Files
codex/codex-rs/network-proxy/src/socks5.rs
T
1013295c2d fix: attribut network requests to the exact exec on linux (#29697)
## Why

Managed-network commands within one Codex conversation share the same
HTTP and SOCKS proxy ingress. When several exec calls run concurrently,
the proxy sees the requested destination but cannot tell which exec
opened the connection.

For example:

```text
exec A: curl https://example.com/a ─┐
                                    ├─> conversation proxy ─> Guardian
exec B: curl https://example.com/b ─┘                        host: example.com
                                                               trigger: unknown
```. Three parallel network execs reached Guardian without their
triggering call IDs or commands. Guardian denied the requests, but Codex
could not safely associate those outcomes with the individual tool
calls.

## What changes

Keep the shared proxy ingress and tag each connection at the existing
trusted Linux bridge:

```text
exec A ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token A][proxy bytes] ─┐
                                                           ├─> shared HTTP/SOCKS ingress
exec B ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token B][proxy bytes] ─┘
                                                                    │
                                              token A ─> exec A ─────┤
                                              token B ─> exec B ─────┘
```

The complete path is:

```text
active exec registration
        │
        ├─ registers its UUID as a short-lived attribution token
        ├─ passes the token to the Linux sandbox helper
        ├─ helper removes the token before launching the user command
        ├─ existing host bridge prepends the token to each proxy connection
        ├─ shared proxy consumes the bounded attribution frame
        └─ proxy attaches the matching execution-scoped state
                ├─ Guardian receives the exact call ID and command
                └─ a denial finishes/cancels the matching tool call
```

Dropping the active or deferred exec registration removes the token.
Connections that were already accepted retain their resolved
attribution; new connections using an expired token fail closed.

## Before and after

Before, Guardian could receive only the network destination:

```json
{
  "tool": "network_access",
  "host": "www.17track.net",
  "port": 443,
  "protocol": "https"
}
```

After, the same request includes the action that caused it:

```json
{
  "tool": "network_access",
  "host": "www.17track.net",
  "port": 443,
  "protocol": "https",
  "trigger": {
    "callId": "exec-network-first",
    "command": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "curl https://www.17track.net"]
  }
}
```

## Listener accounting

This PR does **not** create proxy listeners per exec.

```text
Existing topology:
  one conversation -> one HTTP listener + optional one SOCKS listener

Discarded per-exec approach:
  one conversation -> existing listener pair
                   + up to one additional listener pair per active exec

This PR:
  one conversation -> existing listener pair only
                   + one small token-map entry per active exec
```

The Linux sandbox already creates a trusted routing bridge for each
sandboxed command. This PR adds a short frame write to that bridge
rather than introducing another listener, task, or proxy process.

The existing conversation-scoped listener pair remains. Making a single
proxy service shared across multiple conversations would be a separate
multi-tenant architecture change involving per-conversation policy,
configuration, audit, and Guardian routing.

## Keeping the implementation small

The attribution is bound once, when the TCP connection enters the proxy.
The ingress installs an execution-scoped clone of the existing
`NetworkProxyState`, so the established HTTP, SOCKS, MITM, policy,
audit, and blocked-request paths continue using their existing state
lookup.

This avoids plumbing a new request-context type through every protocol
handler. Outside the two ingress wrappers, protocol-specific request
handling is unchanged.

## Security behavior

- Tokens are generated from the existing random execution registration
IDs.
- The trusted Linux helper consumes and removes the token before
executing user code.
- Attribution frames have a fixed magic prefix, bounded token length,
and bounded read timeout.
- Unknown or expired tokens close the connection.
- A token presented to a proxy for another environment closes the
connection.
- Existing unframed callers preserve the current conservative
attribution behavior.

## Platform scope

Exact bridge attribution is enabled on Linux. macOS and Windows retain
their current shared-proxy behavior.

## Test coverage

The concurrent end-to-end test starts two managed-network execs together
and synchronizes them so both are active before either connects. It then
inspects the two Guardian requests and compares the complete attribution
pairs:

```text
(exec-network-first,  exact first command)
(exec-network-second, exact second command)
```

Focused proxy coverage verifies the bounded frame and that a registered
framed connection receives the matching execution and environment state.

## Scope

This fixes the Linux network-to-exec attribution path and records a
denial against the exact matching tool call. It intentionally does not
change:

- delivery of an entirely unattributed denial to the parent turn;
- how parallel denials count toward the Guardian circuit breaker;
- how the UI displays the rejection reason or completed-turn state.

Those remain separate concerns from attribution.

## Relationship to #29456 and #29668

#29456 made the proxy environment and sandbox policy come from the same
prepared network context. This PR adds the execution token to that
prepared launch and consumes it at the shared ingress.

This follows #29668's shared-ingress framing direction, but completes
the production registration, Linux bridge, core call mapping, denial
mapping, and concurrent end-to-end path. It also keeps attribution in
the existing per-connection proxy state instead of introducing
request-context plumbing through every HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM handler.
This PR is intended to supersede #29668 for the Linux attribution fix.

---------

Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-07-06 14:51:34 -07:00

1159 lines
42 KiB
Rust

use crate::attribution::BindConnectionAttribution;
use crate::config::NetworkMode;
use crate::connect_policy::TargetCheckedTcpConnector;
use crate::mitm;
use crate::network_policy::BlockDecisionAuditEventArgs;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkDecision;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkDecisionSource;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkPolicyDecider;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkPolicyDecision;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkPolicyRequest;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkPolicyRequestArgs;
use crate::network_policy::NetworkProtocol;
use crate::network_policy::emit_block_decision_audit_event;
use crate::network_policy::evaluate_host_policy;
use crate::policy::normalize_host;
use crate::reasons::REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED;
use crate::reasons::REASON_MITM_REQUIRED;
use crate::reasons::REASON_PROXY_DISABLED;
use crate::responses::PolicyDecisionDetails;
use crate::responses::blocked_message_with_policy;
use crate::runtime::HostMitmRequirement;
use crate::state::BlockedRequest;
use crate::state::BlockedRequestArgs;
use crate::state::NetworkProxyState;
use anyhow::Context as _;
use anyhow::Result;
use rama_core::Service;
use rama_core::error::BoxError;
use rama_core::extensions::Extensions;
use rama_core::extensions::ExtensionsMut;
use rama_core::extensions::ExtensionsRef;
use rama_core::service::service_fn;
use rama_net::address::HostWithPort;
use rama_net::client::EstablishedClientConnection;
use rama_net::proxy::ProxyRequest;
use rama_net::proxy::ProxyTarget;
use rama_net::proxy::StreamForwardService;
use rama_net::stream::Socket;
use rama_net::stream::SocketInfo;
use rama_socks5::Socks5Acceptor;
use rama_socks5::server::DefaultConnector;
use rama_socks5::server::DefaultUdpRelay;
use rama_socks5::server::udp::RelayRequest;
use rama_socks5::server::udp::RelayResponse;
use rama_tcp::TcpStream;
use rama_tcp::client::Request as TcpRequest;
use rama_tcp::server::TcpListener;
use std::io;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
use std::net::TcpListener as StdTcpListener;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::task::Context as TaskContext;
use std::task::Poll;
use std::time::Instant;
use tokio::io::AsyncRead;
use tokio::io::AsyncWrite;
use tokio::io::ReadBuf;
use tracing::error;
use tracing::info;
use tracing::warn;
pub async fn run_socks5(
state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
addr: SocketAddr,
policy_decider: Option<Arc<dyn NetworkPolicyDecider>>,
environment_id: Option<String>,
enable_socks5_udp: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let listener = TcpListener::build()
.bind(addr)
.await
// See `http_proxy.rs` for details on why we wrap `BoxError` before converting to anyhow.
.map_err(rama_core::error::OpaqueError::from)
.map_err(anyhow::Error::from)
.with_context(|| format!("bind SOCKS5 proxy: {addr}"))?;
run_socks5_with_listener(
state,
listener,
policy_decider,
environment_id,
enable_socks5_udp,
)
.await
}
pub async fn run_socks5_with_std_listener(
state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
listener: StdTcpListener,
policy_decider: Option<Arc<dyn NetworkPolicyDecider>>,
environment_id: Option<String>,
enable_socks5_udp: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let listener =
TcpListener::try_from(listener).context("convert std listener to SOCKS5 proxy listener")?;
run_socks5_with_listener(
state,
listener,
policy_decider,
environment_id,
enable_socks5_udp,
)
.await
}
async fn run_socks5_with_listener(
state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
listener: TcpListener,
policy_decider: Option<Arc<dyn NetworkPolicyDecider>>,
environment_id: Option<String>,
enable_socks5_udp: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
let addr = listener
.local_addr()
.context("read SOCKS5 listener local addr")?;
info!("SOCKS5 proxy listening on {addr}");
match state.network_mode().await {
Ok(NetworkMode::Limited) => {
info!(
"SOCKS5 UDP and non-HTTPS SOCKS5 TCP are blocked in limited mode; HTTPS SOCKS5 TCP requires MITM inspection"
);
}
Ok(NetworkMode::Full) => {}
Err(err) => {
warn!("failed to read network mode: {err}");
}
}
let tcp_connector = TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state.clone());
let policy_tcp_connector = service_fn({
let policy_decider = policy_decider.clone();
let environment_id = environment_id.clone();
move |req: TcpRequest| {
let tcp_connector = tcp_connector.clone();
let policy_decider = policy_decider.clone();
let environment_id = environment_id.clone();
async move { handle_socks5_tcp(req, tcp_connector, policy_decider, environment_id).await }
}
});
let socks_proxy = service_fn(|request| async move { proxy_socks5_tcp(request).await });
let socks_connector = DefaultConnector::default()
.with_connector(policy_tcp_connector)
.with_service(socks_proxy);
let base = Socks5Acceptor::new().with_connector(socks_connector);
if enable_socks5_udp {
let udp_state = state.clone();
let udp_decider = policy_decider.clone();
let udp_relay =
DefaultUdpRelay::default().with_async_inspector(service_fn({
let environment_id = environment_id.clone();
move |request: RelayRequest| {
let udp_state = udp_state.clone();
let udp_decider = udp_decider.clone();
let environment_id = environment_id.clone();
async move {
inspect_socks5_udp(request, udp_state, udp_decider, environment_id).await
}
}
}));
let socks_acceptor = base.with_udp_associator(udp_relay);
listener
.serve(BindConnectionAttribution::new(
socks_acceptor,
state,
environment_id,
))
.await;
} else {
listener
.serve(BindConnectionAttribution::new(base, state, environment_id))
.await;
}
Ok(())
}
async fn handle_socks5_tcp(
req: TcpRequest,
tcp_connector: TargetCheckedTcpConnector,
policy_decider: Option<Arc<dyn NetworkPolicyDecider>>,
environment_id: Option<String>,
) -> Result<EstablishedClientConnection<Socks5TcpConnection, TcpRequest>, BoxError> {
let app_state = req
.extensions()
.get::<Arc<NetworkProxyState>>()
.cloned()
.ok_or_else(|| io::Error::other("missing state"))?;
let host = normalize_host(&req.authority.host.to_string());
let port = req.authority.port;
let target = req.authority.clone();
if host.is_empty() {
return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "invalid host").into());
}
let client = req
.extensions()
.get::<SocketInfo>()
.map(|info| info.peer_addr().to_string());
match app_state.enabled().await {
Ok(true) => {}
Ok(false) => {
emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
&app_state,
NetworkDecisionSource::ProxyState,
REASON_PROXY_DISABLED,
NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host.as_str(),
port,
client.as_deref(),
);
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision: NetworkPolicyDecision::Deny,
reason: REASON_PROXY_DISABLED,
source: NetworkDecisionSource::ProxyState,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = app_state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: REASON_PROXY_DISABLED.to_string(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: None,
protocol: "socks5".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!("SOCKS blocked; proxy disabled (client={client}, host={host})");
return Err(policy_denied_error(REASON_PROXY_DISABLED, &details).into());
}
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to read enabled state: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error").into());
}
}
let mode = match app_state.network_mode().await {
Ok(mode) => mode,
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to evaluate method policy: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error").into());
}
};
// SOCKS5 only exposes host and port, so only the default HTTPS port is identifiable as a
// TLS stream that the HTTPS MITM path can safely terminate.
let socks5_tcp_target_is_https = port == 443;
if mode == NetworkMode::Limited && !socks5_tcp_target_is_https {
emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
&app_state,
NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED,
NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host.as_str(),
port,
client.as_deref(),
);
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision: NetworkPolicyDecision::Deny,
reason: REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED,
source: NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = app_state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED.to_string(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: Some(NetworkMode::Limited),
protocol: "socks5".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!(
"SOCKS blocked; limited mode only supports HTTPS MITM (client={client}, host={host}, port={port})"
);
return Err(policy_denied_error(REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED, &details).into());
}
let request = NetworkPolicyRequest::new(NetworkPolicyRequestArgs {
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host: host.clone(),
port,
environment_id,
client_addr: client.clone(),
method: None,
command: None,
exec_policy_hint: None,
});
match evaluate_host_policy(&app_state, policy_decider.as_ref(), &request).await {
Ok(NetworkDecision::Deny {
reason,
source,
decision,
}) => {
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision,
reason: &reason,
source,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = app_state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: reason.clone(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: None,
protocol: "socks5".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!("SOCKS blocked (client={client}, host={host}, reason={reason})");
return Err(policy_denied_error(&reason, &details).into());
}
Ok(NetworkDecision::Allow) => {
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
info!("SOCKS allowed (client={client}, host={host}, port={port})");
}
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to evaluate host: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error").into());
}
}
let host_mitm_requirement = match app_state.host_mitm_requirement(&host).await {
Ok(requirement) => requirement,
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to inspect MITM requirements for {host}: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error").into());
}
};
let mitm_state = match app_state.mitm_state().await {
Ok(state) => state,
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to load MITM state: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error").into());
}
};
let socks_mitm_mode = if mode == NetworkMode::Limited {
SocksMitmMode::Enabled
} else {
match host_mitm_requirement {
HostMitmRequirement::None => SocksMitmMode::Disabled,
HostMitmRequirement::Tls => SocksMitmMode::DetectTls,
HostMitmRequirement::Always => SocksMitmMode::Enabled,
}
};
let unsupported_hook_protocol =
host_mitm_requirement == HostMitmRequirement::Always && !socks5_tcp_target_is_https;
if unsupported_hook_protocol
|| (socks_mitm_mode != SocksMitmMode::Disabled && mitm_state.is_none())
{
emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
&app_state,
NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
REASON_MITM_REQUIRED,
NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host.as_str(),
port,
client.as_deref(),
);
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision: NetworkPolicyDecision::Deny,
reason: REASON_MITM_REQUIRED,
source: NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Tcp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = app_state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: REASON_MITM_REQUIRED.to_string(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: Some(mode),
protocol: "socks5".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!(
"SOCKS blocked; MITM required to enforce HTTPS policy (client={client}, host={host}, mode={mode:?}, host_mitm_requirement={host_mitm_requirement:?}, https_target={socks5_tcp_target_is_https})"
);
return Err(policy_denied_error(REASON_MITM_REQUIRED, &details).into());
}
if let Some(mitm_state) = mitm_state {
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
let conn = match socks_mitm_mode {
SocksMitmMode::Disabled => None,
SocksMitmMode::Enabled => Some(Socks5TcpConnection::Mitm {
target,
mode,
mitm: mitm_state,
extensions: Extensions::new(),
}),
SocksMitmMode::DetectTls => Some(Socks5TcpConnection::DetectTls {
target,
mode,
mitm: mitm_state,
state: app_state,
extensions: Extensions::new(),
}),
};
if let Some(conn) = conn {
info!(
"SOCKS MITM selected (client={client}, host={host}, port={port}, mode={mode:?}, mitm_mode={socks_mitm_mode:?})"
);
return Ok(EstablishedClientConnection { input: req, conn });
}
}
info!("SOCKS upstream dial started (host={host}, port={port})");
let connect_started_at = Instant::now();
let result = tcp_connector.serve(req).await.map(|connection| {
let EstablishedClientConnection { input, conn } = connection;
EstablishedClientConnection {
input,
conn: Socks5TcpConnection::Direct(conn),
}
});
match &result {
Ok(_) => info!(
"SOCKS upstream dial established (host={host}, port={port}, elapsed_ms={})",
connect_started_at.elapsed().as_millis()
),
Err(_) => warn!(
"SOCKS upstream dial failed (host={host}, port={port}, elapsed_ms={})",
connect_started_at.elapsed().as_millis()
),
}
result
}
/// Internal connector output for SOCKS5 TCP. MITM requests do not dial upstream before the
/// inner HTTPS request is inspected, so they carry the target metadata instead of a socket.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum SocksMitmMode {
Disabled,
Enabled,
DetectTls,
}
#[derive(Debug)]
enum Socks5TcpConnection {
Direct(TcpStream),
Mitm {
target: HostWithPort,
mode: NetworkMode,
mitm: Arc<mitm::MitmState>,
extensions: Extensions,
},
DetectTls {
target: HostWithPort,
mode: NetworkMode,
mitm: Arc<mitm::MitmState>,
state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
extensions: Extensions,
},
}
impl AsyncRead for Socks5TcpConnection {
fn poll_read(
self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>,
buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>,
) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
match self.get_mut() {
Self::Direct(stream) => Pin::new(stream).poll_read(cx, buf),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
}
}
}
impl AsyncWrite for Socks5TcpConnection {
fn poll_write(
self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>,
buf: &[u8],
) -> Poll<io::Result<usize>> {
match self.get_mut() {
Self::Direct(stream) => Pin::new(stream).poll_write(cx, buf),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Poll::Ready(Ok(buf.len())),
}
}
fn poll_flush(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
match self.get_mut() {
Self::Direct(stream) => Pin::new(stream).poll_flush(cx),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
}
}
fn poll_shutdown(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
match self.get_mut() {
Self::Direct(stream) => Pin::new(stream).poll_shutdown(cx),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
}
}
}
impl Socket for Socks5TcpConnection {
fn local_addr(&self) -> io::Result<SocketAddr> {
match self {
Self::Direct(stream) => stream.local_addr(),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Ok(SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], 0))),
}
}
fn peer_addr(&self) -> io::Result<SocketAddr> {
match self {
Self::Direct(stream) => stream.peer_addr(),
Self::Mitm { .. } | Self::DetectTls { .. } => Ok(SocketAddr::from(([0, 0, 0, 0], 0))),
}
}
}
impl ExtensionsRef for Socks5TcpConnection {
fn extensions(&self) -> &Extensions {
match self {
Self::Direct(stream) => stream.extensions(),
Self::Mitm { extensions, .. } | Self::DetectTls { extensions, .. } => extensions,
}
}
}
impl ExtensionsMut for Socks5TcpConnection {
fn extensions_mut(&mut self) -> &mut Extensions {
match self {
Self::Direct(stream) => stream.extensions_mut(),
Self::Mitm { extensions, .. } | Self::DetectTls { extensions, .. } => extensions,
}
}
}
async fn proxy_socks5_tcp(
request: ProxyRequest<TcpStream, Socks5TcpConnection>,
) -> Result<(), BoxError> {
let ProxyRequest { mut source, target } = request;
match target {
Socks5TcpConnection::Direct(target) => StreamForwardService::default()
.serve(ProxyRequest { source, target })
.await
.map_err(Into::into),
Socks5TcpConnection::Mitm {
target, mode, mitm, ..
} => {
source.extensions_mut().insert(ProxyTarget(target));
source.extensions_mut().insert(mode);
source.extensions_mut().insert(mitm);
mitm::mitm_stream(source).await.map_err(Into::into)
}
Socks5TcpConnection::DetectTls {
target,
mode,
mitm,
state,
..
} => {
source.extensions_mut().insert(ProxyTarget(target.clone()));
source.extensions_mut().insert(mode);
source.extensions_mut().insert(mitm);
let (is_tls, source) = mitm::peek_tls_prefix(source)
.await
.map_err(|err| -> BoxError { err.into() })?;
if is_tls {
mitm::mitm_stream(source).await.map_err(Into::into)
} else {
info!("SOCKS opaque upstream dial started (target={target})");
let connect_started_at = Instant::now();
let EstablishedClientConnection { conn: upstream, .. } =
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state)
.serve(TcpRequest::new(target.clone()))
.await?;
info!(
"SOCKS opaque upstream dial established (target={target}, elapsed_ms={})",
connect_started_at.elapsed().as_millis()
);
StreamForwardService::default()
.serve(ProxyRequest {
source,
target: upstream,
})
.await
.map_err(Into::into)
}
}
}
}
async fn inspect_socks5_udp(
request: RelayRequest,
state: Arc<NetworkProxyState>,
policy_decider: Option<Arc<dyn NetworkPolicyDecider>>,
environment_id: Option<String>,
) -> io::Result<RelayResponse> {
let RelayRequest {
server_address,
payload,
extensions,
..
} = request;
let host = normalize_host(&server_address.ip_addr.to_string());
let port = server_address.port;
if host.is_empty() {
return Err(io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::InvalidInput, "invalid host"));
}
let client = extensions
.get::<SocketInfo>()
.map(|info| info.peer_addr().to_string());
match state.enabled().await {
Ok(true) => {}
Ok(false) => {
emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
&state,
NetworkDecisionSource::ProxyState,
REASON_PROXY_DISABLED,
NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host.as_str(),
port,
client.as_deref(),
);
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision: NetworkPolicyDecision::Deny,
reason: REASON_PROXY_DISABLED,
source: NetworkDecisionSource::ProxyState,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: REASON_PROXY_DISABLED.to_string(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: None,
protocol: "socks5-udp".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!("SOCKS UDP blocked; proxy disabled (client={client}, host={host})");
return Err(policy_denied_error(REASON_PROXY_DISABLED, &details));
}
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to read enabled state: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error"));
}
}
match state.network_mode().await {
Ok(NetworkMode::Limited) => {
emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
&state,
NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED,
NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host.as_str(),
port,
client.as_deref(),
);
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision: NetworkPolicyDecision::Deny,
reason: REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED,
source: NetworkDecisionSource::ModeGuard,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED.to_string(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: Some(NetworkMode::Limited),
protocol: "socks5-udp".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
return Err(policy_denied_error(REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED, &details));
}
Ok(NetworkMode::Full) => {}
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to evaluate method policy: {err}");
return Err(io::Error::other("proxy error"));
}
}
let request = NetworkPolicyRequest::new(NetworkPolicyRequestArgs {
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host: host.clone(),
port,
environment_id,
client_addr: client.clone(),
method: None,
command: None,
exec_policy_hint: None,
});
match evaluate_host_policy(&state, policy_decider.as_ref(), &request).await {
Ok(NetworkDecision::Deny {
reason,
source,
decision,
}) => {
let details = PolicyDecisionDetails {
decision,
reason: &reason,
source,
protocol: NetworkProtocol::Socks5Udp,
host: &host,
port,
};
let _ = state
.record_blocked(BlockedRequest::new(BlockedRequestArgs {
host: host.clone(),
reason: reason.clone(),
client: client.clone(),
method: None,
mode: None,
protocol: "socks5-udp".to_string(),
decision: Some(details.decision.as_str().to_string()),
source: Some(details.source.as_str().to_string()),
port: Some(port),
}))
.await;
let client = client.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
warn!("SOCKS UDP blocked (client={client}, host={host}, reason={reason})");
Err(policy_denied_error(&reason, &details))
}
Ok(NetworkDecision::Allow) => Ok(RelayResponse {
maybe_payload: Some(payload),
extensions,
}),
Err(err) => {
error!("failed to evaluate UDP host: {err}");
Err(io::Error::other("proxy error"))
}
}
}
fn emit_socks_block_decision_audit_event(
state: &NetworkProxyState,
source: NetworkDecisionSource,
reason: &str,
protocol: NetworkProtocol,
host: &str,
port: u16,
client_addr: Option<&str>,
) {
emit_block_decision_audit_event(
state,
BlockDecisionAuditEventArgs {
source,
reason,
protocol,
server_address: host,
server_port: port,
method: None,
client_addr,
},
);
}
fn policy_denied_error(reason: &str, details: &PolicyDecisionDetails<'_>) -> io::Error {
io::Error::new(
io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied,
blocked_message_with_policy(reason, details),
)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::NetworkMode;
use crate::config::NetworkProxyConfig;
use crate::config::NetworkProxySettings;
use crate::mitm_hook::MitmHookConfig;
use crate::mitm_hook::MitmHookMatchConfig;
use crate::network_policy::test_support::POLICY_DECISION_EVENT_NAME;
use crate::network_policy::test_support::capture_events;
use crate::network_policy::test_support::find_event_by_name;
use crate::runtime::ConfigReloader;
use crate::runtime::ConfigReloaderFuture;
use crate::runtime::ConfigState;
use crate::state::NetworkProxyConstraints;
use crate::state::build_config_state;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use rama_core::extensions::Extensions;
use rama_core::extensions::ExtensionsMut;
use rama_net::address::HostWithPort;
use rama_net::address::SocketAddress;
use rama_socks5::server::udp::RelayDirection;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::Mutex;
// Managed MITM CA files live under the shared test CODEX_HOME, so MITM-enabled config state
// must be materialized one test at a time.
static MITM_CONFIG_STATE_LOCK: Mutex<()> = Mutex::new(());
#[derive(Clone)]
struct StaticReloader {
state: ConfigState,
}
impl ConfigReloader for StaticReloader {
fn maybe_reload(&self) -> ConfigReloaderFuture<'_, Option<ConfigState>> {
Box::pin(async { Ok(None) })
}
fn reload_now(&self) -> ConfigReloaderFuture<'_, ConfigState> {
Box::pin(async { Ok(self.state.clone()) })
}
fn source_label(&self) -> String {
"static test reloader".to_string()
}
}
fn state_for_settings(network: NetworkProxySettings) -> Arc<NetworkProxyState> {
let config = NetworkProxyConfig { network };
let _mitm_config_state_guard = config
.network
.mitm
.then(|| MITM_CONFIG_STATE_LOCK.lock().unwrap());
let state = build_config_state(config, NetworkProxyConstraints::default()).unwrap();
let reloader = Arc::new(StaticReloader {
state: state.clone(),
});
Arc::new(NetworkProxyState::with_reloader(state, reloader))
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_emits_block_decision_for_proxy_disabled() {
let state = state_for_settings(NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: false,
mode: NetworkMode::Full,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
});
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("example.com:443").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let (result, events) = capture_events(|| async {
handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state.clone()),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
})
.await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "proxy-disabled request should be denied");
let event = find_event_by_name(&events, POLICY_DECISION_EVENT_NAME)
.expect("expected policy decision event");
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.scope"), Some("non_domain"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.decision"), Some("deny"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.source"), Some("proxy_state"));
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.policy.reason"),
Some(REASON_PROXY_DISABLED)
);
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.transport.protocol"),
Some("socks5_tcp")
);
assert_eq!(event.field("server.address"), Some("example.com"));
assert_eq!(event.field("server.port"), Some("443"));
assert_eq!(event.field("http.request.method"), Some("none"));
assert_eq!(event.field("client.address"), Some("unknown"));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_uses_mitm_in_limited_mode() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Limited,
mitm: true,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("example.com:443").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let result = handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
.expect("limited-mode HTTPS should use MITM");
assert!(matches!(result.conn, Socks5TcpConnection::Mitm { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_blocks_non_https_in_limited_mode() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Limited,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("example.com:80").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let (result, events) = capture_events(|| async {
handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
})
.await;
assert!(
result.is_err(),
"limited-mode non-HTTPS SOCKS should be denied"
);
let event = find_event_by_name(&events, POLICY_DECISION_EVENT_NAME)
.expect("expected policy decision event");
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.scope"), Some("non_domain"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.decision"), Some("deny"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.source"), Some("mode_guard"));
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.policy.reason"),
Some(REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.transport.protocol"),
Some("socks5_tcp")
);
assert_eq!(event.field("server.address"), Some("example.com"));
assert_eq!(event.field("server.port"), Some("80"));
assert_eq!(event.field("http.request.method"), Some("none"));
assert_eq!(event.field("client.address"), Some("unknown"));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_detects_tls_for_brokered_nonstandard_port_in_full_mode() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Full,
mitm: true,
credential_broker: true,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["api.openai.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut env = HashMap::from([("OPENAI_API_KEY".to_string(), "sk-real".to_string())]);
state.virtualize_child_credentials(&mut env);
let mut request = TcpRequest::new(
HostWithPort::try_from("api.openai.com:8443").expect("valid authority"),
);
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let result = handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
.expect("brokered TLS should defer MITM until protocol detection");
assert!(matches!(result.conn, Socks5TcpConnection::DetectTls { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_blocks_limited_mode_without_mitm_state() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Limited,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["example.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("example.com:443").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let err = handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
.expect_err("limited-mode HTTPS requires MITM");
assert!(
format!("{err:?}").contains("MITM required"),
"unexpected error: {err:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_uses_mitm_for_hooked_host_in_full_mode() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Full,
mitm: true,
mitm_hooks: vec![MitmHookConfig {
host: "api.github.com".to_string(),
matcher: MitmHookMatchConfig {
methods: vec!["POST".to_string()],
path_prefixes: vec!["/repos/openai/".to_string()],
..MitmHookMatchConfig::default()
},
..MitmHookConfig::default()
}],
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["api.github.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("api.github.com:443").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let result = handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
.expect("hooked HTTPS should use MITM");
assert!(matches!(result.conn, Socks5TcpConnection::Mitm { .. }));
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn handle_socks5_tcp_blocks_hooked_non_https_host_in_full_mode() {
let mut settings = NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Full,
mitm: true,
mitm_hooks: vec![MitmHookConfig {
host: "api.github.com".to_string(),
matcher: MitmHookMatchConfig {
methods: vec!["POST".to_string()],
path_prefixes: vec!["/repos/openai/".to_string()],
..MitmHookMatchConfig::default()
},
..MitmHookConfig::default()
}],
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
};
settings.set_allowed_domains(vec!["api.github.com".to_string()]);
let state = state_for_settings(settings);
let mut request =
TcpRequest::new(HostWithPort::try_from("api.github.com:80").expect("valid authority"));
request.extensions_mut().insert(state.clone());
let err = handle_socks5_tcp(
request,
TargetCheckedTcpConnector::new(state),
/*policy_decider*/ None,
/*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
.expect_err("hooked non-HTTPS SOCKS should require MITM");
assert!(
format!("{err:?}").contains("MITM required"),
"unexpected error: {err:?}"
);
}
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn inspect_socks5_udp_emits_block_decision_for_mode_guard_deny() {
let state = state_for_settings(NetworkProxySettings {
enabled: true,
mode: NetworkMode::Limited,
..NetworkProxySettings::default()
});
let request = RelayRequest {
direction: RelayDirection::South,
server_address: SocketAddress::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)), 53),
payload: Default::default(),
extensions: Extensions::new(),
};
let (result, events) = capture_events(|| async {
inspect_socks5_udp(
request, state, /*policy_decider*/ None, /*environment_id*/ None,
)
.await
})
.await;
assert!(result.is_err(), "limited-mode UDP request should be denied");
let event = find_event_by_name(&events, POLICY_DECISION_EVENT_NAME)
.expect("expected policy decision event");
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.scope"), Some("non_domain"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.decision"), Some("deny"));
assert_eq!(event.field("network.policy.source"), Some("mode_guard"));
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.policy.reason"),
Some(REASON_METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED)
);
assert_eq!(
event.field("network.transport.protocol"),
Some("socks5_udp")
);
assert_eq!(event.field("server.address"), Some("93.184.216.34"));
assert_eq!(event.field("server.port"), Some("53"));
assert_eq!(event.field("http.request.method"), Some("none"));
assert_eq!(event.field("client.address"), Some("unknown"));
}
}