jif 02de49f718 Harden Seatbelt writable root path binding (#39706) ...

## Why

Resolving attacker-mutable path components while preparing a Seatbelt profile can let a writable root be rebound to a different location before the sandbox is applied. File roots also need to remain confined to the file itself rather than granting access to descendants after replacement.

## What changed

- Preserve mutable components of writable-root paths until Seatbelt binds them, while still normalizing trusted top-level aliases such as `/tmp`.
- Use literal grants for existing file and device roots, and subpath grants for directories and missing roots.
- Exclude both logical and resolved forms of protected subpaths so symlinked metadata directories remain read-only.

## Testing

Add coverage for ancestor rebinding, file-root symlink and directory replacement, missing directory roots, top-level aliases, and symlinked metadata carveouts.

GitOrigin-RevId: 63c00e44dd30766e873b8acdad09d6657657fad9

2026-08-20 12:08:35 +00:00

..

src

Harden Seatbelt writable root path binding (#39706)

2026-08-20 12:08:35 +00:00

BUILD.bazel

Protect macOS Seatbelt writable root anchors (#39599)

2026-08-20 05:36:23 +00:00

Cargo.toml

Support Windows sandboxing in the exec server (#34423)

2026-07-20 22:35:14 +00:00