Files
codex/codex-rs/command/src/bash.rs
Michael Bolin e1fa4b0f21 # Split command parsing/safety out of codex-core into new codex-command
`codex-core` had accumulated command parsing and command safety logic (`bash`, `powershell`, `parse_command`, and `command_safety`) that is logically cohesive but orthogonal to most core session/runtime logic. Keeping this code in `codex-core` made the crate increasingly monolithic and raised iteration cost for unrelated core changes.

This change extracts that surface into a dedicated crate, `codex-command`, while preserving existing `codex_core::...` call sites via re-exports.

## Why this refactor

During analysis, command parsing/safety stood out as a good first split because it has:

- a clear domain boundary (shell parsing + safety classification)
- relatively self-contained dependencies (notably `tree-sitter` / `tree-sitter-bash`)
- a meaningful standalone test surface (`134` tests moved with the crate)
- many downstream uses that benefit from independent compilation and caching

The practical problem was build latency from a large `codex-core` compile/test graph. Clean-build timings before and after this split showed measurable wins:

- `cargo check -p codex-core`: `57.08s` -> `53.54s` (~`6.2%` faster)
- `cargo test -p codex-core --no-run`: `2m39.9s` -> `2m20s` (~`12.4%` faster)
- `codex-core lib` compile unit: `57.18s` -> `49.67s` (~`13.1%` faster)
- `codex-core lib(test)` compile unit: `60.87s` -> `53.21s` (~`12.6%` faster)

This gives a concrete reduction in core build overhead without changing behavior.

## What changed

### New crate

- Added `codex-rs/command` as workspace crate `codex-command`.
- Added:
  - `command/src/lib.rs`
  - `command/src/bash.rs`
  - `command/src/powershell.rs`
  - `command/src/parse_command.rs`
  - `command/src/command_safety/*`
  - `command/src/shell_detect.rs`
  - `command/BUILD.bazel`

### Code moved out of `codex-core`

- Moved modules from `core/src` into `command/src`:
  - `bash.rs`
  - `powershell.rs`
  - `parse_command.rs`
  - `command_safety/*`

### Dependency graph updates

- Added workspace member/dependency entries for `codex-command` in `codex-rs/Cargo.toml`.
- Added `codex-command` dependency to `codex-rs/core/Cargo.toml`.
- Removed `tree-sitter` and `tree-sitter-bash` from `codex-core` direct deps (now owned by `codex-command`).

### API compatibility for callers

To avoid immediate downstream churn, `codex-core` now re-exports the moved modules/functions:

- `codex_command::bash`
- `codex_command::powershell`
- `codex_command::parse_command`
- `codex_command::is_safe_command`
- `codex_command::is_dangerous_command`

This keeps existing `codex_core::...` paths working while enabling gradual migration to direct `codex-command` usage.

### Internal decoupling detail

- Added `command::shell_detect` so moved `bash`/`powershell` logic no longer depends on core shell internals.
- Adjusted PowerShell helper visibility in `codex-command` for existing core test usage (`UTF8` prefix helper + executable discovery functions).

## Validation

- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-command -p codex-core`
- `cargo test -p codex-command` (`134` passed)
- `cargo test -p codex-core --no-run`
- `cargo test -p codex-core shell_command_handler`

## Notes / follow-up

This commit intentionally prioritizes boundary extraction and compatibility. A follow-up can migrate downstream crates to depend directly on `codex-command` (instead of through `codex-core` re-exports) to realize additional incremental build wins.
2026-02-10 13:05:20 -08:00

379 lines
12 KiB
Rust
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tree_sitter::Node;
use tree_sitter::Parser;
use tree_sitter::Tree;
use tree_sitter_bash::LANGUAGE as BASH;
use crate::shell_detect::ShellType;
use crate::shell_detect::detect_shell_type;
/// Parse the provided bash source using tree-sitter-bash, returning a Tree on
/// success or None if parsing failed.
pub fn try_parse_shell(shell_lc_arg: &str) -> Option<Tree> {
let lang = BASH.into();
let mut parser = Parser::new();
#[expect(clippy::expect_used)]
parser.set_language(&lang).expect("load bash grammar");
let old_tree: Option<&Tree> = None;
parser.parse(shell_lc_arg, old_tree)
}
/// Parse a script which may contain multiple simple commands joined only by
/// the safe logical/pipe/sequencing operators: `&&`, `||`, `;`, `|`.
///
/// Returns `Some(Vec<command_words>)` if every command is a plain wordonly
/// command and the parse tree does not contain disallowed constructs
/// (parentheses, redirections, substitutions, control flow, etc.). Otherwise
/// returns `None`.
pub fn try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence(tree: &Tree, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
if tree.root_node().has_error() {
return None;
}
// List of allowed (named) node kinds for a "word only commands sequence".
// If we encounter a named node that is not in this list we reject.
const ALLOWED_KINDS: &[&str] = &[
// top level containers
"program",
"list",
"pipeline",
// commands & words
"command",
"command_name",
"word",
"string",
"string_content",
"raw_string",
"number",
"concatenation",
];
// Allow only safe punctuation / operator tokens; anything else causes reject.
const ALLOWED_PUNCT_TOKENS: &[&str] = &["&&", "||", ";", "|", "\"", "'"];
let root = tree.root_node();
let mut cursor = root.walk();
let mut stack = vec![root];
let mut command_nodes = Vec::new();
while let Some(node) = stack.pop() {
let kind = node.kind();
if node.is_named() {
if !ALLOWED_KINDS.contains(&kind) {
return None;
}
if kind == "command" {
command_nodes.push(node);
}
} else {
// Reject any punctuation / operator tokens that are not explicitly allowed.
if kind.chars().any(|c| "&;|".contains(c)) && !ALLOWED_PUNCT_TOKENS.contains(&kind) {
return None;
}
if !(ALLOWED_PUNCT_TOKENS.contains(&kind) || kind.trim().is_empty()) {
// If it's a quote token or operator it's allowed above; we also allow whitespace tokens.
// Any other punctuation like parentheses, braces, redirects, backticks, etc are rejected.
return None;
}
}
for child in node.children(&mut cursor) {
stack.push(child);
}
}
// Walk uses a stack (LIFO), so re-sort by position to restore source order.
command_nodes.sort_by_key(Node::start_byte);
let mut commands = Vec::new();
for node in command_nodes {
if let Some(words) = parse_plain_command_from_node(node, src) {
commands.push(words);
} else {
return None;
}
}
Some(commands)
}
pub fn extract_bash_command(command: &[String]) -> Option<(&str, &str)> {
let [shell, flag, script] = command else {
return None;
};
if !matches!(flag.as_str(), "-lc" | "-c")
|| !matches!(
detect_shell_type(&PathBuf::from(shell)),
Some(ShellType::Zsh) | Some(ShellType::Bash) | Some(ShellType::Sh)
)
{
return None;
}
Some((shell, script))
}
/// Returns the sequence of plain commands within a `bash -lc "..."` or
/// `zsh -lc "..."` invocation when the script only contains word-only commands
/// joined by safe operators.
pub fn parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(command: &[String]) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
let (_, script) = extract_bash_command(command)?;
let tree = try_parse_shell(script)?;
try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence(&tree, script)
}
fn parse_plain_command_from_node(cmd: tree_sitter::Node, src: &str) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
if cmd.kind() != "command" {
return None;
}
let mut words = Vec::new();
let mut cursor = cmd.walk();
for child in cmd.named_children(&mut cursor) {
match child.kind() {
"command_name" => {
let word_node = child.named_child(0)?;
if word_node.kind() != "word" {
return None;
}
words.push(word_node.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());
}
"word" | "number" => {
words.push(child.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned());
}
"string" => {
let parsed = parse_double_quoted_string(child, src)?;
words.push(parsed);
}
"raw_string" => {
let parsed = parse_raw_string(child, src)?;
words.push(parsed);
}
"concatenation" => {
// Handle concatenated arguments like -g"*.py"
let mut concatenated = String::new();
let mut concat_cursor = child.walk();
for part in child.named_children(&mut concat_cursor) {
match part.kind() {
"word" | "number" => {
concatenated
.push_str(part.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?.to_owned().as_str());
}
"string" => {
let parsed = parse_double_quoted_string(part, src)?;
concatenated.push_str(&parsed);
}
"raw_string" => {
let parsed = parse_raw_string(part, src)?;
concatenated.push_str(&parsed);
}
_ => return None,
}
}
if concatenated.is_empty() {
return None;
}
words.push(concatenated);
}
_ => return None,
}
}
Some(words)
}
fn parse_double_quoted_string(node: Node, src: &str) -> Option<String> {
if node.kind() != "string" {
return None;
}
let mut cursor = node.walk();
for part in node.named_children(&mut cursor) {
if part.kind() != "string_content" {
return None;
}
}
let raw = node.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?;
let stripped = raw
.strip_prefix('"')
.and_then(|text| text.strip_suffix('"'))?;
Some(stripped.to_string())
}
fn parse_raw_string(node: Node, src: &str) -> Option<String> {
if node.kind() != "raw_string" {
return None;
}
let raw_string = node.utf8_text(src.as_bytes()).ok()?;
let stripped = raw_string
.strip_prefix('\'')
.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix('\''));
stripped.map(str::to_owned)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
fn parse_seq(src: &str) -> Option<Vec<Vec<String>>> {
let tree = try_parse_shell(src)?;
try_parse_word_only_commands_sequence(&tree, src)
}
#[test]
fn accepts_single_simple_command() {
let cmds = parse_seq("ls -1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(cmds, vec![vec!["ls".to_string(), "-1".to_string()]]);
}
#[test]
fn accepts_multiple_commands_with_allowed_operators() {
let src = "ls && pwd; echo 'hi there' | wc -l";
let cmds = parse_seq(src).unwrap();
let expected: Vec<Vec<String>> = vec![
vec!["ls".to_string()],
vec!["pwd".to_string()],
vec!["echo".to_string(), "hi there".to_string()],
vec!["wc".to_string(), "-l".to_string()],
];
assert_eq!(cmds, expected);
}
#[test]
fn extracts_double_and_single_quoted_strings() {
let cmds = parse_seq("echo \"hello world\"").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds,
vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "hello world".to_string()]]
);
let cmds2 = parse_seq("echo 'hi there'").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds2,
vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "hi there".to_string()]]
);
}
#[test]
fn accepts_double_quoted_strings_with_newlines() {
let cmds = parse_seq("git commit -m \"line1\nline2\"").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds,
vec![vec![
"git".to_string(),
"commit".to_string(),
"-m".to_string(),
"line1\nline2".to_string(),
]]
);
}
#[test]
fn accepts_mixed_quote_concatenation() {
assert_eq!(
parse_seq(r#"echo "/usr"'/'"local"/bin"#).unwrap(),
vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "/usr/local/bin".to_string()]]
);
assert_eq!(
parse_seq(r#"echo '/usr'"/"'local'/bin"#).unwrap(),
vec![vec!["echo".to_string(), "/usr/local/bin".to_string()]]
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_double_quoted_strings_with_expansions() {
assert!(parse_seq(r#"echo "hi ${USER}""#).is_none());
assert!(parse_seq(r#"echo "$HOME""#).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn accepts_numbers_as_words() {
let cmds = parse_seq("echo 123 456").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds,
vec![vec![
"echo".to_string(),
"123".to_string(),
"456".to_string()
]]
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_parentheses_and_subshells() {
assert!(parse_seq("(ls)").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("ls || (pwd && echo hi)").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_redirections_and_unsupported_operators() {
assert!(parse_seq("ls > out.txt").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("echo hi & echo bye").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_command_and_process_substitutions_and_expansions() {
assert!(parse_seq("echo $(pwd)").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("echo `pwd`").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("echo $HOME").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("echo \"hi $USER\"").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_variable_assignment_prefix() {
assert!(parse_seq("FOO=bar ls").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_trailing_operator_parse_error() {
assert!(parse_seq("ls &&").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn parse_zsh_lc_plain_commands() {
let command = vec!["zsh".to_string(), "-lc".to_string(), "ls".to_string()];
let parsed = parse_shell_lc_plain_commands(&command).unwrap();
assert_eq!(parsed, vec![vec!["ls".to_string()]]);
}
#[test]
fn accepts_concatenated_flag_and_value() {
// Test case: -g"*.py" (flag directly concatenated with quoted value)
let cmds = parse_seq("rg -n \"foo\" -g\"*.py\"").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds,
vec![vec![
"rg".to_string(),
"-n".to_string(),
"foo".to_string(),
"-g*.py".to_string(),
]]
);
}
#[test]
fn accepts_concatenated_flag_with_single_quotes() {
let cmds = parse_seq("grep -n 'pattern' -g'*.txt'").unwrap();
assert_eq!(
cmds,
vec![vec![
"grep".to_string(),
"-n".to_string(),
"pattern".to_string(),
"-g*.txt".to_string(),
]]
);
}
#[test]
fn rejects_concatenation_with_variable_substitution() {
// Environment variables in concatenated strings should be rejected
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$VAR\" pattern").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"${VAR}\" pattern").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn rejects_concatenation_with_command_substitution() {
// Command substitution in concatenated strings should be rejected
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(pwd)\" pattern").is_none());
assert!(parse_seq("rg -g\"$(echo '*.py')\" pattern").is_none());
}
}