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permissions: support workspace roots in profiles

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This commit is contained in:
Michael Bolin
2026-05-14 11:39:03 -07:00
parent 01d93fd9fc
commit 5e3f04da96
54 changed files with 1047 additions and 601 deletions
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codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/codex_app_server_protocol.schemas.json
Generated
-33
View File
@@ -5607,14 +5607,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -5622,31 +5614,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/v2/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AddCreditsNudgeCreditType": {
"enum": [
"credits",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/codex_app_server_protocol.v2.schemas.json
Generated
-33
View File
@@ -143,14 +143,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -158,31 +150,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AddCreditsNudgeCreditType": {
"enum": [
"credits",
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadForkResponse.json
Generated
-33
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadResumeResponse.json
Generated
-33
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/json/v2/ThreadStartResponse.json
Generated
-33
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,6 @@
"id": {
"description": "Identifier from `default_permissions` or the implicit built-in default, such as `:workspace` or a user-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profile.",
"type": "string"
},
"modifications": {
"default": [],
"description": "Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named profile, if any.",
"items": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/ActivePermissionProfileModification"
},
"type": "array"
}
},
"required": [
@@ -33,31 +25,6 @@
],
"type": "object"
},
"ActivePermissionProfileModification": {
"oneOf": [
{
"description": "Additional concrete directory that should be writable.",
"properties": {
"path": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/AbsolutePathBuf"
},
"type": {
"enum": [
"additionalWritableRoot"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModificationType",
"type": "string"
}
},
"required": [
"path",
"type"
],
"title": "AdditionalWritableRootActivePermissionProfileModification",
"type": "object"
}
]
},
"AgentPath": {
"type": "string"
},
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ActivePermissionProfile.ts
Generated
+1 -7
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { ActivePermissionProfileModification } from "./ActivePermissionProfileModification";
export type ActivePermissionProfile = {
/**
@@ -13,9 +12,4 @@ id: string,
* Parent profile identifier once permissions profiles support
* inheritance. This is currently always `null`.
*/
extends: string | null,
/**
* Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
* profile, if any.
*/
modifications: Array<ActivePermissionProfileModification>, };
extends: string | null, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/ActivePermissionProfileModification.ts
Generated
-6
View File
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
// GENERATED CODE! DO NOT MODIFY BY HAND!
// This file was generated by [ts-rs](https://github.com/Aleph-Alpha/ts-rs). Do not edit this file manually.
import type { AbsolutePathBuf } from "../AbsolutePathBuf";
export type ActivePermissionProfileModification = { "type": "additionalWritableRoot", path: AbsolutePathBuf, };
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/schema/typescript/v2/index.ts
Generated
-1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ export type { AccountLoginCompletedNotification } from "./AccountLoginCompletedN
export type { AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification } from "./AccountRateLimitsUpdatedNotification";
export type { AccountUpdatedNotification } from "./AccountUpdatedNotification";
export type { ActivePermissionProfile } from "./ActivePermissionProfile";
export type { ActivePermissionProfileModification } from "./ActivePermissionProfileModification";
export type { AddCreditsNudgeCreditType } from "./AddCreditsNudgeCreditType";
export type { AddCreditsNudgeEmailStatus } from "./AddCreditsNudgeEmailStatus";
export type { AdditionalFileSystemPermissions } from "./AdditionalFileSystemPermissions";
codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/permissions.rs
-46
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkApprovalProtocol as CoreNetworkApprovalPro
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyAmendment as CoreNetworkPolicyAmendment;
use codex_protocol::approvals::NetworkPolicyRuleAction as CoreNetworkPolicyRuleAction;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile as CoreActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification as CoreActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::AdditionalPermissionProfile as CoreAdditionalPermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions as CoreFileSystemPermissions;
use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions as CoreManagedFileSystemPermissions;
@@ -437,41 +436,6 @@ pub struct ActivePermissionProfile {
/// inheritance. This is currently always `null`.
#[serde(default)]
pub extends: Option<String>,
/// Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
/// profile, if any.
#[serde(default)]
pub modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
#[ts(export_to = "v2/")]
pub enum ActivePermissionProfileModification {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
#[ts(rename_all = "camelCase")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfileModification> for ActivePermissionProfileModification {
fn from(value: CoreActivePermissionProfileModification) -> Self {
match value {
CoreActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
Self::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
}
}
}
impl From<ActivePermissionProfileModification> for CoreActivePermissionProfileModification {
fn from(value: ActivePermissionProfileModification) -> Self {
match value {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
Self::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
}
}
}
impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfile> for ActivePermissionProfile {
@@ -479,11 +443,6 @@ impl From<CoreActivePermissionProfile> for ActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: value.id,
extends: value.extends,
modifications: value
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(ActivePermissionProfileModification::from)
.collect(),
}
}
}
@@ -493,11 +452,6 @@ impl From<ActivePermissionProfile> for CoreActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: value.id,
extends: value.extends,
modifications: value
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(CoreActivePermissionProfileModification::from)
.collect(),
}
}
}
codex-rs/app-server/src/lib.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ pub async fn run_main_with_transport_options(
});
}
if let Some(warning) =
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile.get())
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile().get())
{
config_warnings.push(ConfigWarningNotification {
summary: warning,
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/command_exec_processor.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
let started_network_proxy = match self.config.permissions.network.as_ref() {
Some(spec) => match spec
.start_proxy(
self.config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
self.config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*blocked_request_observer*/ None,
managed_network_requirements_enabled,
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
);
self.config
.permissions
.permission_profile
.permission_profile()
.can_set(&effective_permission_profile)
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("invalid permission profile: {err}")))?;
effective_permission_profile
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ impl CommandExecRequestProcessor {
);
self.config
.permissions
.permission_profile
.permission_profile()
.can_set(&permission_profile)
.map_err(|err| invalid_request(format!("invalid sandbox policy: {err}")))?;
permission_profile
} else {
self.config.permissions.permission_profile()
self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile()
};
let codex_linux_sandbox_exe = self.arg0_paths.codex_linux_sandbox_exe.clone();
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/thread_processor.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -977,7 +977,7 @@ impl ThreadRequestProcessor {
let requested_permissions_trust_project =
requested_permissions_trust_project(&typesafe_overrides, config.cwd.as_path());
let effective_permissions_trust_project = permission_profile_trusts_project(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
);
codex-rs/app-server/src/request_processors/turn_processor.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ impl TurnRequestProcessor {
)));
}
(
Some(config.permissions.permission_profile()),
Some(config.permissions.effective_permission_profile()),
config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
)
} else {
codex-rs/cli/src/debug_sandbox.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
let network_proxy = match config.permissions.network.as_ref() {
Some(spec) => Some(
spec.start_proxy(
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*blocked_request_observer*/ None,
managed_network_requirements_enabled,
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ async fn run_command_under_sandbox(
let args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args_for_permission_profile(
command,
cwd.as_path(),
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
sandbox_policy_cwd.as_path(),
use_legacy_landlock,
allow_network_for_proxy(managed_network_requirements_enabled),
codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs
+15
View File
@@ -25,10 +25,25 @@ impl PermissionsToml {
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
#[schemars(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct PermissionProfileToml {
pub workspace_roots: Option<WorkspaceRootsToml>,
pub filesystem: Option<FilesystemPermissionsToml>,
pub network: Option<NetworkToml>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
pub struct WorkspaceRootsToml {
#[serde(flatten)]
pub entries: BTreeMap<String, bool>,
}
impl WorkspaceRootsToml {
pub fn enabled_roots(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &String> {
self.entries
.iter()
.filter_map(|(path, enabled)| (*enabled).then_some(path))
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq, JsonSchema)]
pub struct FilesystemPermissionsToml {
/// Optional maximum depth for expanding unreadable glob patterns on
codex-rs/core/config.schema.json
+6
View File
@@ -1943,6 +1943,9 @@
},
"network": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/NetworkToml"
},
"workspace_roots": {
"$ref": "#/definitions/WorkspaceRootsToml"
}
},
"type": "object"
@@ -3930,6 +3933,9 @@
"type": "string"
}
]
},
"WorkspaceRootsToml": {
"type": "object"
}
},
"description": "Base config deserialized from ~/.codex/config.toml.",
codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs
+172 -43
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkDomainPermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionProfileToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::WorkspaceRootsToml;
use codex_config::profile_toml::ConfigProfile;
use codex_config::types::AppToolApproval;
use codex_config::types::ApprovalsReviewer;
@@ -69,7 +70,6 @@ use codex_model_provider_info::WireApi;
use codex_models_manager::bundled_models_response;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ServiceTier;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE;
@@ -719,6 +719,10 @@ fn config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles() {
let toml = r#"
default_permissions = "workspace"
[permissions.workspace.workspace_roots]
"~/code/openai" = true
"~/code/ignored" = false
[permissions.workspace.filesystem]
":minimal" = "read"
@@ -745,6 +749,12 @@ allow_upstream_proxy = false
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: Some(WorkspaceRootsToml {
entries: BTreeMap::from([
("~/code/ignored".to_string(), false),
("~/code/openai".to_string(), true),
]),
}),
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([
@@ -800,6 +810,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_proxy_policy_does_not_start_managed_network_proxy_
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -953,6 +964,7 @@ async fn network_proxy_feature_matrix_preserves_sandbox_network_semantics() -> s
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1103,6 +1115,7 @@ async fn network_proxy_feature_uses_profile_network_proxy_settings() -> std::io:
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1205,6 +1218,7 @@ enabled = false
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1253,6 +1267,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_network_disabled_by_default_does_not_start_proxy()
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1299,6 +1314,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([
@@ -1332,6 +1348,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
)
.await?;
let cwd_root = cwd.path().abs();
let memories_root = codex_home.path().join("memories").abs();
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy(),
@@ -1343,14 +1360,14 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None),
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cwd_root.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some("docs".into())),
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: cwd_root.join("docs"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
@@ -1371,6 +1388,12 @@ async fn default_permissions_profile_populates_runtime_sandbox_policy() -> std::
exclude_slash_tmp: true,
}
);
assert!(
!config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.can_write_path_with_cwd(&cwd.path().join(".git"), cwd.path())
);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.network_sandbox_policy(),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted
@@ -1403,7 +1426,10 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_populates_runtime_permissions() -> std::io:
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(config.permissions.permission_profile(), permission_profile);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
permission_profile
);
assert_eq!(config.permissions.active_permission_profile(), None);
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
@@ -1433,7 +1459,10 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_managed_unrestricted_filesystem()
)
.await?;
assert_eq!(config.permissions.permission_profile(), permission_profile);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
permission_profile
);
assert_eq!(
&config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
&SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox {
@@ -1565,6 +1594,7 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_configured_network_policy_without
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1602,7 +1632,10 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_configured_network_policy_without
config.permissions.network.is_none(),
"profile network.enabled should not start the managed network proxy"
);
assert_eq!(config.permissions.permission_profile(), permission_profile);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
permission_profile
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -1610,7 +1643,9 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_preserves_configured_network_policy_without
async fn workspace_root_glob_none_compiles_to_filesystem_pattern_entry() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
let extra_root = TempDir::new()?;
tokio::fs::write(cwd.path().join(".git"), "gitdir: nowhere").await?;
tokio::fs::write(extra_root.path().join(".git"), "gitdir: nowhere").await?;
let config = Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides(
ConfigToml {
@@ -1619,6 +1654,7 @@ async fn workspace_root_glob_none_compiles_to_filesystem_pattern_entry() -> std:
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: Some(2),
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1637,6 +1673,7 @@ async fn workspace_root_glob_none_compiles_to_filesystem_pattern_entry() -> std:
},
ConfigOverrides {
cwd: Some(cwd.path().to_path_buf()),
additional_writable_roots: vec![extra_root.path().to_path_buf()],
..Default::default()
},
codex_home.abs(),
@@ -1650,21 +1687,23 @@ async fn workspace_root_glob_none_compiles_to_filesystem_pattern_entry() -> std:
.glob_scan_max_depth,
Some(2)
);
let expected_pattern = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("**/*.env", cwd.path())
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned();
assert!(
config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.entries
.contains(&FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: expected_pattern,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
})
);
for root in [cwd.path(), extra_root.path()] {
let expected_pattern = AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("**/*.env", root)
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned();
assert!(
config
.permissions
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
.entries
.contains(&FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: expected_pattern,
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
})
);
}
assert!(
!config
.permissions
@@ -1694,6 +1733,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_require_default_permissions() -> std::io::Result<(
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -1764,8 +1804,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_can_select_builtin_profile_without_permissions_tabl
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modifications()
-> std::io::Result<()> {
async fn default_permissions_read_only_keeps_add_dir_read_only() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let codex_home = TempDir::new()?;
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
let extra_root = TempDir::new()?;
@@ -1787,20 +1826,88 @@ async fn default_permissions_read_only_applies_additional_writable_roots_as_modi
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected additional writable root to modify :read-only, policy: {policy:?}"
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(extra_root.as_path(), cwd.path()),
"expected :read-only to stay read-only for runtime workspace roots, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
Some(
ActivePermissionProfile::new(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY).with_modifications(
vec![
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot {
path: extra_root,
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
))
);
Ok(())
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn workspace_profile_applies_rules_to_runtime_and_profile_workspace_roots()
-> std::io::Result<()> {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new()?;
let codex_home = temp_dir.path().join("codex-home");
let cwd = temp_dir.path().join("frontend");
let runtime_root = temp_dir.path().join("backend");
let profile_root = temp_dir.path().join("shared");
for root in [&cwd, &runtime_root, &profile_root] {
std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join(".git"))?;
std::fs::create_dir_all(root.join(".codex"))?;
}
let config = Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides(
ConfigToml {
default_permissions: Some("dev".to_string()),
permissions: Some(PermissionsToml {
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"dev".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: Some(WorkspaceRootsToml {
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
profile_root.to_string_lossy().into_owned(),
true,
)]),
}),
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
":workspace_roots".to_string(),
FilesystemPermissionToml::Scoped(BTreeMap::from([
(".".to_string(), FileSystemAccessMode::Write),
(".git".to_string(), FileSystemAccessMode::Read),
(".codex".to_string(), FileSystemAccessMode::Read),
])),
)]),
}),
network: None,
},
]
)
)
)]),
}),
..Default::default()
},
ConfigOverrides {
cwd: Some(cwd.clone()),
additional_writable_roots: vec![runtime_root.clone()],
..Default::default()
},
codex_home.abs(),
)
.await?;
let policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
for root in [cwd.abs(), runtime_root.abs(), profile_root.abs()] {
assert!(
policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(root.as_path(), cwd.as_path()),
"expected workspace root to be writable, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".git"), cwd.as_path()),
"expected .git carveout under {root:?}, policy: {policy:?}"
);
assert!(
!policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(&root.join(".codex"), cwd.as_path()),
"expected .codex carveout under {root:?}, policy: {policy:?}"
);
}
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new("dev"))
);
Ok(())
}
@@ -2068,7 +2175,7 @@ async fn default_permissions_can_select_builtin_full_access_profile() -> std::io
.await?;
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
PermissionProfile::Disabled
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -2185,6 +2292,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_direct_write_roots_outside_workspace_root()
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -2241,6 +2349,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_reject_nested_entries_for_non_workspace_roots() ->
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -2301,6 +2410,7 @@ async fn load_workspace_permission_profile(
#[tokio::test]
async fn permissions_profiles_allow_unknown_special_paths() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let config = load_workspace_permission_profile(PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -2344,6 +2454,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_unknown_special_paths() -> std::io::Result<(
async fn permissions_profiles_allow_unknown_special_paths_with_nested_entries()
-> std::io::Result<()> {
let config = load_workspace_permission_profile(PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -2380,6 +2491,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_unknown_special_paths_with_nested_entries()
#[tokio::test]
async fn permissions_profiles_allow_missing_filesystem_with_warning() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let config = load_workspace_permission_profile(PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: None,
network: None,
})
@@ -2408,6 +2520,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_missing_filesystem_with_warning() -> std::io
#[tokio::test]
async fn permissions_profiles_allow_empty_filesystem_with_warning() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let config = load_workspace_permission_profile(PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::new(),
@@ -2443,6 +2556,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_reject_workspace_root_parent_traversal() -> std::i
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -2489,6 +2603,7 @@ async fn permissions_profiles_allow_network_enablement() -> std::io::Result<()>
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
@@ -7352,10 +7467,13 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_o3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
model_provider: fixture.openai_provider.clone(),
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
permission_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
constrained_permissions_profile: Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::read_only()
),
active_permission_profile: Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
)),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
@@ -7367,6 +7485,8 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_o3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
workspace_roots_explicit: false,
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -7801,10 +7921,11 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
model_provider: fixture.openai_custom_provider.clone(),
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted),
permission_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
constrained_permissions_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
active_permission_profile: Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
)),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
@@ -7816,6 +7937,8 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt3_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
workspace_roots_explicit: false,
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -7964,10 +8087,11 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_zdr_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
model_provider: fixture.openai_provider.clone(),
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::OnFailure),
permission_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
constrained_permissions_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
active_permission_profile: Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
)),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
@@ -7979,6 +8103,8 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_zdr_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
workspace_roots_explicit: false,
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -8112,10 +8238,11 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt5_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
model_provider: fixture.openai_provider.clone(),
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::OnFailure),
permission_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
constrained_permissions_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
active_permission_profile: Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
)),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
@@ -8127,6 +8254,8 @@ async fn test_precedence_fixture_with_gpt5_profile() -> std::io::Result<()> {
user_instructions: None,
notify: None,
cwd: fixture.cwd(),
workspace_roots: vec![fixture.cwd()],
workspace_roots_explicit: false,
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: Default::default(),
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: resolve_mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode(
@@ -9064,7 +9193,7 @@ async fn permission_profile_override_falls_back_when_disallowed_by_requirements(
let expected_sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
assert_eq!(config.legacy_sandbox_policy(), expected_sandbox_policy);
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
PermissionProfile::read_only()
);
Ok(())
@@ -9092,7 +9221,7 @@ async fn active_profile_is_cleared_when_requirements_force_fallback() -> std::io
.await?;
assert_eq!(
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
PermissionProfile::read_only()
);
assert_eq!(config.permissions.active_permission_profile(), None);
@@ -9212,7 +9341,7 @@ async fn requirements_web_search_mode_overrides_danger_full_access_default() ->
assert_eq!(
resolve_web_search_mode_for_turn(
&config.web_search_mode,
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
),
WebSearchMode::Cached,
);
codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs
+218 -93
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ use codex_protocol::config_types::WebSearchConfig;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WebSearchMode;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::SandboxEnforcement;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ModelsResponse;
@@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ use crate::config::permissions::BUILT_IN_WORKSPACE_PROFILE;
use crate::config::permissions::apply_network_proxy_feature_config;
use crate::config::permissions::builtin_permission_profile;
use crate::config::permissions::compile_permission_profile_selection;
use crate::config::permissions::compile_permission_profile_workspace_roots;
use crate::config::permissions::default_builtin_permission_profile_name;
use crate::config::permissions::get_readable_roots_required_for_codex_runtime;
use crate::config::permissions::network_proxy_config_for_profile_selection;
@@ -247,12 +247,16 @@ pub(crate) async fn test_config() -> Config {
pub struct Permissions {
/// Approval policy for executing commands.
pub approval_policy: Constrained<AskForApproval>,
/// Canonical effective runtime permissions after config requirements and
/// runtime readable-root additions have been applied.
pub permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
/// Canonical constrained permissions profile before runtime workspace-root
/// materialization has been applied.
constrained_permissions_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
/// Named or implicit built-in profile selected by config, rather than an
/// ad-hoc override.
pub active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
/// Thread-scoped runtime workspace roots. Symbolic `:workspace_roots`
/// entries in `constrained_permissions_profile` are materialized against
/// these roots.
workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Effective network configuration applied to all spawned processes.
pub network: Option<NetworkProxySpec>,
/// Whether the model may request a login shell for shell-based tools.
@@ -274,10 +278,61 @@ pub struct Permissions {
}
impl Permissions {
/// Build permissions from the constrained values required for a minimal
/// in-process configuration.
pub fn from_approval_and_profile(
approval_policy: Constrained<AskForApproval>,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
) -> Self {
Self {
approval_policy,
constrained_permissions_profile: permission_profile,
active_permission_profile: None,
workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: true,
}
}
/// Borrow the constrained canonical profile. This preserves the raw
/// symbolic `:workspace_roots` form for session/thread state.
pub fn permission_profile(&self) -> &Constrained<PermissionProfile> {
&self.constrained_permissions_profile
}
/// Set the full constrained profile value and preserve the active profile
/// sidecar when the caller has already validated both together.
pub fn set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
&mut self,
permission_profile: Constrained<PermissionProfile>,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
) {
self.constrained_permissions_profile = permission_profile;
self.active_permission_profile = active_permission_profile;
}
pub fn set_workspace_roots(&mut self, workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>) {
self.workspace_roots = workspace_roots;
}
pub fn workspace_roots(&self) -> &[AbsolutePathBuf] {
&self.workspace_roots
}
fn materialized_permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
self.constrained_permissions_profile
.get()
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&self.workspace_roots)
}
/// Effective runtime permissions after config requirements and runtime
/// readable-root additions have been applied.
pub fn permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
self.permission_profile.get().clone()
/// workspace-root materialization have been applied.
pub fn effective_permission_profile(&self) -> PermissionProfile {
self.materialized_permission_profile()
}
/// Named profile selected by config, if the current profile has one.
@@ -287,20 +342,23 @@ impl Permissions {
/// Effective filesystem sandbox policy derived from the canonical profile.
pub fn file_system_sandbox_policy(&self) -> FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.get().file_system_sandbox_policy()
self.materialized_permission_profile()
.file_system_sandbox_policy()
}
/// Effective network sandbox policy derived from the canonical profile.
pub fn network_sandbox_policy(&self) -> NetworkSandboxPolicy {
self.permission_profile.get().network_sandbox_policy()
self.constrained_permissions_profile
.get()
.network_sandbox_policy()
}
/// Legacy compatibility projection derived from the canonical profile.
pub fn legacy_sandbox_policy(&self, cwd: &Path) -> SandboxPolicy {
let permission_profile = self.permission_profile.get();
let permission_profile = self.materialized_permission_profile();
let file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
permission_profile,
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy(),
cwd,
@@ -322,11 +380,12 @@ impl Permissions {
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
self.permission_profile.can_set(&permission_profile)
self.constrained_permissions_profile
.can_set(&permission_profile)
}
/// Replace permissions from a legacy sandbox policy and keep every
/// permission projection in sync.
/// Set permissions from a legacy sandbox policy and keep every permission
/// projection in sync.
pub fn set_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&mut self,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
@@ -341,13 +400,34 @@ impl Permissions {
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
self.workspace_roots = match &sandbox_policy {
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } => {
let mut workspace_roots = vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(cwd, "/")),
];
for root in writable_roots {
if !workspace_roots.iter().any(|existing| existing == root) {
workspace_roots.push(root.clone());
}
}
workspace_roots
}
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess
| SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. }
| SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly { .. } => vec![
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd)
.unwrap_or_else(|_| AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(cwd, "/")),
],
};
self.permission_profile.set(permission_profile)?;
self.constrained_permissions_profile
.set(permission_profile)?;
self.active_permission_profile = None;
Ok(())
}
/// Replace permissions from the canonical profile.
/// Set permissions from the canonical profile.
pub fn set_permission_profile(
&mut self,
permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
@@ -358,16 +438,15 @@ impl Permissions {
)
}
/// Replace permissions from the canonical profile and record the named
/// source profile, if one is known.
/// Set permissions from the canonical profile and record the named source
/// profile, if one is known.
pub fn set_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
&mut self,
permission_profile: PermissionProfile,
active_permission_profile: Option<ActivePermissionProfile>,
) -> ConstraintResult<()> {
self.permission_profile.can_set(&permission_profile)?;
self.permission_profile.set(permission_profile)?;
self.constrained_permissions_profile
.set(permission_profile)?;
self.active_permission_profile = active_permission_profile;
Ok(())
}
@@ -577,6 +656,15 @@ pub struct Config {
/// layer are resolved against this path.
pub cwd: AbsolutePathBuf,
/// Absolute runtime workspace roots for the session. Symbolic
/// `:workspace_roots` permission entries are materialized against these
/// roots while profile-defined workspace roots remain encoded directly in
/// the permission profile.
pub workspace_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
/// Whether runtime workspace roots were supplied explicitly by the caller
/// or legacy config, rather than defaulting to `cwd`.
pub workspace_roots_explicit: bool,
/// Preferred store for CLI auth credentials.
/// file (default): Use a file in the Codex home directory.
/// keyring: Use an OS-specific keyring service.
@@ -1085,8 +1173,14 @@ impl Config {
&mut self,
sandbox_policy: SandboxPolicy,
) -> ConstraintResult<()> {
self.workspace_roots_explicit = matches!(
&sandbox_policy,
SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { writable_roots, .. } if !writable_roots.is_empty()
);
self.permissions
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, self.cwd.as_path())
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, self.cwd.as_path())?;
self.workspace_roots = self.permissions.workspace_roots().to_vec();
Ok(())
}
pub fn to_models_manager_config(&self) -> ModelsManagerConfig {
@@ -1935,6 +2029,14 @@ pub struct ConfigOverrides {
pub bypass_hook_trust: Option<bool>,
/// Additional directories that should be treated as writable roots for this session.
pub additional_writable_roots: Vec<PathBuf>,
/// Explicit runtime workspace roots for this session. When set, this is
/// the full runtime root list rather than an additive override.
pub workspace_roots: Option<Vec<PathBuf>>,
}
fn dedupe_absolute_paths(paths: &mut Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>) {
let mut seen = HashSet::new();
paths.retain(|path| seen.insert(path.clone()));
}
/// Resolves the OSS provider from CLI override, profile config, or global config.
@@ -2248,6 +2350,7 @@ impl Config {
ephemeral,
bypass_hook_trust,
additional_writable_roots,
workspace_roots: workspace_roots_override,
} = overrides;
let bypass_hook_trust = bypass_hook_trust.unwrap_or_default();
@@ -2340,11 +2443,10 @@ impl Config {
}
}
}))?;
let mut additional_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = additional_writable_roots
let requested_additional_writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> = additional_writable_roots
.into_iter()
.map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, resolved_cwd.as_path()))
.collect();
let requested_additional_writable_roots = additional_writable_roots.clone();
let repo_root = resolve_root_git_project_for_trust(fs, &resolved_cwd).await;
let active_project = cfg
.get_active_project(
@@ -2386,12 +2488,7 @@ impl Config {
};
let memories_root = memory_root(&codex_home);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&memories_root)?;
if !additional_writable_roots
.iter()
.any(|existing| existing == &memories_root)
{
additional_writable_roots.push(memories_root);
}
let internal_writable_roots = vec![memories_root];
let profiles_are_active = default_permissions_override.is_some()
|| matches!(
@@ -2401,6 +2498,40 @@ impl Config {
|| permission_config_syntax.is_none();
let using_implicit_builtin_profile =
permission_config_syntax.is_none() && default_permissions.is_none();
let should_seed_legacy_workspace_roots = default_permissions.is_none()
&& matches!(
permission_config_syntax,
None | Some(PermissionConfigSyntax::Legacy)
);
let legacy_workspace_roots_explicit = should_seed_legacy_workspace_roots
&& cfg
.sandbox_workspace_write
.as_ref()
.is_some_and(|sandbox_workspace_write| {
!sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots.is_empty()
});
let workspace_roots_explicit = workspace_roots_override.is_some()
|| !requested_additional_writable_roots.is_empty()
|| legacy_workspace_roots_explicit;
let mut workspace_roots = match workspace_roots_override {
Some(workspace_roots) => workspace_roots
.into_iter()
.map(|path| {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, resolved_cwd.as_path())
})
.collect(),
None => {
let mut workspace_roots = vec![resolved_cwd.clone()];
workspace_roots.extend(requested_additional_writable_roots.clone());
if should_seed_legacy_workspace_roots
&& let Some(sandbox_workspace_write) = cfg.sandbox_workspace_write.as_ref()
{
workspace_roots.extend(sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots.clone());
}
workspace_roots
}
};
dedupe_absolute_paths(&mut workspace_roots);
let (
mut configured_network_proxy_config,
permission_profile,
@@ -2429,18 +2560,24 @@ impl Config {
} else {
NetworkProxyConfig::default()
};
let materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&workspace_roots);
let materialized_permission_profile =
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
let sandbox_policy = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&materialized_permission_profile,
&materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
);
if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&additional_writable_roots,
);
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -2474,6 +2611,20 @@ impl Config {
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&mut startup_warnings,
)?;
let mut configured_workspace_roots = compile_permission_profile_workspace_roots(
cfg.permissions.as_ref(),
default_permissions,
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
)?;
if using_implicit_builtin_profile
&& default_permissions == BUILT_IN_WORKSPACE_PROFILE
&& let Some(sandbox_workspace_write) = cfg.sandbox_workspace_write.as_ref()
{
configured_workspace_roots.extend(sandbox_workspace_write.writable_roots.clone());
}
dedupe_absolute_paths(&mut configured_workspace_roots);
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_materialized_project_roots_for_workspace_roots(&configured_workspace_roots);
let mut permission_profile = if let Some(permission_profile) =
builtin_permission_profile(default_permissions, builtin_workspace_write_settings)
{
@@ -2484,36 +2635,26 @@ impl Config {
network_sandbox_policy,
)
};
let materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&workspace_roots);
let materialized_permission_profile =
PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
let sandbox_policy = compatibility_sandbox_policy_for_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
&materialized_permission_profile,
&materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
);
if matches!(sandbox_policy, SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite { .. }) {
file_system_sandbox_policy = if using_implicit_builtin_profile {
file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(
&additional_writable_roots,
)
} else {
file_system_sandbox_policy.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&additional_writable_roots,
)
};
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
} else if matches!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Managed { .. })
&& !requested_additional_writable_roots.is_empty()
{
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy.with_additional_writable_roots(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
&requested_additional_writable_roots,
);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
network_sandbox_policy,
);
@@ -2529,22 +2670,7 @@ impl Config {
// when doing so would lose roots, network, or tmp settings.
None
} else {
let active_permission_profile = if !requested_additional_writable_roots.is_empty()
&& matches!(permission_profile, PermissionProfile::Managed { .. })
{
ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions).with_modifications(
requested_additional_writable_roots
.iter()
.cloned()
.map(|path| {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
})
.collect(),
)
} else {
ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions)
};
Some(active_permission_profile)
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(default_permissions))
};
(
configured_network_proxy_config,
@@ -2583,25 +2709,21 @@ impl Config {
}
let (mut file_system_sandbox_policy, network_sandbox_policy) =
permission_profile.to_runtime_permissions();
// `additional_writable_roots` is a legacy workspace-write knob. It
// only applies when the derived managed profile has workspace-style
// write access to the project roots; read-only, disabled, external,
// and future non-workspace profiles must not silently grow extra
// write access.
let materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy = permission_profile
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&workspace_roots)
.file_system_sandbox_policy();
if matches!(permission_profile.enforcement(), SandboxEnforcement::Managed)
&& file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
&& materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
resolved_cwd.as_path(),
)
&& !file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
&& !materialized_file_system_sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access()
{
// Keep legacy behavior for extra writable roots while storing
// the result as the canonical permission profile. Explicit
// extra roots are concrete paths, so their metadata carveouts
// are also concrete rather than symbolic `:workspace_roots`
// entries.
// Keep Codex runtime write access while storing the runtime
// workspace roots separately on the thread.
file_system_sandbox_policy = file_system_sandbox_policy
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&additional_writable_roots);
.with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots(&internal_writable_roots);
permission_profile = PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions_with_enforcement(
permission_profile.enforcement(),
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
@@ -3114,11 +3236,14 @@ impl Config {
model_provider_id,
model_provider,
cwd: resolved_cwd,
workspace_roots: workspace_roots.clone(),
workspace_roots_explicit,
startup_warnings,
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: constrained_approval_policy.value,
permission_profile: constrained_permission_profile.value,
constrained_permissions_profile: constrained_permission_profile.value,
active_permission_profile,
workspace_roots,
network,
allow_login_shell,
shell_environment_policy,
@@ -3404,7 +3529,7 @@ impl Config {
pub fn managed_network_requirements_enabled(&self) -> bool {
!matches!(
self.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
self.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
PermissionProfile::Disabled
) && self
.config_layer_stack
codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs
+44 -12
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionProfileToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::WorkspaceRootsToml;
use codex_config::types::SandboxWorkspaceWrite;
use codex_features::NetworkProxyConfigToml;
use codex_features::NetworkProxyDomainPermissionToml;
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_protocol::permissions::project_roots_glob_pattern;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use super::ProjectConfig;
@@ -72,12 +74,12 @@ pub(crate) fn builtin_permission_profile(
BUILT_IN_READ_ONLY_PROFILE => Some(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
BUILT_IN_WORKSPACE_PROFILE => Some(match workspace_write {
Some(SandboxWorkspaceWrite {
writable_roots,
writable_roots: _,
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
}) => PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
writable_roots,
&[],
if *network_access {
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Enabled
} else {
@@ -303,6 +305,41 @@ pub(crate) fn compile_permission_profile_selection(
compile_permission_profile(permissions, profile_name, policy_cwd, startup_warnings)
}
pub(crate) fn compile_permission_profile_workspace_roots(
permissions: Option<&PermissionsToml>,
profile_name: &str,
policy_cwd: &Path,
) -> io::Result<Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>> {
if is_builtin_permission_profile_name(profile_name) {
return Ok(Vec::new());
}
reject_unknown_builtin_permission_profile(profile_name)?;
let permissions = permissions.ok_or_else(|| {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
"default_permissions requires a `[permissions]` table",
)
})?;
let profile = resolve_permission_profile(permissions, profile_name)?;
Ok(compile_workspace_roots(
profile.workspace_roots.as_ref(),
policy_cwd,
))
}
fn compile_workspace_roots(
workspace_roots: Option<&WorkspaceRootsToml>,
policy_cwd: &Path,
) -> Vec<AbsolutePathBuf> {
workspace_roots.map_or_else(Vec::new, |workspace_roots| {
workspace_roots
.enabled_roots()
.map(|path| AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(path, policy_cwd))
.collect()
})
}
fn reject_unknown_builtin_permission_profile(profile_name: &str) -> io::Result<()> {
if profile_name.starts_with(':') {
return Err(io::Error::new(
@@ -478,7 +515,7 @@ fn compile_scoped_filesystem_pattern(
path: &str,
subpath: &str,
access: FileSystemAccessMode,
policy_cwd: &Path,
_policy_cwd: &Path,
) -> io::Result<String> {
// Pattern entries currently mean deny-read only. Supporting broader access
// modes here would imply glob-based read/write allow semantics that the
@@ -493,15 +530,10 @@ fn compile_scoped_filesystem_pattern(
match parse_special_path(path) {
Some(FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. }) => {
// `:workspace_roots` is represented as a special path, but current
// filesystem-policy resolution defines it relative to the session
// cwd. Use the same policy cwd here so glob entries and exact
// scoped entries resolve consistently.
Ok(
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(&subpath, policy_cwd)
.to_string_lossy()
.to_string(),
)
// Keep `:workspace_roots` glob patterns symbolic until the active
// workspace roots are known, then materialize them for cwd and any
// runtime/profile-added workspace roots together.
Ok(project_roots_glob_pattern(&subpath))
}
Some(_) => Err(io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput,
codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs
+36
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkUnixSocketPermissionToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::NetworkUnixSocketPermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionProfileToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::PermissionsToml;
use codex_config::permissions_toml::WorkspaceRootsToml;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ async fn restricted_read_implicitly_allows_helper_executables() -> std::io::Resu
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::new(),
@@ -275,6 +277,39 @@ fn profile_network_proxy_config_keeps_proxy_disabled_for_proxy_policy() {
);
}
#[test]
fn compile_permission_profile_workspace_roots_resolves_enabled_entries() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let cwd = TempDir::new()?;
let workspace_roots = compile_permission_profile_workspace_roots(
Some(&PermissionsToml {
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: Some(WorkspaceRootsToml {
entries: BTreeMap::from([
("backend".to_string(), true),
("disabled".to_string(), false),
]),
}),
filesystem: None,
network: None,
},
)]),
}),
"workspace",
cwd.path(),
)?;
assert_eq!(
workspace_roots,
vec![AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
"backend",
cwd.path()
)]
);
Ok(())
}
#[test]
fn read_write_glob_warnings_skip_supported_deny_read_globs_and_trailing_subpaths() {
let filesystem = FilesystemPermissionsToml {
@@ -359,6 +394,7 @@ fn read_write_trailing_glob_suffix_compiles_as_subpath() -> std::io::Result<()>
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
"workspace".to_string(),
PermissionProfileToml {
workspace_roots: None,
filesystem: Some(FilesystemPermissionsToml {
glob_scan_max_depth: None,
entries: BTreeMap::from([(
codex-rs/core/src/guardian/review_session.rs
+1 -5
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ use codex_analytics::GuardianReviewAnalyticsResult;
use codex_analytics::GuardianReviewSessionKind;
use codex_protocol::config_types::Personality;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningSummary as ReasoningSummaryConfig;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ResponseItem;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ReasoningEffort as ReasoningEffortConfig;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
@@ -896,9 +895,6 @@ pub(crate) fn build_guardian_review_session_config(
guardian_config.developer_instructions = None;
guardian_config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_only(AskForApproval::Never);
let sandbox_policy = SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy();
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile = Constrained::allow_only(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
);
guardian_config
.permissions
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, guardian_config.cwd.as_path())
@@ -924,7 +920,7 @@ pub(crate) fn build_guardian_review_session_config(
guardian_config.permissions.network = Some(NetworkProxySpec::from_config_and_constraints(
live_network_config,
network_constraints,
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
)?);
}
for feature in [
codex-rs/core/src/guardian/tests.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -2163,7 +2163,7 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_preserves_parent_network_proxy() {
}),
..Default::default()
}),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
)
.expect("network proxy spec");
parent_config.permissions.network = Some(network.clone());
@@ -2190,8 +2190,8 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_preserves_parent_network_proxy() {
Constrained::allow_only(AskForApproval::Never)
);
assert_eq!(
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile,
Constrained::allow_only(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
guardian_config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&Constrained::allow_only(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
))
);
@@ -2230,7 +2230,7 @@ async fn guardian_review_session_config_uses_live_network_proxy_state() {
NetworkProxySpec::from_config_and_constraints(
parent_network,
/*requirements*/ None,
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
parent_config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
)
.expect("parent network proxy spec"),
);
codex-rs/core/src/session/mod.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ impl Codex {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
codex-rs/core/src/session/session.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ impl Session {
let (network_proxy, session_network_proxy) = Self::start_managed_network_proxy(
spec,
current_exec_policy.as_ref(),
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
network_policy_decider.as_ref().map(Arc::clone),
blocked_request_observer.as_ref().map(Arc::clone),
managed_network_requirements_configured,
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ impl Session {
// setup is straightforward enough and performs well.
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs
+16 -13
View File
@@ -2128,9 +2128,12 @@ async fn session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox() ->
};
let expected_sandbox_policy = sandbox_policy.clone();
let mut builder = test_codex().with_config(move |config| {
config.permissions.permission_profile = codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy),
);
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&sandbox_policy,
))
.expect("set permission profile");
config
.set_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy)
.expect("set sandbox policy");
@@ -2884,7 +2887,7 @@ async fn set_rate_limits_retains_previous_credits() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -2988,7 +2991,7 @@ async fn set_rate_limits_updates_plan_type_when_present() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -3461,7 +3464,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_configuration_for_tests() -> SessionConfigurati
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -3994,7 +3997,7 @@ async fn session_new_fails_when_zsh_fork_enabled_without_zsh_path() {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -4103,7 +4106,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_and_context() -> (Session, TurnContext) {
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -4150,7 +4153,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn make_session_and_context() -> (Session, TurnContext) {
let services = SessionServices {
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
@@ -4335,7 +4338,7 @@ async fn make_session_with_config_and_rx(
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -4438,7 +4441,7 @@ async fn make_session_with_history_source_and_agent_control_and_rx(
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -5955,7 +5958,7 @@ where
compact_prompt: config.compact_prompt.clone(),
approval_policy: config.permissions.approval_policy.clone(),
approvals_reviewer: config.approvals_reviewer,
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile.clone(),
permission_profile: config.permissions.permission_profile().clone(),
active_permission_profile: config.permissions.active_permission_profile(),
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&config),
cwd: config.cwd.clone(),
@@ -6002,7 +6005,7 @@ where
let services = SessionServices {
mcp_connection_manager: Arc::new(RwLock::new(McpConnectionManager::new_uninitialized(
&config.permissions.approval_policy,
&config.permissions.permission_profile,
config.permissions.permission_profile(),
))),
mcp_startup_cancellation_token: Mutex::new(CancellationToken::new()),
unified_exec_manager: UnifiedExecProcessManager::new(
codex-rs/core/src/session/turn_context.rs
+6 -4
View File
@@ -438,8 +438,12 @@ impl Session {
per_turn_config.service_tier = session_configuration.service_tier.clone();
per_turn_config.personality = session_configuration.personality;
per_turn_config.approvals_reviewer = session_configuration.approvals_reviewer;
per_turn_config.permissions.permission_profile =
session_configuration.permission_profile.clone();
per_turn_config
.permissions
.set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
session_configuration.permission_profile.clone(),
session_configuration.active_permission_profile.clone(),
);
let permission_profile = session_configuration.permission_profile();
let resolved_web_search_mode =
resolve_web_search_mode_for_turn(&per_turn_config.web_search_mode, &permission_profile);
@@ -466,8 +470,6 @@ impl Session {
Self::build_per_turn_config(session_configuration, session_configuration.cwd.clone());
config.model = Some(session_configuration.collaboration_mode.model().to_string());
config.permissions.approval_policy = session_configuration.approval_policy.clone();
config.permissions.active_permission_profile =
session_configuration.active_permission_profile.clone();
config
}
codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/multi_agents_tests.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2111,7 +2111,7 @@ async fn spawn_agent_reapplies_runtime_sandbox_after_role_config() {
turn.permission_profile = expected_permission_profile.clone();
assert_ne!(
expected_permission_profile,
turn.config.permissions.permission_profile(),
turn.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
"test requires a runtime profile override that differs from base config"
);
@@ -3948,7 +3948,7 @@ async fn build_agent_spawn_config_uses_turn_context_values() {
#[allow(deprecated)]
let turn_cwd = turn.cwd.clone();
let sandbox_policy = pick_allowed_sandbox_policy(
&turn.config.permissions.permission_profile,
turn.config.permissions.permission_profile(),
turn.config.legacy_sandbox_policy(),
turn_cwd.as_path(),
);
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/unified_exec.rs
+11 -7
View File
@@ -906,9 +906,12 @@ allow_local_binding = true
.enable(Feature::UnifiedExec)
.expect("test config should allow feature update");
config.permissions.approval_policy = Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never);
config.permissions.permission_profile = Constrained::allow_any(
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(&sandbox_policy_for_config),
);
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(
&sandbox_policy_for_config,
))
.expect("set permission profile");
});
let test = builder.build_remote_aware(server).await?;
assert!(
@@ -2721,7 +2724,6 @@ async fn unified_exec_runs_under_sandbox() -> Result<()> {
#[cfg(unix)]
#[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
async fn unified_exec_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy() -> Result<()> {
use codex_config::Constrained;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
@@ -2752,11 +2754,13 @@ async fn unified_exec_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy() -> Result<()> {
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
});
config.permissions.permission_profile =
Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
));
))
.expect("set permission profile");
});
let TestCodex {
codex,
codex-rs/core/tests/suite/user_shell_cmd.rs
+5 -3
View File
@@ -344,11 +344,13 @@ async fn user_shell_command_does_not_set_network_sandbox_env_var() -> anyhow::Re
let server = responses::start_mock_server().await;
let mut builder = core_test_support::test_codex::test_codex().with_config(|config| {
let file_system_sandbox_policy = config.permissions.file_system_sandbox_policy();
config.permissions.permission_profile =
codex_config::Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(
&file_system_sandbox_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
));
))
.expect("set permission profile");
});
let test = builder.build(&server).await?;
codex-rs/exec/src/event_processor_with_human_output.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ fn config_summary_entries(
(
"sandbox",
summarize_permission_profile(
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
),
),
codex-rs/exec/src/lib.rs
+7 -17
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::ConfigWarningNotification;
use codex_app_server_protocol::JSONRPCErrorError;
use codex_app_server_protocol::McpServerElicitationAction;
use codex_app_server_protocol::McpServerElicitationRequestResponse;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileModificationParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileSelectionParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RequestId;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ReviewStartParams;
@@ -83,7 +82,6 @@ use codex_protocol::SessionId;
use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::config_types::SandboxMode;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::AskForApproval;
use codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewRequest;
@@ -419,6 +417,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(cli: Cli, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::Result
permission_profile: None,
default_permissions: None,
cwd: resolved_cwd,
workspace_roots: None,
model_provider: model_provider.clone(),
service_tier: None,
codex_self_exe: arg0_paths.codex_self_exe.clone(),
@@ -760,7 +759,7 @@ async fn run_exec_session(args: ExecRunArgs) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
event_processor.print_config_summary(&config, &prompt_summary, &session_configured);
if !json_mode
&& let Some(message) =
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile.get())
codex_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(config.permissions.permission_profile().get())
{
event_processor.process_warning(message);
}
@@ -953,7 +952,7 @@ fn thread_start_params_from_config(config: &Config) -> ThreadStartParams {
let permissions = permissions_selection_from_config(config);
let sandbox = permissions.is_none().then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
});
@@ -975,7 +974,7 @@ fn thread_resume_params_from_config(config: &Config, thread_id: String) -> Threa
let permissions = permissions_selection_from_config(config);
let sandbox = permissions.is_none().then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
});
@@ -1003,18 +1002,9 @@ fn permissions_selection_from_config(config: &Config) -> Option<PermissionProfil
fn permissions_selection_from_active_profile(
active: ActivePermissionProfile,
) -> PermissionProfileSelectionParams {
let modifications = active
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(|modification| match modification {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
PermissionProfileModificationParams::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
PermissionProfileSelectionParams::Profile {
id: active.id,
modifications: (!modifications.is_empty()).then_some(modifications),
modifications: None,
}
}
@@ -1091,7 +1081,7 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_start_response(
.permission_profile
.clone()
.map(Into::into)
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.permission_profile()),
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.effective_permission_profile()),
response.active_permission_profile.clone().map(Into::into),
response.cwd.clone(),
response.reasoning_effort,
@@ -1116,7 +1106,7 @@ fn session_configured_from_thread_resume_response(
.permission_profile
.clone()
.map(Into::into)
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.permission_profile()),
.unwrap_or_else(|| config.permissions.effective_permission_profile()),
response.active_permission_profile.clone().map(Into::into),
response.cwd.clone(),
response.reasoning_effort,
codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs
+22 -24
View File
@@ -344,21 +344,6 @@ pub struct ActivePermissionProfile {
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
#[ts(optional)]
pub extends: Option<String>,
/// Bounded user-requested modifications applied on top of the named
/// profile, if any.
#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
pub modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Deserialize, Serialize, JsonSchema, TS)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(tag = "type")]
pub enum ActivePermissionProfileModification {
/// Additional concrete directory that should be writable.
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[ts(rename_all = "snake_case")]
AdditionalWritableRoot { path: AbsolutePathBuf },
}
impl ActivePermissionProfile {
@@ -366,17 +351,8 @@ impl ActivePermissionProfile {
Self {
id: id.into(),
extends: None,
modifications: Vec::new(),
}
}
pub fn with_modifications(
mut self,
modifications: Vec<ActivePermissionProfileModification>,
) -> Self {
self.modifications = modifications;
self
}
}
impl Default for PermissionProfile {
@@ -444,6 +420,28 @@ impl PermissionProfile {
}
}
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(
self,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
match self {
Self::Managed {
file_system,
network,
} => {
let file_system = file_system
.to_sandbox_policy()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(workspace_roots);
Self::Managed {
file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::from_sandbox_policy(&file_system),
network,
}
}
Self::Disabled => Self::Disabled,
Self::External { network } => Self::External { network },
}
}
pub fn from_runtime_permissions(
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs
+220 -8
View File
@@ -350,6 +350,12 @@ pub enum FileSystemPath {
},
}
const PROJECT_ROOTS_GLOB_PATTERN_PREFIX: &str = "codex-project-roots://";
pub fn project_roots_glob_pattern(subpath: &Path) -> String {
format!("{PROJECT_ROOTS_GLOB_PATTERN_PREFIX}{}", subpath.display())
}
impl Default for FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
@@ -703,15 +709,100 @@ impl FileSystemSandboxPolicy {
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_cwd(mut self, cwd: &Path) -> Self {
let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
for entry in &mut self.entries {
let FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. },
} = &entry.path
else {
continue;
};
match &entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { .. },
} => {
if let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd.as_ref()) {
entry.path = FileSystemPath::Path { path };
}
}
FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern } => {
if let (Some(cwd), Some(subpath)) =
(cwd.as_ref(), parse_project_roots_glob_pattern(pattern))
{
entry.path = FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: resolve_project_roots_glob_pattern(subpath, cwd),
};
}
}
FileSystemPath::Special { value: _ } => {}
FileSystemPath::Path { .. } => {}
}
}
self
}
if let Some(path) = resolve_file_system_path(&entry.path, cwd.as_ref()) {
entry.path = FileSystemPath::Path { path };
/// Replaces symbolic `:workspace_roots` entries with concrete entries for
/// each workspace root.
pub fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(
mut self,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(self.entries.len());
for entry in self.entries {
match entry.path {
FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::ProjectRoots { subpath },
} => {
entries.extend(workspace_roots.iter().map(|root| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: match subpath.as_ref() {
Some(subpath) => AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
subpath,
root.as_path(),
),
None => root.clone(),
},
},
access: entry.access,
}));
}
FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern } => {
if let Some(subpath) = parse_project_roots_glob_pattern(&pattern) {
entries.extend(workspace_roots.iter().map(|root| FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: resolve_project_roots_glob_pattern(subpath, root),
},
access: entry.access,
}));
} else {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern { pattern },
access: entry.access,
});
}
}
FileSystemPath::Path { path } => {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path { path },
access: entry.access,
});
}
FileSystemPath::Special { value } => {
entries.push(FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special { value },
access: entry.access,
});
}
}
}
self.entries = entries;
self
}
/// Preserves symbolic `:workspace_roots` entries while also adding concrete
/// entries for each provided workspace root.
pub fn with_materialized_project_roots_for_workspace_roots(
mut self,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> Self {
let materialized = self
.clone()
.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(workspace_roots);
for entry in materialized.entries {
if !self.entries.contains(&entry) {
self.entries.push(entry);
}
}
self
@@ -1209,6 +1300,18 @@ fn resolve_entry_path(
}
}
fn parse_project_roots_glob_pattern(pattern: &str) -> Option<&Path> {
pattern
.strip_prefix(PROJECT_ROOTS_GLOB_PATTERN_PREFIX)
.map(Path::new)
}
fn resolve_project_roots_glob_pattern(subpath: &Path, root: &AbsolutePathBuf) -> String {
AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(subpath, root.as_path())
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned()
}
fn resolve_candidate_path(path: &Path, cwd: &Path) -> Option<AbsolutePathBuf> {
if path.is_absolute() {
AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(path).ok()
@@ -2750,6 +2853,115 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots_expands_exact_and_glob_entries() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let first = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(temp_dir.path().join("first"))
.expect("resolve first root");
let second = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(temp_dir.path().join("second"))
.expect("resolve second root");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(/*subpath*/ None),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Special {
value: FileSystemSpecialPath::project_roots(Some(".git".into())),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: project_roots_glob_pattern(Path::new("**/*.env")),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
]);
let actual =
policy.materialize_project_roots_with_workspace_roots(&[first.clone(), second.clone()]);
assert_eq!(
actual,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: first.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: second.clone(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: first.join(".git"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::Path {
path: second.join(".git"),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
"**/*.env",
first.as_path(),
)
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base(
"**/*.env",
second.as_path(),
)
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
},
])
);
}
#[test]
fn materialize_project_roots_with_cwd_expands_symbolic_glob_entries() {
let cwd = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
let policy = FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: project_roots_glob_pattern(Path::new("**/*.env")),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
}]);
let actual = policy.materialize_project_roots_with_cwd(cwd.path());
assert_eq!(
actual,
FileSystemSandboxPolicy::restricted(vec![FileSystemSandboxEntry {
path: FileSystemPath::GlobPattern {
pattern: AbsolutePathBuf::resolve_path_against_base("**/*.env", cwd.path())
.to_string_lossy()
.into_owned(),
},
access: FileSystemAccessMode::None,
}])
);
}
#[test]
fn with_additional_legacy_workspace_writable_roots_protects_metadata() {
let temp_dir = TempDir::new().expect("tempdir");
codex-rs/thread-manager-sample/src/main.rs
+7 -12
View File
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ use codex_core_api::RealtimeAudioConfig;
use codex_core_api::RealtimeConfig;
use codex_core_api::SessionPickerViewMode;
use codex_core_api::SessionSource;
use codex_core_api::ShellEnvironmentPolicy;
use codex_core_api::TerminalResizeReflowConfig;
use codex_core_api::ThreadManager;
use codex_core_api::ThreadStoreConfig;
@@ -172,16 +171,10 @@ fn new_config(model: Option<String>, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::R
model_provider_id,
model_provider,
personality: None,
permissions: Permissions {
approval_policy: Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
permission_profile: Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
active_permission_profile: None,
network: None,
allow_login_shell: true,
shell_environment_policy: ShellEnvironmentPolicy::default(),
windows_sandbox_mode: None,
windows_sandbox_private_desktop: true,
},
permissions: Permissions::from_approval_and_profile(
Constrained::allow_any(AskForApproval::Never),
Constrained::allow_any(PermissionProfile::read_only()),
),
approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer::User,
enforce_residency: Constrained::allow_any(/*initial_value*/ None),
hide_agent_reasoning: false,
@@ -213,7 +206,9 @@ fn new_config(model: Option<String>, arg0_paths: Arg0DispatchPaths) -> anyhow::R
tui_keymap: TuiKeymap::default(),
tui_session_picker_view: SessionPickerViewMode::Dense,
tui_vim_mode_default: false,
cwd,
cwd: cwd.clone(),
workspace_roots: vec![cwd],
workspace_roots_explicit: false,
cli_auth_credentials_store_mode: AuthCredentialsStoreMode::File,
mcp_servers: Constrained::allow_any(HashMap::new()),
mcp_oauth_credentials_store_mode: OAuthCredentialsStoreMode::File,
codex-rs/tui/src/app.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ See the Codex keymap documentation for supported actions and examples."
// world-writable dirs on Windows.
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
{
let startup_permission_profile = app.config.permissions.permission_profile();
let startup_permission_profile = app.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
let should_check = WindowsSandboxLevel::from_config(&app.config)
!= WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled
&& managed_filesystem_sandbox_is_restricted(&startup_permission_profile)
codex-rs/tui/src/app/config_persistence.rs
+2 -2
View File
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ impl App {
if permission_profile_override.is_some()
&& let Err(err) = self
.chat_widget
.set_permission_profile(self.config.permissions.permission_profile())
.set_permission_profile(self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile())
{
tracing::error!(
error = %err,
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ impl App {
}
if permission_profile_override.is_some() {
self.runtime_permission_profile_override =
Some(self.config.permissions.permission_profile());
Some(self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile());
}
if approval_policy_override.is_some()
codex-rs/tui/src/app/event_dispatch.rs
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1426,7 +1426,7 @@ impl App {
return Ok(AppRunControl::Continue);
}
self.runtime_permission_profile_override =
Some(self.config.permissions.permission_profile());
Some(self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile());
self.sync_active_thread_permission_settings_to_cached_session()
.await;
@@ -1450,7 +1450,8 @@ impl App {
std::env::vars().collect();
let tx = self.app_event_tx.clone();
let logs_base_dir = self.config.codex_home.clone();
let permission_profile = self.config.permissions.permission_profile();
let permission_profile =
self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
Self::spawn_world_writable_scan(
cwd,
env_map,
codex-rs/tui/src/app/startup_prompts.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ pub(super) fn emit_project_config_warnings(app_event_tx: &AppEventSender, config
pub(super) fn emit_system_bwrap_warning(app_event_tx: &AppEventSender, config: &Config) {
let Some(message) = crate::legacy_core::config::system_bwrap_warning(
config.permissions.permission_profile.get(),
config.permissions.permission_profile().get(),
) else {
return;
};
codex-rs/tui/src/app/tests.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1639,7 +1639,7 @@ async fn update_feature_flags_enabling_guardian_selects_auto_review() -> Result<
app.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile(),
.effective_permission_profile(),
auto_review.permission_profile
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ async fn update_feature_flags_enabling_guardian_overrides_explicit_manual_review
app.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile(),
.effective_permission_profile(),
auto_review.permission_profile
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -3001,7 +3001,7 @@ async fn thread_read_session_state_does_not_reuse_primary_permission_profile() {
.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile();
.effective_permission_profile();
assert_eq!(
session.permission_profile, expected_permission_profile,
"thread/read does not return fresh server permissions; the fallback profile must use the \
@@ -3136,7 +3136,7 @@ async fn side_fork_config_inherits_parent_thread_runtime_settings() {
fork_config.model_reasoning_effort,
fork_config.service_tier.as_deref(),
fork_config.permissions.approval_policy.value(),
fork_config.permissions.permission_profile(),
fork_config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
fork_config.approvals_reviewer,
),
(
codex-rs/tui/src/app/thread_routing.rs
+3 -1
View File
@@ -589,7 +589,9 @@ impl App {
let approvals_reviewer =
approvals_reviewer.unwrap_or(config.approvals_reviewer);
let active_permission_profile =
if config.permissions.permission_profile() == permission_profile.clone() {
if config.permissions.effective_permission_profile()
== permission_profile.clone()
{
config.permissions.active_permission_profile()
} else {
None
codex-rs/tui/src/app/thread_session_state.rs
+4 -4
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ impl App {
.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile();
.effective_permission_profile();
let active_permission_profile = self
.chat_widget
.config_ref()
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ impl App {
self.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile()
.effective_permission_profile()
}
fn current_active_permission_profile(&self) -> Option<ActivePermissionProfile> {
@@ -350,11 +350,11 @@ mod tests {
.chat_widget
.config_ref()
.permissions
.permission_profile();
.effective_permission_profile();
assert_eq!(session.permission_profile, expected_permission_profile);
assert_ne!(
session.permission_profile,
app.config.permissions.permission_profile(),
app.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
"thread/read fallback must use the active widget permissions rather than stale app \
config defaults"
);
codex-rs/tui/src/app_server_session.rs
+7 -18
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ use codex_app_server_protocol::MemoryResetResponse;
use codex_app_server_protocol::Model as ApiModel;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ModelListParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::ModelListResponse;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileModificationParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::PermissionProfileSelectionParams;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RateLimitSnapshot;
use codex_app_server_protocol::RequestId;
@@ -108,7 +107,6 @@ use codex_otel::TelemetryAuthMode;
use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::approvals::GuardianAssessmentEvent;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ResponseItem;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ModelAvailabilityNux;
@@ -1175,18 +1173,9 @@ fn sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
fn permissions_selection_from_active_profile(
active: ActivePermissionProfile,
) -> PermissionProfileSelectionParams {
let modifications = active
.modifications
.into_iter()
.map(|modification| match modification {
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { path } => {
PermissionProfileModificationParams::AdditionalWritableRoot { path }
}
})
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
PermissionProfileSelectionParams::Profile {
id: active.id,
modifications: (!modifications.is_empty()).then_some(modifications),
modifications: None,
}
}
@@ -1243,7 +1232,7 @@ fn thread_start_params_from_config(
.is_none()
.then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
})
@@ -1277,7 +1266,7 @@ fn thread_resume_params_from_config(
.is_none()
.then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
})
@@ -1309,7 +1298,7 @@ fn thread_fork_params_from_config(
.is_none()
.then(|| {
sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
)
})
@@ -1499,7 +1488,7 @@ fn permission_profile_from_thread_response(
return permission_profile.clone().into();
}
match thread_params_mode {
ThreadParamsMode::Embedded => config.permissions.permission_profile(),
ThreadParamsMode::Embedded => config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
ThreadParamsMode::Remote => {
PermissionProfile::from_legacy_sandbox_policy_for_cwd(&sandbox.to_core(), cwd)
}
@@ -1723,7 +1712,7 @@ mod tests {
let config = build_config(&temp_dir).await;
let thread_id = ThreadId::new();
let expected_sandbox = sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
);
@@ -1830,7 +1819,7 @@ mod tests {
let thread_id = ThreadId::new();
let remote_cwd = PathBuf::from("repo/on/server");
let expected_sandbox = sandbox_mode_from_permission_profile(
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
);
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/input_submission.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ impl ChatWidget {
None if self.config.notices.fast_default_opt_out == Some(true) => Some(None),
None => None,
};
let permission_profile = self.config.permissions.permission_profile();
let permission_profile = self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
let op = AppCommand::user_turn(
items,
self.config.cwd.to_path_buf(),
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/permission_popups.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ impl ChatWidget {
let include_read_only = cfg!(target_os = "windows");
let current_approval =
AskForApproval::from(self.config.permissions.approval_policy.value());
let current_permission_profile = self.config.permissions.permission_profile();
let current_permission_profile = self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
let guardian_approval_enabled = self.config.features.enabled(Feature::GuardianApproval);
let current_review_policy = self.config.approvals_reviewer;
let mut items: Vec<SelectionItem> = Vec::new();
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/session_flow.rs
+6 -4
View File
@@ -53,10 +53,12 @@ impl ChatWidget {
);
if let Err(err) = permission_sync {
tracing::warn!(%err, "failed to sync permissions from SessionConfigured");
self.config.permissions.permission_profile =
Constrained::allow_only(session.permission_profile.clone());
self.config.permissions.active_permission_profile =
session.active_permission_profile.clone();
self.config
.permissions
.set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
Constrained::allow_only(session.permission_profile.clone()),
session.active_permission_profile.clone(),
);
}
self.config.approvals_reviewer = session.approvals_reviewer;
self.status_line_project_root_name_cache = None;
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/status_surfaces.rs
+6 -2
View File
@@ -901,8 +901,12 @@ fn permissions_display(config: &Config) -> String {
return active_permission_profile.id.clone();
}
let permission_profile = config.permissions.permission_profile();
let summary = summarize_permission_profile(&permission_profile, config.cwd.as_path());
let permission_profile = config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
let summary = summarize_permission_profile(
&permission_profile,
&config.cwd,
config.permissions.workspace_roots(),
);
if let Some(details) = summary.strip_prefix("read-only")
&& !details.contains("(network access enabled)")
{
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/tests/history_replay.rs
+7 -3
View File
@@ -282,7 +282,9 @@ async fn session_configured_syncs_widget_config_permissions_and_cwd() {
let actual_sandbox = SandboxPolicy::from(chat.config_ref().legacy_sandbox_policy());
assert_eq!(&actual_sandbox, &expected_sandbox);
assert_eq!(
AppServerPermissionProfile::from(chat.config_ref().permissions.permission_profile()),
AppServerPermissionProfile::from(
chat.config_ref().permissions.effective_permission_profile()
),
expected_app_server_permission_profile
);
assert_eq!(&chat.config_ref().cwd, &expected_cwd);
@@ -291,7 +293,7 @@ async fn session_configured_syncs_widget_config_permissions_and_cwd() {
chat.set_permission_profile(updated_profile.clone())
.expect("set permission profile");
assert_eq!(
chat.config_ref().permissions.permission_profile(),
chat.config_ref().permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
updated_profile,
"local permission changes should replace SessionConfigured profile-derived runtime permissions"
);
@@ -334,7 +336,9 @@ async fn session_configured_external_sandbox_keeps_external_runtime_policy() {
let actual_sandbox = SandboxPolicy::from(chat.config_ref().legacy_sandbox_policy());
assert_eq!(&actual_sandbox, &expected_sandbox);
assert_eq!(
AppServerPermissionProfile::from(chat.config_ref().permissions.permission_profile()),
AppServerPermissionProfile::from(
chat.config_ref().permissions.effective_permission_profile()
),
expected_app_server_permission_profile
);
}
codex-rs/tui/src/chatwidget/windows_sandbox_prompts.rs
+3 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@ impl ChatWidget {
let mode_label = preset
.as_ref()
.map(|p| describe_profile(&p.permission_profile))
.unwrap_or_else(|| describe_profile(&self.config.permissions.permission_profile()));
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
describe_profile(&self.config.permissions.effective_permission_profile())
});
let info_line = if failed_scan {
Line::from(vec![
"We couldn't complete the world-writable scan, so protections cannot be verified. "
codex-rs/tui/src/history_cell.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1574,7 +1574,7 @@ pub(crate) fn new_session_info(
pub(crate) fn is_yolo_mode(config: &Config) -> bool {
has_yolo_permissions(
AskForApproval::from(config.permissions.approval_policy.value()),
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
)
}
codex-rs/tui/src/lib.rs
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1047,7 +1047,7 @@ pub async fn run_main(
if let Some(warning) = add_dir_warning_message(
&cli.add_dir,
&config.permissions.permission_profile(),
&config.permissions.effective_permission_profile(),
config.cwd.as_path(),
) {
#[allow(clippy::print_stderr)]
codex-rs/tui/src/status/card.rs
+57 -31
View File
@@ -15,17 +15,16 @@ use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::account::PlanType;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_DANGER_FULL_ACCESS;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ReasoningEffort;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_sandbox_summary::summarize_permission_profile;
use ratatui::prelude::*;
use ratatui::style::Stylize;
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use url::Url;
@@ -256,7 +255,8 @@ impl StatusHistoryCell {
refreshing_rate_limits: bool,
) -> (Self, StatusHistoryHandle) {
let approval_policy = AskForApproval::from(config.permissions.approval_policy.value());
let permission_profile = config.permissions.permission_profile();
let permission_profile = config.permissions.effective_permission_profile();
let workspace_roots = config.permissions.workspace_roots();
let mut config_entries = vec![
("workdir", config.cwd.display().to_string()),
("model", model_name.to_string()),
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ impl StatusHistoryCell {
),
(
"sandbox",
summarize_permission_profile(&permission_profile, config.cwd.as_path()),
summarize_permission_profile(&permission_profile, &config.cwd, workspace_roots),
),
];
if config.model_provider.wire_api == WireApi::Responses {
@@ -291,7 +291,8 @@ impl StatusHistoryCell {
.map(|(_, v)| v.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| "<unknown>".to_string());
let active_permission_profile = config.permissions.active_permission_profile();
let sandbox = status_permission_summary(&permission_profile, config.cwd.as_path());
let sandbox = status_permission_summary(&permission_profile, &config.cwd, workspace_roots);
let workspace_root_suffix = workspace_root_suffix(workspace_roots, &config.cwd);
let approval = status_approval_label(approval_policy, config.approvals_reviewer, &approval);
let permissions = status_permissions_label(
active_permission_profile.as_ref(),
@@ -299,6 +300,7 @@ impl StatusHistoryCell {
approval_policy,
&sandbox,
&approval,
workspace_root_suffix.as_deref(),
);
let model_provider = format_model_provider(config, runtime_model_provider_base_url);
let account = compose_account_display(account_display);
@@ -542,8 +544,12 @@ impl StatusHistoryCell {
}
}
fn status_permission_summary(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile, cwd: &Path) -> String {
let summary = summarize_permission_profile(permission_profile, cwd);
fn status_permission_summary(
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> String {
let summary = summarize_permission_profile(permission_profile, cwd, workspace_roots);
if let Some(details) = summary.strip_prefix("read-only") {
if details.contains("(network access enabled)") {
return "read-only with network access".to_string();
@@ -562,33 +568,31 @@ fn status_permission_summary(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile, cwd: &Path)
summary
}
fn workspace_root_suffix(
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
) -> Option<String> {
let extra_roots = workspace_roots
.iter()
.filter(|root| *root != cwd)
.map(|root| root.to_string_lossy().to_string())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
if extra_roots.is_empty() {
None
} else {
Some(format!(" [{}]", extra_roots.join(", ")))
}
}
fn status_permissions_label(
active_permission_profile: Option<&ActivePermissionProfile>,
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox: &str,
approval: &str,
workspace_root_suffix: Option<&str>,
) -> String {
let active_id = active_permission_profile.map(|active| active.id.as_str());
let writable_root_modifications = active_permission_profile
.map(|active| {
active
.modifications
.iter()
.filter(|modification| {
matches!(
modification,
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot { .. }
)
})
.count()
})
.unwrap_or(0);
let modification_suffix = match writable_root_modifications {
0 => String::new(),
1 => " + 1 writable root".to_string(),
count => format!(" + {count} writable roots"),
};
match active_id {
Some(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY) => {
let label = if sandbox == "read-only with network access" {
@@ -596,12 +600,20 @@ fn status_permissions_label(
} else {
"Read Only"
};
return format!("{label}{modification_suffix} ({approval})");
return format!("{label} ({approval})");
}
Some(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE) => match sandbox {
"workspace" => return format!("Workspace{modification_suffix} ({approval})"),
"workspace" => {
return format!(
"Workspace{} ({approval})",
workspace_root_suffix.unwrap_or("")
);
}
"workspace with network access" => {
return format!("Workspace with network access{modification_suffix} ({approval})");
return format!(
"Workspace with network access{} ({approval})",
workspace_root_suffix.unwrap_or("")
);
}
_ => {}
},
@@ -614,7 +626,10 @@ fn status_permissions_label(
format!("No Sandbox ({approval})")
};
}
Some(id) => return format!("Profile {id}{modification_suffix} ({sandbox}, {approval})"),
Some(id) => {
let sandbox = decorate_workspace_sandbox_label(sandbox, workspace_root_suffix);
return format!("Profile {id} ({sandbox}, {approval})");
}
None => {}
}
@@ -622,16 +637,27 @@ fn status_permissions_label(
return format!("Read Only ({approval})");
}
if approval_policy == AskForApproval::OnRequest && sandbox == "workspace" {
return format!("Workspace ({approval})");
return format!(
"Workspace{} ({approval})",
workspace_root_suffix.unwrap_or("")
);
}
if approval_policy == AskForApproval::Never
&& permission_profile == &PermissionProfile::Disabled
{
return "Full Access".to_string();
}
let sandbox = decorate_workspace_sandbox_label(sandbox, workspace_root_suffix);
format!("Custom ({sandbox}, {approval})")
}
fn decorate_workspace_sandbox_label(sandbox: &str, workspace_root_suffix: Option<&str>) -> String {
match workspace_root_suffix {
Some(suffix) if sandbox.starts_with("workspace") => format!("{sandbox}{suffix}"),
_ => sandbox.to_string(),
}
}
fn status_approval_label(
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
approvals_reviewer: ApprovalsReviewer,
codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs
+62 -35
View File
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@ use codex_protocol::ThreadId;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ApprovalsReviewer;
use codex_protocol::config_types::ReasoningSummary;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::models::ActivePermissionProfileModification;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY;
use codex_protocol::models::BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE;
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::openai_models::ReasoningEffort;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use insta::assert_snapshot;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use ratatui::prelude::*;
@@ -97,6 +97,14 @@ async fn test_config(temp_home: &TempDir) -> Config {
config
}
fn set_workspace_cwd(config: &mut Config, cwd: AbsolutePathBuf) {
config.cwd = cwd.clone();
config.workspace_roots = vec![cwd];
config
.permissions
.set_workspace_roots(config.workspace_roots.clone());
}
fn test_status_account_display() -> Option<StatusAccountDisplay> {
None
}
@@ -195,7 +203,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_includes_reasoning_details() {
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.model_provider_id = "openai".to_string();
config.model_reasoning_summary = Some(ReasoningSummary::Detailed);
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(PermissionProfile::workspace_write())
@@ -273,7 +281,7 @@ async fn status_permissions_non_default_workspace_write_uses_workspace_label() {
.approval_policy
.set(AskForApproval::OnRequest.to_core())
.expect("set approval policy");
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile(app_server_workspace_write_profile(
@@ -332,20 +340,15 @@ async fn status_permissions_read_only_profile_shows_additional_writable_roots()
&file_system_policy,
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
),
Some(
ActivePermissionProfile::new(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY)
.with_modifications(vec![
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot {
path: extra_root,
},
]),
),
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_READ_ONLY,
)),
)
.expect("set permission profile");
assert_eq!(
permissions_text_for(&config).as_deref(),
Some("Read Only + 1 writable root (on-request)")
Some("Read Only (on-request)")
);
}
@@ -419,20 +422,44 @@ async fn status_permissions_named_profile_shows_additional_writable_roots() {
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
),
Some(
ActivePermissionProfile::new(BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE)
.with_modifications(vec![
ActivePermissionProfileModification::AdditionalWritableRoot {
path: extra_root,
},
]),
),
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(
BUILT_IN_PERMISSION_PROFILE_WORKSPACE,
)),
)
.expect("set permission profile");
assert_eq!(
permissions_text_for(&config).as_deref(),
Some("Workspace + 1 writable root (on-request)")
Some("Workspace (on-request)")
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn status_permissions_workspace_roots_show_additional_directories() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
config
.permissions
.approval_policy
.set(AskForApproval::OnRequest.to_core())
.expect("set approval policy");
let extra_root = test_path_buf("/workspace/extra").abs();
config.workspace_roots = vec![config.cwd.clone(), extra_root.clone()];
config
.permissions
.set_workspace_roots(config.workspace_roots.clone());
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
PermissionProfile::workspace_write(),
Some(ActivePermissionProfile::new(":workspace")),
)
.expect("set permission profile");
assert_eq!(
permissions_text_for(&config),
Some(format!("Workspace [{}] (on-request)", extra_root.display()))
);
}
@@ -489,7 +516,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_active_user_defined_profile() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
config
.permissions
.set_permission_profile_with_active_profile(
@@ -586,7 +613,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_auto_review_permissions() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
config.approvals_reviewer = ApprovalsReviewer::AutoReview;
config
.permissions
@@ -689,7 +716,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_includes_forked_from() {
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.model_provider_id = "openai".to_string();
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -743,7 +770,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_includes_monthly_limit() {
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.model_provider_id = "openai".to_string();
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1001,7 +1028,7 @@ async fn status_card_token_usage_excludes_cached_tokens() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1049,7 +1076,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_truncates_in_narrow_terminal() {
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.model_provider_id = "openai".to_string();
config.model_reasoning_summary = Some(ReasoningSummary::Detailed);
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1113,7 +1140,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_missing_limits_message() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1161,7 +1188,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_uses_default_reasoning_when_config_empty() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1212,7 +1239,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_refreshing_limits_notice() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let usage = TokenUsage {
input_tokens: 500,
@@ -1277,7 +1304,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_includes_credits_and_limits() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1347,7 +1374,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_unavailable_limits_message() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1405,7 +1432,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_treats_refreshing_empty_limits_as_unavailable() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let usage = TokenUsage {
input_tokens: 500,
@@ -1463,7 +1490,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_shows_stale_limits_message() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex-max".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
@@ -1530,7 +1557,7 @@ async fn status_snapshot_cached_limits_hide_credits_without_flag() {
let temp_home = TempDir::new().expect("temp home");
let mut config = test_config(&temp_home).await;
config.model = Some("gpt-5.1-codex".to_string());
config.cwd = test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs();
set_workspace_cwd(&mut config, test_path_buf("/workspace/tests").abs());
let account_display = test_status_account_display();
let usage = TokenUsage {
codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/Cargo.toml
+1
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ workspace = true
codex-core = { workspace = true }
codex-model-provider-info = { workspace = true }
codex-protocol = { workspace = true }
codex-utils-absolute-path = { workspace = true }
[dev-dependencies]
codex-utils-absolute-path = { workspace = true }
codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs
+70 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::protocol::NetworkAccess;
use codex_protocol::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use std::path::Path;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
pub fn summarize_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> String {
match sandbox_policy {
@@ -51,8 +51,39 @@ pub fn summarize_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy) -> String {
}
}
pub fn summarize_permission_profile(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile, cwd: &Path) -> String {
match permission_profile.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd) {
pub fn summarize_permission_profile(
permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
cwd: &AbsolutePathBuf,
workspace_roots: &[AbsolutePathBuf],
) -> String {
match permission_profile.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd.as_path()) {
Ok(SandboxPolicy::WorkspaceWrite {
network_access,
exclude_tmpdir_env_var,
exclude_slash_tmp,
..
}) => {
let mut summary = "workspace-write".to_string();
let mut writable_entries = vec!["workdir".to_string()];
if !exclude_slash_tmp {
writable_entries.push("/tmp".to_string());
}
if !exclude_tmpdir_env_var {
writable_entries.push("$TMPDIR".to_string());
}
writable_entries.extend(
workspace_roots
.iter()
.filter(|root| *root != cwd)
.map(|root| root.to_string_lossy().to_string()),
);
summary.push_str(&format!(" [{}]", writable_entries.join(", ")));
if network_access {
summary.push_str(" (network access enabled)");
}
summary
}
Ok(policy) => summarize_sandbox_policy(&policy),
Err(_) => {
if permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy().is_enabled() {
@@ -67,6 +98,7 @@ pub fn summarize_permission_profile(permission_profile: &PermissionProfile, cwd:
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
@@ -112,4 +144,39 @@ mod tests {
)
);
}
#[test]
fn permission_profile_summary_uses_runtime_workspace_roots_and_hides_internal_writes() {
let cwd =
AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(if cfg!(windows) { "C:\\repo" } else { "/repo" }).unwrap();
let extra_root = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(if cfg!(windows) {
"C:\\repo-extra"
} else {
"/repo-extra"
})
.unwrap();
let hidden_root = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(if cfg!(windows) {
"C:\\Users\\test\\.codex\\memories"
} else {
"/Users/test/.codex/memories"
})
.unwrap();
let profile = PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
std::slice::from_ref(&hidden_root),
NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
/*exclude_tmpdir_env_var*/ false,
/*exclude_slash_tmp*/ false,
);
let summary =
summarize_permission_profile(&profile, &cwd, &[cwd.clone(), extra_root.clone()]);
assert_eq!(
summary,
format!(
"workspace-write [workdir, /tmp, $TMPDIR, {}]",
extra_root.display()
)
);
}
}