## Why
Allowing a hostname must not bypass deny or review rules on its resolved IP addresses. Forwarding DNS resolution to an upstream proxy also requires checking whether those address restrictions can still be enforced.
## What changed
- Add `TcpUpstreamProxy` and `set_tcp_upstream_proxy` to require a configured HTTP `CONNECT` next hop for opaque SOCKS TCP traffic. Wait for a successful response before forwarding payloads and preserve bytes read past the response headers.
- Enforce resolved IP deny and review rules at direct connection time, carry destination-scoped authorization through HTTP, SOCKS, and MITM forwarding, and report blocked resolutions as policy denials.
- Recognize equivalent numeric IP spellings for restrictive rules. Permit remote TCP DNS only when local binding is allowed and no deny or review pattern can restrict IP addresses; reject upstream proxy loops.
- Restrict Linux proxy bridges to managed proxy environment keys and supplied loopback ports. Bound concurrent bridge workers and release them after connection failures while allowing queued responses to drain.
- Add test-only Linux DNS name mapping and SOCKS relay helpers with stable synthetic addresses and validation before opening upstream connections.
## Testing
Add regression coverage for CONNECT refusal and buffered tunnel data, resolved-address policy denials, approval handling across policy refreshes, equivalent IP literals, DNS mapping stability, rejected relay requests, and bridge cleanup after resets.
GitOrigin-RevId: bdd6e16de3373d0eb39995f689dad0230680b99e
## Why
Domain wildcards need to retain the byte-based behavior of `globset`. Counting Unicode scalar values changes how `?` matches non-ASCII hosts.
## What changed
Match domain patterns against UTF-8 bytes so `?` consumes exactly one byte. For example, `api??.com` matches `apié.com`. Match hosts through borrowed byte slices, avoiding the per-match character-vector allocation.
Document ASCII case insensitivity and the absence of IDNA conversion: hosts supplied as Punycode require patterns using their Punycode spelling.
## Testing
Compare Unicode wildcard cases against `globset` for both allowlists and denylists, including multibyte characters, combining marks, Punycode, and case sensitivity. Update the exhaustive dynamic-programming comparison and retry-boundary tests to operate on bytes.
GitOrigin-RevId: fae5b3b1ae60b469cd61a44c5c6e245730adc8ba
## Why
Network domain rules need explicit wildcard semantics independent of filesystem glob syntax, including matching Unicode hosts with `?`.
## What changed
Replace `globset` in network allowlist and denylist matching with a domain matcher. Make `?` consume one Unicode scalar value, retain ASCII case-insensitive matching and existing host normalization, and preserve the distinction between `*.example.com` and `**.example.com`.
Reject empty patterns, repeated wildcards outside the supported `**.` prefix, character classes, brace expansions, escapes, slashes, and embedded whitespace when loading policies. Continue allowing global wildcards only in allowlists.
## Testing
Add coverage for Unicode wildcard semantics, unsupported syntax, IPv6 normalization, invalid entries in either policy list, and adversarial matching inputs. Compare the matcher against an independent dynamic-programming implementation over exhaustive short inputs.
GitOrigin-RevId: 64f65fcda1a50998d70e046445d22cd2d2dcf27a
viyatb-oai