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codex/codex-rs/core/src/safety.rs
T
Michael Bolin 0a00b5ed29 fix: overhaul SandboxPolicy and config loading in Rust (#732)
Previous to this PR, `SandboxPolicy` was a bit difficult to work with:


https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/237f8a11e11fdcc793a09e787e48215676d9b95b/codex-rs/core/src/protocol.rs#L98-L108

Specifically:

* It was an `enum` and therefore options were mutually exclusive as
opposed to additive.
* It defined things in terms of what the agent _could not_ do as opposed
to what they _could_ do. This made things hard to support because we
would prefer to build up a sandbox config by starting with something
extremely restrictive and only granting permissions for things the user
as explicitly allowed.

This PR changes things substantially by redefining the policy in terms
of two concepts:

* A `SandboxPermission` enum that defines permissions that can be
granted to the agent/sandbox.
* A `SandboxPolicy` that internally stores a `Vec<SandboxPermission>`,
but externally exposes a simpler API that can be used to configure
Seatbelt/Landlock.

Previous to this PR, we supported a `--sandbox` flag that effectively
mapped to an enum value in `SandboxPolicy`. Though now that
`SandboxPolicy` is a wrapper around `Vec<SandboxPermission>`, the single
`--sandbox` flag no longer makes sense. While I could have turned it
into a flag that the user can specify multiple times, I think the
current values to use with such a flag are long and potentially messy,
so for the moment, I have dropped support for `--sandbox` altogether and
we can bring it back once we have figured out the naming thing.

Since `--sandbox` is gone, users now have to specify `--full-auto` to
get a sandbox that allows writes in `cwd`. Admittedly, there is no clean
way to specify the equivalent of `--full-auto` in your `config.toml`
right now, so we will have to revisit that, as well.

Because `Config` presents a `SandboxPolicy` field and `SandboxPolicy`
changed considerably, I had to overhaul how config loading works, as
well. There are now two distinct concepts, `ConfigToml` and `Config`:

* `ConfigToml` is the deserialization of `~/.codex/config.toml`. As one
might expect, every field is `Optional` and it is `#[derive(Deserialize,
Default)]`. Consistent use of `Optional` makes it clear what the user
has specified explicitly.
* `Config` is the "normalized config" and is produced by merging
`ConfigToml` with `ConfigOverrides`. Where `ConfigToml` contains a raw
`Option<Vec<SandboxPermission>>`, `Config` presents only the final
`SandboxPolicy`.

The changes to `core/src/exec.rs` and `core/src/linux.rs` merit extra
special attention to ensure we are faithfully mapping the
`SandboxPolicy` to the Seatbelt and Landlock configs, respectively.

Also, take note that `core/src/seatbelt_readonly_policy.sbpl` has been
renamed to `codex-rs/core/src/seatbelt_base_policy.sbpl` and that
`(allow file-read*)` has been removed from the `.sbpl` file as now this
is added to the policy in `core/src/exec.rs` when
`sandbox_policy.has_full_disk_read_access()` is `true`.
2025-04-29 15:01:16 -07:00

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use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::path::Component;
use std::path::Path;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use codex_apply_patch::ApplyPatchFileChange;
use crate::exec::SandboxType;
use crate::is_safe_command::is_known_safe_command;
use crate::protocol::AskForApproval;
use crate::protocol::SandboxPolicy;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum SafetyCheck {
AutoApprove { sandbox_type: SandboxType },
AskUser,
Reject { reason: String },
}
pub fn assess_patch_safety(
changes: &HashMap<PathBuf, ApplyPatchFileChange>,
policy: AskForApproval,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
) -> SafetyCheck {
if changes.is_empty() {
return SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: "empty patch".to_string(),
};
}
match policy {
AskForApproval::OnFailure | AskForApproval::AutoEdit | AskForApproval::Never => {
// Continue to see if this can be auto-approved.
}
// TODO(ragona): I'm not sure this is actually correct? I believe in this case
// we want to continue to the writable paths check before asking the user.
AskForApproval::UnlessAllowListed => {
return SafetyCheck::AskUser;
}
}
if is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(changes, writable_roots) {
SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
sandbox_type: SandboxType::None,
}
} else if policy == AskForApproval::OnFailure {
// Only auto‑approve when we can actually enforce a sandbox. Otherwise
// fall back to asking the user because the patch may touch arbitrary
// paths outside the project.
match get_platform_sandbox() {
Some(sandbox_type) => SafetyCheck::AutoApprove { sandbox_type },
None => SafetyCheck::AskUser,
}
} else if policy == AskForApproval::Never {
SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: "writing outside of the project; rejected by user approval settings"
.to_string(),
}
} else {
SafetyCheck::AskUser
}
}
pub fn assess_command_safety(
command: &[String],
approval_policy: AskForApproval,
sandbox_policy: &SandboxPolicy,
approved: &HashSet<Vec<String>>,
) -> SafetyCheck {
let approve_without_sandbox = || SafetyCheck::AutoApprove {
sandbox_type: SandboxType::None,
};
// Previously approved or allow-listed commands
// All approval modes allow these commands to continue without sandboxing
if is_known_safe_command(command) || approved.contains(command) {
// TODO(ragona): I think we should consider running even these inside the sandbox, but it's
// a change in behavior so I'm keeping it at parity with upstream for now.
return approve_without_sandbox();
}
// Command was not known-safe or allow-listed
if sandbox_policy.is_unrestricted() {
approve_without_sandbox()
} else {
match get_platform_sandbox() {
// We have a sandbox, so we can approve the command in all modes
Some(sandbox_type) => SafetyCheck::AutoApprove { sandbox_type },
None => {
// We do not have a sandbox, so we need to consider the approval policy
match approval_policy {
// Never is our "non-interactive" mode; it must automatically reject
AskForApproval::Never => SafetyCheck::Reject {
reason: "auto-rejected by user approval settings".to_string(),
},
// Otherwise, we ask the user for approval
_ => SafetyCheck::AskUser,
}
}
}
}
}
pub fn get_platform_sandbox() -> Option<SandboxType> {
if cfg!(target_os = "macos") {
Some(SandboxType::MacosSeatbelt)
} else if cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
Some(SandboxType::LinuxSeccomp)
} else {
None
}
}
fn is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
changes: &HashMap<PathBuf, ApplyPatchFileChange>,
writable_roots: &[PathBuf],
) -> bool {
// Early‑exit if there are no declared writable roots.
if writable_roots.is_empty() {
return false;
}
// Normalize a path by removing `.` and resolving `..` without touching the
// filesystem (works even if the file does not exist).
fn normalize(path: &Path) -> Option<PathBuf> {
let mut out = PathBuf::new();
for comp in path.components() {
match comp {
Component::ParentDir => {
out.pop();
}
Component::CurDir => { /* skip */ }
other => out.push(other.as_os_str()),
}
}
Some(out)
}
// Determine whether `path` is inside **any** writable root. Both `path`
// and roots are converted to absolute, normalized forms before the
// prefix check.
let is_path_writable = |p: &PathBuf| {
let cwd = match std::env::current_dir() {
Ok(cwd) => cwd,
Err(_) => return false,
};
let abs = if p.is_absolute() {
p.clone()
} else {
cwd.join(p)
};
let abs = match normalize(&abs) {
Some(v) => v,
None => return false,
};
writable_roots.iter().any(|root| {
let root_abs = if root.is_absolute() {
root.clone()
} else {
normalize(&cwd.join(root)).unwrap_or_else(|| cwd.join(root))
};
abs.starts_with(&root_abs)
})
};
for (path, change) in changes {
match change {
ApplyPatchFileChange::Add { .. } | ApplyPatchFileChange::Delete => {
if !is_path_writable(path) {
return false;
}
}
ApplyPatchFileChange::Update { move_path, .. } => {
if !is_path_writable(path) {
return false;
}
if let Some(dest) = move_path {
if !is_path_writable(dest) {
return false;
}
}
}
}
}
true
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_writable_roots_constraint() {
let cwd = std::env::current_dir().unwrap();
let parent = cwd.parent().unwrap().to_path_buf();
// Helper to build a single‑entry map representing a patch that adds a
// file at `p`.
let make_add_change = |p: PathBuf| {
let mut m = HashMap::new();
m.insert(
p.clone(),
ApplyPatchFileChange::Add {
content: String::new(),
},
);
m
};
let add_inside = make_add_change(PathBuf::from("inner.txt"));
let add_outside = make_add_change(parent.join("outside.txt"));
assert!(is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_inside,
&[PathBuf::from(".")]
));
let add_outside_2 = make_add_change(parent.join("outside.txt"));
assert!(!is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_outside_2,
&[PathBuf::from(".")]
));
// With parent dir added as writable root, it should pass.
assert!(is_write_patch_constrained_to_writable_paths(
&add_outside,
&[PathBuf::from("..")]
))
}
}