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11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Adam Perry @ OpenAI
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ecfe174d5f |
Use ApiPathString in app-server filesystem permission paths (#28367)
## Why Clients running an app-server on one OS and an exec-server on another OS need to be able to pass sandbox config to app-server that refers to resources on the executor's foreign OS. ## What `AbsolutePathBuf` can't represent these paths and we don't want users to be exposed to `PathUri` yet, so this moves the public app-server API to be expressed in terms of `ApiPathString`. Stacked on #28165. - change app-server v2 filesystem permission paths, including legacy read/write roots, to `ApiPathString` - localize API paths through `PathUri` when converting into the current native core permission types - make path-bearing permission conversions fallible and surface localization failures instead of silently treating malformed grants as ordinary denials - propagate conversion failures through app-server and TUI approval handling - regenerate the app-server JSON and TypeScript schemas - leave migration TODOs on native-path conversions so they can be removed once core permission paths use `PathUri` |
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|
jif
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9de568372d |
Propagate permission approval environment id (#25862)
## Stack 1. #25850 - Key request-permission grants by environment: stores and applies sticky permission grants per environment id. 2. #25858 - Add `environmentId` to `request_permissions`: lets the model target a selected environment and resolves relative permission paths against it. 3. This PR (#25862) - Propagate permission approval environment id: carries the selected environment id through approval events, app-server requests, TUI prompts, and delegate forwarding. 4. #25867 - Add remote request permissions integration coverage: verifies the selected remote environment across request, approval, grant reuse, and exec. This PR is stacked on #25858, and #25867 is stacked on this PR. ## Why PR2 lets the model bind a `request_permissions` call to a selected environment, but the approval event and client-facing request still needed to carry that binding. For CCA, the user-facing prompt and delegated approval path should know which environment the grant applies to instead of relying on cwd alone. ## What Changed - Added optional `environmentId` to `RequestPermissionsEvent`. - Emit the selected environment id from core permission approval events. - Preserve the environment id through delegate forwarding, including cwd-based delegated requests. - Added `environmentId` to app-server permission approval params, generated schema/TypeScript artifacts, and README examples. - Preserve and display the environment id in TUI permission approval prompts. - Updated focused core, app-server protocol, and TUI conversion coverage. ## Testing Not run locally per instruction. Performed read-only `git diff --check`. |
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viyatb-oai
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fe7c069fe6 |
feat(permissions): resolve permission profile inheritance (#22270)
## Stack This is the foundation PR for the permission-profile inheritance stack. - This PR adds config-level `extends` resolution and merge semantics. - Follow-up: #23705 applies resolved profiles at runtime and updates the active-profile protocol surfaces. ## Why Permission profiles are starting to carry enough policy that copy-pasting near-identical definitions becomes hard to review and easy to drift. Before the runtime can consume inherited profiles, the config layer needs one explicit resolver that can merge parent chains and reject unsafe or invalid inheritance shapes. ## What changed - Add `extends` to permission-profile TOML and resolve parent chains in inheritance order. - Merge inherited profile TOML with the existing config merge behavior while preserving the permission-specific normalization needed for network domain keys. - Keep parent descriptions out of resolved child profiles and record inherited profile names separately for downstream consumers. - Reject undefined parents, unsupported built-in parents, and inheritance cycles with targeted errors. - Cover resolver behavior with TOML fixture tests and refresh the generated config schema. ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-config` - `cargo test -p codex-core permissions_profiles_` |
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viyatb-oai
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c3faea0b09 |
feat: add permission profile list api (#23412)
## Why Clients need a typed permission-profile catalog instead of reconstructing that state from config internals. ## What changed - Added `permissionProfile/list` to the app-server v2 protocol with cursor pagination and optional `cwd`. - The list response includes built-in permission profiles plus config-defined `[permissions.<id>]` profiles from the effective config for the request context. - Permission profiles keep optional `description` metadata for display purposes. - App-server docs and schema fixtures are updated for the new RPC. |
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viyatb-oai
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3c76081876 |
Make deny canonical for filesystem permission entries (#23493)
## Why Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`. ## What changed - rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny` - serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value - retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config compatibility - update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the canonical spelling - refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire shape ## Validation - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles --lib` - `cargo test -p codex-core read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib` Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed cleanly. |
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Michael Bolin
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3fd79b7986 |
app-server: use profile ids in v2 permission params (#23360)
## Why The v2 app-server permission profile fields are experimental, but the previous migration kept a legacy object payload for profile selection. That made clients aware of server-owned `activePermissionProfile` metadata such as `extends`, and it kept a `legacy_additional_writable_roots` path even though `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` now owns runtime workspace-root selection. This PR makes the client contract match the intended model: clients select a permission profile by id, and the server resolves and reports active profile provenance in response payloads. Follow-up to #22611. ## What Changed - Changed `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start` permission profile selection to plain profile id strings. - Changed `command/exec.permissionProfile` to a plain profile id string for the same client/server ownership split. - Removed `PermissionProfileSelectionParams` and the legacy `{ type: "profile", modifications: [...] }` compatibility deserializer. - Updated app-server, TUI, and `codex exec` call sites to send only ids, while keeping `activePermissionProfile` as server response metadata. - Updated app-server docs and schema fixtures for the revised `command/exec.permissionProfile` shape. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test -p codex-app-server` - `cargo test -p codex-exec` - `RUST_MIN_STACK=8388608 cargo test -p codex-tui` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/23360). * #23368 * __->__ #23360 |
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Michael Bolin
|
9025550709 |
app-server-protocol: remove PermissionProfile from API (#22924)
## Why The app server API should expose permission profile identity, not the lower-level runtime permission model. `PermissionProfile` is the compiled sandbox/network representation that the server uses internally; exposing it through app-server-protocol forces clients to understand details that should remain implementation-level. The API boundary should prefer `ActivePermissionProfile`: a stable profile id, plus future parent-profile metadata, that clients can pass back when they want to select the same active permissions. This also avoids schema generation collisions between the app-server v2 API type space and the core protocol model. Incidentally, while PR makes a number of changes to `command/exec`, note that we are hoping to deprecate this API in favor of `process/spawn`, so we don't need to be too finicky about these changes. ## What Changed - Removed `PermissionProfile` from the app-server-protocol API surface, including generated schema and TypeScript exports. - Changed `CommandExecParams.permissionProfile` to `ActivePermissionProfile`. - Resolve command exec profile ids through `ConfigManager` for the command cwd, matching turn override selection semantics. - Updated downstream TUI tests/helpers to use core permission types directly instead of app-server-protocol `PermissionProfile` shims. |
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Michael Bolin
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8a5306ff88 |
app-server: use permission ids and runtime workspace roots (#22611)
## Why This PR builds on [#22610](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22610) and is the app-server side of the migration from mutable per-turn `SandboxPolicy` replacement toward selecting immutable permission profiles by id plus mutable runtime workspace roots. Once permission profiles can carry their own immutable `workspace_roots`, app-server no longer needs to mutate the selected `PermissionProfile` just to represent thread-specific filesystem context. The mutable part now lives on the thread as explicit `runtimeWorkspaceRoots`, while `:workspace_roots` remains symbolic until the sandbox is realized for a turn. ## What Changed - Replaced the v2 permission-selection wrapper surface with plain profile ids for `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, `thread/fork`, and `turn/start`. - Removed the API surface for profile modifications (`PermissionProfileSelectionParams`, `PermissionProfileModificationParams`, `ActivePermissionProfileModification`). - Added experimental `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` fields to the thread lifecycle and turn-start APIs. - Threaded runtime workspace roots through core session/thread snapshots, turn overrides, app-server request handling, and command execution permission resolution. - Kept session permission state symbolic so later runtime root updates and cwd-only implicit-root retargeting rebind `:workspace_roots` correctly. - Updated the embedded clients just enough to send and restore the new thread state. - Refreshed the generated schema/TypeScript artifacts and the app-server README to match the new contract. ## Verification Targeted coverage for this layer lives in: - `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2/tests.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_start.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/thread_resume.rs` - `codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/v2/turn_start.rs` - `codex-rs/core/src/session/tests.rs` The key regression checks exercise that: - `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` resolve against the effective cwd on thread start. - Profile-declared workspace roots are excluded from the runtime workspace roots returned by app-server. - A turn-level runtime workspace-root update persists onto the thread and is returned by `thread/resume`. - A named permission profile selected on one turn remains symbolic so a later runtime-root-only turn update changes the actual sandbox writes. - A cwd-only turn update retargets the implicit runtime cwd root while preserving additional runtime roots. - The protocol fixtures and generated client artifacts stay in sync with the string-based permission selection contract. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22611). * #22612 * __->__ #22611 |
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Michael Bolin
|
c25d905f61 |
permissions: support workspace roots in profiles (#22610)
## Why This is the configuration/model half of the alternative permissions migration we discussed as a comparison point for [#22401](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22401) and [#22402](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22402). The old `workspace-write` model mixes three concerns that we want to keep separate: - reusable profile rules that should stay immutable once selected - user/runtime workspace roots from `cwd`, `--add-dir`, and legacy workspace-write config - internal Codex writable roots such as memories, which should not be shown as user workspace roots This PR gives permission profiles first-class `workspace_roots` so users can opt multiple repositories into the same `:workspace_roots` rules without using broad absolute-path write grants. It also starts separating the raw selected profile from the effective runtime profile by making `Permissions` expose explicit accessors instead of public mutable fields. A representative `config.toml` looks like this: ```toml default_permissions = "dev" [permissions.dev.workspace_roots] "~/code/openai" = true "~/code/developers-website" = true [permissions.dev.filesystem.":workspace_roots"] "." = "write" ".codex" = "read" ".git" = "read" ".vscode" = "read" ``` If Codex starts in `~/code/codex` with that profile selected, the effective workspace-root set becomes: - `~/code/codex` from the runtime `cwd` - `~/code/openai` from the profile - `~/code/developers-website` from the profile The `:workspace_roots` rules are materialized across each root, so `.git`, `.codex`, and `.vscode` stay scoped the same way everywhere. Runtime additions such as `--add-dir` can still layer on later stack entries without mutating the selected profile. ## Stack Shape This PR intentionally stops before the profile-identity cleanup in [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) so the base review stays focused on config loading, workspace-root materialization, and compatibility with legacy `workspace-write`. The representation in this PR is therefore transitional: `Permissions` carries enough state to distinguish the raw constrained profile from the effective runtime profile, and there are still call sites that must keep the active profile identity and constrained profile value in sync. The follow-up PR replaces that with a single resolved profile state (`ResolvedPermissionProfile` / `PermissionProfileState`) that keeps the profile id, immutable `PermissionProfile`, and profile-declared workspace roots together. That follow-up removes APIs such as `set_constrained_permission_profile_with_active_profile()` where separate arguments could drift out of sync. Downstream PRs then build on this base to switch app-server turn updates to profile ids plus runtime workspace roots and to finish the user-visible summary behavior. Reviewers should judge this PR as the workspace-roots foundation, not as the final in-memory shape of selected permission profiles. ## Review Guide Suggested review order: 1. Start with `codex-rs/core/src/config/mod.rs`. This is the main shape change in the base slice. `Permissions` now stores a private raw `Constrained<PermissionProfile>` plus runtime `workspace_roots`. Callers use `permission_profile()` when they need the raw constrained value and `effective_permission_profile()` when they need a materialized runtime profile. As noted above, [#22683](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/22683) replaces this transitional shape with a resolved profile state that keeps identity and profile data together. 2. Review `codex-rs/config/src/permissions_toml.rs` and `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions.rs`. These add `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]`, resolve enabled entries relative to the policy cwd, and keep `:workspace_roots` deny-read glob patterns symbolic until the actual roots are known. 3. Review `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` and `codex-rs/protocol/src/models.rs`. These add the policy/profile materialization helpers that expand exact `:workspace_roots` entries and scoped deny-read globs over every workspace root. This is also where `ActivePermissionProfileModification` is removed from the core model. 4. Review the legacy bridge in `Config::load_from_base_config_with_overrides` and `Config::set_legacy_sandbox_policy`. This is where legacy `workspace-write` roots become runtime workspace roots, while Codex internal writable roots stay internal and do not appear as user-facing workspace roots. 5. Then skim downstream call sites. The interesting pattern is raw-vs-effective access: state/proxy/bwrap paths keep the raw constrained profile, while execution, summaries, and user-visible status use the effective profile and workspace-root list. ## What Changed - added `[permissions.<id>.workspace_roots]` to the config model and schema - added runtime `workspace_roots` state to `Config`/`Permissions` and `ConfigOverrides` - made `Permissions` profile fields private and replaced direct mutation with accessors/setters - added `PermissionProfile` and `FileSystemSandboxPolicy` helpers for materializing `:workspace_roots` exact paths and deny-read globs across all roots - moved legacy additional writable roots into runtime workspace-root state instead of active profile modifications - removed `ActivePermissionProfileModification` and its app-server protocol/schema export - updated sandbox/status summary paths so internal writable roots are not reported as user workspace roots ## Verification Strategy The targeted tests cover the behavior at the layers where regressions are most likely: - `codex-rs/core/src/config/config_tests.rs` verifies config loading, legacy workspace-root seeding, effective profile materialization, and memory-root handling. - `codex-rs/core/src/config/permissions_tests.rs` verifies profile `workspace_roots` parsing and `:workspace_roots` scoped/glob compilation. - `codex-rs/protocol/src/permissions.rs` unit tests verify exact and glob materialization over multiple workspace roots. - `codex-rs/tui/src/status/tests.rs` and `codex-rs/utils/sandbox-summary/src/sandbox_summary.rs` verify the user-facing summaries show effective workspace roots and hide internal writes. I also ran `cargo check --tests` locally after the latest stack refresh to catch cross-crate API breakage from the private-field/accessor changes. --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/22610). * #22612 * #22611 * #22683 * __->__ #22610 |
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rhan-oai
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99016ec732 |
[codex-analytics] plumb protocol-native review timing (#21434)
## Why We want terminal tool review analytics, but the reducer should not stamp review timing from its own wall clock. This PR plumbs review timing through the real protocol and app-server seams so downstream analytics can consume the emitter's timestamps directly. Guardian reviews keep their enriched `started_at` / `completed_at` analytics fields by deriving those legacy second-based values from the same protocol-native millisecond lifecycle timestamps, rather than sampling a separate analytics clock. ## What changed - add `started_at_ms` to user approval request payloads - add `started_at_ms` / `completed_at_ms` to guardian review notifications - preserve Guardian review `started_at` / `completed_at` enrichment from the protocol-native timing source - stamp typed `ServerResponse` analytics facts with app-server-observed `completed_at_ms` - thread the new timing fields through core, protocol, app-server, TUI, and analytics fixtures ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-app-server outgoing_message --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol guardian --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml` - `cargo test -p codex-tui guardian --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml` - `cargo test -p codex-analytics analytics_client_tests --manifest-path codex-rs/Cargo.toml` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21434). * #18748 * __->__ #21434 * #18747 * #17090 * #17089 * #20514 |
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Owen Lin
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d7de4dd3ac |
chore(app-server-protocol): split v2 API definitions into modules (#21251)
## Why `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2.rs` had grown into a single ~12k-line definition file for the entire app-server v2 API. This is purely a mechanical refactor to break up the monolithic `v2.rs` file that contains all app-server API v2 types into more modular files, grouped by resource (e.g. account, thread, turn, etc.). `just write-app-server-schema` shows no real changes, so we can be sure that this is purely an internal organizational change. ## What changed - Replaced the monolithic `protocol/v2.rs` with a `protocol/v2/` module tree and a small `mod.rs` that only declares and reexports modules. - Grouped v2 API definitions by conceptual owner, including `account`, `apps`, `collaboration_mode`, `command_exec`, `config`, `device_key`, `experimental_feature`, `feedback`, `fs`, `hook`, `item`, `mcp`, `model`, `notification`, `permissions`, `plugin`, `process`, `realtime`, `review`, `thread`, `thread_data`, `turn`, and `windows_sandbox`. - Moved v2 tests into `protocol/v2/tests.rs` so `mod.rs` stays small. - Kept shared protocol helpers in `protocol/v2/shared.rs`, including the enum mirroring macro and common cross-resource types. - Co-located resource-specific notifications and server-request payloads with the modules that own those resources. - Regenerated app-server protocol schema fixtures. The schema diffs are non-semantic newline-only changes after the refactor. ## Verification - `cargo check -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `just write-app-server-schema` |