ef500f4d23
Split the code-mode protocol and client from the V8-backed runtime so core and
app-server no longer link codex-code-mode in production. ThreadManager now
provisions durable code-mode sessions through a shared external host process,
while tests can still inject the in-process provider.
The IPC protocol uses a persistent stdin/stdout transport. Each frame is a
4-byte big-endian length followed by JSON, with a 16 MiB frame limit. Client
requests carry u64 request IDs so create, execute, wait, terminate, and shutdown
operations can be multiplexed over one process. Session IDs isolate durable
stored values. Execute returns an ExecutionStarted response immediately and an
asynchronous InitialResponse when the initial yield or completion is available.
Nested tool calls and notifications travel from the host back to the client as
delegate requests with their own IDs. Delegate responses, cancellation, and
cell-closed lifecycle messages use the same framed channel. Wire operations
encode errors as Result values. A dead connection fails pending operations,
cancels outstanding delegates, and lets the provider spawn a new host for later
sessions.
Build codex-code-mode-host with V8 pointer-compression sandbox support and add
it to canonical primary and app-server packages, legacy Linux and Windows
bundles, signing verification, installers, Python runtime packages, and release
CI for macOS, Linux, and Windows. The host is discovered next to the current
executable, through CODEX_CODE_MODE_HOST_PATH, or on PATH. OS-level seccomp or
seatbelt restrictions remain a follow-up to this cross-platform process split.
Benchmarks were run from release builds on Linux x86_64 with the V8 sandbox
profile and a text('ok') workload. Cold measurements used 30 samples, warm
session provisioning used 200, and warm command execution used 500. Values are
mean/p50/p95 in milliseconds:
- session startup: in-process 0.002/0.002/0.005, IPC 2.623/2.599/2.894
- fresh-session command: in-process 1.831/1.758/1.915, IPC 7.428/7.252/8.306
- warm session provisioning: in-process 0.002/0.002/0.003,
IPC 0.471/0.463/0.581
- warm command: in-process 1.759/1.757/1.940, IPC 2.005/2.001/2.166
The steady-state median command overhead is approximately 0.244 ms. The median
fresh host plus first command cost is 7.252 ms.
Validation:
- 62/62 core code-mode integration tests passed against the external host
- focused protocol, client, runtime, host, tools, and trace tests passed
- Cargo and Bazel real-process host IPC tests passed
- 11/11 package builder tests passed
- Bazel lock verification, scoped Clippy fixes, and repository formatting passed
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.