Files
codex/codex-rs/core
jif 0b248182be Respect app-server turn admission for agent mailbox wakes (#62537)
## Why

Automatic mailbox wakes can start new turns while the app-server is
draining or has paused turn admission. Native child results still need
to reach the parent during drain so they can survive a daemon restart.

## What changed

- Require a turn admission permit for ordinary automatic mailbox wakes
  and hold it through turn registration. Retry queued work when a
  temporary pause ends. Explicit follow-ups and native child results can
  still wake the parent during drain.
- Let `thread/inject_items` queue plain-text agent messages for native
  child threads when native tools are enabled. Injected mail follows the
  ordinary wake rules.
- Extract the remote app-server client, shared event and request types,
  and WebSocket compression into `codex-app-server-remote-client` so
  callers can use them without linking the app-server runtime.

## Testing

Cover delivery of queued mail when admission reopens, injection into
native child threads, and recovery of a child result after a daemon
restart.

GitOrigin-RevId: 4c5ceeca8829c2612cc2b6b74c03d0c7677a9244
2026-11-19 15:45:17 +00:00
..

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Wine-exec integration tests

On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.

Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:

  • skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.
  • skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.
  • skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.
  • skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.
  • skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

The Linux sandbox accepts both legacy sandbox_mode configs and permission profiles. Bubblewrap enforces filesystem restrictions and provides the network namespace for managed proxy routes. A managed route selects bubblewrap even when features.use_legacy_landlock is set. Without a managed route, the helper rejects legacy Landlock if the policy restricts filesystem writes. With full disk write access it can apply network restrictions in process.

The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.

Windows

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split filesystem policies instead.

The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:

  • legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior
  • split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
  • backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and C:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults

The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra read-only carveouts under those writable roots.

New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed instead of running with weaker enforcement.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Runtime authentication (experimental)

Runtime authentication is off by default. To enable it in config.toml:

[features.runtime_agent_instances]
enabled = true
mode = "dual_header"

dual_header sends the existing actor credential and a fresh agent assertion. assertion_only sends only the assertion. The latter requires backend support; registration failures do not fall back to credential-only requests. Non-OpenAI providers and third-party MCP authentication keep their existing behavior.

The same table in requirements.toml pins enablement and mode. A conflicting explicit mode is rejected. The older boolean runtime_agent_instances = true still works and uses the default mode (dual_header) unless requirements pin it. Deliver typed requirements only to client versions that understand them.

The harness owns the runtime and its memory-only signing key. Ordinary token refreshes reuse it; a different credential source or actor context requires a new runtime. When runtime authentication is selected, legacy AgentIdentity credentials migrate to saved OAuth credentials for the same actor and remove the persisted signing key. If no matching actor credential exists, a supported sign-in is required. Ordinary credential loading does not perform this migration.

Cloud-config bundle and requirements fetches retain their endpoint-restricted bootstrap authentication, including refreshes after runtime initialization.