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https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-11-21 22:50:37 +00:00
fix(permissions): block deny_read bypass via exec escalation
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@@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ pub use plan::PLAN_TOOL;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
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use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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pub use apply_patch::ApplyPatchHandler;
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use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
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pub use dynamic::DynamicToolHandler;
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pub use grep_files::GrepFilesHandler;
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pub use js_repl::JsReplHandler;
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@@ -49,3 +51,58 @@ where
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FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!("failed to parse function arguments: {err}"))
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})
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}
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fn reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present(
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sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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) -> Result<(), FunctionCallError> {
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if sandbox_permissions.requires_escalated_permissions()
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&& sandbox_policy.has_denied_read_paths()
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{
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return Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(
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"filesystem deny_read policy is enforced; reject command — you cannot ask for escalated permissions because managed read restrictions must remain sandboxed".to_string(),
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));
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present;
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use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
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use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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#[test]
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fn explicit_escalation_is_rejected_when_deny_read_paths_exist() {
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let mut policy = SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy();
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let path = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from("/tmp/deny-read-test").expect("absolute path");
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policy.append_deny_read_paths(&[path]);
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let result = reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present(
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SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated,
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&policy,
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);
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let Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(message)) = result else {
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panic!("expected managed deny_read explicit escalation rejection");
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};
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assert!(message.contains("filesystem deny_read policy is enforced"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn non_escalated_command_is_allowed_when_deny_read_paths_exist() {
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let mut policy = SandboxPolicy::new_workspace_write_policy();
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let path = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from("/tmp/deny-read-test").expect("absolute path");
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policy.append_deny_read_paths(&[path]);
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let result = reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present(
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SandboxPermissions::UseDefault,
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&policy,
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);
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assert!(result.is_ok());
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}
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}
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@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use crate::tools::events::ToolEmitter;
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use crate::tools::events::ToolEventCtx;
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use crate::tools::handlers::apply_patch::intercept_apply_patch;
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use crate::tools::handlers::parse_arguments;
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use crate::tools::handlers::reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present;
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use crate::tools::orchestrator::ToolOrchestrator;
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use crate::tools::registry::ToolHandler;
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use crate::tools::registry::ToolKind;
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@@ -268,6 +269,10 @@ impl ShellHandler {
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"approval policy is {approval_policy:?}; reject command — you should not ask for escalated permissions if the approval policy is {approval_policy:?}"
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)));
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}
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reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present(
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exec_params.sandbox_permissions,
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&turn.sandbox_policy,
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)?;
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// Intercept apply_patch if present.
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if let Some(output) = intercept_apply_patch(
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use crate::tools::context::ToolOutput;
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use crate::tools::context::ToolPayload;
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use crate::tools::handlers::apply_patch::intercept_apply_patch;
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use crate::tools::handlers::parse_arguments;
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use crate::tools::handlers::reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present;
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use crate::tools::registry::ToolHandler;
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use crate::tools::registry::ToolKind;
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use crate::unified_exec::ExecCommandRequest;
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@@ -154,6 +155,10 @@ impl ToolHandler for UnifiedExecHandler {
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"approval policy is {approval_policy:?}; reject command — you cannot ask for escalated permissions if the approval policy is {approval_policy:?}"
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)));
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}
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reject_explicit_escalation_if_deny_read_present(
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sandbox_permissions,
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&context.turn.sandbox_policy,
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)?;
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let workdir = workdir.filter(|value| !value.is_empty());
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@@ -214,6 +214,17 @@ impl ToolOrchestrator {
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network_policy_decision,
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})));
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}
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// Managed filesystem read denies are non-overridable. If a command
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// was denied by the sandbox and this was not a managed network
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// policy denial, do not offer a no-sandbox retry path.
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if turn_ctx.sandbox_policy.has_denied_read_paths()
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&& network_approval_context.is_none()
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{
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return Err(ToolError::Codex(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied {
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output,
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network_policy_decision,
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})));
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}
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if !tool.escalate_on_failure() {
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return Err(ToolError::Codex(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::Denied {
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output,
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