## Why
We need `PermissionRequest` hook support!
Also addresses:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16301
- run a script on Hook to do things like play a sound to draw attention
but actually no-op so user can still approve
- can omit the `decision` object from output or just have the script
exit 0 and print nothing
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15311
- let the script approve/deny on its own
- external UI what will run on Hook and relay decision back to codex
## Reviewer Note
There's a lot of plumbing for the new hook, key files to review are:
- New hook added in `codex-rs/hooks/src/events/permission_request.rs`
- Wiring for network approvals
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/network_approval.rs`
- Wiring for tool orchestrator `codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs`
- Wiring for execve
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`
## What
- Wires shell, unified exec, and network approval prompts into the
`PermissionRequest` hook flow.
- Lets hooks allow or deny approval prompts; quiet or invalid hooks fall
back to the normal approval path.
- Uses `tool_input.description` for user-facing context when it helps:
- shell / `exec_command`: the request justification, when present
- network approvals: `network-access <domain>`
- Uses `tool_name: Bash` for shell, unified exec, and network approval
permission-request hooks.
- For network approvals, passes the originating command in
`tool_input.command` when there is a single owning call; otherwise falls
back to the synthetic `network-access ...` command.
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a shell
approval</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "rm -f /tmp/example"
}
}
```
</details>
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for an escalated
`exec_command` request</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "cp /tmp/source.json /Users/alice/export/source.json",
"description": "Need to copy a generated file outside the workspace"
}
}
```
</details>
<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a network
approval</summary>
```json
{
"session_id": "<session-id>",
"turn_id": "<turn-id>",
"transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
"cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
"hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
"model": "gpt-5",
"permission_mode": "default",
"tool_name": "Bash",
"tool_input": {
"command": "curl http://codex-network-test.invalid",
"description": "network-access http://codex-network-test.invalid"
}
}
```
</details>
## Follow-ups
- Implement the `PermissionRequest` semantics for `updatedInput`,
`updatedPermissions`, `interrupt`, and suggestions /
`permission_suggestions`
- Add `PermissionRequest` support for the `request_permissions` tool
path
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- route apply_patch runtime execution through the selected Environment
filesystem instead of the local self-exec path
- keep the standalone apply_patch command surface intact while restoring
its launcher/test/docs contract
- add focused apply_patch filesystem sandbox regression coverage
## Validation
- remote devbox Bazel run in progress
- passed: //codex-rs/apply-patch:apply-patch-unit-tests
--test_filter=test_read_file_utf8_with_context_reports_invalid_utf8
- in progress / follow-up: focused core and exec Bazel test slices on
dev
## Follow-up under review
- remote pre-verification and approval/retry behavior still need
explicit scrutiny for delete/update flows
- runtime sandbox-denial classification may need a tighter assertion
path than rendered stderr matching
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.
## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`
Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
- Migrate apply-patch verification and application internals to use the
async `ExecutorFileSystem` abstraction from `exec-server`.
- Convert apply-patch `cwd` handling to `AbsolutePathBuf` through the
verifier/parser/handler boundary.
Doesn't change how the tool itself works.
## Why
`codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates,
which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module
instead of the actual owner crate.
Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf
crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this
reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following
files:
```
codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml
codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml
```
## What
- Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by
`codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`,
`codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`.
- Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`.
- Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the
owning `codex-*` crate.
- Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner
crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.
## Why
`codex-rs/tools/src/lib.rs` already defines the [canonical `codex_tools`
export
surface](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bf081b9e286e620d25c1d61cf0f38f74a0f982ce/codex-rs/tools/src/lib.rs#L83-L88)
for `ToolsConfig`, `ToolsConfigParams`, and the shell backend config
types. Re-exporting those same types from `core/src/tools/spec.rs` gives
`codex-core` two import paths for one API and blurs which crate owns
those config definitions.
This PR removes that duplicate path so `codex-core` callsites depend on
`codex_tools` directly.
## What
- Remove the five `codex_tools` re-exports from
`core/src/tools/spec.rs`.
- Update `codex-core` production and test callsites to import
`ShellCommandBackendConfig`, `ToolsConfig`, `ToolsConfigParams`,
`UnifiedExecShellMode`, and `ZshForkConfig` from `codex_tools`.
## Verification
- Ran `cargo test -p codex-core`.
- The package run is currently red in five unrelated config tests in
`core/src/config/config_tests.rs` (`approvals_reviewer_*` and
`smart_approvals_alias_*`), while the tool/spec and shell tests touched
by this import cleanup passed.
CHAINED PR - note that base is eternal/hooks-pretooluse-bash, not main
-- so the following PR should be first
Matching post-tool hook to the pre-tool functionality here:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15211
So, PreToolUse calls for plain shell calls, allows blocking. This
PostToolUse call runs after the command executed
example run:
```
› as a test, run in parallel the following commands:
- echo 'one'
- echo '[block-pre-tool-use]'
- echo '[block-post-tool-use]'
⚠ MCP startup incomplete (failed: notion, linear)
• Cruising through those three commands in parallel now, and I’ll share the exact outputs right after
they land.
• Running PreToolUse hook: checking the observatory runes
• Running PreToolUse hook: checking the observatory runes
• Running PreToolUse hook: checking the observatory runes
PreToolUse hook (blocked)
warning: wizard-tower PreToolUse demo blocked a Bash command on purpose.
feedback: PreToolUse demo blocked the command. Remove [block-pre-tool-use] to continue.
PreToolUse hook (completed)
warning: wizard-tower PreToolUse demo inspected Bash: echo 'one'
PreToolUse hook (completed)
warning: wizard-tower PreToolUse demo inspected Bash: echo '[block-post-tool-use]'
• Ran echo '[block-post-tool-use]'
└ [block-post-tool-use]
• Ran echo 'one'
└ one
• Running PostToolUse hook: reading the observatory aftermath
• Running PostToolUse hook: reading the observatory aftermath
PostToolUse hook (blocked)
warning: wizard-tower PostToolUse demo blocked the Bash follow-through on purpose.
feedback: PostToolUse demo blocked the result after execution. Remove [block-post-tool-use] to
continue.
PostToolUse hook (completed)
warning: wizard-tower PostToolUse demo inspected Bash: echo 'one'
hook context: PostToolUse demo saw the Bash result. Response preview: one
──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Ran them in parallel. Little wave report:
- echo 'one' completed and returned one.
- echo '[block-pre-tool-use]' was blocked before execution by the PreToolUse hook.
- echo '[block-post-tool-use]' ran, but its result was blocked afterward by the PostToolUse hook.
The hook messages were:
- PreToolUse demo blocked the command. Remove [block-pre-tool-use] to continue.
- PostToolUse demo blocked the result after execution. Remove [block-post-tool-use] to continue.
› for the blocked messages (correctly blocked in this test) did the tool output land back into
context?
• Yeah, from this run:
- PreToolUse block: the command itself did not execute, so no command output landed in context. Only
the block message did.
- PostToolUse block: the command did execute, but the actual stdout did not come back into context.
Only the post-tool block message did.
So the blocked notifications landed in context, but the blocked command payloads themselves did not.
Nice clean guardrail, aloha.
```
## Summary
- move skill loading and management into codex-core-skills
- leave codex-core with the thin integration layer and shared wiring
## Testing
- CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
- Split the feature system into a new `codex-features` crate.
- Cut `codex-core` and workspace consumers over to the new config and
warning APIs.
Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.
The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.
After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.
## What changed
- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged
Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.
## Verification
- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML
---
* -> #14652
* #14651
## Summary
- launch Windows sandboxed children on a private desktop instead of
`Winsta0\Default`
- make private desktop the default while keeping
`windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false` as the escape hatch
- centralize process launch through the shared
`create_process_as_user(...)` path
- scope the private desktop ACL to the launching logon SID
## Why
Today sandboxed Windows commands run on the visible shared desktop. That
leaves an avoidable same-desktop attack surface for window interaction,
spoofing, and related UI/input issues. This change moves sandboxed
commands onto a dedicated per-launch desktop by default so the sandbox
no longer shares `Winsta0\Default` with the user session.
The implementation stays conservative on security with no silent
fallback back to `Winsta0\Default`
If private-desktop setup fails on a machine, users can still opt out
explicitly with `windows.sandbox_private_desktop=false`.
## Validation
- `cargo build -p codex-cli`
- elevated-path `codex exec` desktop-name probe returned
`CodexSandboxDesktop-*`
- elevated-path `codex exec` smoke sweep for shell commands, nested
`pwsh`, jobs, and hidden `notepad` launch
- unelevated-path full private-desktop compatibility sweep via `codex
exec` with `-c windows.sandbox=unelevated`
## Why
PR #13783 moved the `codex.rs` unit tests into `codex_tests.rs`. This
applies the same extraction pattern across the rest of `codex-rs/core`
so the production modules stay focused on runtime code instead of large
inline test blocks.
Keeping the tests in sibling files also makes follow-up edits easier to
review because product changes no longer have to share a file with
hundreds or thousands of lines of test scaffolding.
## What changed
- replaced each inline `mod tests { ... }` in `codex-rs/core/src/**`
with a path-based module declaration
- moved each extracted unit test module into a sibling `*_tests.rs`
file, using `mod_tests.rs` for `mod.rs` modules
- preserved the existing `cfg(...)` guards and module-local structure so
the refactor remains structural rather than behavioral
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` (`1653 passed; 0 failed; 5 ignored`)
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `cargo fmt --check`
- `cargo shear`
## Stack
fix: fail closed for unsupported split windows sandboxing #14172
fix: preserve split filesystem semantics in linux sandbox #14173
-> fix: align core approvals with split sandbox policies #14171
refactor: centralize filesystem permissions precedence #14174
## Why This PR Exists
This PR is intentionally narrower than the title may suggest.
Most of the original split-permissions migration already landed in the
earlier `#13434 -> #13453` stack. In particular:
- `#13439` already did the broad runtime plumbing for split filesystem
and network policies.
- `#13445` already moved `apply_patch` safety onto filesystem-policy
semantics.
- `#13448` already switched macOS Seatbelt generation to split policies.
- `#13449` and `#13453` already handled Linux helper and bubblewrap
enforcement.
- `#13440` already introduced the first protocol-side helpers for
deriving effective filesystem access.
The reason this PR still exists is that after the follow-on
`[permissions]` work and the new shared precedence helper in `#14174`, a
few core approval paths were still deciding behavior from the legacy
`SandboxPolicy` projection instead of the split filesystem policy that
actually carries the carveouts.
That means this PR is mostly a cleanup and alignment pass over the
remaining core consumers, not a fresh sandbox backend migration.
## What Is Actually New Here
- make unmatched-command fallback decisions consult
`FileSystemSandboxPolicy` instead of only legacy `DangerFullAccess` /
`ReadOnly` / `WorkspaceWrite` categories
- thread `file_system_sandbox_policy` into the shell, unified-exec, and
intercepted-exec approval paths so they all use the same split-policy
semantics
- keep `apply_patch` safety on the same effective-access rules as the
shared protocol helper, rather than letting it drift through
compatibility projections
- add loader-level regression coverage proving legacy `sandbox_mode`
config still builds split policies and round-trips back without semantic
drift
## What This PR Does Not Do
This PR does not introduce new platform backend enforcement on its own.
- Linux backend parity remains in `#14173`.
- Windows fail-closed handling remains in `#14172`.
- The shared precedence/model changes live in `#14174`.
## Files To Focus On
- `core/src/exec_policy.rs`: unmatched-command fallback and approval
rendering now read the split filesystem policy directly
- `core/src/tools/sandboxing.rs`: default exec-approval requirement keys
off `FileSystemSandboxPolicy.kind`
- `core/src/tools/handlers/shell.rs`: shell approval requests now carry
the split filesystem policy
- `core/src/unified_exec/process_manager.rs`: unified-exec approval
requests now carry the split filesystem policy
- `core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`: intercepted exec
fallback now uses the same split-policy approval semantics
- `core/src/safety.rs`: `apply_patch` safety keeps using effective
filesystem access rather than legacy sandbox categories
- `core/src/config/config_tests.rs`: new regression coverage for legacy
`sandbox_mode` no-drift behavior through the split-policy loader
## Notes
- `core/src/codex.rs` and `core/src/codex_tests.rs` are just small
fallout updates for `RequestPermissionsResponse.scope`; they are not the
point of the PR.
- If you reviewed the earlier `#13439` / `#13445` stack, the main review
question here is simply: “are there any remaining approval or
patch-safety paths that still reconstruct semantics from legacy
`SandboxPolicy` instead of consuming the split filesystem policy
directly?”
## Testing
- cargo test -p codex-core
legacy_sandbox_mode_config_builds_split_policies_without_drift
- cargo test -p codex-core request_permissions
- cargo test -p codex-core intercepted_exec_policy
- cargo test -p codex-core
restricted_sandbox_requires_exec_approval_on_request
- cargo test -p codex-core
unmatched_on_request_uses_split_filesystem_policy_for_escalation_prompts
- cargo test -p codex-core explicit_
- cargo clippy -p codex-core --tests -- -D warnings
Adds a built-in `request_permissions` tool and wires it through the
Codex core, protocol, and app-server layers so a running turn can ask
the client for additional permissions instead of relying on a static
session policy.
The new flow emits a `RequestPermissions` event from core, tracks the
pending request by call ID, forwards it through app-server v2 as an
`item/permissions/requestApproval` request, and resumes the tool call
once the client returns an approved subset of the requested permission
profile.
## Summary
Today `SandboxPermissions::requires_additional_permissions()` does not
actually mean "is `WithAdditionalPermissions`". It returns `true` for
any non-default sandbox override, including `RequireEscalated`. That
broad behavior is relied on in multiple `main` callsites.
The naming is security-sensitive because `SandboxPermissions` is used on
shell-like tool calls to tell the executor how a single command should
relate to the turn sandbox:
- `UseDefault`: run with the turn sandbox unchanged
- `RequireEscalated`: request execution outside the sandbox
- `WithAdditionalPermissions`: stay sandboxed but widen permissions for
that command only
## Problem
The old helper name reads as if it only applies to the
`WithAdditionalPermissions` variant. In practice it means "this command
requested any explicit sandbox override."
That ambiguity made it easy to read production checks incorrectly and
made the guardian change look like a standalone `main` fix when it is
not.
On `main` today:
- `shell` and `unified_exec` intentionally reject any explicit
`sandbox_permissions` request unless approval policy is `OnRequest`
- `exec_policy` intentionally treats any explicit sandbox override as
prompt-worthy in restricted sandboxes
- tests intentionally serialize both `RequireEscalated` and
`WithAdditionalPermissions` as explicit sandbox override requests
So changing those callsites from the broad helper to a narrow
`WithAdditionalPermissions` check would be a behavior change, not a pure
cleanup.
## What This PR Does
- documents `SandboxPermissions` as a per-command sandbox override, not
a generic permissions bag
- adds `requests_sandbox_override()` for the broad meaning: anything
except `UseDefault`
- adds `uses_additional_permissions()` for the narrow meaning: only
`WithAdditionalPermissions`
- keeps `requires_additional_permissions()` as a compatibility alias to
the broad meaning for now
- updates the current broad callsites to use the accurately named broad
helper
- adds unit coverage that locks in the semantics of all three helpers
## What This PR Does Not Do
This PR does not change runtime behavior. That is intentional.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
`PermissionProfile` should describe filesystem roots as absolute paths
at the type level. Using `PathBuf` in `FileSystemPermissions` made the
shared type too permissive and blurred together three different
deserialization cases:
- skill metadata in `agents/openai.yaml`, where relative paths should
resolve against the skill directory
- app-server API payloads, where callers should have to send absolute
paths
- local tool-call payloads for commands like `shell_command` and
`exec_command`, where `additional_permissions.file_system` may
legitimately be relative to the command `workdir`
This change tightens the shared model without regressing the existing
local command flow.
## What Changed
- changed `protocol::models::FileSystemPermissions` and the app-server
`AdditionalFileSystemPermissions` mirror to use `AbsolutePathBuf`
- wrapped skill metadata deserialization in `AbsolutePathBufGuard`, so
relative permission roots in `agents/openai.yaml` resolve against the
containing skill directory
- kept app-server/API deserialization strict, so relative
`additionalPermissions.fileSystem.*` paths are rejected at the boundary
- restored cwd/workdir-relative deserialization for local tool-call
payloads by parsing `shell`, `shell_command`, and `exec_command`
arguments under an `AbsolutePathBufGuard` rooted at the resolved command
working directory
- simplified runtime additional-permission normalization so it only
canonicalizes and deduplicates absolute roots instead of trying to
recover relative ones later
- updated the app-server schema fixtures, `app-server/README.md`, and
the affected transport/TUI tests to match the final behavior
This reverts commit daf0f03ac8.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
Include a link to a bug report or enhancement request.
This PR replaces the old `additional_permissions.fs_read/fs_write` shape
with a shared `PermissionProfile`
model and wires it through the command approval, sandboxing, protocol,
and TUI layers. The schema is adopted from the
`SkillManifestPermissions`, which is also refactored to use this unified
struct. This helps us easily expose permission profiles in app
server/core as a follow-up.
Summary
- detect skill-invoking shell commands based on the original command
string, request approvals when needed, and cache positive decisions per
session
- keep implicit skill invocation emitted after approval and keep skill
approval decline messaging centralized to the shell handler
- expand and adjust skill approval tests to cover shell-based skill
scripts while matching the new detection expectations
Testing
- Not run (not requested)
## Why
This PR switches the `shell_command` zsh-fork path over to
`codex-shell-escalation` so the new shell tool can use the shared
exec-wrapper/escalation protocol instead of the `zsh_exec_bridge`
implementation that was introduced in
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052. `zsh_exec_bridge` relied on
UNIX domain sockets, which is not as tamper-proof as the FD-based
approach in `codex-shell-escalation`.
## What Changed
- Added a Unix zsh-fork runtime adapter in `core`
(`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`) that:
- runs zsh-fork commands through
`codex_shell_escalation::run_escalate_server`
- bridges exec-policy / approval decisions into `ShellActionProvider`
- executes escalated commands via a `ShellCommandExecutor` that calls
`process_exec_tool_call`
- Updated `ShellRuntime` / `ShellCommandHandler` / tool spec wiring to
select a `shell_command` backend (`classic` vs `zsh-fork`) while leaving
the generic `shell` tool path unchanged.
- Removed the `zsh_exec_bridge`-based session service and deleted
`core/src/zsh_exec_bridge/mod.rs`.
- Moved exec-wrapper entrypoint dispatch to `arg0` by handling the
`codex-execve-wrapper` arg0 alias there, and removed the old
`codex_core::maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode()` hooks from `cli` and
`app-server` mains.
- Added the needed `codex-shell-escalation` dependencies for `core` and
`arg0`.
## Tests
- `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server turn_start_shell_zsh_fork --
--nocapture`
- verifies zsh-fork command execution and approval flows through the new
backend
- includes subcommand approve/decline coverage using the shared zsh
DotSlash fixture in `app-server/tests/suite/zsh`
- To test manually, I added the following to `~/.codex/config.toml`:
```toml
zsh_path = "/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh"
[features]
shell_zsh_fork = true
```
Then I ran `just c` to run the dev build of Codex with these changes and
sent it the message:
```
run `echo $0`
```
And it replied with:
```
echo $0 printed:
/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh
In this tool context, $0 reflects the script path used to invoke the shell, not just zsh.
```
so the tool appears to be wired up correctly.
## Notes
- The zsh subcommand-decline integration test now uses `rm` under a
`WorkspaceWrite` sandbox. The previous `/usr/bin/true` scenario is
auto-allowed by the new `shell-escalation` policy path, which no longer
produces subcommand approval prompts.
## Summary
Introduces the initial implementation of Feature::RequestPermissions.
RequestPermissions allows the model to request that a command be run
inside the sandbox, with additional permissions, like writing to a
specific folder. Eventually this will include other rules as well, and
the ability to persist these permissions, but this PR is already quite
large - let's get the core flow working and go from there!
<img width="1279" height="541" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-15 at 2 26 22 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ee3ec0f-02ec-4509-91a2-809ac80be368"
/>
## Testing
- [x] Added tests
- [x] Tested locally
- [x] Feature
- use `skills_for_cwd` lookup to scope allowed skills and build
invocation context for downstream processing
- add detection in `stream_events_utils` to classify tool calls as
implicit skill invocations per the proposal (script runners, extensions,
`scripts` dirs, and SKILL.md reads)
- deduplicate invocations per turn and emit analytics/OTEL events on the
same background queue as explicit invokes
## Why
Tool handlers and runtimes needed to pass the same turn/session context
for shell and non-shell workflows without duplicative ownership churn.
Using shared pointers avoids temporary lifetimes and keeps existing
behavior unchanged while simplifying call sites.
## What changed
- Converted `ToolCtx` to store shared context handles (`Arc`-based),
including updates across shell, apply-patch, and unified-exec paths.
- Updated orchestrator/runtime call sites to consume the shared context
consistently and remove brittle move/borrow patterns.
- Kept behavior unchanged while preparing the type surface for the new
shell escalation integration in the next stack commit.
## Verification
- Validated this commit stack point with `just clippy` and confirmed
workspace compiles cleanly in this stack state.
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/12583).
* #12584
* __->__ #12583
* #12556
## Summary
Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
treat approvals as a destination policy decision.
- Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
- Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
prompts.
- Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
- Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
future matching requests.
- Never policy continues to deny without prompting.
Example:
- 3 calls:
- a.com (line 443)
- b.com (line 443)
- a.com (line 443)
=> 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
- a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443
## Testing
- `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
## Summary
This feature is now reasonably stable, let's remove it so we can
simplify our upcoming iterations here.
## Testing
- [x] Existing tests pass
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals
#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.
#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.
#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
As of this PR, `SessionServices` retains a
`Option<StartedNetworkProxy>`, if appropriate.
Now the `network` field on `Config` is `Option<NetworkProxySpec>`
instead of `Option<NetworkProxy>`.
Over in `Session::new()`, we invoke `NetworkProxySpec::start_proxy()` to
create the `StartedNetworkProxy`, which is a new struct that retains the
`NetworkProxy` as well as the `NetworkProxyHandle`. (Note that `Drop` is
implemented for `NetworkProxyHandle` to ensure the proxies are shutdown
when it is dropped.)
The `NetworkProxy` from the `StartedNetworkProxy` is threaded through to
the appropriate places.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/11207).
* #11285
* __->__ #11207
This PR adds the following field to `Config`:
```rust
pub network: Option<NetworkProxy>,
```
Though for the moment, it will always be initialized as `None` (this
will be addressed in a subsequent PR).
This PR does the work to thread `network` through to `execute_exec_env()`, `process_exec_tool_call()`, and `UnifiedExecRuntime.run()` to ensure it is available whenever we span a process.
Took over the work that @aaronl-openai started here:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/10397
Now that app-server clients are able to set up custom tools (called
`dynamic_tools` in app-server), we should expose a way for clients to
pass in not just text, but also image outputs. This is something the
Responses API already supports for function call outputs, where you can
pass in either a string or an array of content outputs (text, image,
file):
https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/responses/create#responses_create-input-input_item_list-item-function_tool_call_output-output-array-input_image
So let's just plumb it through in Codex (with the caveat that we only
support text and image for now). This is implemented end-to-end across
app-server v2 protocol types and core tool handling.
## Breaking API change
NOTE: This introduces a breaking change with dynamic tools, but I think
it's ok since this concept was only recently introduced
(https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/9539) and it's better to get the
API contract correct. I don't think there are any real consumers of this
yet (not even the Codex App).
Old shape:
`{ "output": "dynamic-ok", "success": true }`
New shape:
```
{
"contentItems": [
{ "type": "inputText", "text": "dynamic-ok" },
{ "type": "inputImage", "imageUrl": "" }
]
"success": true
}
```
An experimental flow for env var skill dependencies. Skills can now
declare required env vars in SKILL.md; if missing, the CLI prompts the
user to get the value, and Core will store it in memory (eventually to a
local persistent store)
<img width="790" height="169" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cd928918-9403-43cb-a7e7-b8d59bcccd9a"
/>
Michael Bolin