Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/apply_patch.rs
T
Adam Perry @ OpenAI 5867b529ae unified-exec: preserve PathUri through exec-server (#28681)
## Why

It should be possible for app-server to handle "foreign" OS paths in
unified_exec working directories, allowing e.g. a Linux app-server to
run processes on e.g. a Windows exec-server.

## What

Convert the core unified_exec cwd values to use `PathUri`.

Adds fallible path conversion in several places to try to minimize the
scope of this change. The only time this change suppresses errors from
converting `PathUri` to an `AbsolutePathBuf` is when the turn is
configured with no sandboxing at all to allow us to make progress
testing without sandboxing.

Future changes to apply_patch and sandboxing will clean up these error
paths.

A tool's cwd is resolved from joining a model-provided workdir to the
environment's cwd. When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()`, an
absolute-path workdir would overwrite the environment's cwd and we would
resolve permissions/sandboxing against the model-provided path. This
change extends `PathUri::join()` to also treat an absolute rhs as an
override of the base/lhs.

This also removes some coverage from the remove_env_windows tests until
a follow-up converts foreign paths in command exec events correctly.

## Breaking Changes

When using `AbsolutePathBuf::join()` for workdir resolution, we ended up
resolving tilde-prefixed paths against the app-server's `$HOME`, e.g.
`~/foo/bar` becomes `/home/anp/foo/bar`. It's difficult to do this with
`PathUri` joining, so after offline discussion this PR no longer
implements it.

A quick check of some power users' rollouts suggests that models don't
actually generate home-prefixed absolute working directories for their
spawns, so this shouldn't have any real blast radius.
2026-06-17 19:36:16 +00:00

117 lines
4.3 KiB
Rust

use crate::function_tool::FunctionCallError;
use crate::safety::SafetyCheck;
use crate::safety::assess_patch_safety;
use crate::session::turn_context::TurnContext;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::ExecApprovalRequirement;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchAction;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileChange;
use codex_protocol::protocol::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::PathBuf;
pub(crate) enum InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
/// The `apply_patch` call was handled programmatically, without any sort
/// of sandbox, because the user explicitly approved it. This is the
/// result to use with the `shell` function call that contained `apply_patch`.
Output(Result<String, FunctionCallError>),
/// The `apply_patch` call was approved, either automatically because it
/// appears that it should be allowed based on the user's sandbox policy
/// *or* because the user explicitly approved it. The runtime realizes the
/// patch through the selected environment filesystem.
DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation),
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
pub(crate) action: ApplyPatchAction,
pub(crate) auto_approved: bool,
pub(crate) exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement,
}
pub(crate) async fn apply_patch(
turn_context: &TurnContext,
file_system_sandbox_policy: &FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
action: ApplyPatchAction,
) -> InternalApplyPatchInvocation {
// TODO(anp): Migrate patch safety checks to PathUri.
let cwd = match action.cwd.to_abs_path() {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(err) => {
return InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(Err(FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(
format!(
"patch cwd `{}` is not native to the Codex host: {err}",
action.cwd
),
)));
}
};
match assess_patch_safety(
&action,
turn_context.approval_policy.value(),
&turn_context.permission_profile(),
file_system_sandbox_policy,
&cwd,
turn_context.windows_sandbox_level,
) {
SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
user_explicitly_approved,
..
} => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
action,
auto_approved: !user_explicitly_approved,
exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::Skip {
bypass_sandbox: false,
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
},
}),
SafetyCheck::AskUser => {
// Delegate the approval prompt (including cached approvals) to the
// tool runtime, consistent with how shell/unified_exec approvals
// are orchestrator-driven.
InternalApplyPatchInvocation::DelegateToRuntime(ApplyPatchRuntimeInvocation {
action,
auto_approved: false,
exec_approval_requirement: ExecApprovalRequirement::NeedsApproval {
reason: None,
proposed_execpolicy_amendment: None,
},
})
}
SafetyCheck::Reject { reason } => InternalApplyPatchInvocation::Output(Err(
FunctionCallError::RespondToModel(format!("patch rejected: {reason}")),
)),
}
}
pub(crate) fn convert_apply_patch_to_protocol(
action: &ApplyPatchAction,
) -> HashMap<PathBuf, FileChange> {
let mut result = HashMap::with_capacity(action.changes().len());
for (path, change) in action.changes() {
let protocol_change = match change {
ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { content, .. } => FileChange::Add {
content: content.clone(),
},
ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete { content } => FileChange::Delete {
content: content.clone(),
},
ApplyPatchFileChange::Update {
unified_diff,
move_path,
new_content: _new_content,
} => FileChange::Update {
unified_diff: unified_diff.clone(),
move_path: move_path.clone(),
},
};
result.insert(path.to_path_buf(), protocol_change);
}
result
}
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "apply_patch_tests.rs"]
mod tests;