## Why
An unfamiliar executable can ignore its arguments, so trust in an apparent
inner command must not implicitly trust the executable that runs it.
## What changed
- Evaluate unfamiliar shell executables alongside their parsed commands when
determining unified exec approval requirements. Inner commands can add
restrictions, but cannot grant trust to the executable.
- Include the executable in reusable approval keys so approval for one custom
shell does not apply to another.
- Parse literal PowerShell scripts without launching the requested executable,
preserving command policy checks before approval.
## Testing
Add cross-platform coverage for spoofed shell paths, allowed and forbidden
inner commands, explicit custom-shell approval, and session approval isolation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 0dd2c7e9a2ac30965ef5fe5de1a8d2968bb5f9d0
## What changed
- Add an optional restrictive execution policy to `EnvironmentConfig` and merge it over the active command policy for shell execution and approval decisions.
- Reject environment policies that contain allow rules, so environment configuration can only tighten command access.
- Include the environment policy fingerprint in cached approval keys so policy changes require fresh session approvals.
## Testing
- Cover restrictions overriding saved prefix approvals, policy changes invalidating session approvals, and environment overlays remaining effective when model-specific prefix filtering is active.
GitOrigin-RevId: e94f877549ed5e0f577b8cb52f3c1872c58f029d
## What changed
- Represent `request_permissions` calls as shared approval actions and convert them into Guardian permission requests through the common approval path.
- Preserve turn cancellation while an automatic permission review is pending.
- Cover Guardian allow and deny decisions, cancellation without a user-approval fallback, and clean follow-up turns.
GitOrigin-RevId: 95d0df0288e232f32b162756aa7d64a30df7efa5
## What changed
- Represent blocked network requests as approval actions so permission hooks,
automatic review, and user review use the common approval flow.
- Route network requests using the active turn's review settings, including for
background terminals started by an earlier turn.
- Record the final applied network decision in tool telemetry without exposing
the destination or assigning an approval source.
- Persist deny amendments and keep the blocked request denied.
## Testing
Added coverage for strict automatic review, cross-turn background network
requests, deny amendment persistence, and destination-safe telemetry.
GitOrigin-RevId: a2a9d106962f407ed93f4d198f40ced15f090b8e
## What changed
- Represent MCP tool calls as approval actions and route them through the
session-level approval flow for permission hooks, reviewer selection,
rejection handling, and resolution telemetry.
- Preserve MCP-specific user prompts, session and persistent approval choices,
and the approval policy and reviewer captured for the tool call.
## Testing
- Add coverage for permission hooks resolving MCP calls before user or
automatic review, persistence choices, captured policy routing, and MCP turn
metadata with strict automatic review enabled.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8e134b3d17a19dc62b3b56076d2cd05a54c9f638
## What changed
- Add `ApprovedMcpPolicyAmendment` to represent MCP approvals that persist across sessions.
- Route MCP approval responses directly through the shared `ReviewDecision` type while preserving session-only approvals, rejection reasons, timeouts, and cancellations.
- Reject the MCP-only policy decision if it reaches command, shell, network, or other tool approval paths.
## Testing
- Update MCP approval parsing, normalization, hook, and Guardian tests for the shared decisions.
- Verify generic tool approvals reject MCP policy amendments.
GitOrigin-RevId: b8cc931dc61d4c794915145273ede82b9eb30fc8
## What changed
- Send Unix `execve` approvals intercepted by the zsh fork through the shared approval pipeline, including permission hooks, Guardian review, user prompts, and telemetry.
- Resolve the active turn and its auto-review setting when an intercepted command needs approval, so commands sent to persistent terminals use the current turn's reviewer.
- Give each intercepted command a distinct approval ID and propagate an aborted approval as a turn abort.
## Testing
- Cover Guardian review for intercepted `unified_exec` commands and persistent terminals across turns.
- Verify repeated identical intercepted commands receive separate user approvals.
GitOrigin-RevId: e6cccf160637e4246aff4714c22f08c90b65306d
## Why
Deferred environments can become ready after a turn starts. Guardian approval
reviews must use the environment selected for the current step so their working
directory and permission context are not taken from the stale turn snapshot.
## What changed
- Carry `StepContext` through tool execution and approval handling.
- Add a Guardian review context that pairs the parent turn with the current
step's environment snapshot.
- Use that snapshot for Guardian prompts, reviewer sessions, and delegated
reviewer threads while retaining turn-level fallbacks for callers without a
step context.
## Testing
Added an integration test that makes a deferred remote environment ready before
an escalated command and verifies Guardian receives that environment's working
directory and denied-read policy instead of the initial local environment's.
GitOrigin-RevId: 779096bc7d0e0c7453a009c02141029714b9b407
## What changed
- Move permission hooks, reviewer routing, approval caching, and user approval requests into the session-level approval flow.
- Have shell, unified exec, and apply-patch runtimes describe requests as `ApprovalAction` values, which now provide their hook payloads and cache keys.
- Pass a shared `ApprovalContext` through initial and retry approvals so telemetry and approval reasons are handled consistently.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5bfa61daa97e4427f3a648f6cf9d1c27f1551942
## Why
Guardian reviews received sandbox retry reasons, but not the execution-policy reason that triggered an initial approval request.
## What changed
- Propagate approval and retry reasons through the tool approval flow and include the applicable reason in the Guardian prompt.
- Prefer a sandbox retry reason when both are available.
- Truncate approval context to 512 tokens while preserving the start and end of the reason.
## Testing
Added prompt and integration coverage for policy reasons, retry precedence, and truncation.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5b0f4e1c40b792b031bc8f7b31685a61d12b8d92
## What changed
Add the tool name to `ApprovalCtx` and use the context's call ID and session
telemetry when recording approval decisions. This removes redundant `ToolCtx`
and telemetry parameters from `resolve_tool_approval`.
GitOrigin-RevId: 238a6f708f83993d64606bfaa74df344b0b46178
Rename `resolve_tool_apporval` to `resolve_tool_approval` and update its
call sites in the tool orchestrator.
GitOrigin-RevId: bc7d9ae675b45dd5b6b5b5643fd75e532f6314ca
## What changed
- Change `ReviewDecision::Denied` to carry a rejection string and update the generated protocol schemas.
- Preserve specific rejection reasons through command, patch, network, MCP, delegated, and automatic approval flows so tool results can return them to the model.
- Distinguish invalid approval responses from user declines and truncate oversized rejection messages before adding them to model context.
## Testing
- Add coverage for denial serialization, invalid app-server approval responses, dropped automatic reviews, network rejection propagation, and rejection-message truncation.
GitOrigin-RevId: d48a55643aa03c7ecfa08a8e4b669913eec5464a
## Why
Drive-shaped POSIX paths such as `/C:/workspace` can be mistaken for Windows
paths when an automatic approval request converts them from `PathUri`.
## What changed
- Keep approval paths as `PathUri` values together with their environment ID
until the automatic review request is built.
- Recover host-native paths for local working directories when strict
conversion cannot determine the path convention.
- Continue rejecting incompatible paths from remote environments.
## Testing
Add coverage for drive-shaped local POSIX paths, foreign remote paths, and
preserving apply-patch path URIs while building approval actions.
GitOrigin-RevId: 3fd31cfb4e8b46f9968ff66d5e986ca777430185
## What changed
- Run permission-request hooks before routing approvals to the automated reviewer or user, including when `strict_auto_review` is enabled.
- Centralize approval resolution so hook, automated-reviewer, and user decisions share rejection handling and report the correct telemetry source.
## Testing
- Add an integration test showing that an allow hook can approve a shell command during strict auto-review without invoking the automated reviewer.
GitOrigin-RevId: 18e9d76baee6cbae9d35ae517250f2f82270a9d2
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