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## Why It should be possible for app-server to handle "foreign" OS paths in unified_exec working directories, allowing e.g. a Linux app-server to run processes on e.g. a Windows exec-server. ## What Convert the core unified_exec cwd values to use `PathUri`. Adds fallible path conversion in several places to try to minimize the scope of this change. The only time this change suppresses errors from converting `PathUri` to an `AbsolutePathBuf` is when the turn is configured with no sandboxing at all to allow us to make progress testing without sandboxing. Future changes to apply_patch and sandboxing will clean up these error paths. A tool's cwd is resolved from joining a model-provided workdir to the environment's cwd. When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()`, an absolute-path workdir would overwrite the environment's cwd and we would resolve permissions/sandboxing against the model-provided path. This change extends `PathUri::join()` to also treat an absolute rhs as an override of the base/lhs. This also removes some coverage from the remove_env_windows tests until a follow-up converts foreign paths in command exec events correctly. ## Breaking Changes When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()` for workdir resolution, we ended up resolving tilde-prefixed paths against the app-server's `$HOME`, e.g. `~/foo/bar` becomes `/home/anp/foo/bar`. It's difficult to do this with `PathUri` joining, so after offline discussion this PR no longer implements it. A quick check of some power users' rollouts suggests that models don't actually generate home-prefixed absolute working directories for their spawns, so this shouldn't have any real blast radius.
117 lines
4.3 KiB
Rust
117 lines
4.3 KiB
Rust
use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
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use crate::safety::SafetyCheck;
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use crate::safety::assess_patch_safety;
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use crate::session::turn_context::TurnContext;
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use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
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use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchAction;
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use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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pub(crate) enum InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
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/// The `apply_patch` call was handled programmatically, without any sort
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/// of sandbox, because the user explicitly approved it. This is the
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/// result to use with the `shell` function call that contained `apply_patch`.
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Output(Result<String, FunctionCallError>),
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/// The `apply_patch` call was approved, either automatically because it
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/// appears that it should be allowed based on the user's sandbox policy
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/// *or* because the user explicitly approved it. The runtime realizes the
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/// patch through the selected environment filesystem.
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DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation),
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}
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub(crate) struct ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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pub(crate) action: ApplyPatchAction,
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pub(crate) auto_approved: bool,
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pub(crate) exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement,
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}
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pub(crate) async fn apply_patch(
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turn_context: &TurnContext,
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file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
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action: ApplyPatchAction,
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) -> InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
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// TODO(anp): Migrate patch safety checks to PathUri.
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let cwd = match action.cwd.to_abs_path() {
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Ok(cwd) => cwd,
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Err(err) => {
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return InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(
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format!(
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"patch cwd `{}` is not native to the Codex host: {err}",
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action.cwd
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),
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)));
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}
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};
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match assess_patch_safety(
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&action,
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turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
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&turn_context.permission_profile(),
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file_system_sandbox_policy,
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&cwd,
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turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
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) {
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SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
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user_explicitly_approved,
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..
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} => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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action,
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auto_approved: !user_explicitly_approved,
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exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
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bypass_sandbox: false,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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},
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}),
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SafetyCheck::AskUser => {
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// Delegate the approval prompt (including cached approvals) to the
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// tool runtime, consistent with how shell/unified_exec approvals
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// are orchestrator-driven.
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InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
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action,
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auto_approved: false,
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exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
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reason: None,
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proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
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},
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})
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}
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SafetyCheck::Reject { reason } => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(Err(
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FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!("patch rejected: {reason}")),
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)),
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn convert_apply_patch_to_protocol(
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action: &ApplyPatchAction,
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) -> HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange> {
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let mut result = HashMap::with_capacity(action.changes().len());
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for (path, change) in action.changes() {
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let protocol_change = match change {
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { content, .. } => FileChange::Add {
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content: content.clone(),
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},
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete { content } => FileChange::Delete {
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content: content.clone(),
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},
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ApplyPatchFileChange::Update {
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unified_diff,
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move_path,
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new_content: _new_content,
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} => FileChange::Update {
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unified_diff: unified_diff.clone(),
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move_path: move_path.clone(),
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},
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};
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result.insert(path.to_path_buf(), protocol_change);
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}
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result
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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#[path = "apply_patch_tests.rs"]
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mod tests;
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