cbdee7976b
[Codex Thread 019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6) ## Stack Review and merge in order. Every layer is independently correct and documents its safe stopping point. 1. [openai/codex#30292](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30292) — aggregate File/Secrets store locking 2. [openai/codex#30293](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30293) — resolve and lifecycle-pin the exact OAuth store 3. [openai/codex#30416](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30416) — serialized authoritative refresh transaction 4. [openai/codex#30294](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30294) — Codex-owned transport refresh and one-shot 401 recovery 5. [openai/codex#30295](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30295) — login/logout transaction serialization 6. [openai/codex#30296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30296) — diagnostic-only Auto store drift reporting **This PR is layer 2.** ## Why `Auto` is keyring-first with a File fallback, but re-evaluating that policy during transport reconstruction or persistence can make one MCP client read from one store and later write to another. With rotating refresh tokens, the second store may contain an older token. This layer makes the source selected at client startup explicit and keeps that authority stable for the client lifecycle. ## What this PR does - Keeps `resolve_oauth_tokens_from_store_policy` as the single configured-policy entry point and returns both credentials and the concrete File or Keyring source that supplied them. - Puts exact `load`, `save`, and `delete` operations on `ResolvedOAuthCredentialStore`, making “resolve configured policy” and “use the selected authority” distinct at call sites. - Pins the first concrete source in `pinned_credential_store` in the transport recipe, so initialization retries and session reconstruction cannot re-evaluate `Auto` and adopt another store. - Gives `OAuthPersistor` the resolved store and keeps subsequent persistence and removal on that authority. - Uses a typed keyring-load error to distinguish aggregate-store coordination failures from ordinary backend failures; a coordination failure is surfaced instead of triggering File fallback. - Keeps login-time `Auto` behavior unchanged: prefer Keyring, fall back to File when unavailable, and clean up legacy File state after a successful keyring save. - Adds structured server/backend context when fallback cleanup fails. ## Explicit decisions and non-goals - The selection is lifecycle-local and in memory. This PR does not add a durable backend selector, migration, reconciliation registry, or global source of truth outside `CODEX_HOME`. - `Auto` may choose File at the start of a later process if keyring availability changes. Once this client resolves, a selected-store failure is returned instead of hot-switching. - Different `CODEX_HOME` instances remain independent even when they can access the same Direct keyring credential. - Cross-process refresh serialization is intentionally not part of this layer. ## Safe stopping point This PR can merge alone. A single MCP client no longer hot-switches credential stores across transport rebuilds or persistence. Two processes can still refresh the same selected credential concurrently until layer 3. ## Review size The net layer is 9 files, +668/−144. The production change remains focused on store resolution and lifecycle pinning; the largest follow-up is integration coverage that drives real session recovery. ## Validation - `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (99 passed; 5 expected skips) - Real-client 404 recovery coverage with different Keyring and File tokens; captured bearer headers prove the stale File token is never sent - Mutation check: removing the lifecycle pin makes that integration regression fail by observing the stale File token
codex-core
This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.
Wine-exec integration tests
On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with
bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.
Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:
skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.
Dependencies
Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:
macOS
Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.
When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows
writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or
pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.
Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by
SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.
Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access
(user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.
Linux
Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux.
They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem
policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution.
Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy
enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable
root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used
only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy
SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping
cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the
more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.
The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the
current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but
too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and
switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If
bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap
binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its
normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper.
Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user
namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported
for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user
namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the
bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.
Windows
Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on
Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full
filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split
filesystem policies instead.
The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:
- legacy
ReadOnlyandWorkspaceWritebehavior - split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
- backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as
C:\Windows,C:\Program Files,C:\Program Files (x86), andC:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults
The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read
Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also
supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose
writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra
read-only carveouts under those writable roots.
New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows
only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or
round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics.
Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or
reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed
instead of running with weaker enforcement.
All Platforms
Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual
apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the
codex-arg0 crate for details.