## What changed
- Prefer an eligible account grant over saved enterprise credentials, with a fallback to saved enterprise sign-in during initial connection if the account grant is rejected.
- Remember rejected account grants per enterprise MCP registration across threads and report authentication failures as requiring reauthentication. Keep administrator configuration errors distinct from sign-in failures.
- Compare account grants independently of access and ID token rotation, recheck the latest identity eligibility after exchange, and retry once when the refresh grant changes.
- Make MCP authentication status reflect usable account grants, saved enterprise credentials, and completed connection failures.
## Testing
Extend regression coverage for enterprise sign-in failures and recovery, MCP authentication status, account grant identity across token refreshes, and retries after transient credential failures.
GitOrigin-RevId: eeac65f668d5d2d55e9d8bf4547fbcbdd6a6c42d
## What changed
- Expose `AccountOAuthGrantLease` to prevent this auth manager's token refreshes from rotating account credentials during an identity-provider exchange. Releasing the lease returns an `AccountOAuthGrant` that callers can recheck before accepting asynchronous results.
- Validate grants against cached login ownership and persisted credentials, requiring OAuth provenance and complete account identity. Reject stale grants and propagate storage failures, including unavailable keyrings in `Auto` mode.
- Track `login_generation` separately from account ownership and use it to invalidate enterprise MCP authentication. Losing login metadata invalidates the login while preserving same-account network policy; a new login to the same account advances both generations.
## Testing
Extend auth refresh coverage to verify refresh blocking and wakeup on lease release, invalidation after token rotation or persisted login replacement, metadata loss and restoration, and logout while a lease is held.
GitOrigin-RevId: f51b3cd526d7ee94d5dffa16681f8ca332245ce3
## What changed
Rename the grant manager and supporting modules in `codex-rs/login` to expose `OAuthSessionManager`, its configuration and status types, `OAuthLoginControl`, and `subscribe_oauth_session_status`.
Keep the existing gateway API names as compatibility aliases and retain the credential storage paths and namespace so saved credentials remain usable. Update the existing authentication tests to use the OAuth session API.
GitOrigin-RevId: 72cea12be606dde28cf42809e7f8b8807cbc4a2a
## What changed
- Add `GatewayLoginControl` so hosts can require caller-initiated browser authorization while retaining automatic login by default.
- Expose passive readiness checks, scoped status subscriptions, and cancellable browser login that reports success after credentials are persisted.
- Return non-retryable request errors for `LoginRequired` and `LoginInProgress`, while preserving retries for transient authentication failures.
- Keep rejected credentials unready until replaced, and prevent slow readiness reads from blocking cached requests or overwriting newer credentials.
## Testing
Add coverage for login cancellation, status notifications, external credential recovery, concurrent credential I/O, legacy automatic login, and request retry behavior.
GitOrigin-RevId: e236d203998ceb6eeaca9704cc05d20ad45f2931
## Why
Providers configured with `gateway_oauth` need gateway credentials alongside primary authentication for inference and model discovery.
## What changed
- Attach gateway tokens through the configured header or cookie while preserving primary authentication, including WebSocket handshake headers.
- Share gateway credential managers across matching provider instances and model discovery so they observe refreshed tokens.
- Reject authentication on gateway setup or token failures, invalid token values, and conflicting auth headers. Mark gateway headers sensitive and avoid exposing issuer error details.
- Include gateway OAuth configuration in model catalog cache identity to prevent reuse across different gateway configurations.
## Testing
Add provider and core integration tests covering combined credentials, header and cookie delivery, token refresh, shared credential state, cache isolation, and request blocking on gateway token or HTTP client initialization failures.
GitOrigin-RevId: cb74125cf7e87660967d49edacf14646cf0b99c4
## What changed
- Export `GatewayAuthConfig` and `GatewayAuthManager` with PKCE browser sign-in, loopback callbacks, cached token resolution, and refresh after expiry or rejection.
- Store gateway credentials in a dedicated encrypted namespace with an independent keyring key. Serialize token exchanges and persistence across processes, preserve refresh rotations after caller cancellation, and retain pending credentials when saving fails.
- Validate OAuth endpoints and token responses, disable token-request redirects and logging, and redact sensitive error details.
## Testing
Add tests covering browser authorization, callback state validation and cleanup, concurrent refreshes, cancellation, failed-save recovery, storage isolation, endpoint validation, and credential redaction.
GitOrigin-RevId: e0c17f1eab7acca378a14b2d00b80940d8542e47
## Why
Login and token refresh have separate OAuth request and error handling. Token endpoint errors can echo credentials, and JSON decoding errors can expose token values in diagnostics.
## What changed
- Extract authorization URL construction, callback validation, PKCE, token grants, and error handling into a shared `oauth` module in `codex-rs/login`.
- Route authorization-code exchange and ChatGPT refresh through `OAuthClient`, retaining form and JSON encoding respectively and caller-owned HTTP and credential recovery policies.
- Redact echoed request secrets from rejection details and request IDs, redact sensitive transport URL fields, and replace token decoding errors with a generic error. Preserve original error codes for refresh failure classification.
- Keep callback state validation ahead of codes and provider errors, with the existing onboarding suffix handled by the login server.
## Testing
Add coverage for PKCE binding, request encoding and headers, callback state rejection, credential redaction, oversized or unreadable error bodies, and preservation of stored and cached credentials after transient refresh failures.
GitOrigin-RevId: d0a9583b99e24f5aafb751acd1e7200e2261a0e4
## What changed
- Add an optional `WorkspaceRoutingResolver` to `AuthManager` and pass session configuration into routing lookups. Callers without a resolver retain existing routing behavior.
- Apply resolved backend origins and account routing overrides to eligible ChatGPT Responses HTTP requests and WebSocket handshakes. Preserve endpoint paths, validate routing values, and reject HTTP redirects for routed requests, including `NO_CONSTRAINT` routes.
- Key cached WebSocket connections by destination, routing header, and auth revision. Rebuild request setup after credential refreshes and reject account changes during setup or routing discovery.
- Serialize routing lookups per session and retain whether the session has previously been routed.
## Testing
Add tests for path preservation, provider exclusions, concurrent routing lookups, unavailable resolvers, workspace mismatches, redirect rejection, and credential refresh or account changes during request setup.
GitOrigin-RevId: 2b6609019e84a315745c94858955f3f16426fe7f
## What changed
Advertise the experimental `codex/auth-change` capability for stdio MCP connections with an auth manager. When the server opts in, send `notifications/codex/authChanged` after initialization and on subsequent auth changes, with credential and owner generation counters and no credentials.
Track owner changes separately from credential refreshes so consumers can detect login, logout, or user, workspace, and auth-mode changes even when notifications coalesce. Treat credential changes with incomplete owner identity as owner changes as well.
Tie the notification watcher to the managed client's lifetime, limit each send to five seconds, and close the connection if a subsequent notification fails.
## Testing
Add tests for credential refreshes versus owner changes, coalesced logout and account switches, capability opt-in, notification payloads, and watcher cleanup.
GitOrigin-RevId: 35a99f5252bd48ca60a71fbdd1f708a8158e812c
## What changed
- Add the experimental `amazonBedrockAccessKeys` app-server login flow, persist its credentials in the configured auth store, and use them for SigV4-signed Bedrock requests.
- Report `bedrockAccessKeys` as a distinct auth mode and document access-key login alongside AWS profile and environment credential setup.
- Clear the selected Bedrock provider, AWS settings, and Bedrock-specific model on logout while leaving external AWS credentials and `.env` untouched.
- Reject managed access-key login when higher-precedence configuration would prevent its region or profile settings from taking effect.
## Testing
- Cover access-key login, storage, request signing, configuration conflicts, status reporting, and logout cleanup.
GitOrigin-RevId: bbf297887c6503d3651ceb2aad85c4d626e32723
## What changed
- Treat workload identity environment markers as an explicit authentication selection, even when another process credential is present.
- Return initialization errors from `AuthManager` and propagate them through commands and services instead of continuing with an unusable authentication state.
- Make `codex login status` validate workload identity, keep the TUI on an embedded app server for local workload identity, and reject workload identity in `codex mcp-server`, where it is unsupported.
## Testing
- Cover workload identity precedence and partial configuration errors.
- Verify login status reports an unreadable identity assertion and app-server routing enforces the supported workload identity topology.
GitOrigin-RevId: efc6b6b4cd4d61652617de82aaa3d7ffc75d6618
## What changed
- Select workload identity authentication from `OPENAI_FEDERATION_RULE_ID` and
`OPENAI_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE`, while preserving explicit API key and access
token precedence.
- Adapt workload identity exchanges to the shared authentication manager and
reuse a compatible process-scoped session for token resolution and refresh.
- Reject incomplete, conflicting, or unsupported configurations and exchanged
tokens that change the authenticated subject.
- Classify exchange failures for authentication retry handling and invalidate
rejected cached tokens without discarding a newer concurrent exchange.
## Testing
- Cover configuration selection and validation, session reuse and conflicts,
identity-preserving refreshes, concurrent refreshes, and retry classification.
GitOrigin-RevId: 62afb514b4e0a59effb08f464ac929633462a71b
## What changed
- Accept the allowlisted `.onboarding_entrypoint=life_sciences` suffix on a valid OAuth state while continuing to reject unknown or malformed suffixes.
- Return the parsed callback metadata from the login server without including the suffix in the token exchange redirect URI.
- Add the optional `onboardingEntrypoint` field and `life_sciences` value to the v2 `account/login/completed` notification and generated protocol exports.
## Testing
- Cover valid, invalid, and repeated OAuth state suffixes.
- Verify the end-to-end login callback result, token redirect URI, and app-server notification payload.
GitOrigin-RevId: c2ee146328ddd43c03a503260d5d492e186fa889
## Why
Auth managers should use the application's resolved HTTP client factory instead
of silently falling back to the transport's default proxy behavior.
## What changed
- Make `AuthRouteConfig` required when constructing an `AuthManager` or
`AuthConfig`.
- Pass each production caller's resolved routing configuration through without
wrapping it in an optional value.
- Add a test helper that explicitly selects the transport-default proxy policy
for callers that do not exercise custom routing.
GitOrigin-RevId: d89a3b1f8b5d4007650cdac0aae241c94d598580
## What
Adds an optional hosted login-success redirect path for app-server login
requests.
- Keeps the existing localhost success page as the default.
- Lets app-server callers opt into a hosted success page with an
optional protocol field.
- Persists credentials before redirecting to the hosted success page.
- Keeps org setup and existing CLI/device-code login flows on the local
success page.
- Accepts an optional typed `appBrand` value and forwards it to the
hosted page as `app_brand` so web can select the correct asset.
- Generates the app-server protocol schema updates for the new optional
fields.
## Why
This supports the hosted Codex login success page rollout without
changing existing login behavior by default. The Codex Apps frontend can
gate the opt-in with Statsig after the hosted web page.
## Rollout safety
- Old callers omit the new field and continue using localhost.
- New callers talking to old app-server builds remain safe because the
Codex Apps side treats the field as optional and defaults the flag off.
- Missing brand values default to Codex.
- The hosted redirect always uses the app-login source so the hosted
page can reopen Codex; the existing streamlined-login visual flag
remains separate.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-login -p codex-app-server-protocol -p
codex-app-server -p codex-app-server-test-client -p codex-tui`
- `just test -p codex-login`
- `just test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `git diff HEAD --check`
The focused login and protocol run passed all 380 tests.
I also started the broader `just test -p codex-app-server`; it compiled
successfully, then many tests failed on this machine because spawned
test servers tried to use the ambient `/Users/rafaelj/.codex/sqlite`
state DB, which is read-only in this sandbox. I stopped that run after
confirming the failures shared that environment issue.
## Summary
- refactor `ExternalAuth` to return `CodexAuth` directly
- remove the parallel `ExternalAuthTokens` wrapper
- preserve existing external bearer and app-server refresh behavior
This is a mechanical precursor refactor; it does not add auth
capabilities or change recovery behavior.
## Testing
- `cargo fmt --all`
- `cargo test -q -p codex-login --lib`
- `cargo test -q -p codex-app-server --test all
external_auth_refreshes_on_unauthorized`
## Why
#31323 introduces `codex-http-client` and leaves compatibility
re-exports in `codex-client`. Low-level HTTP consumers should depend on
the crate that now owns those APIs rather than continuing through the
transitional compatibility layer.
This stacked follow-up makes that ownership explicit and moves the
repository toward enforcing the abstraction without mixing call-site
churn into the extraction itself.
## What changed
- Switched `codex-backend-client`, `codex-cloud-tasks`,
`codex-exec-server`, `codex-login`, and `codex-model-provider` from
`codex-client` to `codex-http-client` where they only use low-level HTTP
APIs.
- Added the direct dependency to `codex-api` for its custom-CA request
and websocket paths while retaining `codex-client` for higher-level
retry and transport policy.
- Updated imports and normalized login's internal client type name from
`CodexHttpClient` to `HttpClient`, while preserving its existing
`CodexRequestBuilder` re-export.
- Updated `Cargo.lock` to reflect the new direct dependency edges.
## Review guide
This PR is intentionally mechanical: 20 files and 92 changed lines, with
no runtime logic changes. The largest diff is
`codex-rs/login/src/auth/default_client.rs`, where the only
semantic-looking changes are type and import renames. The remaining
source changes replace `codex_client` import paths with
`codex_http_client`; the manifest and lockfile changes mirror those
imports.
## Test plan
- Compile-checked `codex-api`, `codex-backend-client`,
`codex-cloud-tasks`, `codex-exec-server`, `codex-login`, and
`codex-model-provider` together.
## Summary
Stacked on #26706.
Adds the shared auth/system-proxy contract that later platform resolver
PRs plug into. This PR moves Codex-owned auth and startup HTTP clients
through a common route-aware boundary, but does not yet add Windows or
macOS system proxy resolution.
The default path remains unchanged when `respect_system_proxy` is absent
or disabled.
## Implementation
- Adds `codex-client/src/outbound_proxy.rs` with the shared
route-selection model:
- `OutboundProxyConfig`;
- `ClientRouteClass`;
- `RouteFailureClass`;
- `build_reqwest_client_for_route`.
- Preserves the existing reqwest/default-client behavior when no route
config is supplied.
- Uses the fixed MVP routing policy when route config is supplied:
platform system/PAC/WPAD discovery, then explicit env proxy variables,
then direct connection.
- Keeps platform-specific system discovery behind the shared client
boundary. This PR provides the contract and fallback behavior; later
resolver PRs plug in Windows and macOS discovery.
- Adds `login::AuthRouteConfig` so auth call sites depend on a small
policy type instead of platform resolver details.
- Maps the resolved `Config.respect_system_proxy` boolean into
`AuthRouteConfig` for auth-owned clients.
- Wires the route config through browser login, device-code login,
access-token login, login status, logout/revoke, token refresh, API-key
exchange, app-server account login, TUI/app startup, cloud-config
bootstrap, cloud tasks, plugin auth, and exec startup config loading.
## End-user behavior
- No behavior changes by default.
- When `respect_system_proxy = true`, auth-owned clients opt into the
shared route-aware client path.
- On platforms without a resolver implementation in this PR, system
discovery is unavailable and the route-aware path falls back to explicit
env proxy handling, then direct connection.
- Custom CA handling remains separate from proxy route selection and
still runs through the shared client builder.
- No proxy URLs, PAC contents, or resolved platform details are exposed
through the public config surface introduced here.
## Tests
Adds or updates coverage for:
- preserving default auth-client fallback behavior when no route config
is provided;
- injected environment-proxy fallback without mutating process
environment;
- existing login-server E2E flows using explicit `auth_route_config:
None` to guard unchanged default behavior;
- updated auth manager, login, logout, cloud-config, startup, and
plugin-auth call sites passing route config explicitly.
## Stack
This is PR 2 of the simplified HAI single-run-task stack:
- [#19047](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19047) Agent Identity
assertion and task-registration primitives, including the shared
run-task helper used by existing Agent Identity JWT auth.
- [#19049](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19049)
Disabled-by-default ChatGPT auth opt-in that provisions/reuses persisted
Agent Identity runtime auth and its single run task.
- [#19051](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19051) Run-scoped
provider auth that uses one backend-owned task id for first-party
inference and compaction requests.
[#19054](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/19054) collapsed out of
the active stack because the simplified design no longer needs a
separate background/control-plane task helper.
## Summary
This PR adds the disabled-by-default path for normal ChatGPT-login Codex
sessions to obtain Agent Identity runtime auth through the Codex
backend. Existing Agent Identity JWT startup mode remains a separate
path and does not require the feature flag.
What changed:
- adds the experimental `use_agent_identity` feature flag and config
schema entry
- adds an explicit `AgentIdentityAuthPolicy` so call sites choose
`JwtOnly` or `ChatGptAuth` instead of passing a bare boolean
- stores standalone Agent Identity JWT credentials separately from
backend-registered Agent Identity records
- persists the registered Agent Identity record, private key, and single
run task id in `auth.json` so process restarts reuse the same identity
- derives the agent/task registration base URL from ChatGPT/Codex auth
config while keeping JWT JWKS lookup separate
- provisions and caches ChatGPT-derived Agent Identity runtime auth when
`use_agent_identity` is enabled
- reuses the shared run-task registration helper from PR1 rather than
adding a second task-registration path
This PR intentionally does not switch model inference over to
`AgentAssertion` auth. The provider-auth integration lands in the next
PR.
## Testing
- `just test -p codex-login`
## Why
Windows Credential Manager limits generic credential blobs to 2,560
bytes. Large serialized ChatGPT auth payloads can exceed that limit, so
keyring-mode CLI auth needs a backend that keeps only the encryption key
in the OS keyring and stores the payload in Codex's encrypted
local-secrets file.
This is the third PR in the encrypted-auth stack:
1. #27504 — feature and config selection
2. #27535 — auth-specific local-secrets namespaces
3. This PR — CLI auth implementation and activation
4. MCP OAuth implementation and activation
## What Changed
- Added encrypted CLI-auth storage using the `CliAuth` secrets
namespace.
- Preserved direct keyring storage for platforms/configurations where it
remains selected.
- Selected the backend consistently for login, logout, refresh,
device-code login, auth loading, and login restrictions.
- Threaded resolved bootstrap/full config through CLI, exec, TUI,
app-server account handling, cloud config, and cloud tasks.
- Removed stale `auth.json` fallback data after successful encrypted
saves and removed encrypted, direct-keyring, and fallback data during
logout.
- Added storage and integration coverage for both direct and encrypted
keyring modes.
MCP OAuth persistence is intentionally left to the next PR.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-login` — 131 passed
- `just test -p codex-cli` — 280 passed
- `just test -p codex-app-server v2::account` — 25 passed
- `just test -p codex-cloud-config service` — 21 passed, 7 skipped
- `just fix -p codex-login`
- `just fix -p codex-cli`
- `just fmt`
## Why
First-party async traits should expose their `Send` contracts explicitly
without requiring `async_trait`. This completes the migration pattern
established in #27303 and #27304.
## What changed
- Replaced the remaining first-party `async_trait` traits with native
return-position `impl Future + Send` where statically dispatched and
explicit boxed `Send` futures where object safety is required.
- Kept implementations behavior-preserving, outlining existing async
bodies into inherent methods where that keeps the diff reviewable.
- Removed all direct first-party `async-trait` dependencies and the
workspace dependency declaration.
- Added a cargo-deny policy that permits `async-trait` only through the
remaining transitive wrapper crates.
- Updated `rand` from 0.8.5 to 0.8.6 to resolve RUSTSEC-2026-0097 and
keep the full cargo-deny check passing.
## Validation
- `just test -p codex-exec-server`: 216 passed, 2 skipped.
- `just test -p codex-model-provider`: 39 passed.
- `just test -p codex-core` and `just test`: changed tests passed;
remaining failures are environment-sensitive suites unrelated to this
migration.
- `cargo deny check`
- `just fix`
- `just fmt`
- `cargo shear`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
## Why
Codex needs to manage Amazon Bedrock API key credentials through the
existing auth lifecycle instead of introducing a separate auth manager
or provider-specific credential file. Treating Bedrock API key login as
a primary auth mode gives it the same persistence, keyring, reload, and
logout behavior as the existing OpenAI API key and ChatGPT modes.
The credential is valid only for the `amazon-bedrock` model provider.
OpenAI-compatible providers must reject this auth mode rather than
treating the Bedrock key as an OpenAI bearer token.
## What changed
- Added `bedrockApiKey` as an app-server `AuthMode` and
`CodexAuth::BedrockApiKey` as a primary `AuthManager` mode.
- Added `BedrockApiKeyAuth`, containing the API key and AWS region, to
the existing `AuthDotJson` payload stored in `$CODEX_HOME/auth.json` or
the configured keyring backend.
- Added `login_with_bedrock_api_key(...)`, parallel to
`login_with_api_key(...)`, which replaces the current stored login with
Bedrock credentials.
- Reused generic auth reload and logout behavior instead of adding a
Bedrock-specific auth manager or logout path.
- Updated login restrictions, status reporting, diagnostics, telemetry
classification, generated app-server schemas, and auth fixtures for the
new mode.
- Added explicit errors when Bedrock API key auth is selected with an
OpenAI-compatible model provider.
This PR establishes managed storage and auth-mode behavior. Routing the
managed key and region into Amazon Bedrock requests will be in follow-up
PRs.
## Why
The external startup/login surface for this auth path should talk about
an access token instead of exposing the internal Agent Identity
terminology. Users should pass `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` or pipe a token into
`codex login --with-access-token`; the old external env/flag spellings
are removed so there is only one supported user-facing path.
## What Changed
- Added `CODEX_ACCESS_TOKEN` as the supported environment variable for
this auth path.
- Added `codex login --with-access-token` as the supported stdin-based
login command.
- Removed the legacy `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY` env-var fallback and hidden
`--with-agent-identity` CLI alias.
- Updated CLI error, status, and stdin prompts to use access-token
language.
- Added coverage for access-token env loading, CLI login failure
behavior, and renamed login status text.
## Validation
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
- `cargo test -p codex-cli`
- `just fix -p codex-login`
- `just fix -p codex-cli`
## Summary
This PR lets programmatic AgentIdentity users provide one token through
either stdin login or environment auth.
`codex login --with-agent-identity` reads an Agent Identity JWT from
stdin, validates that it has the required claims, and stores that token
as the `agent_identity` value in `auth.json`. The file format is
token-only; the decoded account and key fields are runtime state, not
hand-authored auth.json fields.
The Agent Identity JWT claim shape and decoder live in
`codex-agent-identity`; `codex-login` only owns env/storage precedence
and conversion into `CodexAuth::AgentIdentity`.
When env auth is enabled, `CODEX_AGENT_IDENTITY` can provide the same
JWT without writing auth state to disk. `CODEX_API_KEY` still wins if
both env vars are set.
Reference old stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
Reference JWT/env stack: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18176
## Stack
1. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18757: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: isolated Agent Identity
crate
3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: explicit AgentIdentity
auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate Codex backend
auth callsites through AuthProvider
5. This PR: accept AgentIdentity JWTs through login/env
## Testing
Tests: targeted login and Agent Identity crate tests, CLI checks, scoped
formatter/linter cleanup, and CI.
---------
Co-authored-by: Shijie Rao <shijie.rao@openai.com>
## Summary
This PR fully reverts the previously merged Agent Identity runtime
integration from the old stack:
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387/changes
It removes the Codex-side task lifecycle wiring, rollout/session
persistence, feature flag plumbing, lazy `auth.json` mutation,
background task auth paths, and request callsite changes introduced by
that stack.
This leaves the repo in a clean pre-AgentIdentity integration state so
the follow-up PRs can reintroduce the pieces in smaller reviewable
layers.
## Stack
1. This PR: full revert
2. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18871: move Agent Identity
business logic into a crate
3. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18785: add explicit
AgentIdentity auth mode and startup task allocation
4. https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18811: migrate auth callsites
through AuthProvider
## Testing
Tests: targeted Rust checks, cargo-shear, Bazel lock check, and CI.
## Summary
Introduces a single background/control-plane agent task for ChatGPT
backend requests that do not have a thread-scoped task, with
`AuthManager` owning the default ChatGPT backend authorization decision.
Callers now ask `AuthManager` for the default ChatGPT backend
authorization header. `AuthManager` decides whether that is bearer or
background AgentAssertion based on config/internal state, while
low-level bootstrap paths can explicitly request bearer-only auth.
This PR is stacked on PR4 and focuses on the shared background task auth
plumbing plus the first tranche of backend/control-plane consumers. The
remaining callsite wiring is split into PR4.2 to keep review size down.
## Stack
- PR1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17385 - add
`features.use_agent_identity`
- PR2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17386 - register agent
identities when enabled
- PR3: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387 - register agent tasks
when enabled
- PR3.1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17978 - persist and
prewarm registered tasks per thread
- PR4: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17980 - use task-scoped
`AgentAssertion` for downstream calls
- PR4.1: this PR - introduce AuthManager-owned background/control-plane
`AgentAssertion` auth
- PR4.2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18260 - use background
task auth for additional backend/control-plane calls
## What Changed
- add background task registration and assertion minting inside
`codex-login`
- persist `agent_identity.background_task_id` separately from
per-session task state
- make `BackgroundAgentTaskManager` private to `codex-login`; call sites
do not instantiate or pass it around
- teach `AuthManager` the ChatGPT backend base URL and feature-derived
background auth mode from resolved config
- expose bearer-only helpers for bootstrap/registration/refresh-style
paths that must not use AgentAssertion
- wire `AuthManager` default ChatGPT authorization through app listing,
connector directory listing, remote plugins, MCP status/listing,
analytics, and core-skills remote calls
- preserve bearer fallback when the feature is disabled, the backend
host is unsupported, or background task registration is not available
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
- `cargo test -p codex-login agent_identity`
- `cargo test -p codex-model-provider bearer_auth_provider`
- `cargo test -p codex-core agent_assertion`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server remote_control`
- `cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements fetch_cloud_requirements`
- `cargo test -p codex-models-manager manager::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt`
- `cargo test -p codex-cloud-tasks`
- `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `git diff --check`
## Summary
This is the AgentAssertion downstream slice for feature-gated agent
identity support, replacing the oversized AgentAssertion slice from PR
#17807.
It isolates task-scoped downstream AgentAssertion wiring on top of the
merged PR3.1 work without re-carrying the earlier agent registration,
task registration, or task-state history.
This PR includes the task-scoped bug-fix call sites from the review:
generic file upload auth, MCP OpenAI file upload auth, and ARC monitor
auth. Broader user/control-plane calls move to PR4.1 and PR4.2.
## Stack
- PR1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17385 - add
`features.use_agent_identity`
- PR2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17386 - register agent
identities when enabled
- PR3: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387 - register agent tasks
when enabled
- PR3.1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17978 - persist and
prewarm registered tasks per thread
- PR4: this PR - use task-scoped `AgentAssertion` downstream when
enabled
- PR4.1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18094 - introduce
AuthManager-owned background/control-plane `AgentAssertion` auth
- PR4.2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/18260 - use background
task auth for additional backend/control-plane calls
## What Changed
- add AgentAssertion envelope generation in `codex-core`
- route downstream HTTP and websocket auth through AgentAssertion when
an agent task is present
- extend the model-provider auth provider so non-bearer authorization
schemes can be passed through cleanly
- make generic file uploads attach the full authorization header value
- make MCP OpenAI file uploads use the cached thread agent task
assertion when present
- make ARC monitor calls use the cached thread agent task assertion when
present
## Why
The original PR had drifted ancestry and showed a much larger diff than
the semantic change actually required. Restacking it onto PR3.1 keeps
the reviewable surface down to the downstream assertion slice.
## Validation
- `just fmt`
- `cargo check -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
- `cargo test -p codex-model-provider bearer_auth_provider`
- `cargo test -p codex-core agent_assertion`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server remote_control`
- `cargo test -p codex-cloud-requirements fetch_cloud_requirements`
- `cargo test -p codex-models-manager manager::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-chatgpt`
- `cargo test -p codex-cloud-tasks`
- `cargo test -p codex-login agent_identity`
- `just fix -p codex-core -p codex-login -p codex-analytics -p
codex-app-server -p codex-cloud-requirements -p codex-cloud-tasks -p
codex-models-manager -p codex-chatgpt -p codex-model-provider -p
codex-mcp -p codex-core-skills`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
- `git diff --check`
## Summary
This changes Codex logout so managed ChatGPT auth is revoked against
AuthAPI before local auth state is removed. CLI logout, TUI `/logout`,
and the app-server account logout path now use the token-revoking logout
flow instead of only deleting `auth.json` / credential store state.
## Root Cause
Logout previously cleared only local auth storage. That removed Codex's
local credentials but did not ask the backend to invalidate the
refresh/access token state associated with a managed ChatGPT login.
## Behavior
For managed ChatGPT auth, logout sends the stored refresh token to
`https://auth.openai.com/oauth/revoke` with `token_type_hint:
refresh_token` and the Codex OAuth client id, then deletes all local
auth stores after revocation succeeds. If only an access token is
available, it falls back to revoking that access token. API key auth and
externally supplied `chatgptAuthTokens` are still only cleared locally
because Codex does not own a refresh token for those modes.
Revocation failures are fail-closed: if Codex cannot load stored auth or
the backend revoke call fails, logout returns an error and leaves local
auth in place so the user can retry instead of silently clearing local
state while backend tokens remain valid.
## Validation
ran local version of `codex-cli` with staging overrides/harness for auth
ran `codex login` then `codex logout`:
saw auth.json clear and backend revocation endpoints were called
```
POST /oauth/revoke
status: 200
revoking access token
should clear auth session
clearing auth session due to token revocation
successfully revoked session and access token
CANONICAL-API-LINE Response: status='200' method='POST' path='/oauth/revoke
```
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- Add `codex-model-provider` as the runtime home for model-provider
behavior that does not belong in `codex-core`, `codex-login`, or
`codex-api`.
- The new crate wraps configured `ModelProviderInfo` in a
`ModelProvider` trait object that can resolve the API provider config,
provider-scoped auth manager, and request auth provider for each call.
- This centralizes provider auth behavior in one place today, and gives
us an extension point for future provider-specific auth, model listing,
request setup, and related runtime behavior.
## Tests
Ran tests manually to make sure that provider auth under different
configs still work as expected.
---------
Co-authored-by: pakrym-oai <pakrym@openai.com>
## Summary
Stack PR 2 of 4 for feature-gated agent identity support.
This PR adds agent identity registration behind
`features.use_agent_identity`. It keeps the app-server protocol
unchanged and starts registration after ChatGPT auth exists rather than
requiring a client restart.
## Stack
- PR1: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17385 - add
`features.use_agent_identity`
- PR2: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17386 - this PR
- PR3: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17387 - register agent tasks
when enabled
- PR4: https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/17388 - use `AgentAssertion`
downstream when enabled
## Validation
Covered as part of the local stack validation pass:
- `just fmt`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib agent_identity`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib agent_assertion`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib websocket_agent_task`
- `cargo test -p codex-api api_bridge`
- `cargo build -p codex-cli --bin codex`
## Notes
The full local app-server E2E path is still being debugged after PR
creation. The current branch stack is directionally ready for review
while that follow-up continues.
## Summary
- reduce public module visibility across Rust crates, preferring private
or crate-private modules with explicit crate-root public exports
- update external call sites and tests to use the intended public crate
APIs instead of reaching through module trees
- add the module visibility guideline to AGENTS.md
## Validation
- `cargo check --workspace --all-targets --message-format=short` passed
before the final fix/format pass
- `just fix` completed successfully
- `just fmt` completed successfully
- `git diff --check` passed
Extract a shared helper that builds AuthManager from Config and applies
the forced ChatGPT workspace override in one place.
Create the shared AuthManager at MessageProcessor call sites so that
upcoming new transport's initialization can reuse the same handle, and
keep only external auth refresher wiring inside `MessageProcessor`.
Remove the now-unused `AuthManager::shared_with_external_auth` helper.
Stacked on #16508.
This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.
No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- split `models-manager` out of `core` and add `ModelsManagerConfig`
plus `Config::to_models_manager_config()` so model metadata paths stop
depending on `core::Config`
- move login-owned/auth-owned code out of `core` into `codex-login`,
move model provider config into `codex-model-provider-info`, move API
bridge mapping into `codex-api`, move protocol-owned types/impls into
`codex-protocol`, and move response debug helpers into a dedicated
`response-debug-context` crate
- move feedback tag emission into `codex-feedback`, relocate tests to
the crates that now own the code, and keep broad temporary re-exports so
this PR avoids a giant import-only rewrite
## Major moves and decisions
- created `codex-models-manager` as the owner for model
cache/catalog/config/model info logic, including the new
`ModelsManagerConfig` struct
- created `codex-model-provider-info` as the owner for provider config
parsing/defaults and kept temporary `codex-login`/`codex-core`
re-exports for old import paths
- moved `api_bridge` error mapping + `CoreAuthProvider` into
`codex-api`, while `codex-login::api_bridge` temporarily re-exports
those symbols and keeps the `auth_provider_from_auth` wrapper
- moved `auth_env_telemetry` and `provider_auth` ownership to
`codex-login`
- moved `CodexErr` ownership to `codex-protocol::error`, plus
`StreamOutput`, `bytes_to_string_smart`, and network policy helpers to
protocol-owned modules
- created `codex-response-debug-context` for
`extract_response_debug_context`, `telemetry_transport_error_message`,
and related response-debug plumbing instead of leaving that behavior in
`core`
- moved `FeedbackRequestTags`, `emit_feedback_request_tags`, and
`emit_feedback_request_tags_with_auth_env` to `codex-feedback`
- deferred removal of temporary re-exports and the mechanical import
rewrites to a stacked follow-up PR so this PR stays reviewable
## Test moves
- moved auth refresh coverage from `core/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs` to
`login/tests/suite/auth_refresh.rs`
- moved text encoding coverage from
`core/tests/suite/text_encoding_fix.rs` to
`protocol/src/exec_output_tests.rs`
- moved model info override coverage from
`core/tests/suite/model_info_overrides.rs` to
`models-manager/src/model_info_overrides_tests.rs`
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Summary
- Replace the separate external auth enum and refresher trait with a
single `ExternalAuth` trait in login auth flow
- Move bearer token auth behind `BearerTokenRefresher` and update
`AuthManager` and app-server wiring to use the generic external auth API
## Summary
`ExternalAuthRefresher` was still shaped around external ChatGPT auth:
`ExternalAuthTokens` always implied ChatGPT account metadata even when a
caller only needed a bearer token.
This PR generalizes that contract so bearer-only sources are
first-class, while keeping the existing ChatGPT paths strict anywhere we
persist or rebuild ChatGPT auth state.
## Motivation
This is the first step toward #15189.
The follow-on provider-auth work needs one shared external-auth contract
that can do both of these things:
- resolve the current bearer token before a request is sent
- return a refreshed bearer token after a `401`
That should not require a second token result type just because there is
no ChatGPT account metadata attached.
## What Changed
- change `ExternalAuthTokens` to carry `access_token` plus optional
`ExternalAuthChatgptMetadata`
- add helper constructors for bearer-only tokens and ChatGPT-backed
tokens
- add `ExternalAuthRefresher::resolve()` with a default no-op
implementation so refreshers can optionally provide the current token
before a request is sent
- keep ChatGPT-only persistence strict by continuing to require ChatGPT
metadata anywhere the login layer seeds or reloads ChatGPT auth state
- update the app-server bridge to construct the new token shape for
external ChatGPT auth refreshes
## Testing
- `cargo test -p codex-login`
---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/16286).
* #16288
* #16287
* __->__ #16286
- Move the auth implementation and token data into codex-login.
- Keep codex-core re-exporting that surface from codex-login for
existing callers.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Stacked PRs
This work is now effectively split across two steps:
- #14178: add custom CA support for browser and device-code login flows,
docs, and hermetic subprocess tests
- #14239: extend that shared custom CA handling across Codex HTTPS
clients and secure websocket TLS
Note: #14240 was merged into this branch while it was stacked on top of
this PR. This PR now subsumes that websocket follow-up and should be
treated as the combined change.
Builds on top of #14178.
## Problem
Custom CA support landed first in the login path, but the real
requirement is broader. Codex constructs outbound TLS clients in
multiple places, and both HTTPS and secure websocket paths can fail
behind enterprise TLS interception if they do not honor
`CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` or `SSL_CERT_FILE` consistently.
This PR broadens the shared custom-CA logic beyond login and applies the
same policy to websocket TLS, so the enterprise-proxy story is no longer
split between “HTTPS works” and “websockets still fail”.
## What This Delivers
Custom CA support is no longer limited to login. Codex outbound HTTPS
clients and secure websocket connections can now honor the same
`CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` / `SSL_CERT_FILE` configuration, so enterprise
proxy/intercept setups work more consistently end-to-end.
For users and operators, nothing new needs to be configured beyond the
same CA env vars introduced in #14178. The change is that more of Codex
now respects them, including websocket-backed flows that were previously
still using default trust roots.
I also manually validated the proxy path locally with mitmproxy using:
`CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE=~/.mitmproxy/mitmproxy-ca-cert.pem
HTTPS_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:8080 just codex`
with mitmproxy installed via `brew install mitmproxy` and configured as
the macOS system proxy.
## Mental model
`codex-client` is now the owner of shared custom-CA policy for outbound
TLS client construction. Reqwest callers start from the builder
configuration they already need, then pass that builder through
`build_reqwest_client_with_custom_ca(...)`. Websocket callers ask the
same module for a rustls client config when a custom CA bundle is
configured.
The env precedence is the same everywhere:
- `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` wins
- otherwise fall back to `SSL_CERT_FILE`
- otherwise use system roots
The helper is intentionally narrow. It loads every usable certificate
from the configured PEM bundle into the appropriate root store and
returns either a configured transport or a typed error that explains
what went wrong.
## Non-goals
This does not add handshake-level integration tests against a live TLS
endpoint. It does not validate that the configured bundle forms a
meaningful certificate chain. It also does not try to force every
transport in the repo through one abstraction; it extends the shared CA
policy across the reqwest and websocket paths that actually needed it.
## Tradeoffs
The main tradeoff is centralizing CA behavior in `codex-client` while
still leaving adoption up to call sites. That keeps the implementation
additive and reviewable, but it means the rule "outbound Codex TLS that
should honor enterprise roots must use the shared helper" is still
partly enforced socially rather than by types.
For websockets, the shared helper only builds an explicit rustls config
when a custom CA bundle is configured. When no override env var is set,
websocket callers still use their ordinary default connector path.
## Architecture
`codex-client::custom_ca` now owns CA bundle selection, PEM
normalization, mixed-section parsing, certificate extraction, typed
CA-loading errors, and optional rustls client-config construction for
websocket TLS.
The affected consumers now call into that shared helper directly rather
than carrying login-local CA behavior:
- backend-client
- cloud-tasks
- RMCP client paths that use `reqwest`
- TUI voice HTTP paths
- `codex-core` default reqwest client construction
- `codex-api` websocket clients for both responses and realtime
websocket connections
The subprocess CA probe, env-sensitive integration tests, and shared PEM
fixtures also live in `codex-client`, which is now the actual owner of
the behavior they exercise.
## Observability
The shared CA path logs:
- which environment variable selected the bundle
- which path was loaded
- how many certificates were accepted
- when `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` labels were normalized
- when CRLs were ignored
- where client construction failed
Returned errors remain user-facing and include the relevant env var,
path, and remediation hint. That same error model now applies whether
the failure surfaced while building a reqwest client or websocket TLS
configuration.
## Tests
Pure unit tests in `codex-client` cover env precedence and PEM
normalization behavior. Real client construction remains in subprocess
tests so the suite can control process env and avoid the macOS seatbelt
panic path that motivated the hermetic test split.
The subprocess coverage verifies:
- `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` precedence over `SSL_CERT_FILE`
- fallback to `SSL_CERT_FILE`
- single-cert and multi-cert bundles
- malformed and empty-file errors
- OpenSSL `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` handling
- CRL tolerance for well-formed CRL sections
The websocket side is covered by the existing `codex-api` / `codex-core`
websocket test suites plus the manual mitmproxy validation above.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ivan Zakharchanka <3axap4eHko@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
## Stacked PRs
This work is split across three stacked PRs:
- #14178: add custom CA support for browser and device-code login flows,
docs, and hermetic subprocess tests
- #14239: broaden the shared custom CA path from login to other outbound
`reqwest` clients across Codex
- #14240: extend that shared custom CA handling to secure websocket TLS
so websocket connections honor the same CA env vars
Review order: #14178, then #14239, then #14240.
Supersedes #6864.
Thanks to @3axap4eHko for the original implementation and investigation
here. Although this version rearranges the code and history
significantly, the majority of the credit for this work belongs to them.
## Problem
Login flows need to work in enterprise environments where outbound TLS
is intercepted by an internal proxy or gateway. In those setups, system
root certificates alone are often insufficient to validate the OAuth and
device-code endpoints used during login. The change adds a
login-specific custom CA loading path, but the important contracts
around env precedence, PEM compatibility, test boundaries, and
probe-only workarounds need to be explicit so reviewers can understand
what behavior is intentional.
For users and operators, the behavior is simple: if login needs to trust
a custom root CA, set `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` to a PEM file containing
one or more certificates. If that variable is unset, login falls back to
`SSL_CERT_FILE`. If neither is set, login uses system roots. Invalid or
empty PEM files now fail with an error that points back to those
environment variables and explains how to recover.
## What This Delivers
Users can now make Codex login work behind enterprise TLS interception
by pointing `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` at a PEM bundle containing the
relevant root certificates. If that variable is unset, login falls back
to `SSL_CERT_FILE`, then to system roots.
This PR applies that behavior to both browser-based and device-code
login flows. It also makes login tolerant of the PEM shapes operators
actually have in hand: multi-certificate bundles, OpenSSL `TRUSTED
CERTIFICATE` labels, and bundles that include well-formed CRLs.
## Mental model
`codex-login` is the place where the login flows construct ad hoc
outbound HTTP clients. That makes it the right boundary for a narrow CA
policy: look for `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE`, fall back to `SSL_CERT_FILE`,
load every parseable certificate block in that bundle into a
`reqwest::Client`, and fail early with a clear user-facing error if the
bundle is unreadable or malformed.
The implementation is intentionally pragmatic about PEM input shape. It
accepts ordinary certificate bundles, multi-certificate bundles, OpenSSL
`TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` labels, and bundles that also contain CRLs. It
does not validate a certificate chain or prove a handshake; it only
constructs the root store used by login.
## Non-goals
This change does not introduce a general-purpose transport abstraction
for the rest of the product. It does not validate whether the provided
bundle forms a real chain, and it does not add handshake-level
integration tests against a live TLS server. It also does not change
login state management or OAuth semantics beyond ensuring the existing
flows share the same CA-loading rules.
## Tradeoffs
The main tradeoff is keeping this logic scoped to login-specific client
construction rather than lifting it into a broader shared HTTP layer.
That keeps the review surface smaller, but it also means future
login-adjacent code must continue to use `build_login_http_client()` or
it can silently bypass enterprise CA overrides.
The `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` handling is also intentionally a local
compatibility shim. The rustls ecosystem does not currently accept that
PEM label upstream, so the code normalizes it locally and trims the
OpenSSL `X509_AUX` trailer bytes down to the certificate DER that
`reqwest` can consume.
## Architecture
`custom_ca.rs` is now the single place that owns login CA behavior. It
selects the CA file from the environment, reads it, normalizes PEM label
shape where needed, iterates mixed PEM sections with `rustls-pki-types`,
ignores CRLs, trims OpenSSL trust metadata when necessary, and returns
either a configured `reqwest::Client` or a typed error.
The browser login server and the device-code flow both call
`build_login_http_client()`, so they share the same trust-store policy.
Environment-sensitive tests run through the `login_ca_probe` helper
binary because those tests must control process-wide env vars and cannot
reliably build a real reqwest client in-process on macOS seatbelt runs.
## Observability
The custom CA path logs which environment variable selected the bundle,
which file path was loaded, how many certificates were accepted, when
`TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` labels were normalized, when CRLs were ignored,
and where client construction failed. Returned errors remain user-facing
and include the relevant path, env var, and remediation hint.
This gives enough signal for three audiences:
- users can see why login failed and which env/file caused it
- sysadmins can confirm which override actually won
- developers can tell whether the failure happened during file read, PEM
parsing, certificate registration, or final reqwest client construction
## Tests
Pure unit tests stay limited to env precedence and empty-value handling.
Real client construction lives in subprocess tests so the suite remains
hermetic with respect to process env and macOS sandbox behavior.
The subprocess tests verify:
- `CODEX_CA_CERTIFICATE` precedence over `SSL_CERT_FILE`
- fallback to `SSL_CERT_FILE`
- single-certificate and multi-certificate bundles
- malformed and empty-bundle errors
- OpenSSL `TRUSTED CERTIFICATE` handling
- CRL tolerance for well-formed CRL sections
The named PEM fixtures under `login/tests/fixtures/` are shared by the
tests so their purpose stays reviewable.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ivan Zakharchanka <3axap4eHko@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
This PR introduces a new `Auth Storage` abstraction layer that takes
care of read, write, and load of auth tokens based on the
AuthCredentialsStoreMode. It is similar to how we handle MCP client
oauth
[here](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/codex-rs/rmcp-client/src/oauth.rs).
Instead of reading and writing directly from disk for auth tokens, Codex
CLI workflows now should instead use this auth storage using the public
helper functions.
This PR is just a refactor of the current code so the behavior stays the
same. We will add support for keyring and hybrid mode in follow-up PRs.
I have read the CLA Document and I hereby sign the CLA
We continue the separation between `codex app-server` and `codex
mcp-server`.
In particular, we introduce a new crate, `codex-app-server-protocol`,
and migrate `codex-rs/protocol/src/mcp_protocol.rs` into it, renaming it
`codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol.rs`.
Because `ConversationId` was defined in `mcp_protocol.rs`, we move it
into its own file, `codex-rs/protocol/src/conversation_id.rs`, and
because it is referenced in a ton of places, we have to touch a lot of
files as part of this PR.
We also decide to get away from proper JSON-RPC 2.0 semantics, so we
also introduce `codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/jsonrpc_lite.rs`, which
is basically the same `JSONRPCMessage` type defined in `mcp-types`
except with all of the `"jsonrpc": "2.0"` removed.
Getting rid of `"jsonrpc": "2.0"` makes our serialization logic
considerably simpler, as we can lean heavier on serde to serialize
directly into the wire format that we use now.
# External (non-OpenAI) Pull Request Requirements
Before opening this Pull Request, please read the dedicated
"Contributing" markdown file or your PR may be closed:
https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/main/docs/contributing.md
If your PR conforms to our contribution guidelines, replace this text
with a detailed and high quality description of your changes.
# test
```
codex-rs % export CODEX_DEVICE_AUTH_BASE_URL=http://localhost:3007
codex-rs % cargo run --bin codex login --experimental_use-device-code
Compiling codex-login v0.0.0 (/Users/rakesh/code/codex/codex-rs/login)
Compiling codex-mcp-server v0.0.0 (/Users/rakesh/code/codex/codex-rs/mcp-server)
Compiling codex-tui v0.0.0 (/Users/rakesh/code/codex/codex-rs/tui)
Compiling codex-cli v0.0.0 (/Users/rakesh/code/codex/codex-rs/cli)
Finished `dev` profile [unoptimized + debuginfo] target(s) in 2.90s
Running `target/debug/codex login --experimental_use-device-code`
To authenticate, enter this code when prompted: 6Q27-KBVRF with interval 5
^C
```
The error in the last line is since the poll endpoint is not yet
implemented
This PR adds a central `AuthManager` struct that manages the auth
information used across conversations and the MCP server. Prior to this,
each conversation and the MCP server got their own private snapshots of
the auth information, and changes to one (such as a logout or token
refresh) were not seen by others.
This is especially problematic when multiple instances of the CLI are
run. For example, consider the case where you start CLI 1 and log in to
ChatGPT account X and then start CLI 2 and log out and then log in to
ChatGPT account Y. The conversation in CLI 1 is still using account X,
but if you create a new conversation, it will suddenly (and
unexpectedly) switch to account Y.
With the `AuthManager`, auth information is read from disk at the time
the `ConversationManager` is constructed, and it is cached in memory.
All new conversations use this same auth information, as do any token
refreshes.
The `AuthManager` is also used by the MCP server's GetAuthStatus
command, which now returns the auth method currently used by the MCP
server.
This PR also includes an enhancement to the GetAuthStatus command. It
now accepts two new (optional) input parameters: `include_token` and
`refresh_token`. Callers can use this to request the in-use auth token
and can optionally request to refresh the token.
The PR also adds tests for the login and auth APIs that I recently added
to the MCP server.
This PR adds the following:
* A getAuthStatus method on the mcp server. This returns the auth method
currently in use (chatgpt or apikey) or none if the user is not
authenticated. It also returns the "preferred auth method" which
reflects the `preferred_auth_method` value in the config.
* A logout method on the mcp server. If called, it logs out the user and
deletes the `auth.json` file — the same behavior in the cli's `/logout`
command.
* An `authStatusChange` event notification that is sent when the auth
status changes due to successful login or logout operations.
* Logic to pass command-line config overrides to the mcp server at
startup time. This allows use cases like `codex mcp -c
preferred_auth_method=apikey`.
jif