The journal capture runs `if: always()` so a failed service start still
leaves a usable record. When the job failed *before* authenticating --
the missing-secrets preflight, for instance -- it ran anyway, failed
with "Host key verification failed", and that became the last error in
the log. The actual cause was twenty lines up and easy to miss.
Conditions it on the authenticate step having succeeded, so it still
captures every case it was added for and stays quiet for the ones it
cannot help with.
Observed on run 6: the preflight correctly reported all three missing
secrets, then the journal step overwrote that with an SSH error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
A missing RSYNC_SSH_KEY first surfaced as ssh failing to parse an empty
identity file, which names neither the secret nor where to set it. Adds
a preflight that lists exactly which secrets are absent, and notes that
HF_TOKEN is optional and only needed for gated repositories.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
The post-reload check compares the certificate on the wire against the
one on disk, because nginx keeps its previous cycle -- and its previous
certificates -- when a reload cannot rebind, while still reporting
success. That check is right and it fired on the first run of this
script.
It was a false positive. Old workers finish their in-flight connections
before exiting, so for a second or two after a reload either cycle may
answer, and the check sampled the old one. A warning that cries wolf on
every first install is worse than no warning, because the real thing
gets ignored.
Retries for up to twenty seconds before reporting a mismatch. Verified
against hanzalova: the first run warned, the serials matched moments
later, and a re-run reports the match immediately.
Also makes the caveman and DNS steps report state rather than always
printing instructions, now that both are provisioned, and points the
bucket guidance at architecture/object-storage.md §3 -- including why
the script refuses to read the MinIO root credentials itself.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
Covers what the guarantees mean in practice, the two deliberate
departures from architecture/generic.md §1, how to run it locally, the
deployment topology, and how to run both test suites.
CLAUDE.md records the invariants that are easy to break silently --
header replay, redirect handling, write ordering, and completing a
response before its manifest write lands -- since each of those was a
real bug rather than a hypothetical one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
Guarantee 1 is "durably stored in the configured bucket before the
response completes". The tee sent every chunk straight through, so the
client saw the last byte before the multipart upload was completed and
well before the manifest referenced it. A client that read a file and
immediately failed over to a sealed instance could be told the file had
never been seen -- and if either storage phase failed, it had already
received a clean 200 over bytes nothing recorded.
The tee now runs one chunk behind and releases the final chunk only
after the upload completes and the manifest write lands. Content-Length
is already on the wire, so a client cannot treat the transfer as
complete without those bytes; a storage or manifest failure now ends the
body short instead, which is what the client detects and retries on.
Costs one chunk of extra latency at the end of a transfer and nothing
else: the withheld chunk is bounded by the upstream chunk size, and a
disconnected client still has its transfer finished without it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
A snapshot_download fans out across a repo's files, so several transfers
finish at once and each rewrites the same manifest document. The
read-merge-write had no conditional put behind it: two writers that read
the same document both wrote their own version, and the second silently
dropped the first's entry. The verify-after-write retry caught most of
that, but the write happens in the detached transfer task -- after the
client already has its bytes -- so a lost entry surfaced only later, as a
sealed instance claiming never to have seen a file it had served. That
breaks the fetch-once retention guarantee.
Adds a compare-and-set pair to the Store port (get_versioned /
put_if_version, conditional on the etag last read) and uses it for
manifest updates, so a racing write is refused and retried rather than
merged away. The local filesystem store cannot do conditional updates,
so it reports supports_compare_and_set() = false and the caller keeps
the verify-after-write path for it.
Also serialises manifest writes per key within the process. CAS alone is
correct but turns eight parallel workers into eight writers contending
for one document, burning the retry budget on self-inflicted collisions;
the lock makes the common case uncontended and leaves the retry loop for
genuinely concurrent writers -- another instance, or the CLI against the
same bucket.
Regression test fetches twelve files of one repo concurrently and
asserts every one survives into the manifest and replays when sealed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
The Hub answers a resolve request with a redirect: 307 to its own
resolve-cache for an ordinary file, 302 to a CDN for an LFS-backed one.
X-Repo-Commit, X-Linked-Etag and X-Linked-Size ride on that redirect
response; the CDN it points at carries none of them and sets an ETag of
its own.
reqwest was following the redirect itself, so head_of() only ever saw
the final hop. Every recorded etag was the CDN's, X-Linked-Etag and
X-Linked-Size were lost, and no file was ever recognised as LFS -- which
also meant expected_sha256() never fired, so nothing was verified
against upstream's oid and every transfer took the staging path instead
of writing straight to its content-addressed key.
Follow redirects by hand instead, absorbing replayable metadata only
while still on the Hub's origin and taking the content length from
whichever hop actually serves the bytes. The operator's upstream token
is dropped when a redirect crosses origins, since a presigned CDN URL
needs no authorization of ours and forwarding one leaks a credential.
Also derives the lfs flag from X-Linked-Size rather than the presence of
X-Linked-Etag: the Hub sends a linked etag for every file (a git blob
SHA-1 for ordinary ones), so the etag alone marked everything as LFS.
Found by running the conformance suite against the MinIO on caveman.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
Scaffolds the workspace per architecture/generic.md §1 and implements
phases 0-3 of doc/spec.md §12.
Crates:
entities manifest/ref/repo schemas, bucket key layout, config, the
X-Error-Code taxonomy. No I/O.
core resolver, freeze pinning, single-flight, the streaming tee,
policy, gc/verify/refresh. Defines the Store and Upstream
ports.
data object_store (S3 + local) and reqwest Hub adapters.
api the axum surface: resolve, model/dataset info, tree, refs,
whoami, metrics, bearer auth, range handling.
bin one binary: serve plus fetch/pin/refresh/list/show/rm/gc/
verify/doctor.
Deployment targets bob.hanzalova.internal:20482 (port derived per
architecture/port-allocations.md §3), storing to the MinIO on
caveman.kosherinata.internal, fronted by hanzalova at rf.internal.
Ships the sysusers drop-in, hardened unit, firewalld service, nginx
vhost, config template, infra-setup.sh and the Gitea Actions
ci/deploy/conformance workflows.
Testing: 112 unit and integration tests, including the sovereignty
suite (cold fetch, sealed replay, single-flight, client disconnect,
range resume, freeze stability, gc-after-rm, digest mismatch), plus a
conformance suite driving a pinned huggingface_hub against a real Hub.
Deviations from the spec, all deliberate:
- one binary with subcommands (spec §9) rather than generic.md's
separate -api and -cli binaries; the library split is unchanged.
- a dedicated sysusers account and hardened unit (generic.md §8)
rather than the spec's illustrative DynamicUser unit.
- manifests carry an optional repo_tree recorded verbatim, resolving
spec §13's "record whole, filter on read" question for the tree
endpoint as well as model-info.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XZG2i4AmfSqE97EJGBVb64
grenadeandClaude Opus 5