Commit Graph
6 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
viyatb-oai d124fe9de1 Add negotiated network policy metadata support for MCP calls (#56278)
## What changed

Add an optional `NetworkPolicyMetadataProvider` to the MCP runtime. Advertise `codex/network-policy-meta` only to trusted ChatGPT origins when a provider is available, and attach policy metadata only when the sending session also advertises support.

Strip caller-supplied policy metadata and derive restrictions from the call's captured permission profile and server environment. Resolve metadata against each session's capabilities, including after recovery, while retaining one policy snapshot per call. Fail the call before sending if policy resolution fails. Existing runtime callers leave the provider unset.

## Testing

Add tests for capability negotiation, trusted-origin restrictions, forged metadata removal, both tool dispatch paths, and policy snapshot reuse. Add HTTP session-recovery coverage for changing capabilities and policy-resolution failures while preserving caller metadata and read-only restrictions.

GitOrigin-RevId: 4b978f986abc0475fc67659be98fc01a2d6ce7cd
2026-10-22 22:33:07 +00:00
teddywyly-oai 6d75b525ea Allow hosted Apps MCP contributions to override the protocol mode (#46019)
## What changed

Add an optional `protocol_mode` to `McpServerContribution::HostedApps` and apply it when registering the server. Preserve the hosted Apps default when no override is provided.

## Testing

Add an integration test that selects MCP `2026-07-28` with the global feature disabled and completes a native user verification flow, including resuming the tool call with the verification response. Extend capability tests to confirm that the override preserves hosted Apps user verification without granting it to ordinary extension registrations.

GitOrigin-RevId: e8662c45f964c00b0bb4503bbcfd8432d7e2fa70
2026-09-16 20:32:52 +00:00
riley-oai f326857cf4 Restrict MCP user verification and add workspace-scoped identity (#43524)
## Why

Configured MCP servers must not be able to request user verification, even when they reuse the hosted apps server name. Local verification identity selection also needs to distinguish a user's workspace memberships.

## What changed

- Advertise `userVerification` only to the host-owned apps MCP server and cancel verification requests from other servers before prompting the client.
- Add `CodexAuth::get_chatgpt_account_user_id()` to read the access token's opaque `chatgpt_account_user_id` only when its workspace matches the selected account. Missing or malformed claims return no identity, without falling back to another user ID or breaking ordinary authentication.

## Testing

Add coverage for capability filtering, rejection of configured servers including those using the hosted apps name, and account-user identity selection with malformed or mismatched claims. Add an MCP round-trip test showing that verification waits for a client response even in full access mode, returns the supplied proof, and discards response metadata.

GitOrigin-RevId: 156e83d5a0302c013b85e564b46b4bfe858cbdb0
2026-09-07 17:26:10 +00:00
victor-openai eec4a23cb1 Support openai/elicitation form requests (#41447)
## What changed

- Advertise `openai/elicitation` form support when the client declares an
  object-valued `form` capability, without deriving it from the legacy
  `openai/form` capability.
- Handle `openai/elicitation/create` requests in `form` mode and forward their
  metadata and opaque schema through app-server as `openaiForm`, preserving
  `x-openai-*` annotations.
- Keep legacy form handling independent and have the TUI automatically decline
  the new form requests it cannot render.

## Testing

- Add an app-server round-trip test for capability negotiation, request
  forwarding, and accepted responses.
- Extend MCP capability filtering coverage for `openai/elicitation.form`.

GitOrigin-RevId: 88f39257bffafe4ee98a9c910e38507843cd7eeb
2026-08-29 02:43:10 +00:00
mchen-oai 4b0e2a0bff Support MCP form input in full-access user threads (#37864)
## Why

Standard MCP forms can require user-entered values even when tool permissions are
otherwise auto-approved in full-access sessions.

## What changed

- Recognize the `openai/standard-form-input` client extension and surface
  non-approval forms in full-access, user-initiated root threads.
- Keep approval forms, automation and subagent threads, headless sessions, and
  clients without the capability on their existing decline or review paths.
- Treat the capability as client-only so it is not advertised to MCP servers,
  and enable it after session startup so required servers cannot block startup
  waiting for form input.

## Testing

Add unit and app-server coverage for accepted form round trips, declined cases,
approval metadata safeguards, resumed threads, and extension filtering.

GitOrigin-RevId: 053bfe397a5c79eceef90a81d13e2aca6353af43
2026-08-10 18:20:12 +00:00
Martin Au-Yeung ee46c5ba0e Negotiate MCP extensions per app-server session (#36910)
## Why

App-server clients need to advertise structured MCP extension settings, including supported MCP App UI MIME types, rather than only opting into OpenAI form elicitation with a boolean.

## What changed

- Add an `extensions` map to initialize capabilities and preserve `mcpServerOpenaiFormElicitation` as a legacy alias for `openai/form`.
- Capture the declared extension profile when a thread is started, resumed, or forked, propagate it to subagents, and advertise it to downstream MCP servers during initialization.
- Keep the profile stable for the lifetime of the loaded session instead of changing it on later turns or direct tool calls.

## Testing

- Cover extension conversion, downstream MCP initialization, session isolation, legacy form support, and subagent inheritance.

GitOrigin-RevId: fbcedbb74ce788e574b0f884a4c45c4cedb9de54
2026-08-04 15:23:43 +00:00