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pakrym-oai e3e5ad2847 Harden unsandboxed patch filesystem access (#39659)
## Why

An `apply_patch` path can be replaced with a symlink after verification, allowing an unsandboxed patch operation to reach a different file than the one that was approved.

## What changed

- Add `follow_symlinks` options to executor filesystem reads, writes, metadata lookups, directory creation, and removal, including the corresponding `followSymlinks` protocol fields.
- Implement no-follow filesystem operations on Unix and Windows that reject links in any path component and restrict file access to regular files.
- Run `apply_patch` with symlink traversal disabled when an otherwise-required sandbox is bypassed, while retaining the existing follow-symlink default for standalone callers.

## Testing

- Cover leaf and ancestor symlinks across patch add, update, delete, and move operations, including a path swap after verification.
- Exercise local and remote no-follow filesystem behavior, concurrent directory creation, special-file rejection, and Windows reparse points.

GitOrigin-RevId: 43fd479084891493ce13564fbd894b98f329c6dd
2026-08-20 08:10:08 +00:00
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