//! Writable PATH candidates must never run while constructing the sandbox.

#![cfg(target_os = "linux")]

use codex_protocol::models::PermissionProfile;
use codex_protocol::permissions::NetworkSandboxPolicy;
use codex_utils_absolute_path::AbsolutePathBuf;
use codex_utils_cargo_bin::cargo_bin;
use codex_utils_cargo_bin::write_executable;
use pretty_assertions::assert_eq;
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
use std::process::Command;

#[test]
fn child_workdir_does_not_probe_or_launch_writable_parent_bwrap() {
    // Bazel can mount the default temp directory noexec.
    let temp = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir().expect("current directory"))
        .or_else(|_| tempfile::tempdir())
        .expect("create fixture");
    let workspace = temp.path().join("workspace");
    let cwd = workspace.join("service");
    let bin = workspace.join("bin");
    let marker = temp.path().join("outside-workspace");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&cwd).expect("create cwd");
    std::fs::create_dir_all(&bin).expect("create bin");
    let fake_bwrap = bin.join("bwrap");
    std::fs::write(
        &fake_bwrap,
        "#!/bin/sh\n: > \"$BWRAP_PROBE_MARKER\"\nprintf '%s\\n' '--as-pid-1 --perms --argv0 --ro-bind-fd'\n",
    )
    .expect("write fake bwrap");
    std::fs::set_permissions(&fake_bwrap, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o755))
        .expect("make fake bwrap executable");
    let policy = PermissionProfile::read_only()
        .file_system_sandbox_policy()
        .with_additional_writable_roots(
            &workspace,
            &[AbsolutePathBuf::try_from(workspace.clone()).expect("absolute workspace")],
        );
    let profile =
        PermissionProfile::from_runtime_permissions(&policy, NetworkSandboxPolicy::Restricted);
    let profile_json = serde_json::to_string(&profile).expect("serialize profile");
    let trusted_path = std::env::var_os("PATH").expect("PATH is set");
    let run = |search_path: &std::ffi::OsStr, script: &str| {
        Command::new(cargo_bin("codex-linux-sandbox").expect("resolve sandbox binary"))
            .arg("--sandbox-policy-cwd")
            .arg(&workspace)
            .arg("--command-cwd")
            .arg(&cwd)
            .arg("--permission-profile")
            .arg(&profile_json)
            .args(["--", "/bin/sh", "-c", script])
            .current_dir(&cwd)
            .env("PATH", search_path)
            .env("BWRAP_PROBE_MARKER", &marker)
            .output()
            .expect("run sandbox")
    };
    let baseline = run(&trusted_path, "printf sandboxed");
    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&baseline.stderr);
    if !baseline.status.success()
        && [
            "bubblewrap is unavailable",
            "No permissions to create a new namespace",
            "setting up uid map: Permission denied",
        ]
        .iter()
        .any(|message| stderr.contains(message))
    {
        eprintln!(
            "sandbox unavailable: {}",
            String::from_utf8_lossy(&baseline.stderr)
        );
        return;
    }
    assert_eq!(baseline.status.success(), true, "{baseline:?}");
    let denied_write = run(&trusted_path, ": > \"$BWRAP_PROBE_MARKER\"");
    assert_eq!(denied_write.status.success(), false, "{denied_write:?}");
    assert!(
        !marker.exists(),
        "sandbox must deny the outside-workspace write"
    );
    let hostile_path = std::env::join_paths(
        [bin]
            .into_iter()
            .chain(std::env::split_paths(&trusted_path)),
    )
    .expect("join PATH");
    let output = run(&hostile_path, "printf sandboxed");
    assert!(!marker.exists(), "writable bwrap ran before confinement");
    assert_eq!(output.status.success(), true, "{output:?}");
    assert_eq!(output.stdout, b"sandboxed");
}

#[test]
fn full_disk_write_with_managed_network_does_not_probe_writable_bwrap() {
    let temp = tempfile::tempdir_in(std::env::current_dir().unwrap()).unwrap();
    let bin = temp.path().join("bin");
    let cwd = temp.path().join("cwd");
    std::fs::create_dir(&bin).unwrap();
    std::fs::create_dir(&cwd).unwrap();
    let bwrap = bin.join("bwrap");
    write_executable(&bwrap, "#!/bin/sh\n: > \"$BWRAP_PROBE_MARKER\"\nexit 1\n").unwrap();
    let run = |profile: &PermissionProfile, marker: &std::path::Path| {
        Command::new(cargo_bin("codex-linux-sandbox").expect("resolve sandbox binary"))
            .arg("--sandbox-policy-cwd")
            .arg(&cwd)
            .arg("--permission-profile")
            .arg(serde_json::to_string(profile).unwrap())
            .args(["--managed-network", "{}", "--", "/bin/true"])
            .current_dir(&cwd)
            .env_clear()
            .env("PATH", &bin)
            .env("HTTP_PROXY", "http://127.0.0.1:9")
            .env("BWRAP_PROBE_MARKER", marker)
            .output()
            .unwrap()
    };
    // Confirm this host reaches the capability probe without needing working
    // namespaces or bundled bubblewrap. Both invocations use managed networking.
    let control_marker = temp.path().join("control");
    let control = run(&PermissionProfile::read_only(), &control_marker);
    assert!(
        control_marker.exists(),
        "probe was not reached: {control:?}"
    );

    let marker = temp.path().join("unrestricted");
    let output = run(&PermissionProfile::Disabled, &marker);
    assert!(
        !marker.exists(),
        "writable bwrap ran before network confinement: {output:?}"
    );
}