mirror of
https://github.com/openai/codex.git
synced 2026-10-28 18:58:46 +00:00
Michael Bolin
9025550709
## Why The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally; exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand details that should remain implementation-level. The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type space and the core protocol model. Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so we don't need to be too finicky about these changes. ## What Changed - Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface, including generated schema and TypeScript exports. - Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to `ActivePermissionProfile`. - Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics. - Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims.
94 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
94 lines
3.6 KiB
Rust
//! Compatibility projections from the canonical permission profile model into
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//! legacy shapes still required by older or remote app-server APIs.
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use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
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use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
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use std::path::Path;
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pub(crate) fn legacy_compatible_permission_profile(
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permission_profile: &PermissionProfile,
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cwd: &Path,
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) -> PermissionProfile {
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if permission_profile.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd).is_ok() {
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return permission_profile.clone();
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}
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let file_system_policy = permission_profile.file_system_sandbox_policy();
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let network_policy = permission_profile.network_sandbox_policy();
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let cwd_abs = AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(cwd).ok();
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let writable_roots = file_system_policy
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.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd)
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.into_iter()
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.map(|root| root.root)
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.filter(|root| cwd_abs.as_ref() != Some(root))
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.collect::<Vec<_>>();
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let tmpdir_writable = std::env::var_os("TMPDIR")
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.filter(|tmpdir| !tmpdir.is_empty())
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.and_then(|tmpdir| {
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AbsolutePathBuf::from_absolute_path(std::path::PathBuf::from(tmpdir)).ok()
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})
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.is_some_and(|tmpdir| file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(tmpdir.as_path(), cwd));
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let slash_tmp = Path::new("/tmp");
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let slash_tmp_writable = slash_tmp.is_absolute()
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&& slash_tmp.is_dir()
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&& file_system_policy.can_write_path_with_cwd(slash_tmp, cwd);
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PermissionProfile::workspace_write_with(
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&writable_roots,
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network_policy,
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!tmpdir_writable,
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!slash_tmp_writable,
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)
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use codex_protocol::models::ManagedFileSystemPermissions;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemAccessMode;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSandboxEntry;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::FileSystemSpecialPath;
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use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
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use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
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#[test]
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fn compatibility_profile_preserves_unbridgeable_write_roots() {
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let cwd = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from("/workspace/project").expect("absolute cwd");
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let extra_root = AbsolutePathBuf::try_from("/workspace/extra").expect("absolute root");
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let permission_profile: PermissionProfile = PermissionProfile::Managed {
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network: NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted,
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file_system: ManagedFileSystemPermissions::Restricted {
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entries: vec![
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Special {
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value: FileSystemSpecialPath::Root,
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Read,
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},
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FileSystemSandboxEntry {
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path: FileSystemPath::Path {
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path: extra_root.clone(),
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},
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access: FileSystemAccessMode::Write,
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},
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],
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glob_scan_max_depth: None,
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},
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};
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let compatibility_profile =
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legacy_compatible_permission_profile(&permission_profile, cwd.as_path());
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let policy = compatibility_profile
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.to_legacy_sandbox_policy(cwd.as_path())
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.expect("compatibility profile should project to legacy policy");
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let roots = policy
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.get_writable_roots_with_cwd(cwd.as_path())
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.into_iter()
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.map(|root| root.root)
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.collect::<Vec<_>>();
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assert_eq!(roots, vec![extra_root, cwd]);
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}
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}
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