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c065ce6a075daa4e3bba335e7450facdff313635
68
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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c065ce6a07 | core: add request-scoped environment context | ||
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1391d786bc |
Scope command approvals by execution environment (#28738)
## Why Command approval cache keys included the command and working directory, but not the execution environment. An approval for `/workspace` locally could therefore be reused for the same command and path on an executor. ## What changed - Include the selected environment ID in shell and unified-exec approval cache keys. - Carry that ID through the normal command approval request so clients can show which environment is being approved. - Expose the environment through app-server as a required nullable `environmentId` and show it in the inline TUI approval prompt. - Keep older recorded approval events compatible when the environment is absent. For example, `echo ok` in local `/workspace` and `echo ok` in executor `/workspace` now produce different approval keys and separate prompts. ## Scope This PR does not change network approvals, Guardian review actions, MCP elicitation, full-screen TUI rendering, or environment-ID validation. Remote `shell_command` execution itself remains in #28722; this PR only makes its approval key environment-aware. |
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022f1221e8 |
[codex] Bind shell snapshots to retained thread environments (#28421)
## Why Shell snapshots are currently session-scoped even though shell and cwd are properties of a selected turn environment. That makes snapshot refresh depend on separate session-cwd plumbing, prevents retained environments from retaining their snapshot work, and can make snapshot construction use a different shell than command execution. This follows #27955 by making the retained thread-environment service own environment snapshot lifecycles. Session configuration remains the requested selection state, while `ThreadEnvironments` remains the source of successfully resolved environments. ## What changed - Configure the shell-snapshot builder before initial environment resolution. - Start each local environment snapshot task when its `TurnEnvironment` is built and retain that shared task while environment ID and cwd still match. - Inherit retained environment snapshots into spawned child threads. - Carry the selected `TurnEnvironment` through shell runtimes so snapshot construction and command execution use the same environment-specific shell and cwd. - Load project instructions and warm plugins/skills after initial environment resolution. - Continue decoding invalid UTF-8 instruction files lossily without emitting a startup warning. - Keep requested selections in `SessionConfiguration`; failed or duplicate resolutions only affect the resolved environment snapshot. ## Validation - `cargo check -p codex-core --tests` - `just test -p codex-home instructions` (6 passed) - Focused environment, instruction, shell-snapshot, and user-shell tests (84 passed) - Focused shell-snapshot, user-shell, and unified-exec tests (126 passed; two event-timing tests passed on retry) |
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1aa3e432cc |
[codex] simplify shell snapshot ownership (#27756)
## Why Shell snapshot lifecycle state was split between `Shell` and `SessionServices`: `Shell` carried the receiver while session code exposed and forwarded the raw sender. That coupled shell identity to mutable snapshot state and made refresh, inheritance, and file lifetime harder to reason about. ## What changed - make each `Arc<ShellSnapshot>` represent one cwd-specific snapshot generation - store the active generation in `SessionServices` with `ArcSwapOption` - have construction start the background build and expose only a cwd-validated snapshot path - use `ShellSnapshotFile` ownership to delete snapshot files automatically - pass snapshot paths explicitly to shell runtimes instead of storing snapshot state on `Shell` - preserve inherited and in-flight generations by pinning their `Arc` while they are in use ## Test plan - `cargo check -p codex-core --lib` - `just test -p codex-core 'shell_snapshot::tests'` - `just test -p codex-core shell_command_snapshot_still_intercepts_apply_patch` - `just test -p codex-core shell_snapshot_deleted_after_shutdown_with_skills` |
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52a50aec70 |
sandboxing: migrate cwd inputs to PathUri (#27816)
## Why Sandbox cwd values can cross app-server and exec-server host boundaries. They should retain URI semantics until the receiving host validates them instead of being interpreted early as native paths. ## What - Carry `PathUri` through filesystem sandbox contexts, sandbox commands, and transform inputs. - Convert command and policy cwd once in `SandboxManager::transform`, then keep launch requests native. - Preserve sandbox cwd over remote filesystem transport and reject non-native URIs without fallback. - Cache paired native/URI turn-environment cwd values during migration, with immutable access to keep them synchronized. - Extend existing protocol, forwarding, transform, and core runtime tests. |
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6bcccb0ee6 |
cli: add package path from install context (#26189)
## Why Codex package installs include helper binaries in `codex-path`, such as the bundled `rg`. Package-layout launches should add that directory before user commands run, but standalone launches were missing it while npm launches only worked because `codex.js` had its own legacy `PATH` rewrite. That made npm and standalone package behavior diverge. Shell snapshot restoration can also reset `PATH` after runtime setup. Any package-owned `PATH` prepend has to be recorded as an explicit runtime override so shells, unified exec, and user-shell commands keep access to `codex-path` after a snapshot is sourced. ## Repro Before this change, a curl-installed package could contain `rg` under `codex-path` but still fail to put it on `PATH`: ```shell mkdir /tmp/test-codex-curl curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh \ | CODEX_HOME=/tmp/test-codex-curl CODEX_NON_INTERACTIVE=1 sh /tmp/test-codex-curl/packages/standalone/current/bin/codex exec \ --skip-git-repo-check 'print `which -a rg`' find /tmp/test-codex-curl -name rg ``` The `which -a rg` output omitted the packaged helper even though `find` showed it under `/tmp/test-codex-curl/packages/standalone/releases/.../codex-path/rg`. The npm install path behaved differently only because `codex-cli/bin/codex.js` had legacy `PATH` rewriting: ```shell mkdir /tmp/test-codex-npm cd /tmp/test-codex-npm npm install @openai/codex ./node_modules/.bin/codex exec --skip-git-repo-check 'print `which -a rg`' ``` That printed the npm package's `vendor/<target>/codex-path/rg` first. This PR moves that behavior into Rust-side package launch setup so curl/standalone and npm/bun launches agree without JS rewriting `PATH`. ## What Changed - `codex-rs/arg0` now uses `InstallContext::current().package_layout.path_dir` to prepend the package helper directory before any threads are created. - Package helper `PATH` setup is independent from the temporary arg0 alias setup, so `codex-path` is still added even if CODEX_HOME tempdir, lock, or symlink setup fails. - `codex-rs/install-context` detects the canonical package layout we ship: `bin/`, `codex-resources/`, and `codex-path/` next to `codex-package.json`. - Shell, local unified exec, and user-shell runtimes now record package `codex-path` prepends in `explicit_env_overrides`, matching the existing zsh-fork behavior so shell snapshots cannot restore over the package helper path. - Remote unified exec requests do not receive the local app-server package path overlay. - `codex-cli/bin/codex.js` no longer computes or overrides `PATH`; it only locates the native binary in the canonical package layout and passes npm/bun management metadata. - Added regression tests for `PATH` ordering, package layout detection, and shell snapshot preservation of package path prepends. ## Verification - `node --check codex-cli/bin/codex.js` - `just test -p codex-install-context -p codex-arg0` - `just test -p codex-core user_shell_snapshot_preserves_package_path_prepend` - `just test -p codex-core tools::runtimes::tests` - `just bazel-lock-update` - `just bazel-lock-check` - `just fix -p codex-install-context -p codex-arg0 -p codex-core` |
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6e10142199 |
fix: preserve deny-read sandboxing for safe commands (#23943)
## Why Permission profiles can mark filesystem entries as unreadable with `deny` rules, including glob patterns. Several shell execution paths treated known-safe commands or execpolicy `allow` rules as sufficient to run outside the filesystem sandbox. That is not valid for read-capable commands: for example, `cat` or `ls` may be reasonable to allow generally, but dropping the sandbox would also drop deny-read constraints such as `**/*.env`. ## What changed - Added a shared check that treats active deny-read restrictions as incompatible with unsandboxed execution. - Kept first-attempt execution sandboxed for explicit escalation and execpolicy allow bypasses when deny-read entries are present. - Prevented no-sandbox retry after a sandbox denial when the active filesystem policy contains deny-read entries. - Updated the zsh-fork execve path so prefix-rule `allow` decisions continue inside the current sandbox when deny-read restrictions are active. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::sandboxing::tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core shell_command_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy` |
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bc10e5b390 |
runtime: prepend zsh fork bin dir to PATH (#23768)
## Why #23756 makes packaged Codex builds include and default to the bundled zsh fork. The important reason to put that fork's directory at the front of `PATH` is to keep executable-level escalation working after a command leaves the original shell and later re-enters zsh through `env`. The expected chain is: 1. The zsh fork runs the top-level shell command. 2. That command launches another program, such as `python3`, while inheriting the `EXEC_WRAPPER` environment and the escalation socket fd. 3. That program spawns a shell script whose shebang is `#!/usr/bin/env zsh` rather than `#!/bin/zsh`, and it does not close the escalation fd. 4. `/usr/bin/env` resolves `zsh` through `PATH`, so it must find the packaged zsh fork before the system zsh. 5. Commands inside that nested script are intercepted by the zsh fork and can still request escalation from Codex. If `PATH` resolves `zsh` to the system shell instead, the nested script loses zsh-fork exec interception. Commands that should request escalation can then run only in the original sandbox, or fail there, without Codex ever receiving the approval request. Shell snapshots make this slightly more subtle: a snapshot can restore an older `PATH` after the child shell starts. This PR treats the zsh fork `PATH` prepend as an explicit environment override so snapshot wrapping preserves it. ## What Changed - Added shared zsh-fork runtime helpers that prepend the configured zsh executable parent directory to `PATH` without duplicate entries. - Applied the zsh fork `PATH` prepend to both zsh-fork `shell_command` launches and unified-exec zsh-fork launches before sandbox command construction. - Kept the shell-command zsh-fork backend API narrow: it derives the configured zsh path from session services and rebuilds its sandbox environment from `req.env`, rather than accepting a second, competing environment map or a separately threaded bin dir. - Kept Unix-only zsh-fork `PATH` mutation out of Windows clippy-visible mutability. - Added coverage for duplicate `PATH` entries, for preserving the zsh fork prepend through shell snapshot wrapping, and for the nested `python3` -> `#!/usr/bin/env zsh` escalation flow. ## Testing - `just fmt` - `just fix -p codex-core` I left final test validation to CI after the latest review-comment cleanup. Before that cleanup, `just test -p codex-core zsh_fork` passed locally for the zsh-fork-focused tests. |
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9152ebd289 |
fix(linux-sandbox): preserve shell cleanup on interruption (#22729)
## Why Interrupted `shell_command` calls can race with the outer tool-dispatch cancellation path. When that happens, the runtime future may be dropped before the spawned process gets a chance to run `SIGTERM` cleanup. For bwrapd-backed Linux sandbox commands, that can leave synthetic protected-path mount bookkeeping such as `.git/.codex` registrations under `/tmp` behind after a TUI interruption. The relevant cancellation points are the outer dispatch race in [`core/src/tools/parallel.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/tools/parallel.rs#L91-L132) and the process shutdown logic in [`core/src/exec.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs#L1367-L1393). ## What changed - Keep `shell_command` dispatch alive long enough for the runtime to finish cancellation cleanup instead of immediately returning the synthetic aborted response. - Fold shell-turn cancellation into the existing `ExecExpiration` path in [`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell.rs#L267-L274), so cancellation and timeout behavior stay centralized. - On cancellation, send `SIGTERM` first, wait briefly for cleanup to run, then hard-kill any remaining descendants in the original process group. - Treat `ESRCH` as an already-gone process-group cleanup case in `codex-utils-pty`, which keeps best-effort teardown from surfacing a stale-process race as an error. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core cancellation` - Added regression coverage for: - `shell_tool_cancellation_waits_for_runtime_cleanup` - `process_exec_tool_call_cancellation_allows_sigterm_cleanup` |
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8ae0c837f0 |
Avoid PowerShell profiles in elevated Windows sandbox (#21400)
## Why On Windows, elevated sandboxed commands run under a dedicated sandbox account while `HOME` / `USERPROFILE` can still point at the real user's profile directory. For PowerShell login shells, that combination can make the sandbox account try to load the real user's PowerShell profile script. If the sandbox account's execution policy differs from the real user's policy, startup can emit profile-loading errors before the requested command runs. For this backend, loading the profile is not a faithful user login shell: it is cross-account profile execution. Treating these PowerShell invocations as non-login shells avoids that invalid startup path. ## Why This Happens Late The normal `login` decision is resolved when shell argv is created, but that point is too early to make this Windows sandbox-specific decision. At argv creation time we do not yet know the actual sandbox attempt that will run the command. A turn can include sandboxed and unsandboxed attempts, and a broad turn-level override would also affect Full Access commands where the user's profile should remain available. Instead, this change carries the selected `ShellType` alongside the argv and applies the `-NoProfile` adjustment in the shell runtimes once the `SandboxAttempt` is known. That keeps the override scoped to actual `WindowsRestrictedToken` attempts with `WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated`. The runtime uses the selected shell metadata rather than re-detecting PowerShell from argv. That avoids brittle parsing and covers PowerShell invocation shapes such as `-EncodedCommand`. ## What Changed - Carry selected shell metadata through `exec_command` / unified exec requests and shell tool requests. - Insert `-NoProfile` for PowerShell commands only when the runtime is about to execute a sandboxed elevated Windows attempt. - Add focused unit coverage for elevated Windows PowerShell, `-EncodedCommand`, existing `-NoProfile`, legacy restricted-token attempts, unsandboxed attempts, and non-PowerShell commands. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core disable_powershell_profile_tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core test_get_command` - `cargo clippy --fix --tests --allow-dirty --allow-no-vcs -p codex-core` A full `cargo test -p codex-core` run was also attempted during development, but it still hit an unrelated stack overflow in `agent::control` tests before reaching this area. |
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83decfa300 |
[codex] Remove unused legacy shell tools (#22246)
## Why Recent session history showed no active use of the raw `shell`, `local_shell`, or `container.exec` execution surfaces. Keeping those handlers/specs wired into core leaves duplicate shell execution paths alongside the supported `shell_command` and unified exec tools. ## What changed - Removed the raw `shell` handler/spec and its `ShellToolCallParams` protocol helper. - Removed the legacy `local_shell` and `container.exec` handler/spec plumbing while preserving persisted-history compatibility for old response items. - Normalized model/config `default` and `local` shell selections to `shell_command`. - Pruned tests that exercised removed raw-shell/local-shell/apply-patch variants and kept coverage on `shell_command`, unified exec, and freeform `apply_patch`. ## Verification - `git diff --check` - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-tools` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::shell` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::spec` - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::router` - `cargo test -p codex-core active_call_preserves_triggering_command_context` - `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_serialization` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_command_` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all local_shell` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all otel::` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all hooks::` - `just fix -p codex-core` - `just fix -p codex-tools` |
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6506765168 |
fix(permissions): preserve managed deny-read during escalation (#15977)
## Why
Managed filesystem `deny_read` requirements are administrator-enforced
restrictions on specific paths. Once those requirements are active,
Codex should not drop them just because an execution path would
otherwise leave the sandbox.
Before this change, an explicit escalation, a prefix-rule allow, a
sandbox-denial retry, or an app-server legacy sandbox override could
rebuild the runtime policy without those managed read-deny entries and
expose a path the administrator had marked unreadable.
This is narrower than general sandbox-mode constraints. If an enterprise
only sets `allowed_sandbox_modes`, a trusted `prefix_rule(..., decision
= "allow")` can still run its matching command unsandboxed; this PR only
preserves managed filesystem `deny_read` restrictions across those
paths.
## What Changed
- Mark filesystem policies built from managed `deny_read` requirements
so callers can tell when those deny entries must survive escalation.
- Preserve managed deny-read entries when runtime permission profiles
are rebuilt through protocol, app-server, or legacy sandbox-policy
compatibility paths.
- Keep managed deny-read attempts inside the selected sandbox on the
first attempt and after sandbox-denial retries.
- Preserve the same behavior in the zsh-fork escalation path, including
prefix-rule-driven escalation.
- Add a regression test showing the opposite case too: without managed
deny-read, a prefix-rule allow still chooses unsandboxed execution.
## Verification
Targeted automated verification:
```shell
cargo test -p codex-core shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_uses_unsandboxed_execution_without_managed_deny_read -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_preserves_managed_deny_read_escalation -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_filesystem_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol permission_profile_file_system_permissions_preserves_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo check -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui
```
Smoke-test invocations:
```shell
# macOS exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
-c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
-c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
# Linux exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
-c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
-c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",glob_scan_max_depth=3,":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
```
Observed manual smoke matrix:
| Case | macOS Seatbelt | Linux bubblewrap |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `cat allowed.txt` | Pass | Pass |
| `cat secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/root.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/one.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/two.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat alias-to-secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| Missing denied path | A file created after sandbox setup remained
unreadable | Creation was blocked by the reserved missing-path
placeholder, and the placeholder was cleaned up after exit |
| Real `codex exec` shell turn | Pass | Pass |
Notes:
- The Linux smoke run used the fallback glob walker because the devbox
did not have `rg` installed.
- The smoke matrix verifies the end-to-end filesystem behavior on macOS
and Linux; the escalation-specific behavior is covered by the focused
tests above.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Charlie Marsh <charliemarsh@openai.com>
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61142b6169 |
Remove ToolName display helper (#21465)
## Why `ToolName::display()` made it too easy to flatten tool identity and accidentally compare rendered strings. Tool identity should stay structural until a legacy string boundary actually requires the flattened spelling. ## What - Removes `ToolName::display()` and relies on the existing `Display` impl for messages and errors. - Adds structural ordering for `ToolName` and uses it for sorting/deduping deferred tools. - Carries `ToolName` through tool/sandbox plumbing, flattening only at legacy boundaries such as hook payloads, telemetry tags, and Responses tool names. - Updates MCP normalization tests to assert `ToolName` structure instead of rendered strings. ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-mcp test_normalize_tools` - `cargo test -p codex-core unavailable_tool` - `just fix -p codex-protocol` - `just fix -p codex-mcp` - `just fix -p codex-core` |
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07c8b8c77c |
fix: handle deferred network proxy denials (#19184)
## Why This bug is exposed by Guardian/auto-review approvals. With the managed network proxy enabled, a blocked network request can be reported back through the network approval service as an approval denial after the command has already started. Before this change, the shell and unified exec runtimes registered those network approval calls, but did not have a way to observe an async proxy denial as a cancellation/failure signal for the running process. The result was confusing: Guardian/auto-review could correctly deny network access, but the command path could keep running or unregister the approval without surfacing the denial as the command failure. ## What Changed - `NetworkApprovalService` now attaches a cancellation token to active and deferred network approvals. - Proxy-denial outcomes are recorded only for active registrations, cancel the owning token, and are consumed when the approval is finalized. - The shell runtime combines the normal command timeout with the network-denial cancellation token. - Unified exec stores the deferred network approval object, terminates tracked processes when the proxy denial arrives, and returns the denial as a process failure while polling or completing the process. - Tool orchestration passes the active network approval cancellation token into the sandbox attempt and preserves deferred approval errors instead of silently unregistering them. - App-server `command/exec` now handles the combined timeout-or-cancellation expiration variant used by the runtime. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core network_approval --lib` - `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings` --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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9aaa5d9358 |
[codex] Bypass managed network for escalated exec (#19595)
## Why `sandbox_permissions = "require_escalated"` is treated as an explicit request to approve the command and run it outside the filesystem/platform sandbox. Before this change, shell and unified exec still registered managed network approval context and could inject Codex-managed proxy state into the child process, which meant an approved escalated command could still hit a second network approval path. This PR makes that escalation boundary consistent: once a command is explicitly approved to run outside the sandbox, Codex does not also route that process through the managed network proxy. ## Security impact Command/filesystem sandbox approval now implies network approval for that command. If an untrusted command or script is allowed to run with `require_escalated`, its network calls are unsandboxed: Codex-managed network allowlists and denylists are not respected for that process, so the command can exfiltrate any data it can read. ## What changed - Skip managed network approval specs for `SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated`. - Pass `network: None` into shell, zsh-fork shell, and unified exec sandbox preparation for explicitly escalated requests. - Strip Codex-managed proxy environment variables when `CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE` is present, while preserving user proxy env when the Codex marker is absent. - Add regression coverage for the prepared exec request so the old behavior cannot silently reappear. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-core explicit_escalation` - `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings` |
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4816b89204 |
permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
## Why
`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.
The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:
```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
Managed {
file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
Disabled,
External {
network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
},
}
```
This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.
## How Existing Modeling Maps
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:
- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.
## What Changed
- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.
## Compatibility
Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.
## Verification
- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
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305825abd9 |
Support MCP tools in hooks (#18385)
## Summary Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows - hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash` - hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input` - core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are model-visible and stable This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior. ## Reviewer Notes I think these are the key files - `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs` - `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs` Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just `command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools. ## Changes - Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads. - Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments as `tool_input`. - Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing `McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload. - Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP elicitation. - Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and `mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`. --------- Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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|
2d73bac45f |
feat: add guardian network approval trigger context (#18197)
## Summary
Give guardian network-access reviews the command context that triggered
a managed-network approval. The prompt JSON now includes the originating
tool call id, tool name, command argv, cwd, sandbox permissions,
additional permissions, justification, and tty state when a single
active tool call can be attributed.
The implementation keeps the trigger shape canonical by serializing
`GuardianNetworkAccessTrigger` directly and lets each runtime build that
trigger from its `ToolCtx`. Non-guardian approval prompts avoid cloning
the full trigger payload.
## UX changes
Guardian network-access reviews now include a `trigger` object that
explains what command caused the network approval. Instead of seeing
only the requested host, the guardian reviewer can also see the
originating tool call, argv, working directory, sandbox mode,
justification, and tty state.
Example payload the guardian reviewer can see:
```json
{
"tool": "network_access",
"target": "https://api.github.com:443",
"host": "api.github.com",
"protocol": "https",
"port": 443,
"trigger": {
"callId": "call_abc123",
"toolName": "shell",
"command": ["gh", "api", "/repos/openai/codex/pulls/18197"],
"cwd": "/workspace/codex",
"sandboxPermissions": "require_escalated",
"justification": "Fetch PR metadata from GitHub.",
"tty": false
}
}
```
The network review itself remains scoped to the network decision:
`target_item_id` stays `null`. `trigger.callId` is attribution context
only, so clients can still distinguish network reviews from
item-targeted command reviews.
## Verification
- Added coverage for serializing network trigger context in guardian
approval JSON.
- Added regression coverage that network guardian reviews do not reuse
`trigger.callId` as `target_item_id`.
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
|
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|
09ebc34f17 |
fix(core): emit hooks for apply_patch edits (#18391)
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16732. ## Why `apply_patch` is Codex's primary file edit path, but it was not emitting `PreToolUse` or `PostToolUse` hook events. That meant hook-based policy, auditing, and write coordination could observe shell commands while missing the actual file mutation performed by `apply_patch`. The issue also exposed that the hook runtime serialized command hook payloads with `tool_name: "Bash"` unconditionally. Even if `apply_patch` supplied hook payloads, hooks would either fail to match it directly or receive misleading stdin that identified the edit as a Bash tool call. ## What Changed - Added `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` payload support to `ApplyPatchHandler`. - Exposed the raw patch body as `tool_input.command` for both JSON/function and freeform `apply_patch` calls. - Taught tool hook payloads to carry a handler-supplied hook-facing `tool_name`. - Preserved existing shell compatibility by continuing to emit `Bash` for shell-like tools. - Serialized the selected hook `tool_name` into hook stdin instead of hardcoding `Bash`. - Relaxed the generated hook command input schema so `tool_name` can represent tools other than `Bash`. ## Verification Added focused handler coverage for: - JSON/function `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload. - Freeform `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload. - Successful `apply_patch` output producing a `PostToolUse` payload. - Shell and `exec_command` handlers continuing to expose `Bash`. Added end-to-end hook coverage for: - A `PreToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` blocking the patch before the target file is created. - A `PostToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` receiving the patch input and tool response, then adding context to the follow-up model request. - Non-participating tools such as the plan tool continuing not to emit `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` hook events. Also validated manually with a live `codex exec` smoke test using an isolated temp workspace and temp `CODEX_HOME`. The smoke test confirmed that a real `apply_patch` edit emits `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` with `tool_name: "apply_patch"`, a shell command still emits `tool_name: "Bash"`, and a denying `PreToolUse` hook prevents the blocked patch file from being created. |
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|
8494e5bd7b |
Add PermissionRequest hooks support (#17563)
## Why We need `PermissionRequest` hook support! Also addresses: - https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16301 - run a script on Hook to do things like play a sound to draw attention but actually no-op so user can still approve - can omit the `decision` object from output or just have the script exit 0 and print nothing - https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15311 - let the script approve/deny on its own - external UI what will run on Hook and relay decision back to codex ## Reviewer Note There's a lot of plumbing for the new hook, key files to review are: - New hook added in `codex-rs/hooks/src/events/permission_request.rs` - Wiring for network approvals `codex-rs/core/src/tools/network_approval.rs` - Wiring for tool orchestrator `codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs` - Wiring for execve `codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs` ## What - Wires shell, unified exec, and network approval prompts into the `PermissionRequest` hook flow. - Lets hooks allow or deny approval prompts; quiet or invalid hooks fall back to the normal approval path. - Uses `tool_input.description` for user-facing context when it helps: - shell / `exec_command`: the request justification, when present - network approvals: `network-access <domain>` - Uses `tool_name: Bash` for shell, unified exec, and network approval permission-request hooks. - For network approvals, passes the originating command in `tool_input.command` when there is a single owning call; otherwise falls back to the synthetic `network-access ...` command. <details> <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a shell approval</summary> ```json { "session_id": "<session-id>", "turn_id": "<turn-id>", "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl", "cwd": "/path/to/cwd", "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest", "model": "gpt-5", "permission_mode": "default", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": { "command": "rm -f /tmp/example" } } ``` </details> <details> <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for an escalated `exec_command` request</summary> ```json { "session_id": "<session-id>", "turn_id": "<turn-id>", "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl", "cwd": "/path/to/cwd", "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest", "model": "gpt-5", "permission_mode": "default", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": { "command": "cp /tmp/source.json /Users/alice/export/source.json", "description": "Need to copy a generated file outside the workspace" } } ``` </details> <details> <summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a network approval</summary> ```json { "session_id": "<session-id>", "turn_id": "<turn-id>", "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl", "cwd": "/path/to/cwd", "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest", "model": "gpt-5", "permission_mode": "default", "tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": { "command": "curl http://codex-network-test.invalid", "description": "network-access http://codex-network-test.invalid" } } ``` </details> ## Follow-ups - Implement the `PermissionRequest` semantics for `updatedInput`, `updatedPermissions`, `interrupt`, and suggestions / `permission_suggestions` - Add `PermissionRequest` support for the `request_permissions` tool path --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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dd1321d11b |
Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)
Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code. |
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a3be74143a |
fix(guardian, app-server): introduce guardian review ids (#17298)
## Description This PR introduces `review_id` as the stable identifier for guardian reviews and exposes it in app-server `item/autoApprovalReview/started` and `item/autoApprovalReview/completed` events. Internally, guardian rejection state is now keyed by `review_id` instead of the reviewed tool item ID. `target_item_id` is still included when a review maps to a concrete thread item, but it is no longer overloaded as the review lifecycle identifier. ## Motivation We'd like to give users the ability to preempt a guardian review while it's running (approve or decline). However, we can't implement the API that allows the user to override a running guardian review because we didn't have a unique `review_id` per guardian review. Using `target_item_id` is not correct since: - with execve reviews, there can be multiple execve calls (and therefore guardian reviews) per shell command - with network policy reviews, there is no target item ID The PR that actually implements user overrides will use `review_id` as the stable identifier. |
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35b5720e8d |
Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063)
## Summary - Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s. - Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through `ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime requests. - Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd. ## Validation - `cargo check -p codex-core --tests` - `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests` - `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing` - `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::` - `just fix -p codex-sandboxing` - `just fix -p codex-core` - `just fmt` Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I kept local validation targeted. |
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feb4f0051a |
Fix nested exec thread ID restore (#16882)
Addresses #15527 Problem: Nested `codex exec` commands could source a shell snapshot that re-exported the parent `CODEX_THREAD_ID`, so commands inside the nested session were attributed to the wrong thread. Solution: Reapply the live command env's `CODEX_THREAD_ID` after sourcing the snapshot. |
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af8a9d2d2b |
remove temporary ownership re-exports (#16626)
Stacked on #16508. This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from `codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`, `codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`. No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer split out from the ownership move. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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aa2403e2eb |
core: remove cross-crate re-exports from lib.rs (#16512)
## Why `codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates, which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module instead of the actual owner crate. Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following files: ``` codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml ``` ## What - Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by `codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`, `codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`, `codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`. - Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`. - Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the owning `codex-*` crate. - Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`. |
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5906c6a658 |
chore: remove skill metadata from command approval payloads (#15906)
## Why This is effectively a follow-up to [#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions. Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area without changing behavior. Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries. ## What changed - removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding `skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server protocol - removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field - updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval plumbing to stop forwarding the field - cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted `skillMetadata` ## Testing - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-protocol` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client` - `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server` - `just argument-comment-lint` |
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0b619afc87 |
Drop sandbox_permissions from sandbox exec requests (#15665)
## Summary - drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and `ExecRequest` adapter types - remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and apply-patch runtime call sites - default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault` where the lower-level API still requires the field ## Testing - `just fmt` - `just argument-comment-lint` - `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`, `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`, and `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`) |
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f49eb8e9d7 |
Extract sandbox manager and transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15603)
Extract sandbox manager |
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ea8b07e680 |
chore(core) Remove Feature::PowershellUtf8 (#15128)
## Summary This feature has been enabled for powershell for a while now, let's get rid of the logic ## Testing - [x] Unit tests |
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2e22885e79 |
Split features into codex-features crate (#15253)
- Split the feature system into a new `codex-features` crate. - Cut `codex-core` and workspace consumers over to the new config and warning APIs. Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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b77fe8fefe |
Apply argument comment lint across codex-rs (#14652)
## Why Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing positional literal call sites without changing those APIs. The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the existing signatures stay in place. After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs. ## What changed - keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci` - mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across `codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased `tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint - keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using `/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented - cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo registry/git metadata in the lint job - split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes - continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so product-code enforcement is unchanged Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself. ## Verification - `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace` - `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui` - parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML --- * -> #14652 * #14651 |
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bc24017d64 |
Add Smart Approvals guardian review across core, app-server, and TUI (#13860)
## Summary
- add `approvals_reviewer = "user" | "guardian_subagent"` as the runtime
control for who reviews approval requests
- route Smart Approvals guardian review through core for command
execution, file changes, managed-network approvals, MCP approvals, and
delegated/subagent approval flows
- expose guardian review in app-server with temporary unstable
`item/autoApprovalReview/{started,completed}` notifications carrying
`targetItemId`, `review`, and `action`
- update the TUI so Smart Approvals can be enabled from `/experimental`,
aligned with the matching `/approvals` mode, and surfaced clearly while
reviews are pending or resolved
## Runtime model
This PR does not introduce a new `approval_policy`.
Instead:
- `approval_policy` still controls when approval is needed
- `approvals_reviewer` controls who reviewable approval requests are
routed to:
- `user`
- `guardian_subagent`
`guardian_subagent` is a carefully prompted reviewer subagent that
gathers relevant context and applies a risk-based decision framework
before approving or denying the request.
The `smart_approvals` feature flag is a rollout/UI gate. Core runtime
behavior keys off `approvals_reviewer`.
When Smart Approvals is enabled from the TUI, it also switches the
current `/approvals` settings to the matching Smart Approvals mode so
users immediately see guardian review in the active thread:
- `approval_policy = on-request`
- `approvals_reviewer = guardian_subagent`
- `sandbox_mode = workspace-write`
Users can still change `/approvals` afterward.
Config-load behavior stays intentionally narrow:
- plain `smart_approvals = true` in `config.toml` remains just the
rollout/UI gate and does not auto-set `approvals_reviewer`
- the deprecated `guardian_approval = true` alias migration does
backfill `approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"` in the same scope
when that reviewer is not already configured there, so old configs
preserve their original guardian-enabled behavior
ARC remains a separate safety check. For MCP tool approvals, ARC
escalations now flow into the configured reviewer instead of always
bypassing guardian and forcing manual review.
## Config stability
The runtime reviewer override is stable, but the config-backed
app-server protocol shape is still settling.
- `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, and `turn/start` keep stable
`approvalsReviewer` overrides
- the config-backed `approvals_reviewer` exposure returned via
`config/read` (including profile-level config) is now marked
`[UNSTABLE]` / experimental in the app-server protocol until we are more
confident in that config surface
## App-server surface
This PR intentionally keeps the guardian app-server shape narrow and
temporary.
It adds generic unstable lifecycle notifications:
- `item/autoApprovalReview/started`
- `item/autoApprovalReview/completed`
with payloads of the form:
- `{ threadId, turnId, targetItemId, review, action? }`
`review` is currently:
- `{ status, riskScore?, riskLevel?, rationale? }`
- where `status` is one of `inProgress`, `approved`, `denied`, or
`aborted`
`action` carries the guardian action summary payload from core when
available. This lets clients render temporary standalone pending-review
UI, including parallel reviews, even when the underlying tool item has
not been emitted yet.
These notifications are explicitly documented as `[UNSTABLE]` and
expected to change soon.
This PR does **not** persist guardian review state onto `thread/read`
tool items. The intended follow-up is to attach guardian review state to
the reviewed tool item lifecycle instead, which would improve
consistency with manual approvals and allow thread history / reconnect
flows to replay guardian review state directly.
## TUI behavior
- `/experimental` exposes the rollout gate as `Smart Approvals`
- enabling it in the TUI enables the feature and switches the current
session to the matching Smart Approvals `/approvals` mode
- disabling it in the TUI clears the persisted `approvals_reviewer`
override when appropriate and returns the session to default manual
review when the effective reviewer changes
- `/approvals` still exposes the reviewer choice directly
- the TUI renders:
- pending guardian review state in the live status footer, including
parallel review aggregation
- resolved approval/denial state in history
## Scope notes
This PR includes the supporting core/runtime work needed to make Smart
Approvals usable end-to-end:
- shell / unified-exec / apply_patch / managed-network / MCP guardian
review
- delegated/subagent approval routing into guardian review
- guardian review risk metadata and action summaries for app-server/TUI
- config/profile/TUI handling for `smart_approvals`, `guardian_approval`
alias migration, and `approvals_reviewer`
- a small internal cleanup of delegated approval forwarding to dedupe
fallback paths and simplify guardian-vs-parent approval waiting (no
intended behavior change)
Out of scope for this PR:
- redesigning the existing manual approval protocol shapes
- persisting guardian review state onto app-server `ThreadItem`s
- delegated MCP elicitation auto-review (the current delegated MCP
guardian shim only covers the legacy `RequestUserInput` path)
---------
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
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19d0949aab | Handle pre-approved permissions in zsh fork (#14431) | ||
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f23fcd6ced |
guardian initial feedback / tweaks (#13897)
## Summary - remove the remaining model-visible guardian-specific `on-request` prompt additions so enabling the feature does not change the main approval-policy instructions - neutralize user-facing guardian wording to talk about automatic approval review / approval requests rather than a second reviewer or only sandbox escalations - tighten guardian retry-context handling so agent-authored `justification` stays in the structured action JSON and is not also injected as raw retry context - simplify guardian review plumbing in core by deleting dead prompt-append paths and trimming some request/transcript setup code ## Notable Changes - delete the dead `permissions/approval_policy/guardian.md` append path and stop threading `guardian_approval_enabled` through model-facing developer-instruction builders - rename the experimental feature copy to `Automatic approval review` and update the `/experimental` snapshot text accordingly - make approval-review status strings generic across shell, patch, network, and MCP review types - forward real sandbox/network retry reasons for shell and unified-exec guardian review, but do not pass agent-authored justification as raw retry context - simplify `guardian.rs` by removing the one-field request wrapper, deduping reasoning-effort selection, and cleaning up transcript entry collection ## Testing - `just fmt` - full validation left to CI --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
||
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340f9c9ecb |
app-server: include experimental skill metadata in exec approval requests (#13929)
## Summary
This change surfaces skill metadata on command approval requests so
app-server clients can tell when an approval came from a skill script
and identify the originating `SKILL.md`.
- add `skill_metadata` to exec approval events in the shared protocol
- thread skill metadata through core shell escalation and delegated
approval handling for skill-triggered approvals
- expose the field in app-server v2 as experimental `skillMetadata`
- regenerate the JSON/TypeScript schemas and cover the new field in
protocol, transport, core, and TUI tests
## Why
Skill-triggered approvals already carry skill context inside core, but
app-server clients could not see which skill caused the prompt. Sending
the skill metadata with the approval request makes it possible for
clients to present better approval UX and connect the prompt back to the
relevant skill definition.
## example event in app-server-v2
verified that we see this event when experimental api is on:
```
< {
< "id": 11,
< "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
< "params": {
< "additionalPermissions": {
< "fileSystem": null,
< "macos": {
< "accessibility": false,
< "automations": {
< "bundle_ids": [
< "com.apple.Notes"
< ]
< },
< "calendar": false,
< "preferences": "read_only"
< },
< "network": null
< },
< "approvalId": "25d600ee-5a3c-4746-8d17-e2e61fb4c563",
< "availableDecisions": [
< "accept",
< "acceptForSession",
< "cancel"
< ],
< "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
< "commandActions": [
< {
< "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
< "type": "unknown"
< }
< ],
< "cwd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes",
< "itemId": "call_jZp3xFpNg4D8iKAD49cvEvZy",
< "skillMetadata": {
< "pathToSkillsMd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/SKILL.md"
< },
< "threadId": "019ccc10-b7d3-7ff2-84fe-3a75e7681e69",
< "turnId": "019ccc10-b848-76f1-81b3-4a1fa225493f"
< }
< }`
```
& verified that this is the event when experimental api is off:
```
< {
< "id": 13,
< "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
< "params": {
< "approvalId": "5fbbf776-261b-4cf8-899b-c125b547f2c0",
< "availableDecisions": [
< "accept",
< "acceptForSession",
< "cancel"
< ],
< "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
< "commandActions": [
< {
< "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
< "type": "unknown"
< }
< ],
< "cwd": "/Users/celia/code/codex/codex-rs",
< "itemId": "call_OV2DHzTgYcbYtWaTTBWlocOt",
< "threadId": "019ccc16-2a2b-7be1-8500-e00d45b892d4",
< "turnId": "019ccc16-2a8e-7961-98ec-649600e7d06a"
< }
< }
```
|
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e84ee33cc0 |
Add guardian approval MVP (#13692)
## Summary - add the guardian reviewer flow for `on-request` approvals in command, patch, sandbox-retry, and managed-network approval paths - keep guardian behind `features.guardian_approval` instead of exposing a public `approval_policy = guardian` mode - route ordinary `OnRequest` approvals to the guardian subagent when the feature is enabled, without changing the public approval-mode surface ## Public model - public approval modes stay unchanged - guardian is enabled via `features.guardian_approval` - when that feature is on, `approval_policy = on-request` keeps the same approval boundaries but sends those approval requests to the guardian reviewer instead of the user - `/experimental` only persists the feature flag; it does not rewrite `approval_policy` - CLI and app-server no longer expose a separate `guardian` approval mode in this PR ## Guardian reviewer - the reviewer runs as a normal subagent and reuses the existing subagent/thread machinery - it is locked to a read-only sandbox and `approval_policy = never` - it does not inherit user/project exec-policy rules - it prefers `gpt-5.4` when the current provider exposes it, otherwise falls back to the parent turn's active model - it fail-closes on timeout, startup failure, malformed output, or any other review error - it currently auto-approves only when `risk_score < 80` ## Review context and policy - guardian mirrors `OnRequest` approval semantics rather than introducing a separate approval policy - explicit `require_escalated` requests follow the same approval surface as `OnRequest`; the difference is only who reviews them - managed-network allowlist misses that enter the approval flow are also reviewed by guardian - the review prompt includes bounded recent transcript history plus recent tool call/result evidence - transcript entries and planned-action strings are truncated with explicit `<guardian_truncated ... />` markers so large payloads stay bounded - apply-patch reviews include the full patch content (without duplicating the structured `changes` payload) - the guardian request layout is snapshot-tested using the same model-visible Responses request formatter used elsewhere in core ## Guardian network behavior - the guardian subagent inherits the parent session's managed-network allowlist when one exists, so it can use the same approved network surface while reviewing - exact session-scoped network approvals are copied into the guardian session with protocol/port scope preserved - those copied approvals are now seeded before the guardian's first turn is submitted, so inherited approvals are available during any immediate review-time checks ## Out of scope / follow-ups - the sandbox-permission validation split was pulled into a separate PR and is not part of this diff - a future follow-up can enable `serde_json` preserve-order in `codex-core` and then simplify the guardian action rendering further --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com> |
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b4cb989563 |
refactor: prepare unified exec for zsh-fork backend (#13392)
## Why `shell_zsh_fork` already provides stronger guarantees around which executables receive elevated permissions. To reuse that machinery from unified exec without pushing Unix-specific escalation details through generic runtime code, the escalation bootstrap and session lifetime handling need a cleaner boundary. That boundary also needs to be safe for long-lived sessions: when an intercepted shell session is closed or pruned, any in-flight approval workers and any already-approved escalated child they spawned must be torn down with the session, and the inherited escalation socket must not leak into unrelated subprocesses. ## What Changed - Extracted a reusable `EscalationSession` and `EscalateServer::start_session(...)` in `shell-escalation` so callers can get the wrapper/socket env overlay and keep the escalation server alive without immediately running a one-shot command. - Documented that `EscalationSession::env()` and `ShellCommandExecutor::run(...)` exchange only that env overlay, which callers must merge into their own base shell environment. - Clarified the prepared-exec helper boundary in `core` by naming the new helper APIs around `ExecRequest`, while keeping the legacy `execute_env(...)` entrypoints as thin compatibility wrappers for existing callers that still use the older naming. - Added a small post-spawn hook on the prepared execution path so the parent copy of the inheritable escalation socket is closed immediately after both the existing one-shot shell-command spawn and the unified-exec spawn. - Made session teardown explicit with session-scoped cancellation: dropping an `EscalationSession` or canceling its parent request now stops intercept workers, and the server-spawned escalated child uses `kill_on_drop(true)` so teardown cannot orphan an already-approved child. - Added `UnifiedExecBackendConfig` plumbing through `ToolsConfig`, a `shell::zsh_fork_backend` facade, and an opaque unified-exec spawn-lifecycle hook so unified exec can prepare a wrapped `zsh -c/-lc` request without storing `EscalationSession` directly in generic process/runtime code. - Kept the existing `shell_command` zsh-fork behavior intact on top of the new bootstrap path. Tool selection is unchanged in this PR: when `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled, `ShellCommand` still wins over `exec_command`. ## Verification - `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation` - includes coverage for `start_session_exposes_wrapper_env_overlay` - includes coverage for `exec_closes_parent_socket_after_shell_spawn` - includes coverage for `dropping_session_aborts_intercept_workers_and_kills_spawned_child` - `cargo test -p codex-core shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec` - `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution` --- [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13392). * #13432 * __->__ #13392 |
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14116ade8d |
feat: include available decisions in command approval requests (#12758)
Command-approval clients currently infer which choices to show from
side-channel fields like `networkApprovalContext`,
`proposedExecpolicyAmendment`, and `additionalPermissions`. That makes
the request shape harder to evolve, and it forces each client to
replicate the server's heuristics instead of receiving the exact
decision list for the prompt.
This PR introduces a mapping between `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision`
and `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision`:
```rust
impl From<CoreReviewDecision> for CommandExecutionApprovalDecision {
fn from(value: CoreReviewDecision) -> Self {
match value {
CoreReviewDecision::Approved => Self::Accept,
CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
} => Self::AcceptWithExecpolicyAmendment {
execpolicy_amendment: proposed_execpolicy_amendment.into(),
},
CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => Self::AcceptForSession,
CoreReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment,
} => Self::ApplyNetworkPolicyAmendment {
network_policy_amendment: network_policy_amendment.into(),
},
CoreReviewDecision::Abort => Self::Cancel,
CoreReviewDecision::Denied => Self::Decline,
}
}
}
```
And updates `CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams` to have a new field:
```rust
available_decisions: Option<Vec<CommandExecutionApprovalDecision>>
```
when, if specified, should make it easier for clients to display an
appropriate list of options in the UI.
This makes it possible for `CoreShellActionProvider::prompt()` in
`unix_escalation.rs` to specify the `Vec<ReviewDecision>` directly,
adding support for `ApprovedForSession` when approving a skill script,
which was previously missing in the TUI.
Note this results in a significant change to `exec_options()` in
`approval_overlay.rs`, as the displayed options are now derived from
`available_decisions: &[ReviewDecision]`.
## What Changed
- Add `available_decisions` to
[`ExecApprovalRequestEvent`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/protocol/src/approvals.rs#L111-L175),
including helpers to derive the legacy default choices when older
senders omit the field.
- Map `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision` to app-server
`CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and expose the ordered list as
experimental `availableDecisions` in
[`CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2.rs#L3798-L3807).
- Thread optional `available_decisions` through the core approval path
so Unix shell escalation can explicitly request `ApprovedForSession` for
session-scoped approvals instead of relying on client heuristics.
[`unix_escalation.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs#L194-L214)
- Update the TUI approval overlay to build its buttons from the ordered
decision list, while preserving the legacy fallback when
`available_decisions` is missing.
- Update the app-server README, test client output, and generated schema
artifacts to document and surface the new field.
## Testing
- Add `approval_overlay.rs` coverage for explicit decision lists,
including the generic `ApprovedForSession` path and network approval
options.
- Update `chatwidget/tests.rs` and app-server protocol tests to populate
the new optional field and keep older event shapes working.
## Developers Docs
- If we document `item/commandExecution/requestApproval` on
[developers.openai.com/codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex), add
experimental `availableDecisions` as the preferred source of approval
choices and note that older servers may omit it.
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16ca527c80 |
chore: migrate additional permissions to PermissionProfile (#12731)
This PR replaces the old `additional_permissions.fs_read/fs_write` shape with a shared `PermissionProfile` model and wires it through the command approval, sandboxing, protocol, and TUI layers. The schema is adopted from the `SkillManifestPermissions`, which is also refactored to use this unified struct. This helps us easily expose permission profiles in app server/core as a follow-up. |
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3ca0e7673b |
feat: run zsh fork shell tool via shell-escalation (#12649)
## Why This PR switches the `shell_command` zsh-fork path over to `codex-shell-escalation` so the new shell tool can use the shared exec-wrapper/escalation protocol instead of the `zsh_exec_bridge` implementation that was introduced in https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052. `zsh_exec_bridge` relied on UNIX domain sockets, which is not as tamper-proof as the FD-based approach in `codex-shell-escalation`. ## What Changed - Added a Unix zsh-fork runtime adapter in `core` (`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`) that: - runs zsh-fork commands through `codex_shell_escalation::run_escalate_server` - bridges exec-policy / approval decisions into `ShellActionProvider` - executes escalated commands via a `ShellCommandExecutor` that calls `process_exec_tool_call` - Updated `ShellRuntime` / `ShellCommandHandler` / tool spec wiring to select a `shell_command` backend (`classic` vs `zsh-fork`) while leaving the generic `shell` tool path unchanged. - Removed the `zsh_exec_bridge`-based session service and deleted `core/src/zsh_exec_bridge/mod.rs`. - Moved exec-wrapper entrypoint dispatch to `arg0` by handling the `codex-execve-wrapper` arg0 alias there, and removed the old `codex_core::maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode()` hooks from `cli` and `app-server` mains. - Added the needed `codex-shell-escalation` dependencies for `core` and `arg0`. ## Tests - `cargo test -p codex-core shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec` - `cargo test -p codex-app-server turn_start_shell_zsh_fork -- --nocapture` - verifies zsh-fork command execution and approval flows through the new backend - includes subcommand approve/decline coverage using the shared zsh DotSlash fixture in `app-server/tests/suite/zsh` - To test manually, I added the following to `~/.codex/config.toml`: ```toml zsh_path = "/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh" [features] shell_zsh_fork = true ``` Then I ran `just c` to run the dev build of Codex with these changes and sent it the message: ``` run `echo $0` ``` And it replied with: ``` echo $0 printed: /Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh In this tool context, $0 reflects the script path used to invoke the shell, not just zsh. ``` so the tool appears to be wired up correctly. ## Notes - The zsh subcommand-decline integration test now uses `rm` under a `WorkspaceWrite` sandbox. The previous `/usr/bin/true` scenario is auto-allowed by the new `shell-escalation` policy path, which no longer produces subcommand approval prompts. |
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f6053fdfb3 |
feat(core) Introduce Feature::RequestPermissions (#11871)
## Summary Introduces the initial implementation of Feature::RequestPermissions. RequestPermissions allows the model to request that a command be run inside the sandbox, with additional permissions, like writing to a specific folder. Eventually this will include other rules as well, and the ability to persist these permissions, but this PR is already quite large - let's get the core flow working and go from there! <img width="1279" height="541" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-15 at 2 26 22 PM" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ee3ec0f-02ec-4509-91a2-809ac80be368" /> ## Testing - [x] Added tests - [x] Tested locally - [x] Feature |
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7f75e74201 |
Use Arc-based ToolCtx in tool runtimes (#12583)
## Why Tool handlers and runtimes needed to pass the same turn/session context for shell and non-shell workflows without duplicative ownership churn. Using shared pointers avoids temporary lifetimes and keeps existing behavior unchanged while simplifying call sites. ## What changed - Converted `ToolCtx` to store shared context handles (`Arc`-based), including updates across shell, apply-patch, and unified-exec paths. - Updated orchestrator/runtime call sites to consume the shared context consistently and remove brittle move/borrow patterns. - Kept behavior unchanged while preparing the type surface for the new shell escalation integration in the next stack commit. ## Verification - Validated this commit stack point with `just clippy` and confirmed workspace compiles cleanly in this stack state. [//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER) Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/12583). * #12584 * __->__ #12583 * #12556 |
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e8afaed502 |
Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)
## Summary Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port). Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now treat approvals as a destination policy decision. - Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt. - Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate prompts. - Allow once approves the current queued request group only. - Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows future matching requests. - Never policy continues to deny without prompting. Example: - 3 calls: - a.com (line 443) - b.com (line 443) - a.com (line 443) => 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision. - a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443 ## Testing - `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`) - `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests` - `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing integration-suite failures remain in this environment) |
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edacbf7b6e |
feat(core): zsh exec bridge (#12052)
zsh fork PR stack: - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052 👈 ### Summary This PR introduces a feature-gated native shell runtime path that routes shell execution through a patched zsh exec bridge, removing MCP-specific behavior from the shell hot path while preserving existing CommandExecution lifecycle semantics. When shell_zsh_fork is enabled, shell commands run via patched zsh with per-`execve` interception through EXEC_WRAPPER. Core receives wrapper IPC requests over a Unix socket, applies existing approval policy, and returns allow/deny before the subcommand executes. ### What’s included **1) New zsh exec bridge runtime in core** - Wrapper-mode entrypoint (maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode) for EXEC_WRAPPER invocations. - Per-execution Unix-socket IPC handling for wrapper requests/responses. - Approval callback integration using existing core approval orchestration. - Streaming stdout/stderr deltas to existing command output event pipeline. - Error handling for malformed IPC, denial/abort, and execution failures. **2) Session lifecycle integration** SessionServices now owns a `ZshExecBridge`. Session startup initializes bridge state; shutdown tears it down cleanly. **3) Shell runtime routing (feature-gated)** When `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled: - Build execution env/spec as usual. - Add wrapper socket env wiring. - Execute via `zsh_exec_bridge.execute_shell_request(...)` instead of the regular shell path. - Non-zsh-fork behavior remains unchanged. **4) Config + feature wiring** - Added `Feature::ShellZshFork` (under development). - Added config support for `zsh_path` (optional absolute path to patched zsh): - `Config`, `ConfigToml`, `ConfigProfile`, overrides, and schema. - Session startup validates that `zsh_path` exists/usable when zsh-fork is enabled. - Added startup test for missing `zsh_path` failure mode. **5) Seatbelt/sandbox updates for wrapper IPC** - Extended seatbelt policy generation to optionally allow outbound connection to explicitly permitted Unix sockets. - Wired sandboxing path to pass wrapper socket path through to seatbelt policy generation. - Added/updated seatbelt tests for explicit socket allow rule and argument emission. **6) Runtime entrypoint hooks** - This allows the same binary to act as the zsh wrapper subprocess when invoked via `EXEC_WRAPPER`. **7) Tool selection behavior** - ToolsConfig now prefers ShellCommand type when shell_zsh_fork is enabled. - Added test coverage for precedence with unified-exec enabled. |
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db4d2599b5 |
feat(core): plumb distinct approval ids for command approvals (#12051)
zsh fork PR stack: - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 👈 - https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052 With upcoming support for a fork of zsh that allows us to intercept `execve` and run execpolicy checks for each subcommand as part of a `CommandExecution`, it will be possible for there to be multiple approval requests for a shell command like `/path/to/zsh -lc 'git status && rg \"TODO\" src && make test'`. To support that, this PR introduces a new `approval_id` field across core, protocol, and app-server so that we can associate approvals properly for subcommands. |
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825a4af42f |
feat: use shell policy in shell snapshot (#11759)
Honor `shell_environment_policy.set` even after a shell snapshot |
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b527ee2890 |
feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
### Description #### Summary Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals #### What changed - Added structured network policy decision modeling in core. - Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval semantics. - Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured decisions. - Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling. - Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow. - Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this layer. #### Why establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior. #### Notes - Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating. - Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server integration. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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62d0f302fd |
fix(core): canonicalize wrapper approvals and support heredoc prefix … (#10941)
## Summary - Reduced repeated approvals for equivalent wrapper commands and fixed execpolicy matching for heredoc-style shell invocations, with minimal behavior change and fail-closed defaults. ## Fixes 1. Canonicalized approval matching for wrappers so equivalent commands map to the same approval intent. 2. Added heredoc-aware prefix extraction for execpolicy so commands like `python3 <<'PY' ... PY` match rules such as `prefix_rule(["python3"], ...)`. 3. Kept fallback behavior conservative: if parsing is ambiguous, existing prompt behavior is preserved. ## Edge Cases Covered - Wrapper path/name differences: `/bin/bash` vs `bash`, `/bin/zsh` vs `zsh`. - Shell modes: `-c` and `-lc`. - Heredoc forms: quoted delimiter (`<<'PY'`) and unquoted delimiter (`<< PY`). - Multi-command heredoc scripts are rejected by the fallback - Non-heredoc redirections (`>`, etc.) are not treated as heredoc prefix matches. - Complex scripts still fall back to prior behavior rather than expanding permissions. --------- Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com> |
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3391e5ea86 |
feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
## Summary - expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars (`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families + tool-specific variants) - harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is malformed - thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs - add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation, and Linux sandbox argument wiring |