Files
codex/codex-rs/core/src/sandboxing/mod.rs
T
viyatb-oaiandCodex b527ee2890 feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals

#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.

#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.

#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-14 04:18:12 +00:00

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/*
Module: sandboxing
Build platform wrappers and produce ExecRequest for execution. Owns low-level
sandbox placement and transformation of portable CommandSpec into a
ready‑to‑spawn environment.
*/
use crate::exec::ExecExpiration;
use crate::exec::ExecToolCallOutput;
use crate::exec::SandboxType;
use crate::exec::StdoutStream;
use crate::exec::execute_exec_env;
use crate::landlock::allow_network_for_proxy;
use crate::landlock::create_linux_sandbox_command_args;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::seatbelt::create_seatbelt_command_args;
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
pub use codex_protocol::models::SandboxPermissions;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CommandSpec {
pub program: String,
pub args: Vec<String>,
pub cwd: PathBuf,
pub env: HashMap<String, String>,
pub expiration: ExecExpiration,
pub sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
pub justification: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct ExecRequest {
pub command: Vec<String>,
pub cwd: PathBuf,
pub env: HashMap<String, String>,
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
pub network_attempt_id: Option<String>,
pub expiration: ExecExpiration,
pub sandbox: SandboxType,
pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
pub sandbox_permissions: SandboxPermissions,
pub justification: Option<String>,
pub arg0: Option<String>,
}
/// Bundled arguments for sandbox transformation.
///
/// This keeps call sites self-documenting when several fields are optional.
pub(crate) struct SandboxTransformRequest<'a> {
pub spec: CommandSpec,
pub policy: &'a SandboxPolicy,
pub sandbox: SandboxType,
pub enforce_managed_network: bool,
// TODO(viyatb): Evaluate switching this to Option<Arc<NetworkProxy>>
// to make shared ownership explicit across runtime/sandbox plumbing.
pub network: Option<&'a NetworkProxy>,
pub sandbox_policy_cwd: &'a Path,
pub codex_linux_sandbox_exe: Option<&'a PathBuf>,
pub use_linux_sandbox_bwrap: bool,
pub windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
}
pub enum SandboxPreference {
Auto,
Require,
Forbid,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub(crate) enum SandboxTransformError {
#[error("missing codex-linux-sandbox executable path")]
MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable,
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
#[error("seatbelt sandbox is only available on macOS")]
SeatbeltUnavailable,
}
#[derive(Default)]
pub struct SandboxManager;
impl SandboxManager {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self
}
pub(crate) fn select_initial(
&self,
policy: &SandboxPolicy,
pref: SandboxablePreference,
windows_sandbox_level: WindowsSandboxLevel,
has_managed_network_requirements: bool,
) -> SandboxType {
match pref {
SandboxablePreference::Forbid => SandboxType::None,
SandboxablePreference::Require => {
// Require a platform sandbox when available; on Windows this
// respects the experimental_windows_sandbox feature.
crate::safety::get_platform_sandbox(
windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
)
.unwrap_or(SandboxType::None)
}
SandboxablePreference::Auto => match policy {
SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess | SandboxPolicy::ExternalSandbox { .. } => {
if has_managed_network_requirements {
crate::safety::get_platform_sandbox(
windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
)
.unwrap_or(SandboxType::None)
} else {
SandboxType::None
}
}
_ => crate::safety::get_platform_sandbox(
windows_sandbox_level != WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
)
.unwrap_or(SandboxType::None),
},
}
}
pub(crate) fn transform(
&self,
request: SandboxTransformRequest<'_>,
) -> Result<ExecRequest, SandboxTransformError> {
let SandboxTransformRequest {
mut spec,
policy,
sandbox,
enforce_managed_network,
network,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
codex_linux_sandbox_exe,
use_linux_sandbox_bwrap,
windows_sandbox_level,
} = request;
let mut env = spec.env;
if !policy.has_full_network_access() {
env.insert(
CODEX_SANDBOX_NETWORK_DISABLED_ENV_VAR.to_string(),
"1".to_string(),
);
}
let mut command = Vec::with_capacity(1 + spec.args.len());
command.push(spec.program);
command.append(&mut spec.args);
let (command, sandbox_env, arg0_override) = match sandbox {
SandboxType::None => (command, HashMap::new(), None),
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => {
let mut seatbelt_env = HashMap::new();
seatbelt_env.insert(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR.to_string(), "seatbelt".to_string());
let mut args = create_seatbelt_command_args(
command.clone(),
policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
enforce_managed_network,
network,
);
let mut full_command = Vec::with_capacity(1 + args.len());
full_command.push(MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE.to_string());
full_command.append(&mut args);
(full_command, seatbelt_env, None)
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt => return Err(SandboxTransformError::SeatbeltUnavailable),
SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp => {
let exe = codex_linux_sandbox_exe
.ok_or(SandboxTransformError::MissingLinuxSandboxExecutable)?;
let allow_proxy_network = allow_network_for_proxy(enforce_managed_network);
let mut args = create_linux_sandbox_command_args(
command.clone(),
policy,
sandbox_policy_cwd,
use_linux_sandbox_bwrap,
allow_proxy_network,
);
let mut full_command = Vec::with_capacity(1 + args.len());
full_command.push(exe.to_string_lossy().to_string());
full_command.append(&mut args);
(
full_command,
HashMap::new(),
Some("codex-linux-sandbox".to_string()),
)
}
// On Windows, the restricted token sandbox executes in-process via the
// codex-windows-sandbox crate. We leave the command unchanged here and
// branch during execution based on the sandbox type.
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (command, HashMap::new(), None),
// When building for non-Windows targets, this variant is never constructed.
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
SandboxType::WindowsRestrictedToken => (command, HashMap::new(), None),
};
env.extend(sandbox_env);
Ok(ExecRequest {
command,
cwd: spec.cwd,
env,
network: network.cloned(),
network_attempt_id: None,
expiration: spec.expiration,
sandbox,
windows_sandbox_level,
sandbox_permissions: spec.sandbox_permissions,
justification: spec.justification,
arg0: arg0_override,
})
}
pub fn denied(&self, sandbox: SandboxType, out: &ExecToolCallOutput) -> bool {
crate::exec::is_likely_sandbox_denied(sandbox, out)
}
}
pub async fn execute_env(
env: ExecRequest,
policy: &SandboxPolicy,
stdout_stream: Option<StdoutStream>,
) -> crate::error::Result<ExecToolCallOutput> {
execute_exec_env(env, policy, stdout_stream).await
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::SandboxManager;
use crate::exec::SandboxType;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
use crate::tools::sandboxing::SandboxablePreference;
use codex_protocol::config_types::WindowsSandboxLevel;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
#[test]
fn danger_full_access_defaults_to_no_sandbox_without_network_requirements() {
let manager = SandboxManager::new();
let sandbox = manager.select_initial(
&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
SandboxablePreference::Auto,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
false,
);
assert_eq!(sandbox, SandboxType::None);
}
#[test]
fn danger_full_access_uses_platform_sandbox_with_network_requirements() {
let manager = SandboxManager::new();
let expected = crate::safety::get_platform_sandbox(false).unwrap_or(SandboxType::None);
let sandbox = manager.select_initial(
&SandboxPolicy::DangerFullAccess,
SandboxablePreference::Auto,
WindowsSandboxLevel::Disabled,
true,
);
assert_eq!(sandbox, expected);
}
}