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## Why Managed-network commands within one Codex conversation share the same HTTP and SOCKS proxy ingress. When several exec calls run concurrently, the proxy sees the requested destination but cannot tell which exec opened the connection. For example: ```text exec A: curl https://example.com/a ─┐ ├─> conversation proxy ─> Guardian exec B: curl https://example.com/b ─┘ host: example.com trigger: unknown ```. Three parallel network execs reached Guardian without their triggering call IDs or commands. Guardian denied the requests, but Codex could not safely associate those outcomes with the individual tool calls. ## What changes Keep the shared proxy ingress and tag each connection at the existing trusted Linux bridge: ```text exec A ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token A][proxy bytes] ─┐ ├─> shared HTTP/SOCKS ingress exec B ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token B][proxy bytes] ─┘ │ token A ─> exec A ─────┤ token B ─> exec B ─────┘ ``` The complete path is: ```text active exec registration │ ├─ registers its UUID as a short-lived attribution token ├─ passes the token to the Linux sandbox helper ├─ helper removes the token before launching the user command ├─ existing host bridge prepends the token to each proxy connection ├─ shared proxy consumes the bounded attribution frame └─ proxy attaches the matching execution-scoped state ├─ Guardian receives the exact call ID and command └─ a denial finishes/cancels the matching tool call ``` Dropping the active or deferred exec registration removes the token. Connections that were already accepted retain their resolved attribution; new connections using an expired token fail closed. ## Before and after Before, Guardian could receive only the network destination: ```json { "tool": "network_access", "host": "www.17track.net", "port": 443, "protocol": "https" } ``` After, the same request includes the action that caused it: ```json { "tool": "network_access", "host": "www.17track.net", "port": 443, "protocol": "https", "trigger": { "callId": "exec-network-first", "command": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "curl https://www.17track.net"] } } ``` ## Listener accounting This PR does **not** create proxy listeners per exec. ```text Existing topology: one conversation -> one HTTP listener + optional one SOCKS listener Discarded per-exec approach: one conversation -> existing listener pair + up to one additional listener pair per active exec This PR: one conversation -> existing listener pair only + one small token-map entry per active exec ``` The Linux sandbox already creates a trusted routing bridge for each sandboxed command. This PR adds a short frame write to that bridge rather than introducing another listener, task, or proxy process. The existing conversation-scoped listener pair remains. Making a single proxy service shared across multiple conversations would be a separate multi-tenant architecture change involving per-conversation policy, configuration, audit, and Guardian routing. ## Keeping the implementation small The attribution is bound once, when the TCP connection enters the proxy. The ingress installs an execution-scoped clone of the existing `NetworkProxyState`, so the established HTTP, SOCKS, MITM, policy, audit, and blocked-request paths continue using their existing state lookup. This avoids plumbing a new request-context type through every protocol handler. Outside the two ingress wrappers, protocol-specific request handling is unchanged. ## Security behavior - Tokens are generated from the existing random execution registration IDs. - The trusted Linux helper consumes and removes the token before executing user code. - Attribution frames have a fixed magic prefix, bounded token length, and bounded read timeout. - Unknown or expired tokens close the connection. - A token presented to a proxy for another environment closes the connection. - Existing unframed callers preserve the current conservative attribution behavior. ## Platform scope Exact bridge attribution is enabled on Linux. macOS and Windows retain their current shared-proxy behavior. ## Test coverage The concurrent end-to-end test starts two managed-network execs together and synchronizes them so both are active before either connects. It then inspects the two Guardian requests and compares the complete attribution pairs: ```text (exec-network-first, exact first command) (exec-network-second, exact second command) ``` Focused proxy coverage verifies the bounded frame and that a registered framed connection receives the matching execution and environment state. ## Scope This fixes the Linux network-to-exec attribution path and records a denial against the exact matching tool call. It intentionally does not change: - delivery of an entirely unattributed denial to the parent turn; - how parallel denials count toward the Guardian circuit breaker; - how the UI displays the rejection reason or completed-turn state. Those remain separate concerns from attribution. ## Relationship to #29456 and #29668 #29456 made the proxy environment and sandbox policy come from the same prepared network context. This PR adds the execution token to that prepared launch and consumes it at the shared ingress. This follows #29668's shared-ingress framing direction, but completes the production registration, Linux bridge, core call mapping, denial mapping, and concurrent end-to-end path. It also keeps attribution in the existing per-connection proxy state instead of introducing request-context plumbing through every HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM handler. This PR is intended to supersede #29668 for the Linux attribution fix. --------- Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
47 lines
1.2 KiB
TOML
47 lines
1.2 KiB
TOML
[package]
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name = "codex-linux-sandbox"
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version.workspace = true
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edition.workspace = true
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license.workspace = true
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[[bin]]
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name = "codex-linux-sandbox"
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path = "src/main.rs"
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[lib]
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name = "codex_linux_sandbox"
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path = "src/lib.rs"
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doctest = false
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[lints]
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workspace = true
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[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dependencies]
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clap = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
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codex-install-context = { workspace = true }
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codex-network-proxy = { workspace = true }
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codex-process-hardening = { workspace = true }
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codex-protocol = { workspace = true }
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codex-sandboxing = { workspace = true }
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codex-utils-absolute-path = { workspace = true }
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globset = { workspace = true }
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landlock = { workspace = true }
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libc = { workspace = true }
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seccompiler = { workspace = true }
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serde = { workspace = true, features = ["derive"] }
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serde_json = { workspace = true }
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sha2 = { workspace = true }
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url = { workspace = true }
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[target.'cfg(target_os = "linux")'.dev-dependencies]
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codex-core = { workspace = true }
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pretty_assertions = { workspace = true }
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tempfile = { workspace = true }
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tokio = { workspace = true, features = [
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"io-std",
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"macros",
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"process",
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"rt-multi-thread",
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"signal",
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] }
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