## What changed
Extract the inline test modules for `bundled_bwrap`, `bwrap`, `exec_util`,
`launcher`, `proxy_routing`, and `seccomp` into sibling `*_tests.rs` files.
Keep them wired through `#[cfg(test)]` and explicit `#[path]` attributes,
with existing test coverage and runtime behavior unchanged.
GitOrigin-RevId: 79b70a092a19b10716939744542415bc1dcaf0b2
## Why
Bubblewrap discovery probes executables before confinement. Excluding only the command's current directory leaves candidates in other writable roots eligible to run outside the sandbox.
## What changed
- Filter canonical `PATH` candidates using the filesystem policy and effective user permissions, including writable ancestors, symlinked roots, and full-disk write access. Preserve protected system installations while rejecting replaceable paths.
- Select the launcher with the command's permissions before the proc-mount preflight, retaining the bundled bubblewrap fallback.
- Use the effective permission profile and policy working directory for startup warning probes.
## Testing
Add unit coverage for writable roots, symlinks, read-only carveouts, replaceable parents, and full-disk policies. Add Linux integration tests showing writable `bwrap` candidates are neither probed nor launched, including when the command runs in a workspace subdirectory or uses managed networking with full-disk write access.
GitOrigin-RevId: 188c9f45e727eaace062f5abb1205dc23fdf3c51
## Why
Concurrent Linux test spawns can inherit writable descriptors for executable fixtures, preventing those fixtures from being executed even after the writing test closes its descriptor.
## What changed
Replace direct executable fixture writes and copies across the Rust tests with `codex_utils_cargo_bin::write_executable` and `copy_executable`. These existing helpers complete writes and copies in separate processes on Linux.
Remove the empty temporary inode before creating fake bubblewrap executables, and stage tampered bubblewrap bytes in a separate data file before copying them into the executable fixture. Add the required test dependencies.
GitOrigin-RevId: c875c83088731a4933ef1574e8d79d8cecc12f54
## Why
When a container denies fresh `/proc` mounts, the existing sandbox fallback retains the caller's `/proc` while creating a new PID namespace. Process IDs inside the sandbox can then differ from those exposed by `/proc`, breaking process lookups.
## What changed
- Add `codex exec-server --linux-sandbox-pid-namespace=inherit` to reuse the caller's PID namespace and `/proc` for both process and filesystem helpers. Repository config and command environment variables cannot enable it.
- Keep `isolate` as the default, preserving the existing mount fallback and compatibility with older helpers. Inheritance requires an updated helper and omits `--unshare-pid` and `--as-pid-1`.
- Preserve other sandbox restrictions. With `:minimal`, bind the inherited `/proc` read-only with its container masks and apply explicit filesystem denials afterward.
Inheritance is intended for dedicated environments: it allows sandboxed commands to signal other same-UID processes, including the executor.
## Testing
Add unit and integration coverage for namespace flags, denied proc mounts, consistent process IDs, retained sandbox restrictions, and startup-only selection across process and filesystem helpers.
GitOrigin-RevId: dd13f2b9286d7edcf366b3a42a455f4d78daaf27
## Why
System Bubblewrap installations that lack `--ro-bind-fd` cannot directly create
the descriptor-backed read-only mounts used by the Linux sandbox.
## What changed
- Detect `--ro-bind-fd` support when probing system Bubblewrap.
- On older versions, translate descriptor-backed mounts to `/proc/self/fd`
read-only binds and pass their descriptors and destinations to the trusted
inner sandbox stage for verification.
- Reject malformed, duplicate, mismatched, or symlink-substituted mounts, and
close inherited descriptors before running sandboxed code.
## Testing
Added unit coverage for capability detection, legacy argument translation,
invalid mount rejection, inode verification, and descriptor closure.
GitOrigin-RevId: dfc0a457b572cdd9aed093fb5abf57360e9724a2
## Why
Sandboxed descendants can outlive their immediate parent and must be collected by
PID 1 in the Bubblewrap namespace.
## What changed
- Launch `codex-linux-sandbox` with Bubblewrap's `--as-pid-1` option, and fall
back to the bundled Bubblewrap when the system version does not support it.
- Run the sandboxed command as a child, forward signals to it, reap other exited
descendants, and preserve the command's exit status.
- Verify proxy bridge parent identity when arming its parent-death signal.
## Testing
Added Linux sandbox coverage for the filtered namespace reaper, orphan
collection, and fallback from an incompatible system Bubblewrap.
GitOrigin-RevId: 379f08d6c2732ea0a4caeb61f93ae302e16d2458
**Summary**
- Add `codex-bwrap`, a standalone `bwrap` binary built from the existing
vendored bubblewrap sources.
- Remove the linked vendored bwrap path from `codex-linux-sandbox`;
runtime now prefers system `bwrap` and falls back to bundled
`codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Add bundled SHA-256 verification with missing/all-zero digest as the
dev-mode skip value, then exec the verified file through
`/proc/self/fd`.
- Keep `launcher.rs` focused on choosing and dispatching the preferred
launcher. Bundled lookup, digest verification, and bundled exec now live
in `linux-sandbox/src/bundled_bwrap.rs`; Bazel runfiles lookup lives in
`linux-sandbox/src/bazel_bwrap.rs`; shared argv/fd exec helpers live in
`linux-sandbox/src/exec_util.rs`.
- Teach Bazel tests to surface the Bazel-built `//codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
through `CARGO_BIN_EXE_bwrap`; `codex-linux-sandbox` only honors that
fallback in debug Bazel runfiles environments so release/user runtime
lookup stays tied to `codex-resources/bwrap`.
- Allow `codex-exec-server` filesystem helpers to preserve just the
Bazel bwrap/runfiles variables they need in debug Bazel builds, since
those helpers intentionally rebuild a small environment before spawning
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
- Verify the Bazel bwrap target in Linux release CI with a build-only
check. Running `bwrap --version` is too strong for GitHub runners
because bubblewrap still attempts namespace setup there.
**Verification**
- Latest update: `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- Latest update: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo check --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu -p codex-linux-sandbox`
could not run locally because this macOS machine does not have
`x86_64-linux-gnu-gcc`; GitHub Linux Bazel CI is expected to cover the
Linux-only modules.
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-bwrap`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo test -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `cargo check --release -p codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox -p
codex-exec-server`
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel test --nobuild
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-all-test
//codex-rs/core:core-all-test
//codex-rs/exec-server:exec-server-file_system-test
//codex-rs/app-server:app-server-all-test` (analysis completed; Bazel
then refuses to run tests under `--nobuild`)
- Earlier in this PR: `bazel build --nobuild //codex-rs/bwrap:bwrap`
- Prior to this update: `just bazel-lock-update`, `just
bazel-lock-check`, and YAML parse check for
`.github/workflows/bazel.yml`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/21255).
* #21257
* #21256
* __->__ #21255
## Why
Codex `0.128` started using `--perms` in more routine Linux sandbox
construction when protected workspace metadata mounts landed in #19852.
Upstream bubblewrap added `--perms` in `v0.5.0`, so system `bwrap`
versions older than that, including the `v0.4.0` and `v0.4.1` family, do
not support the flag. The launcher still selected those binaries as long
as they existed on `PATH`.
That means affected hosts can fail every sandboxed command up front
with:
```text
bwrap: Unknown option --perms
```
The reports in #20590 and duplicate #20623 match that compatibility gap;
#20623 explicitly shows system bubblewrap `0.4.0`.
## What changed
- Replace the single `--argv0` probe with a small system-bwrap
capability probe in `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/launcher.rs`.
- Continue using the old-system `--argv0` compatibility path when
needed, but only select a system `bwrap` if it also advertises
`--perms`.
- Fall back to the vendored `bwrap` when the system binary is too old
for the flags Codex now requires.
- Add regression coverage for the old-system-bwrap case so binaries
without `--perms` stay on the vendored path.
## Verification
- Added `falls_back_to_vendored_when_system_bwrap_lacks_perms` to cover
the reported compatibility gap.
- Ran `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox` and `cargo clippy -p
codex-linux-sandbox --tests` locally. On macOS, the crate builds but its
Linux-only tests are cfg-gated out, so the new regression test still
needs Linux CI or a Linux devbox run for real execution coverage.
## Related issues
- Fixes#20590
- Duplicate report: #20623
## Summary
- move the bwrap PATH lookup and warning helpers out of config/mod.rs
- move the related tests into a dedicated bwrap_tests.rs file
## Validation
- git diff --check
- skipped heavier local tests per request
Follow-up to #15791.
## Summary
- resolve system bwrap from PATH instead of hardcoding /usr/bin/bwrap
- skip PATH entries that resolve inside the current workspace before
launching the sandbox helper
- keep the vendored bubblewrap fallback when no trusted system bwrap is
found
## Validation
- cargo test -p codex-core bwrap --lib
- cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fix -p codex-core
- just fix -p codex-linux-sandbox
- just fmt
- just argument-comment-lint
- cargo clean
Fixes#15283.
## Summary
Older system bubblewrap builds reject `--argv0`, which makes our Linux
sandbox fail before the helper can re-exec. This PR keeps using system
`/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it exists and only falls back to vendored
bwrap when the system binary is missing. That matters on stricter
AppArmor hosts, where the distro bwrap package also provides the policy
setup needed for user namespaces.
For old system bwrap, we avoid `--argv0` instead of switching binaries:
- pass the sandbox helper a full-path `argv0`,
- keep the existing `current_exe() + --argv0` path when the selected
launcher supports it,
- otherwise omit `--argv0` and re-exec through the helper's own
`argv[0]` path, whose basename still dispatches as
`codex-linux-sandbox`.
Also updates the launcher/warning tests and docs so they match the new
behavior: present-but-old system bwrap uses the compatibility path, and
only absent system bwrap falls back to vendored.
### Validation
1. Install Ubuntu 20.04 in a VM
2. Compile codex and run without bubblewrap installed - see a warning
about falling back to the vendored bwrap
3. Install bwrap and verify version is 0.4.0 without `argv0` support
4. run codex and use apply_patch tool without errors
<img width="802" height="631" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 48 36 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/77248a29-aa38-4d7c-9833-496ec6a458b8"
/>
<img width="807" height="634" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 47 32 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5af8b850-a466-489b-95a6-455b76b5050f"
/>
<img width="812" height="635" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 45 45 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/438074f0-8435-4274-a667-332efdd5cb57"
/>
<img width="801" height="623" alt="Screenshot 2026-03-25 at 11 43 56 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0dc8d3f5-e8cf-4218-b4b4-a4f7d9bf02e3"
/>
---------
Co-authored-by: Michael Bolin <mbolin@openai.com>
## Why
Fixes [#15283](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15283), where
sandboxed tool calls fail on older distro `bubblewrap` builds because
`/usr/bin/bwrap` does not understand `--argv0`. The upstream [bubblewrap
v0.9.0 release
notes](https://github.com/containers/bubblewrap/releases/tag/v0.9.0)
explicitly call out `Add --argv0`. Flipping `use_legacy_landlock`
globally works around that compatibility bug, but it also weakens the
default Linux sandbox and breaks proxy-routed and split-policy cases
called out in review.
The follow-up Linux CI failure was in the new launcher test rather than
the launcher logic: the fake `bwrap` helper stayed open for writing, so
Linux would not exec it. This update also closes the user-visibility gap
from review by surfacing the same startup warning when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is present but too old for `--argv0`, not only when it is missing.
## What Changed
- keep `use_legacy_landlock` default-disabled
- teach `codex-rs/linux-sandbox/src/launcher.rs` to fall back to the
vendored bubblewrap build when `/usr/bin/bwrap` does not advertise
`--argv0` support
- add launcher tests for supported, unsupported, and missing system
`bwrap`
- write the fake `bwrap` test helper to a closed temp path so the
supported-path launcher test works on Linux too
- extend the startup warning path so Codex warns when `/usr/bin/bwrap`
is missing or too old to support `--argv0`
- mirror the warning/fallback wording across
`codex-rs/linux-sandbox/README.md` and `codex-rs/core/README.md`,
including that the fallback is the vendored bubblewrap compiled into the
binary
- cite the upstream `bubblewrap` release that introduced `--argv0`
## Verification
- `bazel test --config=remote --platforms=//:rbe
//codex-rs/linux-sandbox:linux-sandbox-unit-tests
--test_filter=launcher::tests::prefers_system_bwrap_when_help_lists_argv0
--test_output=errors`
- `cargo test -p codex-core system_bwrap_warning`
- `cargo check -p codex-exec -p codex-tui -p codex-tui-app-server -p
codex-app-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
## Problem
Ubuntu/AppArmor hosts started failing in the default Linux sandbox path
after the switch to vendored/default bubblewrap in `0.115.0`.
The clearest report is in
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), especially [this
investigation
comment](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919#issuecomment-4076504751):
on affected Ubuntu systems, `/usr/bin/bwrap` works, but a copied or
vendored `bwrap` binary fails with errors like `bwrap: setting up uid
map: Permission denied` or `bwrap: loopback: Failed RTM_NEWADDR:
Operation not permitted`.
The root cause is Ubuntu's `/etc/apparmor.d/bwrap-userns-restrict`
profile, which grants `userns` access specifically to `/usr/bin/bwrap`.
Once Codex started using a vendored/internal bubblewrap path, that path
was no longer covered by the distro AppArmor exception, so sandbox
namespace setup could fail even when user namespaces were otherwise
enabled and `uidmap` was installed.
## What this PR changes
- prefer system `/usr/bin/bwrap` whenever it is available
- keep vendored bubblewrap as the fallback when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is
missing
- when `/usr/bin/bwrap` is missing, surface a Codex startup warning
through the app-server/TUI warning path instead of printing directly
from the sandbox helper with `eprintln!`
- use the same launcher decision for both the main sandbox execution
path and the `/proc` preflight path
- document the updated Linux bubblewrap behavior in the Linux sandbox
and core READMEs
## Why this fix
This still fixes the Ubuntu/AppArmor regression from
[#14919](https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/14919), but it keeps the
runtime rule simple and platform-agnostic: if the standard system
bubblewrap is installed, use it; otherwise fall back to the vendored
helper.
The warning now follows that same simple rule. If Codex cannot find
`/usr/bin/bwrap`, it tells the user that it is falling back to the
vendored helper, and it does so through the existing startup warning
plumbing that reaches the TUI and app-server instead of low-level
sandbox stderr.
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-linux-sandbox`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server --lib`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server
tests::embedded_app_server_start_failure_is_returned`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-linux-sandbox --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-tui-app-server --all-targets`