sandbox,
&response.cwd,
&response.workspace_roots,
),
response.active_permission_profile.clone().map(Into::into),
response.cwd.clone(),
response.workspace_roots.clone(),
response.reasoning_effort,
)
}
fn session_configured_from_thread_resume_response(
response: &ThreadResumeResponse,
config: &Config,
_config: &Config,
) -> Result<SessionConfiguredEvent, String> {
session_configured_from_thread_response(
&response.thread.session_id,
@@ -1099,17 +1094,54 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_resume_response(
response.service_tier.clone(),
response.approval_policy.to_core(),
response.approvals_reviewer.to_core(),
response
.permission_profile
.clone()
.map(Into::into)
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.permission_profile()),
permission_profile_from_thread_response(
&response.sandbox,
&response.cwd,
&response.workspace_roots,
),
response.active_permission_profile.clone().map(Into::into),
response.cwd.clone(),
response.workspace_roots.clone(),
response.reasoning_effort,
)
}
fn permission_profile_from_thread_response(
sandbox: &codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> PermissionProfile {
match sandbox {
codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
legacy_writable_roots,
} => {
let writable_roots = if workspace_roots.is_empty() {
legacy_writable_roots.as_slice()
} else {
workspace_roots
};
PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
writable_roots,
if *network_access {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
},
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
)
}
codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
| codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. }
| codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&sandbox.to_core(), cwd.as_path())
}
}
}
fn review_target_to_api(target: ReviewTarget) -> ApiReviewTarget {
match target {
ReviewTarget::UncommittedChanges => ApiReviewTarget::UncommittedChanges,
@@ -1136,6 +1168,7 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_response(
permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
active_permission_profile: Option<codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile>,
cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
reasoning_effort: Option<codex_protocol::openai_models::ReasoningEffort>,
) -> Result<SessionConfiguredEvent, String> {
let session_id = SessionId::from_string(session_id)
@@ -1157,6 +1190,7 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_response(
permission_profile,
active_permission_profile,
cwd,
workspace_roots,
reasoning_effort,
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
codex-rs/exec/src/lib_tests.rs
+173 -10
View File
@@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ async fn thread_start_params_include_review_policy_when_review_policy_is_manual_
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.harness_overrides(ConfigOverrides {
approvals_reviewer: Some(ApprovalsReviewer::User),
default_permissions: Some(":workspace".to_string()),
..Default::default()
})
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
@@ -456,7 +457,7 @@ async fn thread_start_params_include_review_policy_when_auto_review_is_enabled()
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn thread_lifecycle_params_include_legacy_sandbox_when_no_active_profile() {
async fn thread_lifecycle_params_handle_legacy_sandbox_when_no_active_profile() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
@@ -471,7 +472,11 @@ async fn thread_lifecycle_params_include_legacy_sandbox_when_no_active_profile()
.expect("build config with legacy sandbox override");
let start_params = thread_start_params_from_config(&config);
let resume_params = thread_resume_params_from_config(&config, "thread-id".to_string());
let resume_params = thread_resume_params_from_config(
&config,
"thread-id".to_string(),
/*workspace_roots_explicit*/ false,
);
assert_eq!(config.permissions.active_permission_profile(), None);
assert_eq!(
@@ -479,11 +484,43 @@ async fn thread_lifecycle_params_include_legacy_sandbox_when_no_active_profile()
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess)
);
assert_eq!(start_params.permissions, None);
assert_eq!(
resume_params.sandbox,
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess)
);
assert_eq!(resume_params.sandbox, None);
assert_eq!(resume_params.permissions, None);
assert_eq!(resume_params.workspace_roots, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn thread_resume_params_include_workspace_roots_only_when_explicit() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/tmp/exec-resume-extra-root");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.harness_overrides(ConfigOverrides {
additional_writable_roots: vec![extra_root.clone()],
..Default::default()
})
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
.build()
.await
.expect("build config with additional writable root");
let implicit_resume_params = thread_resume_params_from_config(
&config,
"thread-id".to_string(),
/*workspace_roots_explicit*/ false,
);
let explicit_resume_params = thread_resume_params_from_config(
&config,
"thread-id".to_string(),
/*workspace_roots_explicit*/ true,
);
assert_eq!(implicit_resume_params.workspace_roots, None);
assert_eq!(
explicit_resume_params.workspace_roots,
Some(config.workspace_roots)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
@@ -513,7 +550,7 @@ async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_review_policy_from_respons
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_permission_profile_from_response() {
async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_sandbox_projection() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
@@ -523,7 +560,7 @@ async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_permission_profile_from_re
.await
.expect("build config");
let mut response = sample_thread_start_response();
response.permission_profile = Some(PermissionProfile::Disabled.into());
response.sandbox = codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess;
let event = session_configured_from_thread_start_response(&response, &config)
.expect("build bootstrap session configured event");
@@ -531,6 +568,114 @@ async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_permission_profile_from_re
assert_eq!(event.permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Disabled);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_workspace_roots_for_workspace_sandbox() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
.build()
.await
.expect("build config");
let mut response = sample_thread_start_response();
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/tmp/extra-root").abs();
response.workspace_roots = vec![extra_root.clone()];
response.sandbox = codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
};
let event = session_configured_from_thread_start_response(&response, &config)
.expect("build bootstrap session configured event");
assert_eq!(
event.permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[extra_root],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configured_from_thread_resume_response_uses_workspace_roots_for_workspace_sandbox()
{
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
.build()
.await
.expect("build config");
let mut response = sample_thread_resume_response();
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/tmp/extra-root").abs();
response.workspace_roots = vec![extra_root.clone()];
response.sandbox = codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
};
let event = session_configured_from_thread_resume_response(&response, &config)
.expect("build resumed session configured event");
assert_eq!(
event.permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
&[extra_root],
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
)
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_uses_workspace_roots_from_response() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
.build()
.await
.expect("build config");
let mut response = sample_thread_start_response();
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/tmp/extra-root").abs();
response.workspace_roots = vec![response.cwd.clone(), extra_root.clone()];
let event = session_configured_from_thread_start_response(&response, &config)
.expect("build bootstrap session configured event");
assert_eq!(event.workspace_roots, vec![response.cwd, extra_root]);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn session_configured_from_thread_response_preserves_empty_workspace_roots() {
let codex_home = tempdir().expect("create temp codex home");
let cwd = tempdir().expect("create temp cwd");
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.codex_home(codex_home.path().to_path_buf())
.fallback_cwd(Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()))
.build()
.await
.expect("build config");
let mut response = sample_thread_resume_response();
response.workspace_roots = Vec::new();
let event = session_configured_from_thread_resume_response(&response, &config)
.expect("build resumed session configured event");
assert_eq!(event.workspace_roots, Vec::<AbsolutePathBuf>::new());
}
fn sample_thread_start_response() -> ThreadStartResponse {
ThreadStartResponse {
thread: codex_app_server_protocol::Thread {
@@ -558,17 +703,35 @@ fn sample_thread_start_response() -> ThreadStartResponse {
model_provider: "openai".to_string(),
service_tier: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
instruction_sources: Vec::new(),
approval_policy: codex_app_server_protocol::AskForApproval::OnRequest,
approvals_reviewer: codex_app_server_protocol::ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview,
sandbox: codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
},
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
reasoning_effort: None,
}
}
fn sample_thread_resume_response() -> ThreadResumeResponse {
let start = sample_thread_start_response();
ThreadResumeResponse {
thread: start.thread,
model: start.model,
model_provider: start.model_provider,
service_tier: start.service_tier,
cwd: start.cwd,
workspace_roots: start.workspace_roots,
instruction_sources: start.instruction_sources,
approval_policy: start.approval_policy,
approvals_reviewer: start.approvals_reviewer,
sandbox: start.sandbox,
active_permission_profile: start.active_permission_profile,
reasoning_effort: start.reasoning_effort,
}
}
codex-rs/exec/tests/event_processor_with_json_output.rs
+1
View File
@@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ fn session_configured_produces_thread_started_event() {
permission_profile: PermissionProfile::read_only(),
active_permission_profile: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp/project").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
reasoning_effort: None,
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
codex-rs/exec/tests/suite/sandbox.rs
+16 -4
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
command_cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
additional_workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
@@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
use std::process::Stdio;
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = None;
let mut workspace_roots = vec![sandbox_cwd.clone()];
workspace_roots.extend_from_slice(additional_workspace_roots);
let exec_request = build_exec_request(
ExecParams {
command,
@@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
},
&PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy),
sandbox_cwd,
&workspace_roots,
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
)
@@ -85,6 +89,7 @@ async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
command_cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
sandbox_cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
additional_workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
env: HashMap<String, String>,
) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
@@ -93,7 +98,10 @@ async fn spawn_command_under_sandbox(
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = core_test_support::find_codex_linux_sandbox_exe()
.map_err(|err| io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::NotFound, err))?;
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy);
let mut workspace_roots = vec![sandbox_cwd.clone()];
workspace_roots.extend_from_slice(additional_workspace_roots);
let permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy)
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&workspace_roots);
spawn_command_under_linux_sandbox(
codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
command,
@@ -145,6 +153,7 @@ async fn can_apply_linux_sandbox_policy(
command_cwd.clone(),
policy,
sandbox_cwd,
&[],
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
env,
)
@@ -181,7 +190,6 @@ async fn python_multiprocessing_lock_works_under_sandbox() {
let writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = vec!["/dev/shm".try_into().unwrap()];
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -212,6 +220,7 @@ if __name__ == '__main__':
command_cwd,
&policy,
&sandbox_cwd,
&writable_roots,
StdioPolicy::Inherit,
sandbox_env,
)
@@ -255,6 +264,7 @@ async fn python_getpwuid_works_under_sandbox() {
command_cwd,
&policy,
&sandbox_cwd,
&[],
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
sandbox_env,
)
@@ -295,7 +305,6 @@ async fn sandbox_distinguishes_command_and_policy_cwds() {
// writable only because it is under the sandbox policy cwd, not because it
// is under a writable root.
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -311,6 +320,7 @@ async fn sandbox_distinguishes_command_and_policy_cwds() {
command_root.clone(),
&policy,
&canonical_sandbox_root,
&[],
StdioPolicy::Inherit,
sandbox_env.clone(),
)
@@ -342,6 +352,7 @@ async fn sandbox_distinguishes_command_and_policy_cwds() {
command_root,
&policy,
&canonical_sandbox_root,
&[],
StdioPolicy::Inherit,
sandbox_env,
)
@@ -376,7 +387,6 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation() {
let dot_codex = repo_root.join(".codex");
let config_toml = dot_codex.join("config.toml");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -392,6 +402,7 @@ async fn sandbox_blocks_first_time_dot_codex_creation() {
repo_root.clone(),
&policy,
&repo_root,
&[],
StdioPolicy::RedirectForShellTool,
sandbox_env,
)
@@ -546,6 +557,7 @@ where
command_cwd,
policy,
&sandbox_cwd,
&[],
stdio_policy,
HashMap::from([("IN_SANDBOX".into(), "1".into())]),
)
codex-rs/file-system/src/lib.rs
+21 -1
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ pub struct FileSystemSandboxContext {
pub permissions: PermissionProfile,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub cwd: Option<AbsolutePathBuf>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
#[serde(default)]
pub windows_sandbox_private_desktop: bool,
@@ -77,16 +79,34 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxContext {
permissions: PermissionProfile,
cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> Self {
Self::from_permissions_and_cwd(permissions, Some(cwd))
Self::from_permission_profile_with_workspace_roots(permissions, cwd.clone(), vec![cwd])
}
fn from_permissions_and_cwd(
permissions: PermissionProfile,
cwd: Option<AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Self {
let workspace_roots = cwd.iter().cloned().collect();
Self::from_permissions_cwd_and_workspace_roots(permissions, cwd, workspace_roots)
}
pub fn from_permission_profile_with_workspace_roots(
permissions: PermissionProfile,
cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Self {
Self::from_permissions_cwd_and_workspace_roots(permissions, Some(cwd), workspace_roots)
}
fn from_permissions_cwd_and_workspace_roots(
permissions: PermissionProfile,
cwd: Option<AbsolutePathBuf>,
workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Self {
Self {
permissions,
cwd,
workspace_roots,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: false,
use_legacy_landlock: false,
codex-rs/linux-sandbox/tests/suite/landlock.rs
+2
View File
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ async fn run_cmd_result_with_permission_profile_for_cwd(
params,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_cwd,
std::slice::from_ref(&sandbox_cwd),
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_legacy_landlock,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ async fn assert_network_blocked(cmd: &[&str]) {
params,
&permission_profile,
&sandbox_cwd,
std::slice::from_ref(&sandbox_cwd),
&codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
/*use_legacy_landlock*/ false,
/*stdout_stream*/ None,
codex-rs/mcp-server/src/outgoing_message.rs
+5
View File
@@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ mod tests {
permission_profile: PermissionProfile::read_only(),
active_permission_profile: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/home/user/project").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
reasoning_effort: Some(ReasoningEffort::default()),
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
@@ -354,6 +355,7 @@ mod tests {
permission_profile: PermissionProfile::read_only(),
active_permission_profile: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/home/user/project").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
reasoning_effort: Some(ReasoningEffort::default()),
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
@@ -392,6 +394,7 @@ mod tests {
"approvals_reviewer": "user",
"permission_profile": session_configured_event.permission_profile,
"cwd": test_path_buf("/home/user/project"),
"workspace_roots": [],
"reasoning_effort": session_configured_event.reasoning_effort,
"rollout_path": rollout_file.path().to_path_buf(),
}
@@ -421,6 +424,7 @@ mod tests {
permission_profile: PermissionProfile::read_only(),
active_permission_profile: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/home/user/project").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
reasoning_effort: Some(ReasoningEffort::default()),
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
@@ -460,6 +464,7 @@ mod tests {
"approvals_reviewer": "user",
"permission_profile": session_configured_event.permission_profile,
"cwd": test_path_buf("/home/user/project"),
"workspace_roots": [],
"reasoning_effort": session_configured_event.reasoning_effort,
"rollout_path": rollout_file.path().to_path_buf(),
}
codex-rs/memories/write/src/phase2.rs
+23 -10
View File
@@ -17,9 +17,15 @@ use codex_config::Constrained;
use codex_core::config::Config;
use codex_features::Feature;
use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AgentStatus;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::protocol::TokenUsage;
use codex_protocol::user_input::UserInput;
use codex_state::Stage1Output;
@@ -315,18 +321,25 @@ mod agent {
.features
.disable(Feature::SkillMcpDependencyInstall);
// Sandbox policy
let writable_roots = vec![root];
// The consolidation agent only needs local memory-root write access and no network.
let consolidation_sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
let file_system_policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: root },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
agent_config
.permissions
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(consolidation_sandbox_policy, agent_config.cwd.as_path())
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
))
.ok()?;
agent_config.model = Some(
codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs
+14 -24
View File
@@ -335,21 +335,6 @@ pub struct ActivePermissionProfile {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub extends: Option<String>,
/// Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
/// profile, if any.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum ActivePermissionProfileModification {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
impl ActivePermissionProfile {
@@ -357,17 +342,8 @@ impl ActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: id.into(),
extends: None,
modifications: Vec::new(),
}
}
pub fn with_modifications(
mut self,
modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
) -> Self {
self.modifications = modifications;
self
}
}
impl Default for PermissionProfile {
@@ -539,6 +515,20 @@ impl PermissionProfile {
self.network_sandbox_policy(),
)
}
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(
&self,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
let (file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) = self.to_runtime_permissions();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(workspace_roots);
Self::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
self.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
+78 -62
View File
@@ -576,27 +576,16 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
/// into split filesystem policy.
pub fn from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Self {
let mut file_system_policy = Self::from(sandbox_policy);
if let SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } = sandbox_policy {
if let Ok(cwd_root) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd) {
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
&cwd_root, /*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ true,
) {
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(
&mut file_system_policy.entries,
protected_path,
);
}
}
for writable_root in writable_roots {
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
writable_root,
/*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ false,
) {
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(
&mut file_system_policy.entries,
protected_path,
);
}
if let SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. } = sandbox_policy
&& let Ok(cwd_root) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
{
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
&cwd_root, /*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ true,
) {
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(
&mut file_system_policy.entries,
protected_path,
);
}
}
@@ -717,6 +706,38 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self
}
/// Replaces symbolic `:project_roots` entries with concrete entries for
/// each workspace root.
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(
mut self,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(self.entries.len());
for entry in self.entries {
let FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath },
} = &entry.path
else {
entries.push(entry);
continue;
};
entries.extend(workspace_roots.iter().map(|root| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: match subpath.as_ref() {
Some(subpath) => {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(subpath, root.as_path())
}
None => root.clone(),
},
},
access: entry.access,
}));
}
self.entries = entries;
self
}
pub fn with_additional_readable_roots(
mut self,
cwd: &Path,
@@ -1032,10 +1053,10 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
let cwd_absolute = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
let has_full_disk_write_access = self.has_full_disk_write_access();
let mut workspace_root_writable = false;
let mut writable_roots = Vec::new();
let mut tmpdir_writable = false;
let mut slash_tmp_writable = false;
let mut unbridgeable_root_write = false;
let mut unbridgeable_external_write = false;
for entry in &self.entries {
match &entry.path {
@@ -1045,7 +1066,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
if cwd_absolute.as_ref().is_some_and(|cwd| cwd == path) {
workspace_root_writable = true;
} else {
writable_roots.push(path.clone());
unbridgeable_external_write = true;
}
}
}
@@ -1061,11 +1082,8 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath } => {
if subpath.is_none() && entry.access.can_write() {
workspace_root_writable = true;
} else if let Some(path) =
resolve_file_system_special_path(value, cwd_absolute.as_ref())
&& entry.access.can_write()
{
writable_roots.push(path);
} else if entry.access.can_write() {
unbridgeable_external_write = true;
}
}
FileSystemSpecialPath::Tmpdir => {
@@ -1093,21 +1111,20 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
});
}
if unbridgeable_root_write || unbridgeable_external_write {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"permissions profile requests filesystem writes outside the workspace root, which is not supported until the runtime enforces FileSystemSandboxPolicy directly",
));
}
if workspace_root_writable {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: dedup_absolute_paths(
writable_roots,
/*normalize_effective_paths*/ false,
),
network_access: network_policy.is_enabled(),
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: !tmpdir_writable,
exclude_slash_tmp: !slash_tmp_writable,
}
} else if unbridgeable_root_write
|| !writable_roots.is_empty()
|| tmpdir_writable
|| slash_tmp_writable
{
} else if tmpdir_writable || slash_tmp_writable {
return Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"permissions profile requests filesystem writes outside the workspace root, which is not supported until the runtime enforces FileSystemSandboxPolicy directly",
@@ -1173,12 +1190,11 @@ impl From<&SandboxPolicy> for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
}])
}
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
..
} => FileSystemSandboxPolicy::workspace_write(
writable_roots,
&[],
*exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
*exclude_slash_tmp,
),
@@ -1485,7 +1501,6 @@ fn legacy_runtime_file_system_policy_for_cwd(
cwd: &Path,
) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
let SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
..
@@ -1525,16 +1540,6 @@ fn legacy_runtime_file_system_policy_for_cwd(
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
});
}
entries.extend(
writable_roots
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|path| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
}),
);
if let Ok(cwd_root) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd) {
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
&cwd_root, /*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ true,
@@ -1542,14 +1547,6 @@ fn legacy_runtime_file_system_policy_for_cwd(
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(&mut entries, protected_path);
}
}
for writable_root in writable_roots {
for protected_path in default_read_only_subpaths_for_writable_root(
writable_root,
/*protect_missing_dot_codex*/ false,
) {
append_default_read_only_path_if_no_explicit_rule(&mut entries, protected_path);
}
}
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(entries)
}
@@ -1808,6 +1805,29 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn legacy_bridge_rejects_extra_writable_root_when_cwd_is_writable() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let cwd_path = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd.path()).expect("absolute cwd");
let extra_root = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("extra-root", cwd.path());
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: cwd_path },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path: extra_root },
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
]);
let err = policy
.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted, cwd.path())
.expect_err("extra writable roots cannot be represented by WorkspaceWrite");
assert_eq!(err.kind(), io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput);
}
#[cfg(unix)]
#[test]
fn writable_roots_proactively_protect_missing_dot_codex() {
@@ -1838,7 +1858,6 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn legacy_workspace_write_projection_preserves_symbolic_project_root() {
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -1994,7 +2013,6 @@ mod tests {
)
.expect("absolute root");
let policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -2510,7 +2528,6 @@ mod tests {
fn legacy_projection_runtime_enforcement_ignores_entry_order() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let legacy_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -2537,7 +2554,6 @@ mod tests {
fn missing_symbolic_metadata_carveouts_need_direct_runtime_enforcement() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let legacy_policy = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: Vec::new(),
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
codex-rs/protocol/src/protocol.rs
+295 -17
View File
@@ -462,6 +462,10 @@ pub enum Op {
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
cwd: Option<PathBuf>,
/// Updated workspace roots for sandbox/tool calls.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
/// Updated command approval policy.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
approval_policy: Option<AskForApproval>,
@@ -1004,14 +1008,9 @@ pub enum SandboxPolicy {
},
/// Same as `ReadOnly` but additionally grants write access to the current
/// working directory ("workspace").
/// thread workspace roots.
#[serde(rename = "workspace-write")]
WorkspaceWrite {
/// Additional folders (beyond cwd and possibly TMPDIR) that should be
/// writable from within the sandbox.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// When set to `true`, outbound network access is allowed. `false` by
/// default.
#[serde(default)]
@@ -1121,7 +1120,6 @@ impl SandboxPolicy {
/// not allow network access.
pub fn new_workspace_write_policy() -> Self {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: false,
@@ -1159,13 +1157,11 @@ impl SandboxPolicy {
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => Vec::new(),
SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => Vec::new(),
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
network_access: _,
} => {
// Start from explicitly configured writable roots.
let mut roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = writable_roots.clone();
let mut roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = Vec::new();
// Always include defaults: cwd, /tmp (if present on Unix), and
// on macOS, the per-user TMPDIR unless explicitly excluded.
@@ -2704,6 +2700,8 @@ pub struct SessionMeta {
pub forked_from_id: Option<ThreadId>,
pub timestamp: String,
pub cwd: PathBuf,
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub originator: String,
pub cli_version: String,
#[serde(default)]
@@ -2738,6 +2736,7 @@ impl Default for SessionMeta {
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: String::new(),
cwd: PathBuf::new(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: String::new(),
cli_version: String::new(),
source: SessionSource::default(),
@@ -2801,13 +2800,15 @@ pub struct TurnContextNetworkItem {
/// context updates, and again after mid-turn compaction when replacement
/// history re-establishes full context, so resume/fork replay can recover the
/// latest durable baseline.
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, Debug, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[derive(Serialize, Clone, Debug, JsonSchema, TS)]
pub struct TurnContextItem {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub turn_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub trace_id: Option<String>,
pub cwd: PathBuf,
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub current_date: Option<String>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
@@ -2816,6 +2817,8 @@ pub struct TurnContextItem {
pub sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub network: Option<TurnContextNetworkItem>,
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
@@ -2840,6 +2843,181 @@ pub struct TurnContextItem {
pub truncation_policy: Option<TruncationPolicy>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct RolloutSandboxPolicy {
policy: SandboxPolicy,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "kebab-case")]
enum RolloutSandboxPolicyWire {
DangerFullAccess,
ReadOnly {
#[serde(default)]
network_access: bool,
},
ExternalSandbox {
#[serde(default)]
network_access: NetworkAccess,
},
WorkspaceWrite {
#[serde(default)]
writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
#[serde(default)]
network_access: bool,
#[serde(default)]
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: bool,
#[serde(default)]
exclude_slash_tmp: bool,
},
}
impl From<RolloutSandboxPolicyWire> for RolloutSandboxPolicy {
fn from(value: RolloutSandboxPolicyWire) -> Self {
match value {
RolloutSandboxPolicyWire::DangerFullAccess => Self {
policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
},
RolloutSandboxPolicyWire::ReadOnly { network_access } => Self {
policy: SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { network_access },
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
},
RolloutSandboxPolicyWire::ExternalSandbox { network_access } => Self {
policy: SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { network_access },
legacy_writable_roots: Vec::new(),
},
RolloutSandboxPolicyWire::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
} => Self {
policy: SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
},
legacy_writable_roots: writable_roots,
},
}
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for RolloutSandboxPolicy {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
Ok(RolloutSandboxPolicyWire::deserialize(deserializer)?.into())
}
}
impl RolloutSandboxPolicy {
fn workspace_roots_for_legacy_workspace_write(
&self,
cwd: &Path,
) -> Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>> {
if !matches!(self.policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
return None;
}
let mut roots = Vec::new();
if let Ok(cwd) = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd) {
roots.push(cwd);
}
for root in &self.legacy_writable_roots {
if !roots.iter().any(|existing| existing == root) {
roots.push(root.clone());
}
}
Some(roots)
}
}
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for TurnContextItem {
fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
{
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Wire {
#[serde(default)]
turn_id: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
trace_id: Option<String>,
cwd: PathBuf,
#[serde(default)]
workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
current_date: Option<String>,
timezone: Option<String>,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: RolloutSandboxPolicy,
#[serde(default)]
permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[serde(default)]
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
network: Option<TurnContextNetworkItem>,
#[serde(default)]
file_system_sandbox_policy: Option<FileSystemSandboxPolicy>,
model: String,
personality: Option<Personality>,
#[serde(default)]
collaboration_mode: Option<CollaborationMode>,
#[serde(default)]
realtime_active: Option<bool>,
effort: Option<ReasoningEffortConfig>,
summary: ReasoningSummaryConfig,
user_instructions: Option<String>,
developer_instructions: Option<String>,
final_output_json_schema: Option<Value>,
#[serde(default)]
truncation_policy: Option<TruncationPolicy>,
}
let wire = Wire::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let workspace_roots = match wire.workspace_roots {
Some(workspace_roots) => workspace_roots,
None => wire
.sandbox_policy
.workspace_roots_for_legacy_workspace_write(&wire.cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::relative_to_current_dir(&wire.cwd).unwrap_or_else(|_| {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(&wire.cwd, "/")
}),
]
}),
};
Ok(Self {
turn_id: wire.turn_id,
trace_id: wire.trace_id,
cwd: wire.cwd,
workspace_roots,
current_date: wire.current_date,
timezone: wire.timezone,
approval_policy: wire.approval_policy,
sandbox_policy: wire.sandbox_policy.policy,
permission_profile: wire.permission_profile,
active_permission_profile: wire.active_permission_profile,
network: wire.network,
file_system_sandbox_policy: wire.file_system_sandbox_policy,
model: wire.model,
personality: wire.personality,
collaboration_mode: wire.collaboration_mode,
realtime_active: wire.realtime_active,
effort: wire.effort,
summary: wire.summary,
user_instructions: wire.user_instructions,
developer_instructions: wire.developer_instructions,
final_output_json_schema: wire.final_output_json_schema,
truncation_policy: wire.truncation_policy,
})
}
}
impl TurnContextItem {
pub fn permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
self.permission_profile.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| {
@@ -3448,6 +3626,10 @@ pub struct SessionConfiguredEvent {
/// session.
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Workspace roots used to realize symbolic `:project_roots` entries.
#[serde(default)]
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// The effort the model is putting into reasoning about the user's request.
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub reasoning_effort: Option<ReasoningEffortConfig>,
@@ -3491,11 +3673,13 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SessionConfiguredEvent {
// `SessionConfiguredEvent` is persisted into rollout history. Older
// rollouts only have `sandbox_policy`, so accept it on deserialize
// and immediately project it into the canonical `permission_profile`.
sandbox_policy: Option<SandboxPolicy>,
sandbox_policy: Option<RolloutSandboxPolicy>,
permission_profile: Option<PermissionProfile>,
#[serde(default)]
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
#[serde(default)]
workspace_roots: Option<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>>,
reasoning_effort: Option<ReasoningEffortConfig>,
initial_messages: Option<Vec<EventMsg>>,
network_proxy: Option<SessionNetworkProxyRuntime>,
@@ -3503,16 +3687,24 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SessionConfiguredEvent {
}
let wire = Wire::deserialize(deserializer)?;
let permission_profile = match (wire.permission_profile, wire.sandbox_policy) {
let permission_profile = match (wire.permission_profile, wire.sandbox_policy.as_ref()) {
(Some(permission_profile), _) => permission_profile,
(None, Some(sandbox_policy)) => PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(
&sandbox_policy,
&sandbox_policy.policy,
wire.cwd.as_path(),
),
(None, None) => {
return Err(serde::de::Error::missing_field("permission_profile"));
}
};
let workspace_roots = wire.workspace_roots.unwrap_or_else(|| {
wire.sandbox_policy
.as_ref()
.and_then(|sandbox_policy| {
sandbox_policy.workspace_roots_for_legacy_workspace_write(wire.cwd.as_path())
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| vec![wire.cwd.clone()])
});
Ok(Self {
session_id: wire.session_id,
@@ -3528,6 +3720,7 @@ impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for SessionConfiguredEvent {
permission_profile,
active_permission_profile: wire.active_permission_profile,
cwd: wire.cwd,
workspace_roots,
reasoning_effort: wire.reasoning_effort,
initial_messages: wire.initial_messages,
network_proxy: wire.network_proxy,
@@ -4477,7 +4670,6 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn legacy_sandbox_policy_semantics_survive_split_bridge() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let writable_root = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("writable", cwd.path());
let policies = [
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
@@ -4490,13 +4682,11 @@ mod tests {
network_access: false,
},
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![],
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
},
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots: vec![writable_root],
network_access: true,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: false,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
@@ -5174,17 +5364,68 @@ mod tests {
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn turn_context_item_migrates_legacy_workspace_write_writable_roots() -> Result<()> {
let cwd = test_path_buf("/home/user/project");
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/home/user/extra").abs();
let item: TurnContextItem = serde_json::from_value(json!({
"cwd": cwd,
"approval_policy": "never",
"sandbox_policy": {
"type": "workspace-write",
"writable_roots": [extra_root],
"exclude_tmpdir_env_var": true,
"exclude_slash_tmp": true
},
"model": "gpt-5",
"summary": "auto",
}))?;
assert_eq!(
item.sandbox_policy,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
}
);
assert_eq!(item.workspace_roots, vec![cwd.abs(), extra_root]);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn turn_context_item_migrates_missing_workspace_roots_to_cwd() -> Result<()> {
let cwd = test_path_buf("/home/user/project");
let item: TurnContextItem = serde_json::from_value(json!({
"cwd": cwd,
"approval_policy": "never",
"sandbox_policy": { "type": "read-only" },
"permission_profile": PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),
"model": "gpt-5",
"summary": "auto",
}))?;
assert_eq!(item.workspace_roots, vec![cwd.abs()]);
assert_eq!(
item.permission_profile(),
PermissionProfile::workspace_write()
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn turn_context_item_serializes_network_when_present() -> Result<()> {
let item = TurnContextItem {
turn_id: None,
trace_id: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/tmp"),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
current_date: None,
timezone: None,
approval_policy: AskForApproval::Never,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
permission_profile: None,
active_permission_profile: None,
network: Some(TurnContextNetworkItem {
allowed_domains: vec!["api.example.com".to_string()],
denied_domains: vec!["blocked.example.com".to_string()],
@@ -5257,6 +5498,7 @@ mod tests {
permission_profile: permission_profile.clone(),
active_permission_profile: None,
cwd: test_path_buf("/home/user/project").abs(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
reasoning_effort: Some(ReasoningEffortConfig::default()),
initial_messages: None,
network_proxy: None,
@@ -5276,6 +5518,7 @@ mod tests {
"approvals_reviewer": "user",
"permission_profile": permission_profile,
"cwd": test_path_buf("/home/user/project"),
"workspace_roots": [],
"reasoning_effort": "medium",
"rollout_path": format!("{}", rollout_file.path().display()),
}
@@ -5301,6 +5544,41 @@ mod tests {
let event: SessionConfiguredEvent = serde_json::from_value(value)?;
assert_eq!(event.permission_profile, PermissionProfile::read_only());
assert_eq!(event.workspace_roots, vec![cwd.abs()]);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn deserialize_legacy_session_configured_event_migrates_workspace_write_writable_roots()
-> Result<()> {
let cwd = test_path_buf("/home/user/project");
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/home/user/extra").abs();
let value = json!({
"session_id": "67e55044-10b1-426f-9247-bb680e5fe0c8",
"model": "codex-mini-latest",
"model_provider_id": "openai",
"approval_policy": "never",
"approvals_reviewer": "user",
"sandbox_policy": {
"type": "workspace-write",
"writable_roots": [extra_root],
"exclude_tmpdir_env_var": true,
"exclude_slash_tmp": true
},
"cwd": cwd,
});
let event: SessionConfiguredEvent = serde_json::from_value(value)?;
let expected_sandbox = SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access: false,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var: true,
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
};
assert_eq!(
event.permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&expected_sandbox, cwd.as_path())
);
assert_eq!(event.workspace_roots, vec![cwd.abs(), extra_root]);
Ok(())
}
codex-rs/rollout/Cargo.toml
+1
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ codex-login = { workspace = true }
codex-otel = { workspace = true }
codex-protocol = { workspace = true }
codex-state = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-absolute-path = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-path = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-string = { workspace = true }
serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
codex-rs/rollout/src/config.rs
+17
View File
@@ -2,10 +2,13 @@ use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
pub trait RolloutConfigView {
fn codex_home(&self) -> &Path;
fn sqlite_home(&self) -> &Path;
fn cwd(&self) -> &Path;
fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf];
fn model_provider_id(&self) -> &str;
fn generate_memories(&self) -> bool;
}
@@ -15,6 +18,7 @@ pub struct RolloutConfig {
pub codex_home: PathBuf,
pub sqlite_home: PathBuf,
pub cwd: PathBuf,
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
pub model_provider_id: String,
pub generate_memories: bool,
}
@@ -27,6 +31,7 @@ impl RolloutConfig {
codex_home: view.codex_home().to_path_buf(),
sqlite_home: view.sqlite_home().to_path_buf(),
cwd: view.cwd().to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: view.workspace_roots().to_vec(),
model_provider_id: view.model_provider_id().to_string(),
generate_memories: view.generate_memories(),
}
@@ -46,6 +51,10 @@ impl RolloutConfigView for RolloutConfig {
self.cwd.as_path()
}
fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf] {
&self.workspace_roots
}
fn model_provider_id(&self) -> &str {
self.model_provider_id.as_str()
}
@@ -68,6 +77,10 @@ impl<T: RolloutConfigView + ?Sized> RolloutConfigView for &T {
(*self).cwd()
}
fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf] {
(*self).workspace_roots()
}
fn model_provider_id(&self) -> &str {
(*self).model_provider_id()
}
@@ -90,6 +103,10 @@ impl<T: RolloutConfigView + ?Sized> RolloutConfigView for Arc<T> {
self.as_ref().cwd()
}
fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf] {
self.as_ref().workspace_roots()
}
fn model_provider_id(&self) -> &str {
self.as_ref().model_provider_id()
}
codex-rs/rollout/src/metadata_tests.rs
+3
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ async fn extract_metadata_from_rollout_uses_session_meta() {
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: "2026-01-27T12:34:56Z".to_string(),
cwd: dir.path().to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "cli".to_string(),
cli_version: "0.0.0".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::default(),
@@ -89,6 +90,7 @@ async fn extract_metadata_from_rollout_returns_latest_memory_mode() {
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: "2026-01-27T12:34:56Z".to_string(),
cwd: dir.path().to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "cli".to_string(),
cli_version: "0.0.0".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::default(),
@@ -349,6 +351,7 @@ fn write_rollout_in_sessions_with_cwd(
forked_from_id: None,
timestamp: event_ts.to_string(),
cwd,
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
originator: "cli".to_string(),
cli_version: "0.0.0".to_string(),
source: SessionSource::default(),
codex-rs/rollout/src/recorder.rs
+1
View File
@@ -675,6 +675,7 @@ impl RolloutRecorder {
forked_from_id,
timestamp,
cwd: config.cwd().to_path_buf(),
workspace_roots: config.workspace_roots().to_vec(),
originator: originator().value,
cli_version: env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION").to_string(),
agent_nickname: source.get_nickname(),

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