Files
codex/codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/landlock.rs
T
Michael Bolin e428b13c8a Make sandbox read access configurable with ReadOnlyAccess
## What

This change introduces a new `ReadOnlyAccess` model and threads it through
sandbox policy consumers so read access is explicit instead of implicit.

- Added `ReadOnlyAccess` to protocol:
  - `Restricted { include_platform_defaults, readable_roots }`
  - `FullAccess`
- Changed `SandboxPolicy` shape:
  - `ReadOnly` is now `ReadOnly { access: ReadOnlyAccess }`
  - `WorkspaceWrite` now carries `read_only_access: ReadOnlyAccess`
- Kept existing behavior for now by defaulting to `ReadOnlyAccess::FullAccess`
  in constructors and current config/app-server mappings.
- Added helper methods to compute effective readable roots (including optional
  platform defaults + cwd) and to detect full read access.
- Updated seatbelt policy generation to honor restricted read roots by emitting
  scoped `(allow file-read* ...)` entries when full read access is not granted.
- Updated Linux backends (`bwrap`, legacy landlock path) to fail closed with an
  explicit `UnsupportedOperation` when restricted read access is requested but
  not yet implemented there.
- Updated Windows sandbox backends (standard, elevated, and runner paths) to
  fail closed in the same way for restricted read access.
- Updated all call sites/tests/pattern matches for the new structured variants
  and regenerated app-server protocol schema/types.

## Why

The previous `SandboxPolicy::ReadOnly` implied full-disk read access and left
no way to express a narrower read surface.

This refactor establishes the policy model needed to support user-configurable
read restrictions in a follow-up without changing current runtime behavior.

It also ensures we do not silently ignore future restricted-read policies on
platform backends that do not support them yet. Failing closed keeps sandbox
semantics predictable and avoids accidental over-permission.

## Compatibility and rollout notes

- Existing behavior is preserved by default (`FullAccess`).
- Existing config/app-server flows continue to serialize/deserialize cleanly.
- New schema artifacts are included to keep generated protocol outputs in sync.

## Validation

- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol -p codex-core -p codex-linux-sandbox -p codex-windows-sandbox -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo check -p codex-windows-sandbox`
- Targeted crate/test runs were executed during development for protocol/core/
  sandbox-related crates.
2026-02-10 21:41:43 -08:00

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//! In-process Linux sandbox primitives: `no_new_privs` and seccomp.
//!
//! Filesystem restrictions are enforced by bubblewrap in `linux_run_main`.
//! Landlock helpers remain available here as legacy/backup utilities.
use std::collections::BTreeMap;
use std::path::Path;
use codex_core::error::CodexErr;
use codex_core::error::Result;
use codex_core::error::SandboxErr;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use landlock::ABI;
#[allow(unused_imports)]
use landlock::Access;
use landlock::AccessFs;
use landlock::CompatLevel;
use landlock::Compatible;
use landlock::Ruleset;
use landlock::RulesetAttr;
use landlock::RulesetCreatedAttr;
use seccompiler::BpfProgram;
use seccompiler::SeccompAction;
use seccompiler::SeccompCmpArgLen;
use seccompiler::SeccompCmpOp;
use seccompiler::SeccompCondition;
use seccompiler::SeccompFilter;
use seccompiler::SeccompRule;
use seccompiler::TargetArch;
use seccompiler::apply_filter;
/// Apply sandbox policies inside this thread so only the child inherits
/// them, not the entire CLI process.
///
/// This function is responsible for:
/// - enabling `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` when restrictions apply, and
/// - installing the network seccomp filter when network access is disabled.
///
/// Filesystem restrictions are intentionally handled by bubblewrap.
pub(crate) fn apply_sandbox_policy_to_current_thread(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
cwd: &Path,
apply_landlock_fs: bool,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let install_network_seccomp =
should_install_network_seccomp(sandbox_policy, allow_network_for_proxy);
// `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` is required for seccomp, but it also prevents
// setuid privilege elevation. Many `bwrap` deployments rely on setuid, so
// we avoid this unless we need seccomp or we are explicitly using the
// legacy Landlock filesystem pipeline.
if install_network_seccomp
|| (apply_landlock_fs && !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access())
{
set_no_new_privs()?;
}
if install_network_seccomp {
install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread()?;
}
if apply_landlock_fs && !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_write_access() {
if !sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access() {
return Err(CodexErr::UnsupportedOperation(
"Restricted read-only access is not supported by the legacy Linux Landlock filesystem backend."
.to_string(),
));
}
let writable_roots = sandbox_policy
.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
.into_iter()
.map(|writable_root| writable_root.root)
.collect();
install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(writable_roots)?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn should_install_network_seccomp(
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
allow_network_for_proxy: bool,
) -> bool {
// Managed-network sessions should remain fail-closed even for policies that
// would normally grant full network access (for example, DangerFullAccess).
!sandbox_policy.has_full_network_access() || allow_network_for_proxy
}
/// Enable `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS` so seccomp can be applied safely.
fn set_no_new_privs() -> Result<()> {
let result = unsafe { libc::prctl(libc::PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) };
if result != 0 {
return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error().into());
}
Ok(())
}
/// Installs Landlock file-system rules on the current thread allowing read
/// access to the entire file-system while restricting write access to
/// `/dev/null` and the provided list of `writable_roots`.
///
/// # Errors
/// Returns [`CodexErr::Sandbox`] variants when the ruleset fails to apply.
///
/// Note: this is currently unused because filesystem sandboxing is performed
/// via bubblewrap. It is kept for reference and potential fallback use.
fn install_filesystem_landlock_rules_on_current_thread(
writable_roots: Vec<AbsolutePathBuf>,
) -> Result<()> {
let abi = ABI::V5;
let access_rw = AccessFs::from_all(abi);
let access_ro = AccessFs::from_read(abi);
let mut ruleset = Ruleset::default()
.set_compatibility(CompatLevel::BestEffort)
.handle_access(access_rw)?
.create()?
.add_rules(landlock::path_beneath_rules(&["/"], access_ro))?
.add_rules(landlock::path_beneath_rules(&["/dev/null"], access_rw))?
.set_no_new_privs(true);
if !writable_roots.is_empty() {
ruleset = ruleset.add_rules(landlock::path_beneath_rules(&writable_roots, access_rw))?;
}
let status = ruleset.restrict_self()?;
if status.ruleset == landlock::RulesetStatus::NotEnforced {
return Err(CodexErr::Sandbox(SandboxErr::LandlockRestrict));
}
Ok(())
}
/// Installs a seccomp filter that blocks outbound network access except for
/// AF_UNIX domain sockets.
///
/// The filter is applied to the current thread so only the sandboxed child
/// inherits it.
fn install_network_seccomp_filter_on_current_thread() -> std::result::Result<(), SandboxErr> {
// Build rule map.
let mut rules: BTreeMap<i64, Vec<SeccompRule>> = BTreeMap::new();
// Helper – insert unconditional deny rule for syscall number.
let mut deny_syscall = |nr: i64| {
rules.insert(nr, vec![]); // empty rule vec = unconditional match
};
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_connect);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_accept);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_accept4);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_bind);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_listen);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_getpeername);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_getsockname);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_shutdown);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_sendto);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_sendmmsg);
// NOTE: allowing recvfrom allows some tools like: `cargo clippy` to run
// with their socketpair + child processes for sub-proc management
// deny_syscall(libc::SYS_recvfrom);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_recvmmsg);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_getsockopt);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_setsockopt);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_ptrace);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_io_uring_setup);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_io_uring_enter);
deny_syscall(libc::SYS_io_uring_register);
// For `socket` we allow AF_UNIX (arg0 == AF_UNIX) and deny everything else.
let unix_only_rule = SeccompRule::new(vec![SeccompCondition::new(
0, // first argument (domain)
SeccompCmpArgLen::Dword,
SeccompCmpOp::Ne,
libc::AF_UNIX as u64,
)?])?;
rules.insert(libc::SYS_socket, vec![unix_only_rule.clone()]);
rules.insert(libc::SYS_socketpair, vec![unix_only_rule]); // always deny (Unix can use socketpair but fine, keep open?)
let filter = SeccompFilter::new(
rules,
SeccompAction::Allow, // default – allow
SeccompAction::Errno(libc::EPERM as u32), // when rule matches – return EPERM
if cfg!(target_arch = "x86_64") {
TargetArch::x86_64
} else if cfg!(target_arch = "aarch64") {
TargetArch::aarch64
} else {
unimplemented!("unsupported architecture for seccomp filter");
},
)?;
let prog: BpfProgram = filter.try_into()?;
apply_filter(&prog)?;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::should_install_network_seccomp;
use codex_core::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn managed_network_enforces_seccomp_even_for_full_network_policy() {
assert_eq!(
should_install_network_seccomp(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, true),
true
);
}
#[test]
fn full_network_policy_without_managed_network_skips_seccomp() {
assert_eq!(
should_install_network_seccomp(&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess, false),
false
);
}
#[test]
fn restricted_network_policy_always_installs_seccomp() {
assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
false
));
assert!(should_install_network_seccomp(
&SandboxPolicy::new_read_only_policy(),
true
));
}
}