## What changed
Negotiate executor support for `credential_masking` and enable built-in credential brokerage in executor-local network proxies. Supported non-login Bash commands on Linux and macOS receive credential placeholders, with real credentials injected by the proxy for matching destinations.
Retain credential mappings across process launches within the same executor session, scoped by environment, conversation, and broker configuration. Keep credentials and destination context on the executor.
Fall back to unmasked execution for unsupported shells or shell startup, and for configured credential providers. Emit warnings when masking is unavailable, preserving shell profiles and snapshots.
## Testing
Add coverage for capability negotiation, fallback behavior, mapping reuse and isolation, proxy credential injection, and keeping executor credentials out of model-visible request history. Test warning, removal, and rejection modes for credentials left unmasked during preparation.
GitOrigin-RevId: f64e916a5de8350fa0d289d3440ec29761accd75
## Why
Sequential dispatch lets a long-running request block unrelated health checks
and cleanup on the same connection.
## What changed
- Add `--concurrent-requests <COUNT>` for local and remote exec-server
connections, while retaining sequential dispatch when the option is omitted
or set to `1`.
- Preserve handshake ordering before enabling concurrent dispatch.
- Reserve separate capacity for status, signal, terminate, and close requests so
they remain responsive when ordinary request capacity is saturated.
- Drain queued client responses during disconnect and cancel outstanding
request tasks during connection shutdown.
## Testing
- Cover CLI parsing and concurrency-limit validation.
- Verify default sequential behavior, pipelined handshake ordering, concurrent
request progress, control-request responsiveness, and disconnect handling.
GitOrigin-RevId: 48e4b092e318204ed635543f01f9ee0e7df095fc
## What changed
- Rename `ReqwestHttpClient` to `RouteAwareHttpClient` to reflect that delegated HTTP uses Codex's shared route-aware transport.
- Use `codex_http_client` response and error types plus transport-neutral `http` and `url` types, removing the exec server's direct `reqwest` dependency.
## Testing
- Cover fragment stripping and Unicode hostname normalization for delegated HTTP requests.
GitOrigin-RevId: 8b0fc60a76004feb57198bfb4afb1371c9ceb1bd
[Codex Thread
019ef1f9-36e2-7e91-9337-504f097b9dc1](https://codex-thread-link.openai.chatgpt-team.site/thread/019ef1f9-36e2-7e91-9337-504f097b9dc1)
## Why
Hosted plugin-service Streamable HTTP MCP traffic uses
`https://chatgpt.com/backend-api/ps/mcp` and depends on Cloudflare's
`__cflb` cookie for load-balancer affinity. The local and exec-server
`http/request` path built a fresh reqwest client for each request
without installing Codex's existing shared ChatGPT Cloudflare cookie
store, so affinity could be lost between calls.
This is an affinity-hardening change motivated by an incident
investigation. It does not establish the broader connector-cache
incident RCA or claim to fix that incident in full.
## What changed
- Install the existing process-local, strictly allowlisted ChatGPT
Cloudflare cookie store on the reqwest client used by
`ReqwestHttpClient`.
- Fresh clients now share allowed Cloudflare infrastructure cookies
within the process that originates the local or exec-server network
request.
- Keep the existing HTTPS ChatGPT-host and Cloudflare-cookie-name
restrictions. This does not introduce a general cookie jar or send
ChatGPT Cloudflare cookies to unrelated hosts.
## Test coverage
- `codex-client` unit coverage verifies that the existing strict store
accepts and returns `__cflb` for HTTPS ChatGPT URLs.
- The exec-server HTTPS integration test sends four independent
`http/request` calls through a local TLS-intercepting proxy and verifies
that:
- `Set-Cookie: __cflb=west` is sent on the next plugin-service request;
- a later `Set-Cookie: __cflb=central` replaces the stored value;
- non-Cloudflare session cookies are discarded;
- no stored ChatGPT Cloudflare cookie is sent to a non-ChatGPT host.
- `just test -p codex-client` — 38 passed.
- `just test -p codex-exec-server --test chatgpt_cloudflare_affinity` —
1 passed.
- `just bazel-lock-check` — passed.
## Non-goals
- No persistence of ChatGPT auth, account, session, residency, or
arbitrary cookies.
- No cookie persistence for third-party MCP servers.
- No special composition of caller-provided `Cookie` headers.
- No plugin-service, connector-cache, Habitat/habicache, routing,
redirect, or API-contract changes.
- No broader incident RCA conclusions.