Eric Traut ff770113ca Restrict MCP HTTP redirects to the configured origin (#39046) ...

## Why

MCP requests can contain sensitive headers and tool-call bodies. Following a
cross-origin redirect could disclose them to another server.

## What changed

- Follow redirects only when every hop remains on the configured server's
  origin, and require HTTPS for redirects on non-loopback hostnames.
- Preserve standard redirect method and body handling while sharing the
  original timeout and enforcing a 10-hop limit.
- Avoid replaying plaintext proxy credentials across redirects, while leaving
  OAuth requests that stop at redirects unchanged.

## Testing

Add coverage for same-origin and cross-origin redirects, redirect methods,
headers and bodies, proxy credentials, timeouts, hop limits, and legacy MCP
tool calls.

GitOrigin-RevId: 3e267911a1665ad8c2fc63825099a758770f4d68

2026-08-17 18:46:12 +00:00

..

src

Restrict MCP HTTP redirects to the configured origin (#39046)

2026-08-17 18:46:12 +00:00

tests

Restrict MCP HTTP redirects to the configured origin (#39046)

2026-08-17 18:46:12 +00:00

BUILD.bazel

[3/4] Add executor-backed RMCP HTTP client (#18583)

2026-04-22 17:38:04 -07:00

Cargo.toml

Propagate custom CA settings to local MCP servers (#38040)

2026-08-11 17:24:04 +00:00