mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-10-29 19:08:43 +00:00
Michael Bolin
e6e2999209
## Why `PermissionProfile` should only describe the per-command permissions we still want to grant dynamically. Keeping `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` in that surface forced extra macOS-only approval, protocol, schema, and TUI branches for a capability we no longer want to expose. ## What changed - Removed the macOS-specific permission-profile types from `codex-protocol`, the app-server v2 API, and the generated schema/TypeScript artifacts. - Deleted the core and sandboxing plumbing that threaded `MacOsSeatbeltProfileExtensions` through execution requests and seatbelt construction. - Simplified macOS seatbelt generation so it always includes the fixed read-only preferences allowlist instead of carrying a configurable profile extension. - Removed the macOS additional-permissions UI/docs/test coverage and deleted the obsolete macOS permission modules. - Tightened `request_permissions` intersection handling so explicitly empty requested read lists are preserved only when that field was actually granted, avoiding zero-grant responses being stored as active permissions.
49 lines
1.6 KiB
Rust
49 lines
1.6 KiB
Rust
#![cfg(target_os = "macos")]
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use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
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use crate::spawn::CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR;
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use crate::spawn::SpawnChildRequest;
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use crate::spawn::StdioPolicy;
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use crate::spawn::spawn_child_async;
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use codex_network_proxy::NetworkProxy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use codex_sandboxing::seatbelt::MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE;
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use codex_sandboxing::seatbelt::create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::path::Path;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use tokio::process::Child;
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pub async fn spawn_command_under_seatbelt(
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command: Vec<String>,
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command_cwd: PathBuf,
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sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
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sandbox_policy_cwd: &Path,
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stdio_policy: StdioPolicy,
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network: Option<&NetworkProxy>,
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mut env: HashMap<String, String>,
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) -> std::io::Result<Child> {
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let args = create_seatbelt_command_args_for_policies(
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command,
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&FileSystemSandboxPolicy::from_legacy_sandbox_policy(sandbox_policy, sandbox_policy_cwd),
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NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
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sandbox_policy_cwd,
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/*enforce_managed_network*/ false,
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network,
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);
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let arg0 = None;
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env.insert(CODEX_SANDBOX_ENV_VAR.to_string(), "seatbelt".to_string());
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spawn_child_async(SpawnChildRequest {
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program: PathBuf::from(MACOS_PATH_TO_SEATBELT_EXECUTABLE),
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args,
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arg0,
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cwd: command_cwd,
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network_sandbox_policy: NetworkSandboxPolicy::from(sandbox_policy),
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network,
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stdio_policy,
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env,
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})
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.await
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}
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