## What changed
- Report the executor's user home in environment metadata.
- Cache the reported home on selected turn environments and include it in
filesystem sandbox contexts, including `apply_patch` requests.
- Preserve compatibility with executors that do not report a home directory.
## Testing
- Cover local, remote, inherited, serialized, and `apply_patch` sandbox
contexts.
GitOrigin-RevId: ea65e68e33a80bc9bcfc7c53b1486ab944699470
## What changed
- Add the `write_stdin_approval` feature flag, disabled by default, to require a fresh approval before sending non-empty input to an escalated unified-exec terminal.
- Route these reviews through hooks, Guardian, app-server, and the TUI as `writeStdin` approvals while keeping the parent command item unchanged.
- Preserve the terminal environment, launch directory, and escalation state across turns, and revalidate the process identity after approval before writing input.
## Testing
- Cover approval routing, policy decisions, process reuse, terminal identity preservation, app-server events, analytics, and TUI rendering.
GitOrigin-RevId: 4ba29eaae6208e934737ba078c96e589c7c2164d
## Why
Filesystem policies containing `:tmpdir` need executor-local directory bindings,
including when execution occurs in a remote environment.
## What changed
- Cache temporary directories reported by remote executors and discover the
equivalent directories for local environments.
- Preserve the cached directories across inherited environment selection and
include them in `FileSystemSandboxContext`.
- Add `FileSystemSandboxPolicyContext` and a context accessor so filesystem
policy entries can be resolved with the executor-owned current directory,
workspace roots, and temporary directories.
## Testing
Extend environment-selection tests to cover local, remote, and inherited
temporary-directory policy context.
GitOrigin-RevId: 36335af3465c529f024bf69293af288803dd582d
## Why
Filesystem permission paths can use a convention that differs from the host
running Codex. Converting them immediately to native absolute paths can change
the meaning of ambiguous paths such as `/C:/secret` or Windows UNC paths.
## What changed
- Store literal filesystem permission paths as `PathUri` values through the
runtime policy and execution protocol.
- Keep legacy string-based serialization at explicit protocol boundaries and
reject conversions that cannot be represented losslessly.
- Encode native paths as opaque URIs when a normal file URI would imply the
wrong path convention.
## Testing
Added coverage for cross-platform and ambiguous path round trips, UNC path
variants, permission-profile serialization, and deny-policy enforcement.
GitOrigin-RevId: 5247713796d1f2bb4e02f94eb9fc82d4698060f0
## Why
Windows sandbox requests must preserve managed filesystem deny rules across every execution path and setup refresh. Unsupported policies should fail closed instead of allowing a command to run without the requested protection.
## What changed
- Resolve Windows filesystem overrides while constructing each sandbox execution request so both `shell_command` and `exec_command` enforce exact-path and glob deny-read entries.
- Carry resolved deny-read paths into Windows sandbox setup refreshes, including workspace-relative entries.
- Reject unelevated restricted-token requests that cannot enforce deny-read rules.
- Reject recursive globs rooted at a filesystem root unless `glob_scan_max_depth` bounds their expansion.
## Testing
Added coverage for deny-read enforcement through both command runtimes, setup refresh resolution, restricted-token failure, and bounded root-level glob scans.
GitOrigin-RevId: 33dfa4d1a45b14850cbf58f9173717e3e707d9bf
## Why
Cross-platform remote `apply_patch` calls were rejected when filesystem writes
were restricted because patch verification and writes could not be safely
performed against executor files.
## What changed
- Route intercepted and direct remote patches through the executor-managed
filesystem sandbox, including the configured workspace roots.
- Select the restricted-token sandbox for Windows executor paths when no
Windows sandbox level was configured.
- Fail closed when an executor cannot enforce the requested sandbox, and treat
executor-managed access failures as sandbox denials so approval can retry the
patch without sandboxing.
## Testing
- Cover sandboxed remote patches, denied writes, approval retries, Windows
sandbox selection, and executor filesystem enforcement.
GitOrigin-RevId: caddeed0b266c456a689080a14a3a58e2bd7887c
## Why
Guardian review commands can run without the proxy-port environment used to
configure the parent session. Reconciling persistent Windows sandbox settings
for those commands can discard the parent's proxy configuration.
## What changed
- Add a session-level Windows sandbox proxy-settings mode and use `Preserve`
for guardian review sessions while keeping `Reconcile` as the default.
- Carry the mode through unified exec and the exec-server sandbox context to
Windows process launches.
- In preserve mode, reuse the proxy settings recorded by the existing sandbox
setup marker.
## Testing
Added coverage for guardian session configuration, exec-server transport, and
preserving an existing setup marker when proxy-port environment variables are
absent.
GitOrigin-RevId: 214655c6e6d97360906431773dc0de0fdda2db6e
## Why
Default read-only protections for project metadata should apply when paths such
as `.git`, `.agents`, and `.codex` exist, without causing sandbox setup to
materialize missing paths as ACL targets.
## What changed
- Add an optional `missing_path_behavior` to filesystem sandbox entries and
mark default project-metadata protections with `skip`.
- Preserve the behavior through permission transforms and exec/MCP protocol
serialization while keeping existing path wire variants stable.
- Ignore skip-missing entries when projecting configuration or Windows sandbox
overrides, while retaining explicit metadata carveouts.
## Testing
- Cover protocol round trips for path and special-path entries.
- Verify default metadata protections and Windows explicit carveout handling.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6df13dadacdd131c44aab9f15a967c81051355c1
## Why
Remote executions need managed-network proxy listeners in the executor so their
loopback proxy addresses are reachable by the launched process.
## What changed
- Add a capability-gated exec-server protocol field for executor-local proxy
launch configuration, including network policy, audit metadata, and execution
attribution.
- Start the proxy while preparing a remote process, replace inherited proxy
environment variables with its local addresses, and derive the sandbox
context from its listeners.
- Keep the proxy alive until inherited output streams close, then shut it down.
- Reject unsupported remote settings such as MITM and credential injection.
## Testing
- Cover configuration round trips and rejection of unsupported settings.
- Verify executor-local startup, blocked-domain enforcement, protocol
compatibility, and proxy lifetime through process closure.
GitOrigin-RevId: c984f54e3e600aa9ebcbf8cf4574046e2c199d11
## Why
Multi-environment turns can run against different filesystems, so a single
thread-wide workspace-root list cannot accurately describe every selected
environment.
## What changed
- Add optional `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` to each app-server environment selection.
Omitted roots default to that environment's `cwd`, while an empty list selects
no roots.
- Carry environment-native roots through turn selection, model-visible context,
permission materialization, and tool sandboxing.
- Keep the top-level `runtimeWorkspaceRoots` field as a compatibility input when
constructing default environment selections; explicit selections use their
own roots.
## Testing
- Cover thread and turn API defaults, overrides, empty roots, and schema
round-tripping.
- Verify foreign roots remain model-visible and remote execution applies the
target environment's roots before sandbox selection.
GitOrigin-RevId: c6e7a62883c45c676c153055f46a55ee15a323a4
## What changed
- Pass configured workspace roots from core to the exec server so filesystem and process sandbox permissions are materialized against the intended roots.
- Preserve an explicitly empty workspace-root list instead of treating the sandbox working directory as an implicit root.
- Initialize filesystem sandbox contexts with their working directory as the default workspace root.
## Testing
- Add end-to-end coverage for patch and command writes inside and outside workspace roots.
- Verify remote filesystem and process sandboxes do not grant access through an empty workspace-root list.
GitOrigin-RevId: 6684c8f7de50970b45a29e2a6323df954c96f9f6
## Why
Managed-network commands within one Codex conversation share the same
HTTP and SOCKS proxy ingress. When several exec calls run concurrently,
the proxy sees the requested destination but cannot tell which exec
opened the connection.
For example:
```text
exec A: curl https://example.com/a ─┐
├─> conversation proxy ─> Guardian
exec B: curl https://example.com/b ─┘ host: example.com
trigger: unknown
```. Three parallel network execs reached Guardian without their
triggering call IDs or commands. Guardian denied the requests, but Codex
could not safely associate those outcomes with the individual tool
calls.
## What changes
Keep the shared proxy ingress and tag each connection at the existing
trusted Linux bridge:
```text
exec A ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token A][proxy bytes] ─┐
├─> shared HTTP/SOCKS ingress
exec B ─> existing Linux bridge ─> [token B][proxy bytes] ─┘
│
token A ─> exec A ─────┤
token B ─> exec B ─────┘
```
The complete path is:
```text
active exec registration
│
├─ registers its UUID as a short-lived attribution token
├─ passes the token to the Linux sandbox helper
├─ helper removes the token before launching the user command
├─ existing host bridge prepends the token to each proxy connection
├─ shared proxy consumes the bounded attribution frame
└─ proxy attaches the matching execution-scoped state
├─ Guardian receives the exact call ID and command
└─ a denial finishes/cancels the matching tool call
```
Dropping the active or deferred exec registration removes the token.
Connections that were already accepted retain their resolved
attribution; new connections using an expired token fail closed.
## Before and after
Before, Guardian could receive only the network destination:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"host": "www.17track.net",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "https"
}
```
After, the same request includes the action that caused it:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"host": "www.17track.net",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "https",
"trigger": {
"callId": "exec-network-first",
"command": ["/bin/sh", "-c", "curl https://www.17track.net"]
}
}
```
## Listener accounting
This PR does **not** create proxy listeners per exec.
```text
Existing topology:
one conversation -> one HTTP listener + optional one SOCKS listener
Discarded per-exec approach:
one conversation -> existing listener pair
+ up to one additional listener pair per active exec
This PR:
one conversation -> existing listener pair only
+ one small token-map entry per active exec
```
The Linux sandbox already creates a trusted routing bridge for each
sandboxed command. This PR adds a short frame write to that bridge
rather than introducing another listener, task, or proxy process.
The existing conversation-scoped listener pair remains. Making a single
proxy service shared across multiple conversations would be a separate
multi-tenant architecture change involving per-conversation policy,
configuration, audit, and Guardian routing.
## Keeping the implementation small
The attribution is bound once, when the TCP connection enters the proxy.
The ingress installs an execution-scoped clone of the existing
`NetworkProxyState`, so the established HTTP, SOCKS, MITM, policy,
audit, and blocked-request paths continue using their existing state
lookup.
This avoids plumbing a new request-context type through every protocol
handler. Outside the two ingress wrappers, protocol-specific request
handling is unchanged.
## Security behavior
- Tokens are generated from the existing random execution registration
IDs.
- The trusted Linux helper consumes and removes the token before
executing user code.
- Attribution frames have a fixed magic prefix, bounded token length,
and bounded read timeout.
- Unknown or expired tokens close the connection.
- A token presented to a proxy for another environment closes the
connection.
- Existing unframed callers preserve the current conservative
attribution behavior.
## Platform scope
Exact bridge attribution is enabled on Linux. macOS and Windows retain
their current shared-proxy behavior.
## Test coverage
The concurrent end-to-end test starts two managed-network execs together
and synchronizes them so both are active before either connects. It then
inspects the two Guardian requests and compares the complete attribution
pairs:
```text
(exec-network-first, exact first command)
(exec-network-second, exact second command)
```
Focused proxy coverage verifies the bounded frame and that a registered
framed connection receives the matching execution and environment state.
## Scope
This fixes the Linux network-to-exec attribution path and records a
denial against the exact matching tool call. It intentionally does not
change:
- delivery of an entirely unattributed denial to the parent turn;
- how parallel denials count toward the Guardian circuit breaker;
- how the UI displays the rejection reason or completed-turn state.
Those remain separate concerns from attribution.
## Relationship to #29456 and #29668#29456 made the proxy environment and sandbox policy come from the same
prepared network context. This PR adds the execution token to that
prepared launch and consumes it at the shared ingress.
This follows #29668's shared-ingress framing direction, but completes
the production registration, Linux bridge, core call mapping, denial
mapping, and concurrent end-to-end path. It also keeps attribution in
the existing per-connection proxy state instead of introducing
request-context plumbing through every HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM handler.
This PR is intended to supersede #29668 for the Linux attribution fix.
---------
Co-authored-by: viyatb-oai <viyatb@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
Managed network configures commands to use local HTTP and SOCKS proxies.
For commands delegated to the exec server, the proxy environment and the
sandbox policy were prepared separately. On macOS, that meant a command
could receive `HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123` while Seatbelt still
denied access to port `43123`.
## What changed
`NetworkProxy` now prepares the command environment and sandbox context
together from the same runtime snapshot:
```text
Prepared managed network
├── command environment: HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:43123
└── sandbox context: allow outbound to 127.0.0.1:43123
```
That context travels with remote exec requests. The exec server
preserves the managed proxy and CA environment, and macOS Seatbelt
allows only the prepared loopback proxy ports without enabling broad
network access or local binding.
The protocol field is optional and the existing enforcement flag remains
in place, preserving compatibility with callers that do not send the new
context.
## Why
PR #29108 lets the orchestrator send sandbox intent with `process/start`
without wrapping the command for its own operating system.
This PR completes that boundary by making the executor interpret and
enforce the intent using its own filesystem paths and sandbox
implementation.
For example, a macOS TUI targeting a Linux devbox sends `/bin/bash -lc
pwd`. The Linux executor turns that into its own `codex-linux-sandbox
... /bin/bash -lc pwd` launch.
## What changes
- Keep `process/start` unchanged when no sandbox intent is present.
- Convert sandbox `PathUri` values into native paths on the executor.
- Bind symbolic `:workspace_roots` permissions to the executor's native
sandbox cwd.
- Select the sandbox implementation on the executor and wrap the
original command immediately before spawning it.
- Reject sandbox-required execution before spawning when the executor
cannot enforce the intent.
- Pass exec-server runtime paths into process creation so Linux can
locate `codex-linux-sandbox`.
The boundary is therefore:
```text
orchestrator executor
original argv + sandbox intent -> select and enforce local sandbox
```
This PR intentionally treats a denied remote command as an ordinary
command failure. Draft follow-up #29424 carries a semantic
`sandboxDenied` result back to unified exec for the existing approval
and retry flow.
## Platform scope
Linux and macOS use their existing direct-spawn sandbox transforms.
Windows sandboxed remote process launch is intentionally unsupported in
this PR. The current Windows direct-spawn wrapper does not correctly
preserve arbitrary argv, TTY behavior, or pass the full child
environment out of band. The executor rejects the request instead of
running it incorrectly or unsandboxed.
## Known follow-ups
- The transported permission profile can still contain
orchestrator-materialized helper or explicit paths. A `TODO(jif)` marks
where the executor boundary should receive pre-host-materialization
permission intent.
- The sandbox wrapper currently replaces a requested custom inner
`arg0`. A `TODO(jif)` marks where this must be preserved or rejected
explicitly.
- Draft PR #29424 contains the deferred sandbox-denial classification
and approval/retry behavior.
## Rollout assumption
This executor-sandbox stack is unreleased and its client and executor
are expected to move together. This PR does not add mixed-version
negotiation with older exec servers.
## What changed
PR #29099 stopped sending the orchestrator's concrete sandbox wrapper to
a remote exec-server. Remote commands now arrive as plain native argv.
This PR adds the next piece: Codex also sends portable sandbox intent
next to that plain argv.
For a remote unified-exec command, the request can now include:
- the canonical permission profile before local workspace-root
materialization
- the sandbox cwd and workspace roots as `PathUri` values
- Windows sandbox settings
- the legacy Landlock setting
- whether managed networking must be enforced
The important part is that symbolic entries such as `:workspace_roots`
stay symbolic while crossing the boundary. The executor can then bind
them to its own workspace-root paths instead of receiving
orchestrator-local absolute paths.
The data travels through `ExecRequest` into `ExecParams`. Older
exec-servers can still deserialize requests because the new fields have
defaults.
## Why
The orchestrator should not decide how another machine implements
sandboxing.
For example:
- a local macOS Codex would normally build a Seatbelt command
- a remote Linux executor needs a Linux sandbox command instead
The orchestrator now sends the plain command plus the policy it intended
to enforce. A later PR can let the exec-server choose and build the
correct sandbox for its own operating system.
## Important detail
This keeps the portable intent separate from the local `SandboxType`.
`SandboxType::None` is ambiguous:
- it can mean the command was explicitly approved to run without a
sandbox
- it can also mean the orchestrator host has no concrete sandbox
implementation available
Those cases are different for remote execution. This PR adds
`sandbox_requested` so an executor can still receive sandbox intent when
the orchestrator cannot build a local wrapper. Explicit unsandboxed
retries still send no sandbox context.
## Behavior today
This PR only transports the intent. The exec-server accepts the new
fields but does not apply them yet.
Remote commands therefore remain unsandboxed after this PR, just as they
are after PR #29099.
## Follow-up
The next PR will make exec-server read this portable intent, bind
symbolic workspace permissions to executor-native roots, choose the
sandbox for its own operating system, build the wrapper locally, and
then spawn the command.
## Summary
- Remote unified-exec now sends the original command argv to exec-server
instead of materializing the orchestrator's sandbox wrapper first.
- Local unified-exec keeps the existing sandbox path unchanged.
- Add a focused regression test for a macOS-selected sandbox producing
plain remote argv.
Before:
macOS orchestrator -> /usr/bin/sandbox-exec ... -> Linux exec-server
After:
macOS orchestrator -> /bin/bash -lc pwd -> Linux exec-server
This is intentionally only the first cleanup step. Remote unified-exec
commands are sent without a process sandbox until the targeted
follow-ups below land. For the macOS-to-Linux path this is not a
practical regression: the old sandboxed attempt failed before process
launch because the Linux executor could not spawn macOS sandbox paths.
## Targeted follow-ups
1. Carry sandbox intent separately from argv.
- Add an optional sandbox field to exec-server process params.
- Reuse FileSystemSandboxContext rather than introducing a new sandbox
model.
- Carry managed-network enforcement as one explicit bit.
- Keep argv plain.
2. Apply that intent inside exec-server.
- Add a small process-start adapter before LocalProcess::exec.
- Reuse the existing codex-sandboxing SandboxManager and exec-server
runtime paths.
- Follow the same shape already used by exec-server filesystem
sandboxing.
- Do not duplicate or move the sandbox implementations.
3. Report the sandbox actually used.
- Return the executor-selected sandbox type from process/start.
- Use that value in core for sandbox-denial detection and retry
behavior.
## End state
The orchestrator sends plain commands plus portable sandbox intent. The
executor chooses and applies its own native sandbox: Linux executors use
Linux sandboxing, macOS executors use Seatbelt, and Windows executors
use Windows sandboxing. Concrete wrapper argv, helper paths, and sandbox
env markers never cross the executor boundary.
## Why
Permission profiles can mark filesystem entries as unreadable with
`deny` rules, including glob patterns. Several shell execution paths
treated known-safe commands or execpolicy `allow` rules as sufficient to
run outside the filesystem sandbox. That is not valid for read-capable
commands: for example, `cat` or `ls` may be reasonable to allow
generally, but dropping the sandbox would also drop deny-read
constraints such as `**/*.env`.
## What changed
- Added a shared check that treats active deny-read restrictions as
incompatible with unsandboxed execution.
- Kept first-attempt execution sandboxed for explicit escalation and
execpolicy allow bypasses when deny-read entries are present.
- Prevented no-sandbox retry after a sandbox denial when the active
filesystem policy contains deny-read entries.
- Updated the zsh-fork execve path so prefix-rule `allow` decisions
continue inside the current sandbox when deny-read restrictions are
active.
## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::sandboxing::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_command_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy`
## Why
Filesystem permission profiles used `none` for deny-read entries, which
is less direct than the action the entry actually represents. This
change makes `deny` the canonical filesystem permission spelling while
preserving compatibility for older configs that still send `none`.
## What changed
- rename `FileSystemAccessMode::None` to `Deny`
- serialize and generate schemas with `deny` as the canonical value
- retain `none` only as a legacy input alias for temporary config
compatibility
- update filesystem glob diagnostics and regression coverage to use the
canonical spelling
- refresh config and app-server schema fixtures to match the new wire
shape
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-core config_toml_deserializes_permission_profiles
--lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
read_write_glob_patterns_still_reject_non_subpath_globs --lib`
Earlier in the session, a broad `cargo test -p codex-core` run reached
unrelated pre-existing failures in timing/snapshot/git-info tests under
this environment; the targeted surfaces touched by this PR passed
cleanly.
## Why
`SandboxPolicy` is a legacy compatibility shape, but several core tests
still used it for ordinary turn setup even when the runtime path now
carries `PermissionProfile`. With the first cleanup PR merged, this
follow-up trims more core test scaffolding so remaining `SandboxPolicy`
matches are easier to classify as production compatibility,
legacy-boundary coverage, or explicit conversion tests.
## What Changed
- Updated apply-patch handler and runtime tests to pass
`PermissionProfile` directly.
- Changed sandboxing test helpers to build permission profiles without
first creating `SandboxPolicy` values.
- Converted request-permissions integration turns to pass
`PermissionProfile` through the test helper, leaving legacy sandbox
projection at the `Op::UserTurn` boundary.
- Converted unified exec integration helpers and direct turn submissions
to use `PermissionProfile` values instead of `SandboxPolicy` setup.
- Removed now-unused `SandboxPolicy` imports from the touched core
tests.
## Test Plan
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::sandboxing::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::runtimes::apply_patch::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::apply_patch::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib unified_exec::process_manager::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all request_permissions::`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all unified_exec::`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
## Why
Managed filesystem `deny_read` requirements are administrator-enforced
restrictions on specific paths. Once those requirements are active,
Codex should not drop them just because an execution path would
otherwise leave the sandbox.
Before this change, an explicit escalation, a prefix-rule allow, a
sandbox-denial retry, or an app-server legacy sandbox override could
rebuild the runtime policy without those managed read-deny entries and
expose a path the administrator had marked unreadable.
This is narrower than general sandbox-mode constraints. If an enterprise
only sets `allowed_sandbox_modes`, a trusted `prefix_rule(..., decision
= "allow")` can still run its matching command unsandboxed; this PR only
preserves managed filesystem `deny_read` restrictions across those
paths.
## What Changed
- Mark filesystem policies built from managed `deny_read` requirements
so callers can tell when those deny entries must survive escalation.
- Preserve managed deny-read entries when runtime permission profiles
are rebuilt through protocol, app-server, or legacy sandbox-policy
compatibility paths.
- Keep managed deny-read attempts inside the selected sandbox on the
first attempt and after sandbox-denial retries.
- Preserve the same behavior in the zsh-fork escalation path, including
prefix-rule-driven escalation.
- Add a regression test showing the opposite case too: without managed
deny-read, a prefix-rule allow still chooses unsandboxed execution.
## Verification
Targeted automated verification:
```shell
cargo test -p codex-core shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_uses_unsandboxed_execution_without_managed_deny_read -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_preserves_managed_deny_read_escalation -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_filesystem_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol permission_profile_file_system_permissions_preserves_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo check -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui
```
Smoke-test invocations:
```shell
# macOS exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
-c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
-c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
# Linux exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
-c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
-c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",glob_scan_max_depth=3,":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
```
Observed manual smoke matrix:
| Case | macOS Seatbelt | Linux bubblewrap |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `cat allowed.txt` | Pass | Pass |
| `cat secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/root.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/one.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/two.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat alias-to-secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| Missing denied path | A file created after sandbox setup remained
unreadable | Creation was blocked by the reserved missing-path
placeholder, and the placeholder was cleaned up after exit |
| Real `codex exec` shell turn | Pass | Pass |
Notes:
- The Linux smoke run used the fallback glob walker because the devbox
did not have `rg` installed.
- The smoke matrix verifies the end-to-end filesystem behavior on macOS
and Linux; the escalation-specific behavior is covered by the focused
tests above.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Charlie Marsh <charliemarsh@openai.com>
## Summary
Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
`PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
- hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
- hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
- core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings
That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
model-visible and stable
This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.
## Reviewer Notes
I think these are the key files
- `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
- `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`
Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
`command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.
## Changes
- Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
- Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
as `tool_input`.
- Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
`McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
- Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
elicitation.
- Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
`mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Why
PR #13783 moved the `codex.rs` unit tests into `codex_tests.rs`. This
applies the same extraction pattern across the rest of `codex-rs/core`
so the production modules stay focused on runtime code instead of large
inline test blocks.
Keeping the tests in sibling files also makes follow-up edits easier to
review because product changes no longer have to share a file with
hundreds or thousands of lines of test scaffolding.
## What changed
- replaced each inline `mod tests { ... }` in `codex-rs/core/src/**`
with a path-based module declaration
- moved each extracted unit test module into a sibling `*_tests.rs`
file, using `mod_tests.rs` for `mod.rs` modules
- preserved the existing `cfg(...)` guards and module-local structure so
the refactor remains structural rather than behavioral
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib` (`1653 passed; 0 failed; 5 ignored`)
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `cargo fmt --check`
- `cargo shear`