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## Summary Some permission profiles can encode filesystem reads that should remain unavailable to the agent. Before this change, the model-visible context and automatic approval review prompt summarized the effective permissions as a legacy sandbox mode, which can omit permission-profile filesystem entries from escalation decisions. For example, a profile can grant workspace access while denying a private subtree across every workspace root: ```toml default_permissions = "restricted-workspace" [permissions.restricted-workspace.workspace_roots] "/Users/alice/project" = true "/Users/alice/other-project" = true [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem] ":minimal" = "read" [permissions.restricted-workspace.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" "private" = "deny" "private/**" = "deny" ``` The context window now describes the workspace roots and effective filesystem side of the `PermissionProfile` directly, with deny entries marked as non-escalatable: ```xml <environment_context> <cwd>/Users/alice/project</cwd> <shell>zsh</shell> <filesystem><workspace_roots><root>/Users/alice/project</root><root>/Users/alice/other-project</root></workspace_roots><permission_profile type="managed"><file_system type="restricted"><entry access="read"><special>:minimal</special></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/project</path></entry><entry access="write"><path>/Users/alice/other-project</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><path>/Users/alice/other-project/private</path></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/project/private/**</glob></entry><entry access="deny" escalatable="false"><glob>/Users/alice/other-project/private/**</glob></entry></file_system></permission_profile></filesystem> </environment_context> ``` Managed requirements can impose the same kind of deny-read restriction: ```toml [permissions.filesystem] deny_read = [ "/Users/alice/project/private", "/Users/alice/project/private/**", ] ``` The automatic approval review prompt also receives the parent turn's denied-read context, so review decisions can account for the active permission profile. ## What Changed - Render the effective filesystem profile in `<environment_context>`, including profile type, filesystem entries, workspace roots, and non-escalatable deny entries. - Persist effective `workspace_roots` in `TurnContextItem` so resumed/replayed context does not have to bind `:workspace_roots` through legacy `cwd` fallback. - Add explicit permission instructions that denied reads are policy restrictions, not escalation targets. - Pass the parent turn's denied-read context into automatic approval reviews. - Add targeted coverage for prompt rendering, workspace-root materialization, replay context, and review prompt context. - Keep the prompt-context test expectations platform-aware so the same filesystem rendering assertions pass on Unix and Windows paths. ## Testing - `just test -p codex-core context::environment_context::tests::serialize_environment_context_with_full_filesystem_profile` - `just test -p codex-core context::environment_context::tests::turn_context_item_filesystem_uses_workspace_roots_instead_of_cwd` - `just test -p codex-core context::permissions_instructions::permissions_instructions_tests::builds_permissions_from_profile_with_denied_reads` - `just fix -p codex-core` I also attempted `just test -p codex-core`; the changed prompt-context tests passed, but the full local run did not complete cleanly in this sandboxed macOS environment due unrelated user-shell `CODEX_SANDBOX*` expectations and integration-test timeouts.
176 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust
176 lines
6.5 KiB
Rust
//! Guardian review decides whether an `on-request` approval should be granted
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//! automatically instead of shown to the user.
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//!
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//! High-level approach:
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//! 1. Reconstruct a compact transcript that preserves user intent plus the most
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//! relevant recent assistant and tool context.
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//! 2. Ask a dedicated guardian review session to assess the exact planned
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//! action and return strict JSON.
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//! The guardian clones the parent config, so it inherits any managed
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//! network proxy / allowlist that the parent turn already had.
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//! 3. Fail closed on timeout, execution failure, or malformed output.
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//! 4. Apply the guardian's explicit allow/deny outcome.
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mod approval_request;
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mod metrics;
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mod prompt;
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mod review;
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mod review_session;
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use std::time::Duration;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianAssessmentDecisionSource;
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use codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianAssessmentOutcome;
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use serde::Deserialize;
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use serde::Serialize;
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pub(crate) use approval_request::GuardianApprovalRequest;
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pub(crate) use approval_request::GuardianMcpAnnotations;
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pub(crate) use approval_request::GuardianNetworkAccessTrigger;
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) use approval_request::guardian_approval_request_to_json;
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pub(crate) use review::guardian_rejection_message;
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pub(crate) use review::guardian_timeout_message;
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pub(crate) use review::is_guardian_reviewer_source;
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pub(crate) use review::new_guardian_review_id;
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) use review::record_guardian_denial_for_test;
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pub(crate) use review::review_approval_request;
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) use review::review_approval_request_with_cancel;
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pub(crate) use review::routes_approval_to_guardian;
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pub(crate) use review::spawn_approval_request_review;
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pub(crate) use review_session::GuardianReviewSessionManager;
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pub(crate) use review_session::prompt_cache_key_override_for_review_session;
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pub(crate) const GUARDIAN_REVIEW_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(90);
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pub(crate) const GUARDIAN_REVIEWER_NAME: &str = "guardian";
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pub(crate) const MAX_CONSECUTIVE_GUARDIAN_DENIALS_PER_TURN: u32 = 3;
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pub(crate) const MAX_RECENT_AUTO_REVIEW_DENIALS_PER_TURN: u32 = 10;
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pub(crate) const AUTO_REVIEW_DENIAL_WINDOW_SIZE: usize = 50;
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pub(crate) const AUTO_REVIEW_DENIED_ACTION_APPROVAL_DEVELOPER_PREFIX: &str =
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"The user has manually approved a specific action that was previously `Rejected`.";
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const GUARDIAN_MAX_MESSAGE_TRANSCRIPT_TOKENS: usize = 10_000;
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const GUARDIAN_MAX_TOOL_TRANSCRIPT_TOKENS: usize = 10_000;
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const GUARDIAN_MAX_MESSAGE_ENTRY_TOKENS: usize = 2_000;
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const GUARDIAN_MAX_TOOL_ENTRY_TOKENS: usize = 1_000;
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const GUARDIAN_MAX_ACTION_STRING_TOKENS: usize = 16_000;
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const GUARDIAN_RECENT_ENTRY_LIMIT: usize = 40;
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const TRUNCATION_TAG: &str = "truncated";
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/// Structured output contract that the guardian reviewer must satisfy.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct GuardianAssessment {
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pub(crate) risk_level: codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianRiskLevel,
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pub(crate) user_authorization: codex_protocol::protocol::GuardianUserAuthorization,
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pub(crate) outcome: GuardianAssessmentOutcome,
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pub(crate) rationale: String,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) struct GuardianRejection {
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pub(crate) rationale: String,
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pub(crate) source: GuardianAssessmentDecisionSource,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Default)]
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pub(crate) struct GuardianRejectionCircuitBreaker {
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turns: std::collections::HashMap<String, GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerTurn>,
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}
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#[derive(Debug, Default)]
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struct GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerTurn {
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consecutive_denials: u32,
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recent_denials: std::collections::VecDeque<bool>,
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interrupt_triggered: bool,
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}
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub(crate) enum GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerAction {
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Continue,
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InterruptTurn {
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consecutive_denials: u32,
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recent_denials: u32,
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},
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}
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impl GuardianRejectionCircuitBreaker {
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pub(crate) fn clear_turn(&mut self, turn_id: &str) {
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self.turns.remove(turn_id);
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}
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pub(crate) fn record_denial(&mut self, turn_id: &str) -> GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerAction {
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let turn = self.turns.entry(turn_id.to_string()).or_default();
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turn.consecutive_denials = turn.consecutive_denials.saturating_add(1);
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Self::record_recent_review(turn, /*denied*/ true);
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let recent_denials = turn.recent_denials.iter().filter(|denied| **denied).count() as u32;
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if !turn.interrupt_triggered
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&& (turn.consecutive_denials >= MAX_CONSECUTIVE_GUARDIAN_DENIALS_PER_TURN
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|| recent_denials >= MAX_RECENT_AUTO_REVIEW_DENIALS_PER_TURN)
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{
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turn.interrupt_triggered = true;
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GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerAction::InterruptTurn {
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consecutive_denials: turn.consecutive_denials,
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recent_denials,
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}
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} else {
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GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerAction::Continue
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}
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}
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pub(crate) fn record_non_denial(&mut self, turn_id: &str) {
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let turn = self.turns.entry(turn_id.to_string()).or_default();
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turn.consecutive_denials = 0;
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Self::record_recent_review(turn, /*denied*/ false);
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}
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fn record_recent_review(turn: &mut GuardianRejectionCircuitBreakerTurn, denied: bool) {
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turn.recent_denials.push_back(denied);
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if turn.recent_denials.len() > AUTO_REVIEW_DENIAL_WINDOW_SIZE {
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turn.recent_denials.pop_front();
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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use approval_request::format_guardian_action_pretty;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use approval_request::guardian_assessment_action;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use approval_request::guardian_request_turn_id;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::GuardianPromptMode;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::GuardianTranscriptCursor;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::GuardianTranscriptEntry;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::GuardianTranscriptEntryKind;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::build_guardian_prompt_items;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::build_guardian_prompt_items_with_parent_turn;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::collect_guardian_transcript_entries;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::guardian_output_schema;
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) use prompt::guardian_policy_prompt;
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#[cfg(test)]
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pub(crate) use prompt::guardian_policy_prompt_with_config;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::guardian_truncate_text;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::parse_guardian_assessment;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use prompt::render_guardian_transcript_entries;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use review::GuardianReviewOutcome;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use review::run_guardian_review_session as run_guardian_review_session_for_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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use review_session::build_guardian_review_session_config as build_guardian_review_session_config_for_test;
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests;
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