## Why
Refreshing MCP connection identities should not stall the async executor while another process holds the OAuth credential-store lock.
## What changed
- Probe file and secrets credential stores without waiting during runtime refreshes, retaining the last known credentials when the store is contended.
- Reuse unchanged authentication failures while credentials are temporarily unavailable instead of restarting the connection.
- Run blocking credential loads on a blocking worker during MCP client construction.
- Allow OAuth fallback when a configured authorization header is missing, empty, or invalid.
GitOrigin-RevId: 38dad5606da9a1ceb30fe945000ec9151a5058fa
## Why
Concurrent MCP startup and status checks should not serialize when they only read the shared credential store. Repeated reads of the encrypted MCP OAuth store also needlessly decrypted unchanged contents.
## What changed
- Use shared locks for `File` and `Secrets` credential reads while keeping saves and deletes exclusive.
- Cache decrypted MCP OAuth secrets by store path, ciphertext, and passphrase, and invalidate the cache after writes.
## Testing
- Cover concurrent readers, reader/writer exclusion, shared credential loads, and cache invalidation after updates and deletes.
GitOrigin-RevId: f13512e6404d4919879ba5ba77a3e34e52b35640
## Why
An OAuth-backed Streamable HTTP MCP server can fail startup when its stored credentials are rejected. If a client then completes OAuth sign-in and replaces those credentials, the failed server needs to become available without restarting the Codex session.
## What changed
- Track the credential store and OAuth tokens used for each MCP connection, and detect replacements after authentication failures.
- Refresh affected MCP servers before the next turn and include their recovered tools in the model request.
- Classify HTTP authentication challenges and rejected refresh tokens as requiring reauthentication, with sign-in guidance appropriate to local and client-managed environments.
## Testing
- Cover recovery from expired credentials through an externally written replacement token.
- Cover authentication-error classification, startup messaging, and `Auto` store migration from file credentials to the keyring.
GitOrigin-RevId: 9b090089d4e7a44ffc182f4e25da20a18e97b70f
## Why
MCP servers running in an executor must not reuse host-owned OAuth credentials,
even when they have the same configured server name and URL.
## What changed
- Derive environment-scoped credential names for executor-owned MCP servers and
use them consistently for login, logout, authentication, and connection setup.
- Mark executor-owned entries in the file credential store and fail closed when
loading or saving an entry could cross the host/executor boundary.
- Preserve compatibility with existing local OAuth credentials, including local
server names that overlap the new reserved prefixes.
## Testing
- Extend the executor MCP integration test to verify that executor requests use
the executor token, never send the host token, and persist both credentials
separately.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4fc92d0533b0fe2e0df34f6d47b81e3d20d07807
## Why
Refreshing MCP runtime state should not restart an unchanged, ready server or
relist its tools.
## What changed
- Reconcile refreshed MCP configuration against the published connection set
and reuse connections whose transport, environment, authentication, OAuth
credentials, and client capabilities are unchanged.
- Keep tool filters, timeouts, metadata, and plugin provenance in the published
server view so those settings can change without reconnecting.
- Update elicitation authority in place for reused connections, and reconnect
when connection-defining inputs or live OAuth credentials change.
## Testing
Added coverage for unchanged-server reuse, view-only and elicitation-policy
updates, connection identity changes, OAuth credential changes, and avoiding
redundant tool listing.
GitOrigin-RevId: f04f5db5fbdde127b6a14f6aa9673112c0b557e7
## Why
Concurrent Codex processes can otherwise refresh the same rotating token, and a
cancelled or partially persisted refresh can leave durable and in-memory MCP
credentials out of sync.
## What changed
- Serialize each credential's read-refresh-write transaction across processes,
reread the authoritative store after locking, and adopt credentials refreshed
by another process.
- Keep refresh persistence running after caller cancellation, bound lock and
provider waits independently, and preserve omitted refresh tokens and scopes.
- Fail MCP startup and operations when refresh or persistence fails instead of
continuing with stale credentials, while requiring reauthorization for
missing, unusable, or rejected refresh tokens.
- Exclude OAuth refresh time from the MCP initialization timeout.
## Testing
Add coverage for lock contention, concurrent refreshes, rejected and missing
credentials, storage failures, caller cancellation, and provider timeouts.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4d29b879bec646d2ceb922b526dc793b1a1f5423
[Codex Thread
019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6)
## Stack
Review and merge in order. Every layer is independently correct and
documents its safe stopping point.
1. [openai/codex#30292](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30292) —
aggregate File/Secrets store locking
2. [openai/codex#30293](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30293) —
resolve and lifecycle-pin the exact OAuth store
3. [openai/codex#30416](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30416) —
serialized authoritative refresh transaction
4. [openai/codex#30294](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30294) —
Codex-owned transport refresh and one-shot 401 recovery
5. [openai/codex#30295](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30295) —
login/logout transaction serialization
6. [openai/codex#30296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30296) —
diagnostic-only Auto store drift reporting
**This PR is layer 2.**
## Why
`Auto` is keyring-first with a File fallback, but re-evaluating that
policy during transport reconstruction or persistence can make one MCP
client read from one store and later write to another. With rotating
refresh tokens, the second store may contain an older token. This layer
makes the source selected at client startup explicit and keeps that
authority stable for the client lifecycle.
## What this PR does
- Keeps `resolve_oauth_tokens_from_store_policy` as the single
configured-policy entry point and returns both credentials and the
concrete File or Keyring source that supplied them.
- Puts exact `load`, `save`, and `delete` operations on
`ResolvedOAuthCredentialStore`, making “resolve configured policy” and
“use the selected authority” distinct at call sites.
- Pins the first concrete source in `pinned_credential_store` in the
transport recipe, so initialization retries and session reconstruction
cannot re-evaluate `Auto` and adopt another store.
- Gives `OAuthPersistor` the resolved store and keeps subsequent
persistence and removal on that authority.
- Uses a typed keyring-load error to distinguish aggregate-store
coordination failures from ordinary backend failures; a coordination
failure is surfaced instead of triggering File fallback.
- Keeps login-time `Auto` behavior unchanged: prefer Keyring, fall back
to File when unavailable, and clean up legacy File state after a
successful keyring save.
- Adds structured server/backend context when fallback cleanup fails.
## Explicit decisions and non-goals
- The selection is lifecycle-local and in memory. This PR does not add a
durable backend selector, migration, reconciliation registry, or global
source of truth outside `CODEX_HOME`.
- `Auto` may choose File at the start of a later process if keyring
availability changes. Once this client resolves, a selected-store
failure is returned instead of hot-switching.
- Different `CODEX_HOME` instances remain independent even when they can
access the same Direct keyring credential.
- Cross-process refresh serialization is intentionally not part of this
layer.
## Safe stopping point
This PR can merge alone. A single MCP client no longer hot-switches
credential stores across transport rebuilds or persistence. Two
processes can still refresh the same selected credential concurrently
until layer 3.
## Review size
The net layer is 9 files, +668/−144. The production change remains
focused on store resolution and lifecycle pinning; the largest follow-up
is integration coverage that drives real session recovery.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (99 passed; 5 expected skips)
- Real-client 404 recovery coverage with different Keyring and File
tokens; captured bearer headers prove the stale File token is never sent
- Mutation check: removing the lifecycle pin makes that integration
regression fail by observing the stale File token
[Codex Thread
019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019edd6d-6f14-74e2-853c-345d1803d4a6)
## Stack
Review and merge in order. Every layer is independently correct and
documents its safe stopping point.
1. [openai/codex#30292](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30292) —
aggregate File/Secrets store locking
2. [openai/codex#30293](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30293) —
resolve and lifecycle-pin the exact OAuth store
3. [openai/codex#30416](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30416) —
serialized authoritative refresh transaction
4. [openai/codex#30294](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30294) —
Codex-owned transport refresh and one-shot 401 recovery
5. [openai/codex#30295](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30295) —
login/logout transaction serialization
6. [openai/codex#30296](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/30296) —
diagnostic-only Auto store drift reporting
**This PR is layer 1.**
## Why
MCP OAuth credentials stored in File or Secrets share one aggregate map.
Concurrent read-modify-write operations for different MCP servers can
both read the same snapshot and let the later write discard the earlier
update. That is a correctness problem independent of refresh-token
rotation.
## What this PR does
- Adds a bounded cross-process lock around aggregate File and Secrets
loads, saves, and deletes.
- Distinguishes aggregate-lock failures from Secrets backend
unavailability, so Auto can fall back only for the latter and cannot
bypass serialization by reading or writing File.
- Keeps Direct keyring operations outside this lock because they are
already per credential.
- Releases the Secrets aggregate lock before legacy File cleanup so
cross-store cleanup cannot create nested aggregate-lock ordering.
- Tests actual contention by waiting for an observed `WouldBlock`,
rather than assuming a sleeping worker reached the lock.
- Tests load and save with only the Secrets lock path broken while
fallback File remains readable and writable.
## Decisions and non-goals
- This lock protects aggregate-store read-modify-write integrity only.
It does not choose a credential authority or serialize an OAuth refresh
transaction.
- The lock is scoped to the active `CODEX_HOME`, matching the aggregate
files it protects.
- Lock waits are bounded, and coordination failures are surfaced rather
than treated as evidence that Secrets is unavailable.
## Safe stopping point
This PR can merge alone. It prevents lost updates and partial aggregate
reads. Auto can still resolve again during a client lifecycle until
layer 2, and concurrent refreshes remain possible until layer 3.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (96 passed; expected environment
skips)
- Focused aggregate File/Secrets lock contention and Auto fallback tests
## Summary
- store MCP OAuth credentials in the configured auth credential backend
- support encrypted-local OAuth storage, including legacy keyring
migration
- propagate the credential backend through MCP refresh, session, CLI,
and app-server paths
## Stack
1. #27504 — config and feature flag
2. #27535 — auth-specific secret namespaces
3. #27539 — encrypted CLI auth storage
4. this PR — encrypted MCP OAuth storage
This is a parallel review stack; the original #17931 remains unchanged.
## Tests
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (the transport round-trip test passed
after building the required `codex` binary and retrying)
- `just test -p codex-mcp`
- `just test -p codex-app-server
refresh_config_uses_latest_auth_keyring_backend`
- `just test -p codex-core
refresh_mcp_servers_is_deferred_until_next_turn`
- `just test -p codex-cli mcp`
- `just fix -p codex-rmcp-client -p codex-mcp -p codex-core -p codex-cli
-p codex-app-server -p codex-protocol`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Why
Persisted MCP OAuth credentials were reported as authenticated whenever
a credential record existed. An expired token without a usable refresh
token could therefore appear as `OAuth` even though startup could not
authenticate with it, leaving users with a misleading status instead of
a login prompt.
## What changed
- Classify stored OAuth credentials as missing, usable, or requiring
authorization.
- Reuse the existing refresh window so near-expiry credentials without a
refresh path are also treated as logged out.
- Validate required credential fields before reporting OAuth
authentication.
- Add unit coverage for credential usability and integration coverage
for expired, unexpired, and refreshable persisted credentials.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client`
## Why
Codex persists OAuth expiry as an absolute `expires_at`, then
reconstructs RMCP’s relative `expires_in` when credentials are loaded.
For an already-expired token, Codex reconstructed `expires_in` as
missing.
[RMCP 0.15 treated a missing `expires_in` as zero when a refresh token
was
present](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/blob/9cfc905a9ef17c8bba6748dc0a9bdd2452681733/crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs#L704-L723),
so this still triggered a refresh. [RMCP 1.7 treats missing expiry
information as unknown and uses the access token
as-is](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/blob/3529c3675ff64db805bd947ca6ece6090809e43d/crates/rmcp/src/transport/auth.rs#L1233-L1265),
causing the stale token to be sent during `initialize`.
## What changed
- Represent a known-expired persisted token as `expires_in = 0`,
preserving `None` for genuinely unknown expiry.
- Add Streamable HTTP coverage requiring the token to refresh before the
startup handshake.
## Validation
- The new regression test fails on RMCP 1.7 before the fix and passes
afterward.
- The same scenario passes on the commit immediately before the RMCP 1.7
update, using RMCP 0.15.
- `just test -p codex-rmcp-client` (63 passed).
WIll make it easier to uprev when the new draft spec is supported.
Also updates reqwest where needed for compatibility but doesn't update
it everywhere since this is already a large diff.
The new version of rmcp handles certain kinds of authentication failures
differently, this patch includes support for identifying the failing scope
in a WWW-Authenticate header.
## Why
This PR prepares the stack to enable Clippy await-holding lints that
were left disabled in #18178. The mechanical lock-scope cleanup is
handled separately; this PR is the documentation/configuration layer for
the remaining await-across-guard sites.
Without explicit annotations, reviewers and future maintainers cannot
tell whether an await-holding warning is a real concurrency smell or an
intentional serialization boundary.
## What changed
- Configures `clippy.toml` so `await_holding_invalid_type` also covers
`tokio::sync::{MutexGuard,RwLockReadGuard,RwLockWriteGuard}`.
- Adds targeted `#[expect(clippy::await_holding_invalid_type, reason =
...)]` annotations for intentional async guard lifetimes.
- Documents the main categories of intentional cases: active-turn state
transitions that must remain atomic, session-owned MCP manager accesses,
remote-control websocket serialization, JS REPL kernel/process
serialization, OAuth persistence, external bearer token refresh
serialization, and tests that intentionally serialize shared global or
session-owned state.
- For external bearer token refresh, documents the existing
serialization boundary: holding `cached_token` across the provider
command prevents concurrent cache misses from starting duplicate refresh
commands, and the current behavior is small enough that an explicit
expectation is easier to maintain than adding another synchronization
primitive.
## Verification
- `cargo clippy -p codex-login --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-connectors --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets`
- The follow-up PR #18698 enables `await_holding_invalid_type` and
`await_holding_lock` as workspace `deny` lints, so any undocumented
remaining offender will fail Clippy.
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/18423).
* #18698
* __->__ #18423
Summary
- require `CODEX_HOME` to point to an existing directory before
canonicalizing and surface clear errors otherwise
- share the same helper logic in both `core` and `rmcp-client` and add
unit tests that cover missing, non-directory, valid, and default paths
This addresses #9222
### What
Add JSON Schema generation for `config.toml`, with checked‑in
`docs/config.schema.json`. We can move the schema elsewhere if preferred
(and host it if there's demand).
Add fixture test to prevent drift and `just write-config-schema` to
regenerate on schema changes.
Generate MCP config schema from `RawMcpServerConfig` instead of
`McpServerConfig` because that is the runtime type used for
deserialization.
Populate feature flag values into generated schema so they can be
autocompleted.
### Tests
Added tests + regenerate script to prevent drift. Tested autocompletions
using generated jsonschema locally with Even Better TOML.
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5aa7cd39-520c-4a63-96fb-63798183d0bc
Follow-up PR to #5569. Add Keyring Support for Auth Storage in Codex CLI
as well as a hybrid mode (default to persisting in keychain but fall
back to file when unavailable.)
It also refactors out the keyringstore implementation from rmcp-client
[here](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/rmcp-client/src/oauth.rs)
to a new keyring-store crate.
There will be a follow-up that picks the right credential mode depending
on the config, instead of hardcoding `AuthCredentialsStoreMode::File`.
This adds a queryable auth status for MCP servers which is useful:
1. To determine whether a streamable HTTP server supports auth or not
based on whether or not it supports RFC 8414-3.2
2. Allow us to build a better user experience on top of MCP status
This lets users/companies explicitly choose whether to force/disallow
the keyring/fallback file storage for mcp credentials.
People who develop with Codex will want to use this until we sign
binaries or else each ad-hoc debug builds will require keychain access
on every build. I don't love this and am open to other ideas for how to
handle that.
```toml
mcp_oauth_credentials_store = "auto"
mcp_oauth_credentials_store = "file"
mcp_oauth_credentials_store = "keyrung"
```
Defaults to `auto`
This PR adds oauth login support to streamable http servers when
`experimental_use_rmcp_client` is enabled.
This PR is large but represents the minimal amount of work required for
this to work. To keep this PR smaller, login can only be done with
`codex mcp login` and `codex mcp logout` but it doesn't appear in `/mcp`
or `codex mcp list` yet. Fingers crossed that this is the last large MCP
PR and that subsequent PRs can be smaller.
Under the hood, credentials are stored using platform credential
managers using the [keyring crate](https://crates.io/crates/keyring).
When the keyring isn't available, it falls back to storing credentials
in `CODEX_HOME/.credentials.json` which is consistent with how other
coding agents handle authentication.
I tested this on macOS, Windows, WSL (ubuntu), and Linux. I wasn't able
to test the dbus store on linux but did verify that the fallback works.
One quirk is that if you have credentials, during development, every
build will have its own ad-hoc binary so the keyring won't recognize the
reader as being the same as the write so it may ask for the user's
password. I may add an override to disable this or allow
users/enterprises to opt-out of the keyring storage if it causes issues.
<img width="5064" height="686" alt="CleanShot 2025-09-30 at 19 31 40"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9573f9b4-07f1-4160-83b8-2920db287e2d"
/>
<img width="745" height="486" alt="image"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9562649b-ea5f-4f22-ace2-d0cb438b143e"
/>