mirror of
https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent.git
synced 2026-09-10 20:26:51 +00:00
Compare commits
15 Commits
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bf46b55c92 | ||
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88edcabf98 |
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ RUN cp -r /agent ./
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RUN /dist/agent/main version
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FROM node:18.14.0-alpine3.16 AS build-ui
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FROM node:22-alpine AS build-ui
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RUN apk update && apk upgrade --available && sync
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@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ RUN cp -r /agent ./
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RUN /dist/agent/main version
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FROM node:18.14.0-alpine3.16 AS build-ui
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FROM node:22-alpine AS build-ui
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RUN apk update && apk upgrade --available && sync
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@@ -68,9 +68,9 @@ func UploadKerberosHub(configuration *models.Configuration, fileName string) (bo
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tr := &http.Transport{
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TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
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}
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client = &http.Client{Transport: tr}
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client = &http.Client{Transport: tr, CheckRedirect: stripHubCredentialsOnCrossHostRedirect}
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} else {
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client = &http.Client{}
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client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: stripHubCredentialsOnCrossHostRedirect}
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}
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resp, err := client.Do(req)
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@@ -129,3 +129,20 @@ func UploadKerberosHub(configuration *models.Configuration, fileName string) (bo
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log.Log.Info(errorMessage)
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return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage)
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}
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// stripHubCredentialsOnCrossHostRedirect removes the custom Kerberos Hub
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// credential headers on a redirect that crosses to a different host. net/http
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// already strips the standard sensitive headers (Authorization, Cookie,
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// WWW-Authenticate) on a cross-host redirect, but it does NOT strip
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// custom-named headers, so without this the Hub private/public keys would be
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// forwarded to any host the configured HubURI redirects to.
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func stripHubCredentialsOnCrossHostRedirect(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
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if len(via) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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if req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
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req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")
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req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey")
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}
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return nil
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}
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@@ -552,6 +552,17 @@ func OverrideWithEnvironmentVariables(configuration *models.Configuration) {
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PrivateKey: "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\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\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
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}
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}
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// When the agent is configured through environment variables (for example
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// delivered via a Kubernetes ConfigMap in the factory standalone/configmap
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// mode), there is no separate global/custom configuration coming from
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// MongoDB. Mirror the effective configuration into CustomConfig so consumers
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// that read the per-agent ("custom") configuration — such as the factory
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// agent edit page — see the values that were injected through the
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// environment instead of an empty configuration.
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if os.Getenv("DEPLOYMENT") == "" || os.Getenv("DEPLOYMENT") == "agent" {
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configuration.CustomConfig = configuration.Config
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}
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}
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func SaveConfig(configDirectory string, config models.Config, configuration *models.Configuration, communication *models.Communication) error {
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@@ -14,7 +14,14 @@ import (
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func JWTMiddleWare() jwt.GinJWTMiddleware {
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identityKey := "id"
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myKey := "TOBECHANGED"
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// Allow the JWT signing secret to be configured through an environment
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// variable so that tokens issued by another service (e.g. the Kerberos
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// Factory) can be validated by the agent. Falls back to the historic
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// default to preserve backwards compatibility.
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myKey := os.Getenv("AGENT_JWT_SECRET")
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if myKey == "" {
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myKey = "TOBECHANGED"
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}
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m := jwt.GinJWTMiddleware{
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Realm: "kerberosio",
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@@ -106,7 +113,11 @@ func JWTMiddleWare() jwt.GinJWTMiddleware {
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// - "query:<name>"
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// - "cookie:<name>"
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// - "param:<name>"
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TokenLookup: "header: Authorization, query: token, cookie: jwt",
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// X-Authorization is included because requests proxied through the
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// Kubernetes apiserver service-proxy have their Authorization header
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// consumed by the apiserver; the original bearer token is forwarded in
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// the X-Authorization header instead.
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TokenLookup: "header: Authorization, header: X-Authorization, query: token, cookie: jwt",
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// TokenLookup: "query:token",
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// TokenLookup: "cookie:token",
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@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import (
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"math/rand"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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mqtt "github.com/eclipse/paho.mqtt.golang"
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@@ -170,11 +171,45 @@ func ConfigureMQTT(configDirectory string, configuration *models.Configuration,
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return nil
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}
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// maxSignalingAge is the maximum age of a WebRTC signaling message (request-hd-stream,
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// receive-hd-candidates) before it is considered stale and discarded. With CleanSession=false
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// the MQTT broker may replay queued messages from previous sessions; this prevents the agent
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// from setting up peer connections for viewers that are no longer waiting.
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const maxSignalingAge = 30 * time.Second
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// recentHDSessions tracks recently-seen WebRTC viewer session IDs so we can
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// dedupe duplicate request-hd-stream messages without relying on the broker's
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// (and the viewer's) wall clock. The viewer's offer-republish loop can fire
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// the same request several times for the same session_id while waiting for an
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// answer; the broker can also redeliver a message after a reconnect with
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// CleanSession=false. In both cases we want to handle the session exactly
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// once.
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//
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// Entries expire after recentHDSessionTTL. The map is small (one entry per
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// active viewer over the TTL window) so a periodic sweep is sufficient.
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const recentHDSessionTTL = 60 * time.Second
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var (
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recentHDSessionsMu sync.Mutex
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recentHDSessions = make(map[string]time.Time)
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)
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// markHDSessionSeen returns true if this session_id was already processed
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// within the TTL window (i.e. this message should be treated as a duplicate).
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// It also opportunistically prunes expired entries.
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func markHDSessionSeen(sessionID string) bool {
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if sessionID == "" {
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return false
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}
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recentHDSessionsMu.Lock()
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defer recentHDSessionsMu.Unlock()
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now := time.Now()
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// Lazy GC — cheap given the expected map size.
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for k, t := range recentHDSessions {
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if now.Sub(t) > recentHDSessionTTL {
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delete(recentHDSessions, k)
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}
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}
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if _, exists := recentHDSessions[sessionID]; exists {
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return true
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}
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recentHDSessions[sessionID] = now
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return false
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}
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func MQTTListenerHandler(mqttClient mqtt.Client, hubKey string, configDirectory string, configuration *models.Configuration, communication *models.Communication) {
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if hubKey == "" {
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@@ -282,16 +317,13 @@ func MQTTListenerHandler(mqttClient mqtt.Client, hubKey string, configDirectory
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// We'll find out which message we received, and act accordingly.
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log.Log.Info("routers.mqtt.main.MQTTListenerHandler(): received message with action: " + payload.Action)
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// For time-sensitive WebRTC signaling messages, discard stale ones that may
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// have been queued by the broker while CleanSession=false.
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if payload.Action == "request-hd-stream" || payload.Action == "receive-hd-candidates" {
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messageAge := time.Since(time.Unix(message.Timestamp, 0))
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if messageAge > maxSignalingAge {
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log.Log.Info("routers.mqtt.main.MQTTListenerHandler(): discarding stale " + payload.Action +
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" message (age: " + messageAge.Round(time.Second).String() + ")")
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return
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}
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}
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// NOTE: We intentionally do NOT discard request-hd-stream /
|
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// receive-hd-candidates messages based on a wall-clock age. The
|
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// viewer and agent clocks can drift (especially on embedded
|
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// devices), which previously caused valid requests to be
|
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// silently dropped and forced the user to refresh the page.
|
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// Duplicate handling for request-hd-stream is done by session_id
|
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// inside HandleRequestHDStream (see markHDSessionSeen).
|
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|
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switch payload.Action {
|
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case "record":
|
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@@ -536,6 +568,15 @@ func HandleRequestHDStream(mqttClient mqtt.Client, hubKey string, payload models
|
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|
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if requestHDStreamPayload.Timestamp != 0 {
|
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if communication.CameraConnected {
|
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// Dedupe by session_id: the viewer republishes its offer while
|
||||
// waiting for an answer (and the broker may redeliver), and we
|
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// don't want to spawn multiple peer connections for the same
|
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// browser session.
|
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if markHDSessionSeen(requestHDStreamPayload.SessionID) {
|
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log.Log.Info("routers.mqtt.main.HandleRequestHDStream(): duplicate request for session " +
|
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requestHDStreamPayload.SessionID + ", ignoring")
|
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return
|
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}
|
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// Set the Hub key, so we can send back the answer.
|
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requestHDStreamPayload.HubKey = hubKey
|
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if communication.HandleLiveHDHandshake == nil {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,7 +26,12 @@ import (
|
||||
|
||||
const (
|
||||
// Channel buffer sizes
|
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candidateChannelBuffer = 100
|
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// candidateChannelBuffer: large enough to absorb the burst of trickled ICE
|
||||
// candidates that can arrive over MQTT before the SetRemoteDescription
|
||||
// goroutine starts draining them. A small buffer caused candidates to be
|
||||
// dropped silently on restrictive networks, leaving ICE stuck in
|
||||
// "checking" until the viewer refreshed.
|
||||
candidateChannelBuffer = 512
|
||||
rtcpBufferSize = 1500
|
||||
|
||||
// Timeouts and intervals
|
||||
@@ -116,6 +121,22 @@ func (cm *ConnectionManager) RemovePeerConnection(sessionKey string) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CloseExistingPeerConnection closes and removes any peer connection currently
|
||||
// registered under sessionKey. Returns true if one was found. This is used to
|
||||
// reset state cleanly when a new request-hd-stream arrives for a session id
|
||||
// that the agent thinks is still active (for example after a viewer reload
|
||||
// where the previous PC hasn't yet been timed out by ICE).
|
||||
func (cm *ConnectionManager) CloseExistingPeerConnection(sessionKey string) bool {
|
||||
cm.mu.RLock()
|
||||
wrapper, exists := cm.peerConnections[sessionKey]
|
||||
cm.mu.RUnlock()
|
||||
if !exists || wrapper == nil {
|
||||
return false
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleanupPeerConnection(sessionKey, wrapper)
|
||||
return true
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// QueueCandidate safely queues a candidate for a session without racing with channel closure.
|
||||
func (cm *ConnectionManager) QueueCandidate(sessionKey string, candidate string) bool {
|
||||
cm.mu.Lock()
|
||||
@@ -341,6 +362,17 @@ func InitializeWebRTCConnection(configuration *models.Configuration, communicati
|
||||
|
||||
// We create a channel which will hold the candidates for this session.
|
||||
sessionKey := config.Key + "/" + handshakePayload.SessionID
|
||||
|
||||
// If a previous peer connection for this exact session is still hanging
|
||||
// around (e.g. a viewer reloaded before pion's ICE timeout fired) close it
|
||||
// first so we start from a clean slate. Without this, the new request would
|
||||
// race against a stale PC that still owns the per-peer broadcaster tracks.
|
||||
if globalConnectionManager.CloseExistingPeerConnection(sessionKey) {
|
||||
log.Log.Info("webrtc.main.InitializeWebRTCConnection(): closed stale peer connection for session " + handshakePayload.SessionID)
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Drain/reset the candidate channel too \u2014 leftover candidates from the
|
||||
// prior session are not valid for the new ICE agent.
|
||||
globalConnectionManager.CloseCandidateChannel(sessionKey)
|
||||
candidateChannel := globalConnectionManager.GetOrCreateCandidateChannel(sessionKey)
|
||||
|
||||
// Set variables
|
||||
|
||||
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