Michael Bolin
6afcf26d5d
## Why `features.respect_system_proxy` already routes authentication traffic through the OS proxy APIs, but it does not affect the primary inference path. That leaves users behind OS-managed proxies unable to send normal Responses API requests even after login succeeds. This PR is the first product-path migration onto the route-aware transport introduced in #31323 and refined in #31331. It also establishes the construction pattern for later migrations: the effective feature state is resolved once into a required HTTP client factory rather than represented by an optional per-call setting. The scope remains limited to the two HTTP Responses endpoints; WebSockets, model discovery, memories, realtime, and file uploads remain follow-up migrations. ## What changed - Replace the optional proxy marker with an explicit `OutboundProxyPolicy::{ReqwestDefault, RespectSystemProxy}` and a required `HttpClientFactory`. The policy has no default, and the lower-level route-aware reqwest builder is now private. - Have `Config` construct the factory from the effective feature state and require every `ModelClient` constructor to receive it. There is no optional setter or implicit `None` fallback. - Build HTTP clients for `/responses` and `/responses/compact` with `ClientRouteClass::Api`, using the complete destination URL so PAC rules can make URL-specific decisions. - Layer route-aware selection onto Codex's existing default headers, Cloudflare cookie store, custom CA handling, and sandbox no-proxy behavior. - Add an integration test that loads `features.respect_system_proxy` through `config.toml`, creates a real Codex session, and verifies that both a normal Responses turn and remote compaction reach an isolated local proxy. ## Review guide 1. `http-client/src/outbound_proxy.rs` defines the mandatory policy/factory boundary and keeps route resolution private. 2. `core/src/config/mod.rs`, `core/src/session/session.rs`, and `core/src/client.rs` show the compile-time invariant: effective config creates the factory, and `ModelClient` cannot be constructed without one. 3. `login/src/auth/default_client.rs` preserves existing default-client behavior while accepting the required factory for migrated routes. 4. `core/src/client.rs` switches only streaming Responses and remote compaction HTTP transports to the API route class. 5. `core/tests/suite/responses_api_system_proxy.rs` is the behavioral regression boundary. Its Linux subprocess deliberately sets the CGI marker that disables reqwest's implicit environment-proxy handling, so the test fails if session wiring or either Responses call site falls back to the default client. ## Test plan - `cargo check --tests -p codex-http-client -p codex-login -p codex-core` - `just test -p codex-login` - `just test -p codex-core respect_system_proxy_feature_resolves_enabled` - Existing `compact_uses_bearer_after_agent_identity_session_fallback` coverage passes with the new transport construction. - New Linux integration coverage: `responses_and_compact_use_enabled_system_proxy` - `just bazel-lock-check` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/31335). * #31342 * __->__ #31335
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.
Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:
skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.