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Preserve target-native paths in command approvals (#42577)

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## What changed

- Pass the selected executor's `PathUri` through user command approval requests instead of converting the working directory to a host-native path.
- Make native-path permission helpers explicitly local and require executor-aware permission transforms to receive a `FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext`.
- Cover approved remote commands to verify that the approval request reports the selected remote working directory and execution resumes after approval.

GitOrigin-RevId: 0aa3042f2d7594af6c7d0abf31d7f99cf67d5556
This commit is contained in:
iceweasel-oai
2026-09-03 16:21:10 +00:00
committed by copyberry
parent 0650d6d1ca
commit 7a7c188682
30 changed files with 304 additions and 368 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_processor.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1329,7 +1329,7 @@ impl ThreadRequestProcessor {
codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile::Managed { .. } => {
effective_permission_profile
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(config.cwd.as_path(), config.cwd.as_path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(config.cwd.as_path(), config.cwd.as_path())
}
};
codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
+32 -28
View File
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
!config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path())
);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.network_sandbox_policy(),
@@ -2828,7 +2828,7 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_keeps_memories_root_out_of_legacy_projectio
!config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(memories_root.as_path(), cwd.path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(memories_root.as_path(), cwd.path())
);
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
@@ -3064,11 +3064,11 @@ async fn default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_tabl
Some(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE)
);
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected :workspace to allow writing the project root, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path()),
"expected :workspace to protect project metadata, policy: {policy:?}"
);
Ok(())
@@ -3097,7 +3097,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_read_only_keeps_add_dir_read_only() -> std::io::Res
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected :read-only to stay read-only for runtime workspace roots, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -3186,15 +3186,15 @@ async fn workspace_profile_applies_rules_to_runtime_and_profile_workspace_roots(
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
for root in [cwd_abs, runtime_root_abs, profile_root_abs.clone()] {
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.as_path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.as_path()),
"expected workspace root to be writable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".git"), cwd.as_path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".git"), cwd.as_path()),
"expected .git carveout under {root:?}, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".codex"), cwd.as_path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".codex"), cwd.as_path()),
"expected .codex carveout under {root:?}, policy: {policy:?}"
);
}
@@ -3293,11 +3293,11 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_can_extend_builtin_workspace() -> std::io::
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected profile extending :workspace to keep project-root writes, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path()),
"expected profile extending :workspace to keep metadata carveouts, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
@@ -3388,11 +3388,11 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_can_extend_builtin_read_only() -> std::io::
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected profile extending :read-only to keep read access, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected profile extending :read-only to stay non-writable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -3448,16 +3448,16 @@ async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_profile_for_trusted_project() -> std::
);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected trusted project fallback to stay read-only without Windows sandbox support, policy: {policy:?}"
);
} else {
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected trusted project fallback to use :workspace, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".codex"), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".codex"), cwd.path()),
"expected :workspace metadata carveouts, policy: {policy:?}"
);
}
@@ -3502,21 +3502,21 @@ async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_profile_for_untrusted_project() -> std
})
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to allow reads, policy: {policy:?}"
);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to stay read-only without Windows sandbox support, policy: {policy:?}"
);
} else {
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected untrusted project fallback to use :workspace, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".codex"), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".codex"), cwd.path()),
"expected :workspace metadata carveouts, policy: {policy:?}"
);
}
@@ -3562,7 +3562,7 @@ async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_sandbox_workspace_write_se
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected implicit :workspace to preserve sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -3629,12 +3629,12 @@ async fn implicit_builtin_workspace_profile_preserves_add_dir_metadata_carveouts
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let extra_root = extra_root.path().abs();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected implicit :workspace to preserve additional writable roots, policy: {policy:?}"
);
for subpath in [".git", ".agents", ".codex"] {
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&extra_root.join(subpath), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&extra_root.join(subpath), cwd.path()),
"expected implicit :workspace to preserve legacy metadata carveout for {subpath}, \
policy: {policy:?}"
);
@@ -3660,11 +3660,11 @@ async fn empty_config_defaults_to_builtin_read_only_without_trust_decision() ->
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected :read-only to allow reads, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
"expected :read-only to deny writes, policy: {policy:?}"
);
Ok(())
@@ -3842,7 +3842,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_direct_write_roots_outside_workspace_root()
config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(external_write_path.as_path(), cwd.path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(external_write_path.as_path(), cwd.path())
);
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
@@ -6035,8 +6035,12 @@ async fn memory_tool_makes_memories_root_readable_without_creating_or_widening_w
memories_root.display()
);
let file_system_policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(file_system_policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(memories_root_abs.as_path(), cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(memories_root_abs.as_path(), cwd.path()));
assert!(
file_system_policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(memories_root_abs.as_path(), cwd.path())
);
assert!(
!file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(memories_root_abs.as_path(), cwd.path())
);
if cfg!(target_os = "windows") {
match &config.legacy_sandbox_policy() {
@@ -10975,7 +10979,7 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_split_write_roots() -> std::io::R
config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(outside_root.as_path(), config.cwd.as_path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(outside_root.as_path(), config.cwd.as_path())
);
assert!(matches!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+3 -6
View File
@@ -4091,17 +4091,14 @@ impl Config {
}) = filesystem_requirements.as_ref()
&& let Some(managed_file_system_policy) = managed_deny_read_policy.as_ref()
{
let _initial_matcher =
ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(managed_file_system_policy, resolved_cwd.as_path())
let managed_deny_matcher =
ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(managed_file_system_policy, resolved_cwd.as_path())
.map_err(std::io::Error::other)?;
let managed_file_system_policy = Arc::clone(managed_file_system_policy);
let permission_cwd = resolved_cwd.clone();
let requirement_source = requirement_source.clone();
constrained_permission_profile
.value
.add_validator(move |permission_profile| {
let managed_deny_matcher =
ReadDenyMatcher::new(&managed_file_system_policy, permission_cwd.as_path());
let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let missing_required_deny = managed_file_system_policy
.entries
@@ -4118,7 +4115,7 @@ impl Config {
let path = path.to_abs_path().ok()?;
managed_deny_matcher
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_read_denied(path.as_path()))
.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_local_path_read_denied(path.as_path()))
.then_some(path)
});
if missing_required_deny || violating_root.is_some() {
codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs
+6 -6
View File
@@ -96,15 +96,15 @@ async fn restricted_read_implicitly_allows_helper_executables() -> std::io::Resu
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(expected_zsh.as_path(), &cwd),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(expected_zsh.as_path(), &cwd),
"expected zsh helper path to be readable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(expected_allowed_arg0_dir.as_path(), &cwd),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(expected_allowed_arg0_dir.as_path(), &cwd),
"expected active arg0 helper dir to be readable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(expected_sibling_arg0_dir.as_path(), &cwd),
!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(expected_sibling_arg0_dir.as_path(), &cwd),
"expected sibling arg0 helper dir to remain unreadable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
@@ -493,7 +493,7 @@ docs = "read"
let (read_deny_policy, _) =
compile_permission_profile(&permissions, "read_deny", &mut startup_warnings)?;
assert_eq!(
read_deny_policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
read_deny_policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
);
@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ docs = "read"
compile_permission_profile(&permissions, "write_deny", &mut startup_warnings)?;
assert!(!write_deny_policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
write_deny_policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
write_deny_policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
);
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ docs = "read"
compile_permission_profile(&permissions, "write_read", &mut startup_warnings)?;
assert!(!write_read_policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
write_read_policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(&docs, cwd.path()),
write_read_policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(&docs, cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -5894,13 +5894,13 @@ async fn session_configuration_apply_preserves_absolute_cwd_write_root_on_cwd_up
assert!(
updated
.file_system_sandbox_policy(&[])
.can_write_path_with_cwd(original_cwd.as_path(), updated.cwd().as_path()),
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(original_cwd.as_path(), updated.cwd().as_path()),
"absolute grant to the old cwd must remain writable"
);
assert!(
!updated
.file_system_sandbox_policy(&[])
.can_write_path_with_cwd(next_cwd.as_path(), updated.cwd().as_path()),
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(next_cwd.as_path(), updated.cwd().as_path()),
"cwd-only update must not reinterpret an absolute old-cwd grant as :workspace_roots"
);
}
codex-rs/core/src/tools/approvals.rs
+1 -10
View File
@@ -708,15 +708,6 @@ impl Session {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
..
} => {
let cwd = match guardian_cwd(environment_id, cwd.clone()) {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(err) => {
tracing::error!(%err, "failed to resolve approval command cwd");
return ReviewDecision::denied(format!(
"failed to resolve approval command cwd: {err}"
));
}
};
let tool_name = "unified_exec";
let reason = ctx
.retry_reason
@@ -743,7 +734,7 @@ impl Session {
/*approval_id*/ None,
Some(environment_id.clone()),
command.clone(),
cwd.into(),
cwd.clone(),
reason,
ctx.network_approval_context.clone(),
proposed_execpolicy_amendment.clone(),
codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mod.rs
+5 -5
View File
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ mod tests {
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::GranularApprovalConfig;
use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::intersect_permission_profiles;
use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::intersect_permission_profiles_with_context;
use codex_sandboxing::policy_transforms::merge_permission_profiles;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
@@ -538,21 +538,21 @@ mod tests {
}),
..Default::default()
};
let stored_grant = intersect_permission_profiles(
let cwd_uri = PathUri::from_host_native_path(cwd.path()).expect("cwd URI");
let stored_grant = intersect_permission_profiles_with_context(
requested_permissions.clone(),
requested_permissions.clone(),
cwd.path(),
&local_context(&cwd_uri),
);
let effective_permissions =
merge_permission_profiles(Some(&requested_permissions), Some(&stored_grant))
.expect("merged permissions");
let cwd = PathUri::from_host_native_path(cwd.path()).expect("cwd URI");
assert_eq!(
preapproved_permission_profile(
&effective_permissions,
&stored_grant,
&local_context(&cwd),
&local_context(&cwd_uri),
),
Some(stored_grant)
);
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/cloud_config.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ async fn managed_deny_read_requirements_follow_thread_permission_updates() -> Re
!snapshot
.permission_profile
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_read_path_with_cwd(nested_root.as_path(), snapshot.cwd().as_path()),
.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(nested_root.as_path(), snapshot.cwd().as_path()),
"a live permission change must preserve managed deny-read rules"
);
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/remote_env.rs
+38 -9
View File
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ async fn remote_test_env_exposes_target_shell_and_exec_guidance_to_model() -> Re
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn explicit_remote_shell_runs_in_remote_cwd() -> Result<()> {
async fn approved_remote_shell_runs_in_remote_cwd() -> Result<()> {
const CALL_ID: &str = "remote-explicit-shell";
skip_if_no_remote_env!(Ok(()));
@@ -406,9 +406,15 @@ async fn explicit_remote_shell_runs_in_remote_cwd() -> Result<()> {
"shell": shell,
"login": false,
"yield_time_ms": 10_000,
"sandbox_permissions": SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
"justification": "Test target-native command approval cwd.",
}))?;
let mut builder = test_codex();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(|config| {
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::OnRequest);
config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::User;
});
let test = builder.build_with_auto_env(&server).await?;
let selection = test.executor_environment().selection().clone();
let response_mock = mount_sse_sequence(
&server,
vec![
@@ -426,16 +432,39 @@ async fn explicit_remote_shell_runs_in_remote_cwd() -> Result<()> {
)
.await;
test.submit_turn_with_environments(
submit_turn_with_approval_and_environments(
&test,
"run the remote shell in the remote cwd",
Some(vec![TurnEnvironmentSelection {
environment_id: REMOTE_ENVIRONMENT_ID.to_string(),
cwd: test.executor_environment().selection().cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: vec![test.executor_environment().selection().cwd.clone()],
config: EnvironmentConfigState::FromThread,
}]),
vec![selection.clone()],
AskForApproval::OnRequest,
)
.await?;
let event = wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(
event,
EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(_) | EventMsg::TurnComplete(_)
)
})
.await;
let EventMsg::ExecApprovalRequest(approval) = event else {
panic!("expected remote command approval before completion: {event:?}");
};
assert_eq!(
approval.cwd.to_inferred_path_uri().as_ref(),
Some(&selection.cwd)
);
test.codex
.submit(Op::ExecApproval {
id: approval.effective_approval_id(),
turn_id: Some(approval.turn_id),
decision: ReviewDecision::Approved,
})
.await?;
wait_for_event(&test.codex, |event| {
matches!(event, EventMsg::TurnComplete(_))
})
.await;
let request = response_mock
.last_request()
.context("model should receive the command output")?;
codex-rs/exec-server/src/fs_sandbox.rs
+16 -10
View File
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ fn add_helper_runtime_permissions(
}
for helper_read_root in helper_read_roots {
if file_system_policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(helper_read_root.as_path(), cwd) {
if file_system_policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(helper_read_root.as_path(), cwd) {
continue;
}
@@ -571,8 +571,8 @@ mod tests {
cwd.as_path(),
);
assert!(policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(readable.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(writable.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(readable.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(writable.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
}
#[test]
@@ -800,10 +800,13 @@ mod tests {
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path(), cwd.as_path())
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(
runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path(),
cwd.as_path(),
)
);
assert!(!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(sibling.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(sibling.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
}
#[test]
@@ -831,11 +834,14 @@ mod tests {
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path(), cwd.as_path())
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(
runtime_paths.codex_self_exe.as_path(),
cwd.as_path(),
)
);
assert!(policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(alias.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(codex_parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(alias_parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(alias.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(codex_parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(alias_parent.as_path(), cwd.as_path()));
}
fn restricted_policy(entries: Vec<FileSystemSandboxEntry>) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
codex-rs/exec/src/lib.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1263,7 +1263,7 @@ fn sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
.network_sandbox_policy()
.is_enabled()
.then_some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess)
} else if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
} else if file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite)
} else {
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::ReadOnly)
codex-rs/protocol/src/permission_profile_intersection.rs
+7 -6
View File
@@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ pub fn intersect_effective_permission_profiles(
policy.entries.retain(|entry| entry.path != tmpdir);
}
let authority_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(&authority_policy, cwd)
let authority_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&authority_policy, cwd)
.map_err(PermissionIntersectionError::UnsupportedPath)?;
let requested_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(&requested_policy, cwd)
let requested_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&requested_policy, cwd)
.map_err(PermissionIntersectionError::UnsupportedPath)?;
let sources = [
(&authority_policy, authority_denies.as_ref()),
@@ -214,7 +214,8 @@ pub fn intersect_effective_permission_profiles(
denies.sort_by_cached_key(|entry| format!("{:?}", entry.path));
let mut intersection = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(denies);
intersection.glob_scan_max_depth = glob_depth.flatten();
let intersection_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::new(&intersection, cwd);
let intersection_denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&intersection, cwd)
.map_err(PermissionIntersectionError::UnsupportedPath)?;
for path in paths {
let [left, right] =
@@ -395,11 +396,11 @@ fn effective_access(
path: &Path,
cwd: &Path,
) -> FileSystemAccessMode {
if denies.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_read_denied(path)) {
if denies.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_local_path_read_denied(path)) {
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
} else if policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(path, cwd) {
} else if policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(path, cwd) {
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
} else if policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(path, cwd) {
} else if policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(path, cwd) {
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
} else {
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
codex-rs/protocol/src/permission_profile_intersection_tests.rs
+13 -9
View File
@@ -117,14 +117,15 @@ fn effective_workspace_intersection_preserves_network_metadata_and_temp() {
assert_eq!(
[&root, &project]
.map(|path| policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(path.as_path(), root.as_path())),
.map(|path| policy
.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), root.as_path())),
[Read, Write]
);
assert_eq!(result.network_sandbox_policy(), Restricted);
assert!(policy.entries.contains(&special(Tmpdir, Write)));
for name in [".git", ".agents", ".codex"] {
let protected = project.join(name);
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(protected.as_path(), root.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(protected.as_path(), root.as_path()));
assert!(policy.entries.contains(&skipped(protected.into(), Read)));
}
assert!(policy.entries.contains(&skipped(gitdir.into(), Read)));
@@ -177,10 +178,13 @@ fn exact_denies_nested_read_carveouts_and_reopened_writes_are_preserved() {
let right = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&right_policy, Restricted);
let result = intersection(&left, &right, &root);
let policy = result.file_system_sandbox_policy();
let denies = ReadDenyMatcher::new(&policy, root.as_path()).expect("merged denies");
let denies = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&policy, root.as_path())
.expect("valid merged deny globs")
.expect("merged denies");
assert_eq!(
[&root, &shared, &editable]
.map(|path| policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(path.as_path(), root.as_path())),
.map(|path| policy
.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), root.as_path())),
[Write, Read, Write]
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -190,7 +194,7 @@ fn exact_denies_nested_read_carveouts_and_reopened_writes_are_preserved() {
&root.join("credentials.env"),
&root.join("credentials.token"),
]
.map(|path| denies.is_read_denied(path.as_path())),
.map(|path| denies.is_local_path_read_denied(path.as_path())),
[true, true, true, true]
);
assert_eq!(policy.glob_scan_max_depth, Some(4));
@@ -317,7 +321,7 @@ fn canonical_grants_cannot_escape_through_readable_or_writable_symlinks() {
let parent = rooted(&root, Write, []);
let child = rooted(&escaped, Write, []);
let policy = intersection(&parent, &child, &root).file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(outside.as_path(), root.as_path()));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(outside.as_path(), root.as_path()));
let parent = managed(vec![entry(root.as_path(), Read)]);
let child = managed(vec![entry(escaped.as_path(), Read)]);
@@ -329,7 +333,7 @@ fn canonical_grants_cannot_escape_through_readable_or_writable_symlinks() {
let parent = rooted(&root, Write, []);
let child = rooted(&internal_alias, Write, []);
let policy = intersection(&parent, &child, &root).file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(inside.as_path(), root.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(inside.as_path(), root.as_path()));
assert!(
!policy
.entries
@@ -355,7 +359,7 @@ fn macos_system_path_aliases_share_the_same_physical_permissions() {
let right = managed(vec![entry(canonical.as_path(), access)]);
let policy = intersection(&left, &right, &canonical).file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(canonical.as_path(), canonical.as_path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(canonical.as_path(), canonical.as_path()),
access
);
}
@@ -365,5 +369,5 @@ fn macos_system_path_aliases_share_the_same_physical_permissions() {
&canonical,
)
.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(canonical.as_path(), canonical.as_path()));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(canonical.as_path(), canonical.as_path()));
}
codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
+71 -143
View File
@@ -325,28 +325,12 @@ impl ReadDenyMatcher {
.flatten()
}
/// Builds a matcher from exact deny-read roots and deny-read glob entries.
///
/// Returns `None` when the policy has no deny-read restrictions, so callers
/// can skip read-deny checks without allocating matcher state. The `cwd`
/// resolves cwd-relative policy paths and special paths before matching.
pub fn new(file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy, cwd: &Path) -> Option<Self> {
match Self::build(
file_system_sandbox_policy,
cwd,
InvalidDenyReadGlobBehavior::FailClosed,
) {
Ok(matcher) => matcher,
Err(_) => unreachable!("fail-closed glob handling does not return errors"),
}
}
/// Builds a matcher for callers that must reject malformed glob patterns.
/// Builds a local-path matcher for callers that must reject malformed glob patterns.
///
/// Runtime read checks intentionally fail closed on malformed deny patterns.
/// Host-side expansion work should use this constructor instead so a typo
/// cannot broaden the set of paths it mutates before execution starts.
pub fn try_new(
pub fn try_new_for_local_paths(
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> Result<Option<Self>, String> {
@@ -386,8 +370,8 @@ impl ReadDenyMatcher {
}))
}
/// Returns whether `path` is denied by the policy used to build this matcher.
pub fn is_read_denied(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
/// Returns whether a local native `path` is denied by this matcher.
pub fn is_local_path_read_denied(&self, path: &Path) -> bool {
let Some(cwd) = self.native_cwd.as_ref() else {
return true;
};
@@ -421,8 +405,12 @@ impl ReadDenyMatcher {
/// parent and a non-symlink directory entry. Symlinks and Windows junctions
/// must be resolved separately. Do not reuse these locations across walks:
/// a later operation must observe newly created files and changed links.
pub fn is_read_denied_with_canonical_path(&self, path: &Path, canonical_path: &Path) -> bool {
self.is_read_denied(path) || self.is_read_denied(canonical_path)
pub fn is_local_path_read_denied_with_canonical_path(
&self,
path: &Path,
canonical_path: &Path,
) -> bool {
self.is_local_path_read_denied(path) || self.is_local_path_read_denied(canonical_path)
}
}
@@ -641,7 +629,14 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.entries.retain(|entry| !entry.skips_missing_path());
}
pub fn has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
/// Native-path compatibility adapter for local executor boundaries.
/// Selected-executor orchestrators must keep paths as [`PathUri`] and use
/// context-aware policy APIs instead.
pub fn has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_local_path_with_cwd(
&self,
path: &Path,
cwd: &Path,
) -> bool {
let Some(path) = resolve_candidate_path(path, cwd) else {
return false;
};
@@ -930,18 +925,28 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
})
}
pub fn resolve_access_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> FileSystemAccessMode {
/// Native-path compatibility adapter for local executor boundaries.
/// Selected-executor orchestrators must use [`Self::resolve_access`] with
/// a [`PathUri`] and [`FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext`] instead.
pub fn resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(
&self,
path: &Path,
cwd: &Path,
) -> FileSystemAccessMode {
with_local_policy_context(path, cwd, |path, context| {
self.resolve_access(path, context)
})
.unwrap_or(FileSystemAccessMode::Deny)
}
pub fn can_read_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
self.resolve_access_with_cwd(path, cwd).can_read()
/// Native-path compatibility adapter for local executor boundaries.
pub fn can_read_local_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
self.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(path, cwd)
.can_read()
}
pub fn can_write_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
/// Native-path compatibility adapter for local executor boundaries.
pub fn can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&self, path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
with_local_policy_context(path, cwd, |path, context| {
self.can_write_path(path, context)
})
@@ -1166,38 +1171,6 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
.collect()
}
/// Replaces symbolic `:workspace_roots` entries with absolute paths resolved
/// against `cwd`.
///
/// Use this when a durable permission profile must survive a cwd-only
/// update without rebinding its project-root authority to the new cwd.
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_cwd(mut self, cwd: &Path) -> Self {
let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
for entry in &mut self.entries {
match &entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. },
} => {
if let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd.as_ref()) {
entry.path = path.into();
}
}
FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern } => {
if let (Some(cwd), Some(subpath)) =
(cwd.as_ref(), parse_project_roots_glob_pattern(pattern))
{
entry.path = FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: resolve_project_roots_glob_pattern(subpath, cwd),
};
}
}
FileSystemPath::Special { value: _ } => {}
FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => {}
}
}
self
}
/// Replaces symbolic `:workspace_roots` entries with concrete entries for
/// each workspace root.
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(
@@ -1344,7 +1317,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
}
for path in additional_readable_roots {
if self.can_read_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
if self.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
continue;
}
@@ -1363,7 +1336,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
additional_writable_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
for path in additional_writable_roots {
if self.can_write_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
if self.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
continue;
}
@@ -1452,7 +1425,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.into_iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_read())
.filter(|entry| self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.filter(|entry| self.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.map(|entry| entry.path)
.collect(),
/*normalize_effective_paths*/ true,
@@ -1465,18 +1438,6 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.get_writable_roots_with_cwd_impl(cwd, WritableRootPathResolution::Effective)
}
/// Returns whether any effective writable root exists without materializing its carveouts.
pub fn has_writable_roots_with_cwd(&self, cwd: &Path) -> bool {
!self.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& self
.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.into_iter()
.any(|entry| {
entry.access.can_write()
&& self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd)
})
}
/// Reports configured writable roots for diagnostics without inspecting the filesystem.
///
/// Unlike runtime root resolution, this includes configured roots even if they
@@ -1531,7 +1492,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
let writable_entries: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = resolved_entries
.iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access.can_write())
.filter(|entry| self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.filter(|entry| self.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.map(|entry| entry.path.clone())
.collect();
@@ -1578,7 +1539,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
resolved_entries
.iter()
.filter(|entry| !entry.access.can_write())
.filter(|entry| !self.can_write_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.filter(|entry| !self.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.filter_map(|entry| {
let effective_path = path_resolution.resolve(entry.path.clone());
// Preserve the literal in-root path whenever the
@@ -1654,7 +1615,7 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.resolved_entries_with_cwd(cwd)
.iter()
.filter(|entry| entry.access == FileSystemAccessMode::Deny)
.filter(|entry| !self.can_read_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
.filter(|entry| !self.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(entry.path.as_path(), cwd))
// Restricted policies already deny reads outside explicit allow roots,
// so materializing the filesystem root here would erase narrower
// readable carveouts when downstream sandboxes apply deny masks last.
@@ -2408,10 +2369,9 @@ fn protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
.map(|raw_root| raw_root.join(*metadata_name)),
);
if metadata_paths
.iter()
.all(|metadata_path| !policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(metadata_path.as_path(), cwd))
{
if metadata_paths.iter().all(|metadata_path| {
!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(metadata_path.as_path(), cwd)
}) {
protected_names.push((*metadata_name).to_string());
}
}
@@ -2584,10 +2544,6 @@ mod tests {
];
for policy in policies {
assert_eq!(
policy.has_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
!policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()).is_empty()
);
assert_eq!(
policy.has_configured_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()),
!policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path()).is_empty()
@@ -2632,11 +2588,11 @@ mod tests {
]);
assert!(
!policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(Path::new(path), cwd.path()),
!policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(Path::new(path), cwd.path()),
"deny should apply to {path}"
);
assert!(
policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join("ordinary"), cwd.path()),
policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join("ordinary"), cwd.path()),
"opaque deny for {path} should not poison ordinary paths"
);
}
@@ -3044,7 +3000,7 @@ mod tests {
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ true,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
)
.can_write_path_with_cwd(slash_tmp.as_path(), cwd.path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(slash_tmp.as_path(), cwd.path())
);
}
@@ -3277,12 +3233,10 @@ mod tests {
.contains(&explicit_dot_codex),
"explicit .codex rule should win over the default protected carveout"
);
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
explicit_dot_codex.join("config.toml").as_path(),
cwd.path()
)
);
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(
explicit_dot_codex.join("config.toml").as_path(),
cwd.path()
));
}
#[test]
@@ -3299,9 +3253,9 @@ mod tests {
missing_path_behavior: None,
}]);
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&dot_git_config, cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&dot_agents_config, cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&dot_codex_config, cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&dot_git_config, cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&dot_agents_config, cwd.path()));
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&dot_codex_config, cwd.path()));
let writable_roots = file_system_policy.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
assert_eq!(writable_roots.len(), 1);
@@ -3385,18 +3339,17 @@ mod tests {
Some(".git")
);
assert!(
file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(Path::new("src/main.rs"), relative_cwd,)
file_system_policy
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(Path::new("src/main.rs"), relative_cwd,)
);
assert!(
!file_system_policy
.can_write_path_with_cwd(Path::new(".codex/config.toml"), relative_cwd,)
);
assert!(
!file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
Path::new(".agents/skills/example/SKILL.md"),
relative_cwd,
)
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(Path::new(".codex/config.toml"), relative_cwd,)
);
assert!(!file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(
Path::new(".agents/skills/example/SKILL.md"),
relative_cwd,
));
}
#[cfg(unix)]
@@ -3777,7 +3730,7 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn resolve_access_with_cwd_uses_most_specific_entry() {
fn resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd_uses_most_specific_entry() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let docs = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs", cwd.path());
let docs_private = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("docs/private", cwd.path());
@@ -3813,19 +3766,20 @@ mod tests {
]);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(cwd.path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs_private.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs_private_public.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy
.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs_private_public.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
}
@@ -3939,7 +3893,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert!(
@@ -3978,7 +3932,7 @@ mod tests {
]);
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Read
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -4013,7 +3967,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(!policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Deny
);
}
@@ -4044,7 +3998,7 @@ mod tests {
assert!(policy.has_full_disk_write_access());
assert_eq!(
policy.resolve_access_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
policy.resolve_access_for_local_path_with_cwd(docs.as_path(), cwd.path()),
FileSystemAccessMode::Write
);
}
@@ -4215,33 +4169,6 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn materialize_project_roots_with_cwd_expands_symbolic_glob_entries() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: project_roots_glob_pattern(Path::new("**/*.env")),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
missing_path_behavior: None,
}]);
let actual = policy.materialize_project_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
assert_eq!(
actual,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("**/*.env", cwd.path())
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
missing_path_behavior: None,
}])
);
}
#[test]
fn with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots_protects_metadata() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
@@ -4375,8 +4302,9 @@ mod tests {
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
) -> bool {
ReadDenyMatcher::new(file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd)
.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_read_denied(path))
ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(file_system_sandbox_policy, cwd)
.expect("valid deny-read globs")
.is_some_and(|matcher| matcher.is_local_path_read_denied(path))
}
#[test]
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/manager.rs
+4 -2
View File
@@ -686,11 +686,13 @@ fn compatibility_workspace_write_policy(
.and_then(|tmpdir| {
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(std::path::PathBuf::from(tmpdir)).ok()
})
.is_some_and(|tmpdir| file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(tmpdir.as_path(), cwd));
.is_some_and(|tmpdir| {
file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(tmpdir.as_path(), cwd)
});
let slash_tmp = Path::new("/tmp");
let slash_tmp_writable = slash_tmp.is_absolute()
&& slash_tmp.is_dir()
&& file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(slash_tmp, cwd);
&& file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(slash_tmp, cwd);
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/policy_transforms.rs
-69
View File
@@ -12,11 +12,9 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::ReadDenyMatcher;
use codex_protocol::permissions::file_system_root;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathConvention;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use std::num::NonZeroUsize;
use std::path::Path;
pub fn normalize_additional_permissions(
additional_permissions: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
@@ -81,18 +79,6 @@ pub fn normalize_additional_permissions_with_context(
/// Resolves cwd-dependent permission entries without filtering their authority.
///
/// Unlike intersection, this preserves narrower grants beneath denied paths.
pub fn materialize_additional_permissions(
additional_permissions: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
cwd: &Path,
) -> Result<AdditionalPermissionProfile, String> {
let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
.map_err(|err| format!("invalid permission cwd: {err}"))?;
let cwd = PathUri::from(cwd);
with_local_context_for_cwd(&cwd, |context| {
materialize_additional_permissions_with_context(additional_permissions, context)
})
}
pub fn materialize_additional_permissions_with_context(
mut additional_permissions: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
context: &FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext<'_>,
@@ -158,21 +144,6 @@ pub fn merge_permission_profiles(
}
}
pub fn intersect_permission_profiles(
requested: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
granted: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
cwd: &Path,
) -> AdditionalPermissionProfile {
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
.ok()
.map(PathUri::from)
.map_or_else(AdditionalPermissionProfile::default, |cwd| {
with_local_context_for_cwd(&cwd, |context| {
intersect_permission_profiles_with_context(requested, granted, context)
})
})
}
pub fn intersect_permission_profiles_with_context(
requested: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
granted: AdditionalPermissionProfile,
@@ -248,46 +219,6 @@ pub fn intersect_permission_profiles_with_context(
}
}
fn with_local_context_for_cwd<T>(
cwd: &PathUri,
evaluate: impl FnOnce(&FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext<'_>) -> T,
) -> T {
let user_home_dir = PathUri::from_host_native_path("~").ok();
let local_cwd = std::env::current_dir().ok();
let temporary_directory_env_vars: &[&str] = if cfg!(windows) {
&["TEMP", "TMP"]
} else {
&["TMPDIR"]
};
let normalize_temp_path = |path: std::ffi::OsString| {
PathUri::from_host_native_path(&path).ok().or_else(|| {
if cfg!(unix) {
PathUri::from_host_native_path(local_cwd.as_ref()?.join(path)).ok()
} else {
None
}
})
};
let mut temporary_directories = Vec::new();
for name in temporary_directory_env_vars {
if let Some(path) = std::env::var_os(name)
.filter(|path| !path.is_empty())
.filter(|path| cfg!(unix) || Path::new(path).is_absolute())
.and_then(&normalize_temp_path)
&& !temporary_directories.contains(&path)
{
temporary_directories.push(path);
}
}
let context = FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext {
cwd,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(cwd),
user_home_dir: user_home_dir.as_ref(),
temporary_directories: Some(&temporary_directories),
};
evaluate(&context)
}
fn merge_glob_scan_max_depth(
left_entries: &[FileSystemSandboxEntry],
left_depth: Option<usize>,
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/policy_transforms_tests.rs
+63 -25
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
use super::effective_file_system_sandbox_policy;
use super::intersect_permission_profiles;
use super::intersect_permission_profiles_with_context;
use super::materialize_additional_permissions;
use super::materialize_additional_permissions_with_context;
use super::merge_file_system_policy_with_additional_permissions;
use super::normalize_additional_permissions;
@@ -23,7 +21,6 @@ use codex_utils_path_uri::PathConvention;
use codex_utils_path_uri::PathUri;
use dunce::canonicalize;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[cfg(unix)]
use std::path::Path;
use tempfile::TempDir;
@@ -32,6 +29,21 @@ fn symlink_dir(original: &Path, link: &Path) -> std::io::Result<()> {
std::os::unix::fs::symlink(original, link)
}
fn intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
requested: PermissionProfile,
granted: PermissionProfile,
cwd: &Path,
) -> PermissionProfile {
let cwd = PathUri::from_host_native_path(cwd).expect("cwd URI");
let context = FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext {
cwd: &cwd,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(&cwd),
user_home_dir: None,
temporary_directories: None,
};
intersect_permission_profiles_with_context(requested, granted, &context)
}
#[test]
fn full_access_restricted_policy_skips_platform_sandbox_when_network_is_enabled() {
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
@@ -303,6 +315,13 @@ fn materialize_additional_permissions_preserves_authority_and_constraints() {
)
.expect("absolute temp dir");
let home = PathUri::from_host_native_path("~").expect("host home");
let cwd_uri = PathUri::from(cwd.clone());
let context = FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext {
cwd: &cwd_uri,
workspace_roots: std::slice::from_ref(&cwd_uri),
user_home_dir: Some(&home),
temporary_directories: None,
};
let project_path = |subpath: &str| FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(subpath.to_owned())),
};
@@ -342,7 +361,7 @@ fn materialize_additional_permissions_preserves_authority_and_constraints() {
]);
assert_eq!(
materialize_additional_permissions(requested, cwd.as_path())
materialize_additional_permissions_with_context(requested, &context)
.expect("materialized permissions"),
expected
);
@@ -409,7 +428,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_preserves_explicit_empty_requested_reads() {
let granted = requested.clone();
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested.clone(), granted, temp_dir.path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested.clone(), granted, temp_dir.path()),
requested
);
}
@@ -430,7 +449,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_drops_ungranted_nonempty_path_requests() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, PermissionProfile::default(), temp_dir.path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
requested,
PermissionProfile::default(),
temp_dir.path()
),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -451,7 +474,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_drops_explicit_empty_reads_without_grant() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, PermissionProfile::default(), temp_dir.path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
requested,
PermissionProfile::default(),
temp_dir.path()
),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -491,7 +518,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_preserves_parent_relative_project_root_restrict
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -522,11 +549,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_rejects_symbolic_slash_tmp_grants() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.path()),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(granted.clone(), granted, cwd.path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(granted.clone(), granted, cwd.path()),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -553,7 +580,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_preserves_deny_across_case_variant_grant() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
profile(vec![requested_write, requested_deny.clone()]),
profile(vec![granted_write.clone()]),
requested_root.as_path(),
@@ -698,7 +725,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_preserves_opaque_child_deny() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
profile(vec![requested_write, requested_deny.clone()]),
profile(vec![granted_write.clone()]),
root.as_path(),
@@ -737,7 +764,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_accepts_child_path_granted_for_requested_cwd()
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.as_path()),
granted
);
}
@@ -763,7 +790,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_materializes_cwd_grant_for_reuse() {
..Default::default()
};
let intersected = intersect_permission_profiles(
let intersected = intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
cwd_write_permissions.clone(),
cwd_write_permissions,
request_cwd.as_path(),
@@ -780,7 +807,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_materializes_cwd_grant_for_reuse() {
}
);
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions::from_read_write_roots(
/*read*/ None,
@@ -822,7 +849,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_deduplicates_materialized_grants() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(permissions.clone(), permissions, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
permissions.clone(),
permissions,
cwd.as_path()
),
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions::from_read_write_roots(
/*read*/ None,
@@ -862,7 +893,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_materializes_cwd_deny_entries() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(permissions.clone(), permissions, request_cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
permissions.clone(),
permissions,
request_cwd.as_path()
),
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
entries: vec![
@@ -924,7 +959,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_drops_deny_entries_without_filesystem_grants()
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted.clone(), cwd.as_path()),
granted
);
}
@@ -968,7 +1003,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_rejects_concrete_grants_matched_by_requested_de
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -1002,8 +1037,11 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_materializes_relative_deny_globs_for_reuse() {
..Default::default()
};
let intersected =
intersect_permission_profiles(permissions.clone(), permissions, request_cwd.as_path());
let intersected = intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
permissions.clone(),
permissions,
request_cwd.as_path(),
);
assert_eq!(
intersected,
@@ -1029,7 +1067,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_materializes_relative_deny_globs_for_reuse() {
}
);
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions::from_read_write_roots(
/*read*/ None,
@@ -1074,7 +1112,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_drops_broader_cwd_grant_for_requested_child_pat
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
PermissionProfile::default()
);
}
@@ -1112,7 +1150,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_uses_granted_bounded_glob_scan_depth() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
entries: vec![
@@ -1170,7 +1208,7 @@ fn intersect_permission_profiles_uses_granted_unbounded_glob_scan_depth() {
};
assert_eq!(
intersect_permission_profiles(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
intersect_permission_profiles_with_local_cwd(requested, granted, cwd.as_path()),
PermissionProfile {
file_system: Some(FileSystemPermissions {
entries: vec![
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/seatbelt.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -607,7 +607,7 @@ fn protected_metadata_names_for_writable_root(
continue;
}
let path = writable_root.root.join(*name);
if !file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
if !file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), cwd) {
names.push((*name).to_string());
}
}
codex-rs/sandboxing/src/windows.rs
+6 -4
View File
@@ -254,8 +254,10 @@ pub fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
.needs_direct_runtime_enforcement(network_sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd);
let has_explicit_write_carveouts = split_writable_roots.iter().any(|writable_root| {
writable_root.read_only_subpaths.iter().any(|path| {
file_system_sandbox_policy
.has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_path_with_cwd(path.as_path(), sandbox_policy_cwd)
file_system_sandbox_policy.has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_local_path_with_cwd(
path.as_path(),
sandbox_policy_cwd,
)
})
});
let normalize_path = |path: PathBuf| dunce::canonicalize(&path).unwrap_or(path);
@@ -322,7 +324,7 @@ pub fn resolve_windows_elevated_filesystem_overrides(
})
});
let explicitly_configured = file_system_sandbox_policy
.has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_path_with_cwd(
.has_explicit_non_write_entry_for_local_path_with_cwd(
read_only_subpath.as_path(),
sandbox_policy_cwd,
);
@@ -370,7 +372,7 @@ fn windows_policy_has_root_read_access(
let Some(root) = cwd.as_path().ancestors().last() else {
return false;
};
file_system_sandbox_policy.can_read_path_with_cwd(root, cwd.as_path())
file_system_sandbox_policy.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(root, cwd.as_path())
}
fn permission_profile_display_name(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile) -> &'static str {
codex-rs/tui/src/additional_dirs.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ pub fn add_dir_warning_message(
return None;
}
if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
if file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
return None;
}
codex-rs/tui/src/app_server_session.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1830,7 +1830,7 @@ fn sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
.network_sandbox_policy()
.is_enabled()
.then_some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::DangerFullAccess)
} else if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
} else if file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd) {
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::WorkspaceWrite)
} else {
Some(codex_app_server_protocol::SandboxMode::ReadOnly)
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/permission_popups.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ impl ChatWidget {
matches!(
current_permission_profile,
PermissionProfile::Managed { .. }
) && file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd)
) && file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(cwd, cwd)
&& !file_system_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
}
_ => current_permission_profile == &preset.permission_profile,
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/windows_sandbox_prompts.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ impl ChatWidget {
"Full Access mode"
} else if profile
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(self.config.cwd.as_path(), self.config.cwd.as_path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(self.config.cwd.as_path(), self.config.cwd.as_path())
{
"Agent mode"
} else {
codex-rs/tui/src/external_editor.rs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -126,8 +126,9 @@ pub(super) fn editor_directory(
let Some(parent) = directory.parent() else {
return true;
};
let is_writable = file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(directory, cwd)
|| file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(parent, cwd)
let is_writable = file_system_policy
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(directory, cwd)
|| file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(parent, cwd)
|| writable_roots.iter().any(|root| {
root.is_path_writable(directory)
|| root.root.as_path().starts_with(directory)
codex-rs/tui/src/external_editor_tests.rs
+14 -14
View File
@@ -135,8 +135,8 @@ fn editor_directory_rejects_writable_codex_home_alias() {
symlink(&paths.codex_home, &aliased_home).expect("create Codex home symlink");
let policy = workspace_write_policy(&[]);
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&aliased_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&aliased_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(editor_directory(&[&aliased_home], &policy, &paths.cwd).is_err());
}
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ fn editor_directory_rejects_writable_codex_home_alias_target() {
symlink(&paths.codex_home, &aliased_home).expect("create Codex home symlink");
let policy = workspace_write_policy(&[&paths.codex_home]);
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&aliased_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&aliased_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home.join("editor"), &paths.cwd));
assert!(editor_directory(&[&aliased_home], &policy, &paths.cwd).is_err());
}
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ fn editor_directory_uses_protected_workspace_fallback_with_default_temporary_gra
);
assert!(!workspace_codex_home.exists());
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home.join("editor"), &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home.join("editor"), &cwd));
let directory = editor_directory(&[&codex_home, &workspace_codex_home], &policy, &cwd)
.expect("use protected workspace metadata directory");
@@ -210,8 +210,8 @@ fn editor_directory_rejects_explicitly_writable_workspace_fallback() {
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
);
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(
editor_directory(&[&codex_home, &workspace_codex_home], &policy, &cwd).is_err(),
"explicitly writable metadata must not be used for editor buffers"
@@ -229,8 +229,8 @@ fn editor_directory_rejects_workspace_fallback_symlink_to_writable_target() {
symlink(&paths.codex_home, &workspace_codex_home).expect("create workspace metadata symlink");
let policy = workspace_write_policy(&[&paths.codex_home]);
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &paths.cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home, &paths.cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &paths.cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&paths.codex_home, &paths.cwd));
assert!(
editor_directory(
&[&paths.codex_home, &workspace_codex_home],
@@ -347,9 +347,9 @@ async fn editor_process_uses_protected_workspace_fallback_with_default_temporary
];
assert!(!workspace_codex_home.exists());
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&default_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&default_codex_home, &cwd));
assert!(!policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&workspace_codex_home, &cwd));
let content = run_editor("seed", &editor_command, &codex_home, &policy, &cwd)
.await
codex-rs/tui/src/inline_visualization.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ impl InlineVisualizationContext {
context.viewer_dir.parent()?.parent()?.to_path_buf(),
];
for viewer_cache in viewer_caches {
if file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&viewer_cache, config.cwd.as_path())
if file_system_policy.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(&viewer_cache, config.cwd.as_path())
|| file_system_policy
.can_write_path_with_cwd(viewer_cache.parent()?, config.cwd.as_path())
.can_write_local_path_with_cwd(viewer_cache.parent()?, config.cwd.as_path())
|| writable_roots.iter().any(|root| {
root.is_path_writable(&viewer_cache)
|| root.root.as_path().starts_with(&viewer_cache)
codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/deny_read_resolver.rs
+5 -3
View File
@@ -56,7 +56,8 @@ pub fn resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
})
.collect(),
);
let Some(matcher) = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(&glob_policy, cwd.as_path())? else {
let Some(matcher) = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&glob_policy, cwd.as_path())?
else {
return Ok(paths);
};
@@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ pub fn resolve_windows_deny_read_paths(
let directory_scan_mode = if let Some(file_paths) = ripgrep_files(&scan_plan)? {
for path in file_paths {
if matcher.is_read_denied(&path) {
if matcher.is_local_path_read_denied(&path) {
push_absolute_path(&mut paths, &mut seen, path)?;
}
}
@@ -131,7 +132,8 @@ fn ripgrep_files(scan_plan: &GlobScanPlan) -> Result<Option<Vec<PathBuf>>, Strin
// Ripgrep uses exit 2 for traversal errors, including protected
// Windows directories. Its output may be incomplete. The caller
// must enumerate again using the matcher-backed walker; policy
// syntax has already been validated by ReadDenyMatcher::try_new.
// syntax has already been validated by
// ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths.
return Ok(None);
}
codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/deny_read_resolver_access_tests.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -219,11 +219,11 @@ fn native_walk_preserves_canonical_matches_through_directory_links_and_cycles()
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Deny,
missing_path_behavior: None,
}]);
let matcher = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new(&policy, cwd.as_path())
let matcher = ReadDenyMatcher::try_new_for_local_paths(&policy, cwd.as_path())
.expect("valid matcher")
.expect("deny restriction");
assert!(
matcher.is_read_denied_with_canonical_path(
matcher.is_local_path_read_denied_with_canonical_path(
&alias.join("secret.env"),
&target
.canonicalize()
codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/deny_read_walker.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -69,8 +69,8 @@ impl GlobWalker<'_> {
let denied = match canonical {
Some(canonical) => self
.matcher
.is_read_denied_with_canonical_path(path, canonical),
None => self.matcher.is_read_denied(path),
.is_local_path_read_denied_with_canonical_path(path, canonical),
None => self.matcher.is_local_path_read_denied(path),
};
if denied {
push_absolute_path(self.paths, self.seen_paths, path.to_path_buf())?;
codex-rs/windows-sandbox-rs/src/resolved_permissions.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ impl ResolvedWindowsSandboxPermissions {
}) && cwd
.ancestors()
.last()
.is_some_and(|root| self.file_system.can_read_path_with_cwd(root, cwd))
.is_some_and(|root| self.file_system.can_read_local_path_with_cwd(root, cwd))
}
pub(crate) fn include_platform_defaults(&self) -> bool {