mirror of https://github.com/openai/codex.git synced 2026-09-03 14:59:03 +00:00

Files

Michael Bolin 0e19d5e908 codex-api: route file uploads through HTTP client factory (#31363 )

## Why

Codex Apps file parameters use a three-step upload flow: create a file
record, PUT bytes to a returned signed URL, and finalize the upload.
Each step still constructed a default `reqwest` client, so the flow
could bypass `features.respect_system_proxy` even after model API
requests honored it.

This stack entry makes the resolved client policy a required input to
the upload API and resolves each concrete destination independently.

## What changed

- Require `HttpClientFactory` in `upload_openai_file`.
- Build clients for the create, signed upload, and finalize URLs through
the shared API route policy.
- Pass the factory derived from the turn configuration at the Apps/MCP
call site.
- Return a destination-aware `ClientBuild` error when enabled route
selection cannot construct a client.
- Preserve the legacy logged fallback for the feature-off
`ReqwestDefault` policy.

## Review guide

1. `codex-api/src/files.rs` changes the upload API and centralizes
route-aware client construction.
2. The three request stages each supply their actual URL, including the
separately hosted signed blob URL.
3. `core/src/mcp_openai_file.rs` is the only production caller and
supplies the turn configuration factory.

## Validation

- `cargo check --tests -p codex-api -p codex-core`
- `just test -p codex-api files` (1 matching upload test passed; 135
tests skipped by filter)
- `just fix -p codex-api -p codex-core`

## Follow-up

Other direct HTTP clients remain separate migration slices.














---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/31363).
* #31637
* #31431
* __->__ #31363

2026-07-09 09:58:22 -07:00

src

codex-api: route file uploads through HTTP client factory (#31363 )

2026-07-09 09:58:22 -07:00

templates

[codex] Consolidate shared prompts in codex-prompts (#25151 )

2026-06-01 18:45:07 +00:00

tests

fix: forward originator to Codex Apps MCP (#31481 )

2026-07-09 16:51:44 +00:00

BUILD.bazel

code-mode: move to hosted mode by default (#31500 )

2026-07-08 11:06:58 -07:00

Cargo.toml

feat(core): emit canonical review mode items (#31473 )

2026-07-08 09:59:50 -07:00

config.schema.json

[codex-rs] Add writes app approval mode (#30482 )

2026-07-07 13:13:59 -04:00

gpt_5_1_prompt.md

chore(core) rm AskForApproval::OnFailure (#28418 )

2026-06-23 12:13:54 -07:00

gpt_5_2_prompt.md

chore(core) rm AskForApproval::OnFailure (#28418 )

2026-06-23 12:13:54 -07:00

gpt_5_codex_prompt.md

…

gpt-5.1-codex-max_prompt.md

…

gpt-5.2-codex_prompt.md

…

prompt_with_apply_patch_instructions.md

chore(core) rm AskForApproval::OnFailure (#28418 )

2026-06-23 12:13:54 -07:00

README.md

test: branch on target OS instead of runner flavor (#29712 )

2026-06-23 14:27:13 -07:00

README.md

codex-core

This crate implements the business logic for Codex. It is designed to be used by the various Codex UIs written in Rust.

Wine-exec integration tests

On x86-64 Linux, run the shared suite against the Windows exec server with bazel test //codex-rs/core:core-all-wine-exec-test.

Local execution targets the host OS, Docker targets Linux, and Wine exec targets Windows. Choose the skip macro by what the test depends on:

skip_if_target_windows!: Windows target behavior.
skip_if_host_windows!: Windows host constraints.
skip_if_remote!: Local-only test behavior.
skip_if_no_remote_env!: Remote-only test behavior.
skip_if_wine_exec!: Wine-specific runner debt.

Dependencies

Note that codex-core makes some assumptions about certain helper utilities being available in the environment. Currently, this support matrix is:

macOS

Expects /usr/bin/sandbox-exec to be present.

When using the workspace-write sandbox policy, the Seatbelt profile allows writes under the configured writable roots while keeping .git (directory or pointer file), the resolved gitdir: target, and .codex read-only.

Network access and filesystem read/write roots are controlled by SandboxPolicy. Seatbelt consumes the resolved policy and enforces it.

Seatbelt also keeps the legacy default preferences read access (user-preference-read) needed for cfprefs-backed macOS behavior.

Linux

Expects the binary containing codex-core to run the equivalent of codex sandbox when arg0 is codex-linux-sandbox. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Linux. They can continue to use the legacy Landlock path when the split filesystem policy is sandbox-equivalent to the legacy model after cwd resolution. Split filesystem policies that need direct FileSystemSandboxPolicy enforcement, such as read-only or denied carveouts under a broader writable root, automatically route through bubblewrap. The legacy Landlock path is used only when the split filesystem policy round-trips through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. That includes overlapping cases like /repo = write, /repo/a = none, /repo/a/b = write, where the more specific writable child must reopen under a denied parent.

The Linux sandbox helper prefers the first bwrap found on PATH outside the current working directory whenever it is available. If bwrap is present but too old to support --argv0, the helper keeps using system bubblewrap and switches to a no---argv0 compatibility path for the inner re-exec. If bwrap is missing, it falls back to the bundled codex-resources/bwrap binary shipped with Codex and Codex surfaces a startup warning through its normal notification path instead of printing directly from the sandbox helper. Codex also surfaces a startup warning when bubblewrap cannot create user namespaces. WSL2 uses the normal Linux bubblewrap path. WSL1 is not supported for bubblewrap sandboxing because it cannot create the required user namespaces, so Codex rejects sandboxed shell commands that would enter the bubblewrap path before invoking bwrap.

Windows

Legacy SandboxPolicy / sandbox_mode configs are still supported on Windows. Legacy read-only and workspace-write policies imply full filesystem read access; exact readable roots are represented by split filesystem policies instead.

The elevated Windows sandbox also supports:

legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior
split filesystem policies that need exact readable roots, exact writable roots, or extra read-only carveouts under writable roots
backend-managed system read roots required for basic execution, such as C:\Windows, C:\Program Files, C:\Program Files (x86), and C:\ProgramData, when a split filesystem policy requests platform defaults

The unelevated restricted-token backend still supports the legacy full-read Windows model for legacy ReadOnly and WorkspaceWrite behavior. It also supports a narrow split-filesystem subset: full-read split policies whose writable roots still match the legacy WorkspaceWrite root set, but add extra read-only carveouts under those writable roots.

New [permissions] / split filesystem policies remain supported on Windows only when they can be enforced directly by the selected Windows backend or round-trip through the legacy SandboxPolicy model without changing semantics. Policies that would require direct explicit unreadable carveouts (none) or reopened writable descendants under read-only carveouts still fail closed instead of running with weaker enforcement.

All Platforms

Expects the binary containing codex-core to simulate the virtual apply_patch CLI when arg1 is --codex-run-as-apply-patch. See the codex-arg0 crate for details.