Commit Graph
68 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Sayan Sisodiya c065ce6a07 core: add request-scoped environment context 2026-06-18 09:24:43 -07:00
jif 1391d786bc Scope command approvals by execution environment (#28738)
## Why

Command approval cache keys included the command and working directory,
but not the execution environment. An approval for `/workspace` locally
could therefore be reused for the same command and path on an executor.

## What changed

- Include the selected environment ID in shell and unified-exec approval
cache keys.
- Carry that ID through the normal command approval request so clients
can show which environment is being approved.
- Expose the environment through app-server as a required nullable
`environmentId` and show it in the inline TUI approval prompt.
- Keep older recorded approval events compatible when the environment is
absent.

For example, `echo ok` in local `/workspace` and `echo ok` in executor
`/workspace` now produce different approval keys and separate prompts.

## Scope

This PR does not change network approvals, Guardian review actions, MCP
elicitation, full-screen TUI rendering, or environment-ID validation.
Remote `shell_command` execution itself remains in #28722; this PR only
makes its approval key environment-aware.
2026-06-17 19:52:43 +02:00
pakrym-oai 022f1221e8 [codex] Bind shell snapshots to retained thread environments (#28421)
## Why

Shell snapshots are currently session-scoped even though shell and cwd
are properties of a selected turn environment. That makes snapshot
refresh depend on separate session-cwd plumbing, prevents retained
environments from retaining their snapshot work, and can make snapshot
construction use a different shell than command execution.

This follows #27955 by making the retained thread-environment service
own environment snapshot lifecycles. Session configuration remains the
requested selection state, while `ThreadEnvironments` remains the source
of successfully resolved environments.

## What changed

- Configure the shell-snapshot builder before initial environment
resolution.
- Start each local environment snapshot task when its `TurnEnvironment`
is built and retain that shared task while environment ID and cwd still
match.
- Inherit retained environment snapshots into spawned child threads.
- Carry the selected `TurnEnvironment` through shell runtimes so
snapshot construction and command execution use the same
environment-specific shell and cwd.
- Load project instructions and warm plugins/skills after initial
environment resolution.
- Continue decoding invalid UTF-8 instruction files lossily without
emitting a startup warning.
- Keep requested selections in `SessionConfiguration`; failed or
duplicate resolutions only affect the resolved environment snapshot.

## Validation

- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `just test -p codex-home instructions` (6 passed)
- Focused environment, instruction, shell-snapshot, and user-shell tests
(84 passed)
- Focused shell-snapshot, user-shell, and unified-exec tests (126
passed; two event-timing tests passed on retry)
2026-06-15 20:10:53 -07:00
pakrym-oai 1aa3e432cc [codex] simplify shell snapshot ownership (#27756)
## Why

Shell snapshot lifecycle state was split between `Shell` and
`SessionServices`: `Shell` carried the receiver while session code
exposed and forwarded the raw sender. That coupled shell identity to
mutable snapshot state and made refresh, inheritance, and file lifetime
harder to reason about.

## What changed

- make each `Arc<ShellSnapshot>` represent one cwd-specific snapshot
generation
- store the active generation in `SessionServices` with `ArcSwapOption`
- have construction start the background build and expose only a
cwd-validated snapshot path
- use `ShellSnapshotFile` ownership to delete snapshot files
automatically
- pass snapshot paths explicitly to shell runtimes instead of storing
snapshot state on `Shell`
- preserve inherited and in-flight generations by pinning their `Arc`
while they are in use

## Test plan

- `cargo check -p codex-core --lib`
- `just test -p codex-core 'shell_snapshot::tests'`
- `just test -p codex-core
shell_command_snapshot_still_intercepts_apply_patch`
- `just test -p codex-core
shell_snapshot_deleted_after_shutdown_with_skills`
2026-06-15 08:18:13 -07:00
Adam Perry @ OpenAI 52a50aec70 sandboxing: migrate cwd inputs to PathUri (#27816)
## Why

Sandbox cwd values can cross app-server and exec-server host boundaries.
They should retain URI semantics until the receiving host validates them
instead of being interpreted early as native paths.

## What

- Carry `PathUri` through filesystem sandbox contexts, sandbox commands,
and transform inputs.
- Convert command and policy cwd once in `SandboxManager::transform`,
then keep launch requests native.
- Preserve sandbox cwd over remote filesystem transport and reject
non-native URIs without fallback.
- Cache paired native/URI turn-environment cwd values during migration,
with immutable access to keep them synchronized.
- Extend existing protocol, forwarding, transform, and core runtime
tests.
2026-06-12 11:38:01 -07:00
Michael Bolin 6bcccb0ee6 cli: add package path from install context (#26189)
## Why

Codex package installs include helper binaries in `codex-path`, such as
the bundled `rg`. Package-layout launches should add that directory
before user commands run, but standalone launches were missing it while
npm launches only worked because `codex.js` had its own legacy `PATH`
rewrite. That made npm and standalone package behavior diverge.

Shell snapshot restoration can also reset `PATH` after runtime setup.
Any package-owned `PATH` prepend has to be recorded as an explicit
runtime override so shells, unified exec, and user-shell commands keep
access to `codex-path` after a snapshot is sourced.

## Repro

Before this change, a curl-installed package could contain `rg` under
`codex-path` but still fail to put it on `PATH`:

```shell
mkdir /tmp/test-codex-curl
curl -fsSL https://chatgpt.com/codex/install.sh \
  | CODEX_HOME=/tmp/test-codex-curl CODEX_NON_INTERACTIVE=1 sh
/tmp/test-codex-curl/packages/standalone/current/bin/codex exec \
  --skip-git-repo-check 'print `which -a rg`'
find /tmp/test-codex-curl -name rg
```

The `which -a rg` output omitted the packaged helper even though `find`
showed it under
`/tmp/test-codex-curl/packages/standalone/releases/.../codex-path/rg`.

The npm install path behaved differently only because
`codex-cli/bin/codex.js` had legacy `PATH` rewriting:

```shell
mkdir /tmp/test-codex-npm
cd /tmp/test-codex-npm
npm install @openai/codex
./node_modules/.bin/codex exec --skip-git-repo-check 'print `which -a rg`'
```

That printed the npm package's `vendor/<target>/codex-path/rg` first.
This PR moves that behavior into Rust-side package launch setup so
curl/standalone and npm/bun launches agree without JS rewriting `PATH`.

## What Changed

- `codex-rs/arg0` now uses
`InstallContext::current().package_layout.path_dir` to prepend the
package helper directory before any threads are created.
- Package helper `PATH` setup is independent from the temporary arg0
alias setup, so `codex-path` is still added even if CODEX_HOME tempdir,
lock, or symlink setup fails.
- `codex-rs/install-context` detects the canonical package layout we
ship: `bin/`, `codex-resources/`, and `codex-path/` next to
`codex-package.json`.
- Shell, local unified exec, and user-shell runtimes now record package
`codex-path` prepends in `explicit_env_overrides`, matching the existing
zsh-fork behavior so shell snapshots cannot restore over the package
helper path.
- Remote unified exec requests do not receive the local app-server
package path overlay.
- `codex-cli/bin/codex.js` no longer computes or overrides `PATH`; it
only locates the native binary in the canonical package layout and
passes npm/bun management metadata.
- Added regression tests for `PATH` ordering, package layout detection,
and shell snapshot preservation of package path prepends.

## Verification

- `node --check codex-cli/bin/codex.js`
- `just test -p codex-install-context -p codex-arg0`
- `just test -p codex-core
user_shell_snapshot_preserves_package_path_prepend`
- `just test -p codex-core tools::runtimes::tests`
- `just bazel-lock-update`
- `just bazel-lock-check`
- `just fix -p codex-install-context -p codex-arg0 -p codex-core`
2026-06-03 19:08:19 -07:00
Michael Bolin 6e10142199 fix: preserve deny-read sandboxing for safe commands (#23943)
## Why

Permission profiles can mark filesystem entries as unreadable with
`deny` rules, including glob patterns. Several shell execution paths
treated known-safe commands or execpolicy `allow` rules as sufficient to
run outside the filesystem sandbox. That is not valid for read-capable
commands: for example, `cat` or `ls` may be reasonable to allow
generally, but dropping the sandbox would also drop deny-read
constraints such as `**/*.env`.

## What changed

- Added a shared check that treats active deny-read restrictions as
incompatible with unsandboxed execution.
- Kept first-attempt execution sandboxed for explicit escalation and
execpolicy allow bypasses when deny-read entries are present.
- Prevented no-sandbox retry after a sandbox denial when the active
filesystem policy contains deny-read entries.
- Updated the zsh-fork execve path so prefix-rule `allow` decisions
continue inside the current sandbox when deny-read restrictions are
active.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::sandboxing::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
tools::runtimes::shell::unix_escalation::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_command_enforces_glob_deny_read_policy`
2026-05-28 22:49:37 -07:00
Michael Bolin bc10e5b390 runtime: prepend zsh fork bin dir to PATH (#23768)
## Why

#23756 makes packaged Codex builds include and default to the bundled
zsh fork. The important reason to put that fork's directory at the front
of `PATH` is to keep executable-level escalation working after a command
leaves the original shell and later re-enters zsh through `env`.

The expected chain is:

1. The zsh fork runs the top-level shell command.
2. That command launches another program, such as `python3`, while
inheriting the `EXEC_WRAPPER` environment and the escalation socket fd.
3. That program spawns a shell script whose shebang is `#!/usr/bin/env
zsh` rather than `#!/bin/zsh`, and it does not close the escalation fd.
4. `/usr/bin/env` resolves `zsh` through `PATH`, so it must find the
packaged zsh fork before the system zsh.
5. Commands inside that nested script are intercepted by the zsh fork
and can still request escalation from Codex.

If `PATH` resolves `zsh` to the system shell instead, the nested script
loses zsh-fork exec interception. Commands that should request
escalation can then run only in the original sandbox, or fail there,
without Codex ever receiving the approval request.

Shell snapshots make this slightly more subtle: a snapshot can restore
an older `PATH` after the child shell starts. This PR treats the zsh
fork `PATH` prepend as an explicit environment override so snapshot
wrapping preserves it.

## What Changed

- Added shared zsh-fork runtime helpers that prepend the configured zsh
executable parent directory to `PATH` without duplicate entries.
- Applied the zsh fork `PATH` prepend to both zsh-fork `shell_command`
launches and unified-exec zsh-fork launches before sandbox command
construction.
- Kept the shell-command zsh-fork backend API narrow: it derives the
configured zsh path from session services and rebuilds its sandbox
environment from `req.env`, rather than accepting a second, competing
environment map or a separately threaded bin dir.
- Kept Unix-only zsh-fork `PATH` mutation out of Windows clippy-visible
mutability.
- Added coverage for duplicate `PATH` entries, for preserving the zsh
fork prepend through shell snapshot wrapping, and for the nested
`python3` -> `#!/usr/bin/env zsh` escalation flow.

## Testing

- `just fmt`
- `just fix -p codex-core`

I left final test validation to CI after the latest review-comment
cleanup. Before that cleanup, `just test -p codex-core zsh_fork` passed
locally for the zsh-fork-focused tests.
2026-05-28 14:10:40 -07:00
viyatb-oai 9152ebd289 fix(linux-sandbox): preserve shell cleanup on interruption (#22729)
## Why
Interrupted `shell_command` calls can race with the outer tool-dispatch
cancellation path. When that happens, the runtime future may be dropped
before the spawned process gets a chance to run `SIGTERM` cleanup. For
bwrapd-backed Linux sandbox commands, that can leave synthetic
protected-path mount bookkeeping such as `.git/.codex` registrations
under `/tmp` behind after a TUI interruption.

The relevant cancellation points are the outer dispatch race in
[`core/src/tools/parallel.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/tools/parallel.rs#L91-L132)
and the process shutdown logic in
[`core/src/exec.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/exec.rs#L1367-L1393).

## What changed
- Keep `shell_command` dispatch alive long enough for the runtime to
finish cancellation cleanup instead of immediately returning the
synthetic aborted response.
- Fold shell-turn cancellation into the existing `ExecExpiration` path
in
[`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/bd184ba84703cc924921ed883f0cf17d3dba60ff/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell.rs#L267-L274),
so cancellation and timeout behavior stay centralized.
- On cancellation, send `SIGTERM` first, wait briefly for cleanup to
run, then hard-kill any remaining descendants in the original process
group.
- Treat `ESRCH` as an already-gone process-group cleanup case in
`codex-utils-pty`, which keeps best-effort teardown from surfacing a
stale-process race as an error.

## Verification
- `cargo test -p codex-core cancellation`
- Added regression coverage for:
  - `shell_tool_cancellation_waits_for_runtime_cleanup`
  - `process_exec_tool_call_cancellation_allows_sigterm_cleanup`
2026-05-27 12:59:11 -07:00
iceweasel-oai 8ae0c837f0 Avoid PowerShell profiles in elevated Windows sandbox (#21400)
## Why

On Windows, elevated sandboxed commands run under a dedicated sandbox
account while `HOME` / `USERPROFILE` can still point at the real user's
profile directory. For PowerShell login shells, that combination can
make the sandbox account try to load the real user's PowerShell profile
script. If the sandbox account's execution policy differs from the real
user's policy, startup can emit profile-loading errors before the
requested command runs.

For this backend, loading the profile is not a faithful user login
shell: it is cross-account profile execution. Treating these PowerShell
invocations as non-login shells avoids that invalid startup path.

## Why This Happens Late

The normal `login` decision is resolved when shell argv is created, but
that point is too early to make this Windows sandbox-specific decision.
At argv creation time we do not yet know the actual sandbox attempt that
will run the command. A turn can include sandboxed and unsandboxed
attempts, and a broad turn-level override would also affect Full Access
commands where the user's profile should remain available.

Instead, this change carries the selected `ShellType` alongside the argv
and applies the `-NoProfile` adjustment in the shell runtimes once the
`SandboxAttempt` is known. That keeps the override scoped to actual
`WindowsRestrictedToken` attempts with `WindowsSandboxLevel::Elevated`.

The runtime uses the selected shell metadata rather than re-detecting
PowerShell from argv. That avoids brittle parsing and covers PowerShell
invocation shapes such as `-EncodedCommand`.

## What Changed

- Carry selected shell metadata through `exec_command` / unified exec
requests and shell tool requests.
- Insert `-NoProfile` for PowerShell commands only when the runtime is
about to execute a sandboxed elevated Windows attempt.
- Add focused unit coverage for elevated Windows PowerShell,
`-EncodedCommand`, existing `-NoProfile`, legacy restricted-token
attempts, unsandboxed attempts, and non-PowerShell commands.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core disable_powershell_profile_tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core test_get_command`
- `cargo clippy --fix --tests --allow-dirty --allow-no-vcs -p
codex-core`

A full `cargo test -p codex-core` run was also attempted during
development, but it still hit an unrelated stack overflow in
`agent::control` tests before reaching this area.
2026-05-13 21:37:50 +00:00
pakrym-oai 83decfa300 [codex] Remove unused legacy shell tools (#22246)
## Why

Recent session history showed no active use of the raw `shell`,
`local_shell`, or `container.exec` execution surfaces. Keeping those
handlers/specs wired into core leaves duplicate shell execution paths
alongside the supported `shell_command` and unified exec tools.

## What changed

- Removed the raw `shell` handler/spec and its `ShellToolCallParams`
protocol helper.
- Removed the legacy `local_shell` and `container.exec` handler/spec
plumbing while preserving persisted-history compatibility for old
response items.
- Normalized model/config `default` and `local` shell selections to
`shell_command`.
- Pruned tests that exercised removed raw-shell/local-shell/apply-patch
variants and kept coverage on `shell_command`, unified exec, and
freeform `apply_patch`.

## Verification

- `git diff --check`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-tools`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::handlers::shell`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::spec`
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::router`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
active_call_preserves_triggering_command_context`
- `cargo test -p codex-core guardian_tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_serialization`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all apply_patch_cli`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all shell_command_`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all local_shell`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all otel::`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all hooks::`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-tools`
2026-05-13 16:43:25 +00:00
6506765168 fix(permissions): preserve managed deny-read during escalation (#15977)
## Why

Managed filesystem `deny_read` requirements are administrator-enforced
restrictions on specific paths. Once those requirements are active,
Codex should not drop them just because an execution path would
otherwise leave the sandbox.

Before this change, an explicit escalation, a prefix-rule allow, a
sandbox-denial retry, or an app-server legacy sandbox override could
rebuild the runtime policy without those managed read-deny entries and
expose a path the administrator had marked unreadable.

This is narrower than general sandbox-mode constraints. If an enterprise
only sets `allowed_sandbox_modes`, a trusted `prefix_rule(..., decision
= "allow")` can still run its matching command unsandboxed; this PR only
preserves managed filesystem `deny_read` restrictions across those
paths.

## What Changed

- Mark filesystem policies built from managed `deny_read` requirements
so callers can tell when those deny entries must survive escalation.
- Preserve managed deny-read entries when runtime permission profiles
are rebuilt through protocol, app-server, or legacy sandbox-policy
compatibility paths.
- Keep managed deny-read attempts inside the selected sandbox on the
first attempt and after sandbox-denial retries.
- Preserve the same behavior in the zsh-fork escalation path, including
prefix-rule-driven escalation.
- Add a regression test showing the opposite case too: without managed
deny-read, a prefix-rule allow still chooses unsandboxed execution.

## Verification

Targeted automated verification:

```shell
cargo test -p codex-core shell_request_escalation_execution_is_explicit -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_uses_unsandboxed_execution_without_managed_deny_read -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-core prefix_rule_preserves_managed_deny_read_escalation -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile_round_trip_preserves_filesystem_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-protocol preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable -- --nocapture
cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol permission_profile_file_system_permissions_preserves_policy_metadata -- --nocapture
cargo check -p codex-app-server -p codex-tui
```

Smoke-test invocations:

```shell
# macOS exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
  -c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
  -c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
  'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'

# Linux exact deny + allowed control
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -C "$ROOT" \
  -c 'default_permissions="deny_read_smoke"' \
  -c 'permissions.deny_read_smoke.filesystem={":minimal"="read",glob_scan_max_depth=3,":project_roots"={"."="write","secrets"="none","future-secret"="none","**/*.env"="none"}}' \
  'Run shell commands only. Print the contents of allowed.txt. Then test whether reading secrets/exact-secret.txt succeeds without printing that file if it does. End with exactly two lines: allowed=<contents> and exact_secret=<BLOCKED or READABLE>.'
```

Observed manual smoke matrix:

| Case | macOS Seatbelt | Linux bubblewrap |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `cat allowed.txt` | Pass | Pass |
| `cat secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/root.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/one.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat envs/nested/two.env` | Blocked | Blocked |
| `cat alias-to-secrets/exact-secret.txt` | Blocked | Blocked |
| Missing denied path | A file created after sandbox setup remained
unreadable | Creation was blocked by the reserved missing-path
placeholder, and the placeholder was cleaned up after exit |
| Real `codex exec` shell turn | Pass | Pass |

Notes:

- The Linux smoke run used the fallback glob walker because the devbox
did not have `rg` installed.
- The smoke matrix verifies the end-to-end filesystem behavior on macOS
and Linux; the escalation-specific behavior is covered by the focused
tests above.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Charlie Marsh <charliemarsh@openai.com>
2026-05-11 11:49:44 -07:00
pakrym-oai 61142b6169 Remove ToolName display helper (#21465)
## Why

`ToolName::display()` made it too easy to flatten tool identity and
accidentally compare rendered strings. Tool identity should stay
structural until a legacy string boundary actually requires the
flattened spelling.

## What

- Removes `ToolName::display()` and relies on the existing `Display`
impl for messages and errors.
- Adds structural ordering for `ToolName` and uses it for
sorting/deduping deferred tools.
- Carries `ToolName` through tool/sandbox plumbing, flattening only at
legacy boundaries such as hook payloads, telemetry tags, and Responses
tool names.
- Updates MCP normalization tests to assert `ToolName` structure instead
of rendered strings.

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-mcp test_normalize_tools`
- `cargo test -p codex-core unavailable_tool`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-mcp`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
2026-05-08 12:17:48 -07:00
viyatb-oaiandCodex 07c8b8c77c fix: handle deferred network proxy denials (#19184)
## Why

This bug is exposed by Guardian/auto-review approvals. With the managed
network proxy enabled, a blocked network request can be reported back
through the network approval service as an approval denial after the
command has already started. Before this change, the shell and unified
exec runtimes registered those network approval calls, but did not have
a way to observe an async proxy denial as a cancellation/failure signal
for the running process.

The result was confusing: Guardian/auto-review could correctly deny
network access, but the command path could keep running or unregister
the approval without surfacing the denial as the command failure.

## What Changed

- `NetworkApprovalService` now attaches a cancellation token to active
and deferred network approvals.
- Proxy-denial outcomes are recorded only for active registrations,
cancel the owning token, and are consumed when the approval is
finalized.
- The shell runtime combines the normal command timeout with the
network-denial cancellation token.
- Unified exec stores the deferred network approval object, terminates
tracked processes when the proxy denial arrives, and returns the denial
as a process failure while polling or completing the process.
- Tool orchestration passes the active network approval cancellation
token into the sandbox attempt and preserves deferred approval errors
instead of silently unregistering them.
- App-server `command/exec` now handles the combined
timeout-or-cancellation expiration variant used by the runtime.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core network_approval --lib`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-app-server --all-targets -- -D warnings`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-29 19:13:57 +00:00
viyatb-oai 9aaa5d9358 [codex] Bypass managed network for escalated exec (#19595)
## Why

`sandbox_permissions = "require_escalated"` is treated as an explicit
request to approve the command and run it outside the
filesystem/platform sandbox. Before this change, shell and unified exec
still registered managed network approval context and could inject
Codex-managed proxy state into the child process, which meant an
approved escalated command could still hit a second network approval
path.

This PR makes that escalation boundary consistent: once a command is
explicitly approved to run outside the sandbox, Codex does not also
route that process through the managed network proxy.

## Security impact

Command/filesystem sandbox approval now implies network approval for
that command. If an untrusted command or script is allowed to run with
`require_escalated`, its network calls are unsandboxed: Codex-managed
network allowlists and denylists are not respected for that process, so
the command can exfiltrate any data it can read.

## What changed

- Skip managed network approval specs for
`SandboxPermissions::RequireEscalated`.
- Pass `network: None` into shell, zsh-fork shell, and unified exec
sandbox preparation for explicitly escalated requests.
- Strip Codex-managed proxy environment variables when
`CODEX_NETWORK_PROXY_ACTIVE` is present, while preserving user proxy env
when the Codex marker is absent.
- Add regression coverage for the prepared exec request so the old
behavior cannot silently reappear.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-core explicit_escalation`
- `cargo clippy -p codex-core --all-targets -- -D warnings`
2026-04-25 23:23:58 +00:00
Michael Bolin 4816b89204 permissions: make profiles represent enforcement (#19231)
## Why

`PermissionProfile` is becoming the canonical permissions abstraction,
but the old shape only carried optional filesystem and network fields.
It could describe allowed access, but not who is responsible for
enforcing it. That made `DangerFullAccess` and `ExternalSandbox` lossy
when profiles were exported, cached, or round-tripped through app-server
APIs.

The important model change is that active permissions are now a disjoint
union over the enforcement mode. Conceptually:

```rust
pub enum PermissionProfile {
    Managed {
        file_system: FileSystemSandboxPolicy,
        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    },
    Disabled,
    External {
        network: NetworkSandboxPolicy,
    },
}
```

This distinction matters because `Disabled` means Codex should apply no
outer sandbox at all, while `External` means filesystem isolation is
owned by an outside caller. Those are not equivalent to a broad managed
sandbox. For example, macOS cannot nest Seatbelt inside Seatbelt, so an
inner sandbox may require the outer Codex layer to use no sandbox rather
than a permissive one.

## How Existing Modeling Maps

Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains a boundary projection, but it now maps
into the higher-fidelity profile model:

- `ReadOnly` and `WorkspaceWrite` map to `PermissionProfile::Managed`
with restricted filesystem entries plus the corresponding network
policy.
- `DangerFullAccess` maps to `PermissionProfile::Disabled`, preserving
the “no outer sandbox” intent instead of treating it as a lax managed
sandbox.
- `ExternalSandbox { network_access }` maps to
`PermissionProfile::External { network }`, preserving external
filesystem enforcement while still carrying the active network policy.
- Split runtime policies that legacy `SandboxPolicy` cannot faithfully
express, such as managed unrestricted filesystem plus restricted
network, stay `Managed` instead of being collapsed into
`ExternalSandbox`.
- Per-command/session/turn grants remain partial overlays via
`AdditionalPermissionProfile`; full `PermissionProfile` is reserved for
complete active runtime permissions.

## What Changed

- Change active `PermissionProfile` into a tagged union: `managed`,
`disabled`, and `external`.
- Keep partial permission grants separate with
`AdditionalPermissionProfile` for command/session/turn overlays.
- Represent managed filesystem permissions as either `restricted`
entries or `unrestricted`; `glob_scan_max_depth` is non-zero when
present.
- Preserve old rollout compatibility by accepting the pre-tagged `{
network, file_system }` profile shape during deserialization.
- Preserve fidelity for important edge cases: `DangerFullAccess`
round-trips as `disabled`, `ExternalSandbox` round-trips as `external`,
and managed unrestricted filesystem + restricted network stays managed
instead of being mistaken for external enforcement.
- Preserve configured deny-read entries and bounded glob scan depth when
full profiles are projected back into runtime policies, including
unrestricted replacements that now become `:root = write` plus deny
entries.
- Regenerate the experimental app-server v2 JSON/TypeScript schema and
update the `command/exec` README example for the tagged
`permissionProfile` shape.

## Compatibility

Legacy `SandboxPolicy` remains available at config/API boundaries as the
compatibility projection. Existing rollout lines with the old
`PermissionProfile` shape continue to load. The app-server
`permissionProfile` field is experimental, so its v2 wire shape is
intentionally updated to match the higher-fidelity model.

## Verification

- `just write-app-server-schema`
- `cargo check --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol permission_profile`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol
preserving_deny_entries_keeps_unrestricted_policy_enforceable`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol
permission_profile_file_system_permissions`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol serialize_client_response`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
session_configured_reports_permission_profile_for_external_sandbox`
- `just fix`
- `just fix -p codex-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fix -p codex-app-server`
2026-04-23 23:02:18 -07:00
305825abd9 Support MCP tools in hooks (#18385)
## Summary

Lifecycle hooks currently treat `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and
`PermissionRequest` as Bash-only flows
- hook schema constrains `tool_name` to `Bash`
- hook input assumes a command-shaped `tool_input`
- core hook dispatch path passes only shell command strings

That means hooks cannot target MCP tools even though MCP tool names are
model-visible and stable

This change generalizes those hook paths so they can match and receive
payloads for MCP tools while preserving the existing Bash behavior.

## Reviewer Notes

I think these are the key files
- `codex-rs/core/src/tools/handlers/mcp.rs`
- `codex-rs/core/src/mcp_tool_call.rs`

Otherwise the changes across apply_patch, shell, and unified_exec are
mainly to rewire everything to be `tool_input` based instead of just
`command` so that it'll make sense for MCP tools.

## Changes

- Allow `PreToolUse`, `PostToolUse`, and `PermissionRequest` hook inputs
to carry arbitrary `tool_name` and `tool_input` values instead of
hard-coding `Bash` and command-only payloads.
- Add MCP hook payload support through `McpHandler`, using the
model-visible tool name from `ToolInvocation` and the raw MCP arguments
as `tool_input`.
- Include MCP tool responses in `PostToolUse` by serializing
`McpToolOutput` into the hook response payload.
- Run `PermissionRequest` hooks for MCP approval requests after
remembered approval checks and before falling back to user-facing MCP
elicitation.
- Preserve exact matching for literal hook matchers like `Bash` and
`mcp__memory__create_entities`, while keeping regex matcher support for
patterns like `mcp__memory__.*` and `mcp__.*__write.*`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Andrei Eternal <eternal@openai.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-23 07:33:57 +00:00
viyatb-oaiandCodex 2d73bac45f feat: add guardian network approval trigger context (#18197)
## Summary

Give guardian network-access reviews the command context that triggered
a managed-network approval. The prompt JSON now includes the originating
tool call id, tool name, command argv, cwd, sandbox permissions,
additional permissions, justification, and tty state when a single
active tool call can be attributed.

The implementation keeps the trigger shape canonical by serializing
`GuardianNetworkAccessTrigger` directly and lets each runtime build that
trigger from its `ToolCtx`. Non-guardian approval prompts avoid cloning
the full trigger payload.

## UX changes

Guardian network-access reviews now include a `trigger` object that
explains what command caused the network approval. Instead of seeing
only the requested host, the guardian reviewer can also see the
originating tool call, argv, working directory, sandbox mode,
justification, and tty state.

Example payload the guardian reviewer can see:

```json
{
  "tool": "network_access",
  "target": "https://api.github.com:443",
  "host": "api.github.com",
  "protocol": "https",
  "port": 443,
  "trigger": {
    "callId": "call_abc123",
    "toolName": "shell",
    "command": ["gh", "api", "/repos/openai/codex/pulls/18197"],
    "cwd": "/workspace/codex",
    "sandboxPermissions": "require_escalated",
    "justification": "Fetch PR metadata from GitHub.",
    "tty": false
  }
}
```

The network review itself remains scoped to the network decision:
`target_item_id` stays `null`. `trigger.callId` is attribution context
only, so clients can still distinguish network reviews from
item-targeted command reviews.

## Verification

- Added coverage for serializing network trigger context in guardian
approval JSON.
- Added regression coverage that network guardian reviews do not reuse
`trigger.callId` as `target_item_id`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-22 14:00:53 -07:00
Felipe Coury 09ebc34f17 fix(core): emit hooks for apply_patch edits (#18391)
Fixes https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16732.

## Why

`apply_patch` is Codex's primary file edit path, but it was not emitting
`PreToolUse` or `PostToolUse` hook events. That meant hook-based policy,
auditing, and write coordination could observe shell commands while
missing the actual file mutation performed by `apply_patch`.

The issue also exposed that the hook runtime serialized command hook
payloads with `tool_name: "Bash"` unconditionally. Even if `apply_patch`
supplied hook payloads, hooks would either fail to match it directly or
receive misleading stdin that identified the edit as a Bash tool call.

## What Changed

- Added `PreToolUse` and `PostToolUse` payload support to
`ApplyPatchHandler`.
- Exposed the raw patch body as `tool_input.command` for both
JSON/function and freeform `apply_patch` calls.
- Taught tool hook payloads to carry a handler-supplied hook-facing
`tool_name`.
- Preserved existing shell compatibility by continuing to emit `Bash`
for shell-like tools.
- Serialized the selected hook `tool_name` into hook stdin instead of
hardcoding `Bash`.
- Relaxed the generated hook command input schema so `tool_name` can
represent tools other than `Bash`.

## Verification

Added focused handler coverage for:

- JSON/function `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Freeform `apply_patch` calls producing a `PreToolUse` payload.
- Successful `apply_patch` output producing a `PostToolUse` payload.
- Shell and `exec_command` handlers continuing to expose `Bash`.

Added end-to-end hook coverage for:

- A `PreToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` blocking the patch before
the target file is created.
- A `PostToolUse` hook matching `^apply_patch$` receiving the patch
input and tool response, then adding context to the follow-up model
request.
- Non-participating tools such as the plan tool continuing not to emit
`PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` hook events.

Also validated manually with a live `codex exec` smoke test using an
isolated temp workspace and temp `CODEX_HOME`. The smoke test confirmed
that a real `apply_patch` edit emits `PreToolUse`/`PostToolUse` with
`tool_name: "apply_patch"`, a shell command still emits `tool_name:
"Bash"`, and a denying `PreToolUse` hook prevents the blocked patch file
from being created.
2026-04-21 22:00:40 -03:00
AbhinavandCodex 8494e5bd7b Add PermissionRequest hooks support (#17563)
## Why

We need `PermissionRequest` hook support!

Also addresses:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/16301
- run a script on Hook to do things like play a sound to draw attention
but actually no-op so user can still approve
- can omit the `decision` object from output or just have the script
exit 0 and print nothing
- https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/15311
  - let the script approve/deny on its own
  - external UI what will run on Hook and relay decision back to codex


## Reviewer Note

There's a lot of plumbing for the new hook, key files to review are:
- New hook added in `codex-rs/hooks/src/events/permission_request.rs`
- Wiring for network approvals
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/network_approval.rs`
- Wiring for tool orchestrator `codex-rs/core/src/tools/orchestrator.rs`
- Wiring for execve
`codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`

## What

- Wires shell, unified exec, and network approval prompts into the
`PermissionRequest` hook flow.
- Lets hooks allow or deny approval prompts; quiet or invalid hooks fall
back to the normal approval path.
- Uses `tool_input.description` for user-facing context when it helps:
  - shell / `exec_command`: the request justification, when present
  - network approvals: `network-access <domain>`
- Uses `tool_name: Bash` for shell, unified exec, and network approval
permission-request hooks.
- For network approvals, passes the originating command in
`tool_input.command` when there is a single owning call; otherwise falls
back to the synthetic `network-access ...` command.

<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a shell
approval</summary>

```json
{
  "session_id": "<session-id>",
  "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
  "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
  "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
  "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
  "model": "gpt-5",
  "permission_mode": "default",
  "tool_name": "Bash",
  "tool_input": {
    "command": "rm -f /tmp/example"
  }
}
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for an escalated
`exec_command` request</summary>

```json
{
  "session_id": "<session-id>",
  "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
  "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
  "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
  "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
  "model": "gpt-5",
  "permission_mode": "default",
  "tool_name": "Bash",
  "tool_input": {
    "command": "cp /tmp/source.json /Users/alice/export/source.json",
    "description": "Need to copy a generated file outside the workspace"
  }
}
```

</details>

<details>
<summary>Example `PermissionRequest` hook input for a network
approval</summary>

```json
{
  "session_id": "<session-id>",
  "turn_id": "<turn-id>",
  "transcript_path": "/path/to/transcript.jsonl",
  "cwd": "/path/to/cwd",
  "hook_event_name": "PermissionRequest",
  "model": "gpt-5",
  "permission_mode": "default",
  "tool_name": "Bash",
  "tool_input": {
    "command": "curl http://codex-network-test.invalid",
    "description": "network-access http://codex-network-test.invalid"
  }
}
```

</details>

## Follow-ups

- Implement the `PermissionRequest` semantics for `updatedInput`,
`updatedPermissions`, `interrupt`, and suggestions /
`permission_suggestions`
- Add `PermissionRequest` support for the `request_permissions` tool
path

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-17 14:45:47 +00:00
pakrym-oai dd1321d11b Spread AbsolutePathBuf (#17792)
Mechanical change to promote absolute paths through code.
2026-04-14 14:26:10 -07:00
Owen Lin a3be74143a fix(guardian, app-server): introduce guardian review ids (#17298)
## Description

This PR introduces `review_id` as the stable identifier for guardian
reviews and exposes it in app-server `item/autoApprovalReview/started`
and `item/autoApprovalReview/completed` events.

Internally, guardian rejection state is now keyed by `review_id` instead
of the reviewed tool item ID. `target_item_id` is still included when a
review maps to a concrete thread item, but it is no longer overloaded as
the review lifecycle identifier.

## Motivation

We'd like to give users the ability to preempt a guardian review while
it's running (approve or decline).

However, we can't implement the API that allows the user to override a
running guardian review because we didn't have a unique `review_id` per
guardian review. Using `target_item_id` is not correct since:
- with execve reviews, there can be multiple execve calls (and therefore
guardian reviews) per shell command
- with network policy reviews, there is no target item ID

The PR that actually implements user overrides will use `review_id` as
the stable identifier.
2026-04-10 16:21:02 -07:00
pakrym-oai 35b5720e8d Use AbsolutePathBuf for exec cwd plumbing (#17063)
## Summary
- Carry `AbsolutePathBuf` through tool cwd parsing/resolution instead of
resolving workdirs to raw `PathBuf`s.
- Type exec/sandbox request cwd fields as `AbsolutePathBuf` through
`ExecParams`, `ExecRequest`, `SandboxCommand`, and unified exec runtime
requests.
- Keep `PathBuf` conversions at external/event boundaries and update
existing tests/fixtures for the typed cwd.

## Validation
- `cargo check -p codex-core --tests`
- `cargo check -p codex-sandboxing --tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-sandboxing`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --lib tools::handlers::`
- `just fix -p codex-sandboxing`
- `just fix -p codex-core`
- `just fmt`

Full `codex-core` test suite was not run locally; per repo guidance I
kept local validation targeted.
2026-04-08 10:54:12 -07:00
Eric Traut feb4f0051a Fix nested exec thread ID restore (#16882)
Addresses #15527

Problem: Nested `codex exec` commands could source a shell snapshot that
re-exported the parent `CODEX_THREAD_ID`, so commands inside the nested
session were attributed to the wrong thread.

Solution: Reapply the live command env's `CODEX_THREAD_ID` after
sourcing the snapshot.
2026-04-07 09:26:22 -07:00
Ahmed IbrahimandCodex af8a9d2d2b remove temporary ownership re-exports (#16626)
Stacked on #16508.

This removes the temporary `codex-core` / `codex-login` re-export shims
from the ownership split and rewrites callsites to import directly from
`codex-model-provider-info`, `codex-models-manager`, `codex-api`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-feedback`, and `codex-response-debug-context`.

No behavior change intended; this is the mechanical import cleanup layer
split out from the ownership move.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-04-03 00:33:34 -07:00
Michael Bolin aa2403e2eb core: remove cross-crate re-exports from lib.rs (#16512)
## Why

`codex-core` was re-exporting APIs owned by sibling `codex-*` crates,
which made downstream crates depend on `codex-core` as a proxy module
instead of the actual owner crate.

Removing those forwards makes crate boundaries explicit and lets leaf
crates drop unnecessary `codex-core` dependencies. In this PR, this
reduces the dependency on `codex-core` to `codex-login` in the following
files:

```
codex-rs/backend-client/Cargo.toml
codex-rs/mcp-server/tests/common/Cargo.toml
```

## What

- Remove `codex-rs/core/src/lib.rs` re-exports for symbols owned by
`codex-login`, `codex-mcp`, `codex-rollout`, `codex-analytics`,
`codex-protocol`, `codex-shell-command`, `codex-sandboxing`,
`codex-tools`, and `codex-utils-path`.
- Delete the `default_client` forwarding shim in `codex-rs/core`.
- Update in-crate and downstream callsites to import directly from the
owning `codex-*` crate.
- Add direct Cargo dependencies where callsites now target the owner
crate, and remove `codex-core` from `codex-rs/backend-client`.
2026-04-01 23:06:24 -07:00
Michael Bolin 5906c6a658 chore: remove skill metadata from command approval payloads (#15906)
## Why

This is effectively a follow-up to
[#15812](https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/15812). That change
removed the special skill-script exec path, but `skill_metadata` was
still being threaded through command-approval payloads even though the
approval flow no longer uses it to render prompts or resolve decisions.

Keeping it around added extra protocol, schema, and client surface area
without changing behavior.

Removing it keeps the command-approval contract smaller and avoids
carrying a dead field through app-server, TUI, and MCP boundaries.

## What changed

- removed `ExecApprovalRequestSkillMetadata` and the corresponding
`skillMetadata` field from core approval events and the v2 app-server
protocol
- removed the generated JSON and TypeScript schema output for that field
- updated app-server, MCP server, TUI, and TUI app-server approval
plumbing to stop forwarding the field
- cleaned up tests that previously constructed or asserted
`skillMetadata`

## Testing

- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-protocol`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server-test-client`
- `cargo test -p codex-mcp-server`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
2026-03-26 15:32:03 -07:00
pakrym-oai 0b619afc87 Drop sandbox_permissions from sandbox exec requests (#15665)
## Summary
- drop `sandbox_permissions` from the sandboxing `ExecOptions` and
`ExecRequest` adapter types
- remove the now-unused plumbing from shell, unified exec, JS REPL, and
apply-patch runtime call sites
- default reconstructed `ExecParams` to `SandboxPermissions::UseDefault`
where the lower-level API still requires the field

## Testing
- `just fmt`
- `just argument-comment-lint`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (still running locally; first failures
observed in `suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli`,
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_config_override`,
and
`suite::cli_stream::responses_mode_stream_cli_supports_openai_base_url_env_fallback`)
2026-03-24 15:42:45 -07:00
pakrym-oai f49eb8e9d7 Extract sandbox manager and transforms into codex-sandboxing (#15603)
Extract sandbox manager
2026-03-24 08:20:57 -07:00
Dylan Hurd ea8b07e680 chore(core) Remove Feature::PowershellUtf8 (#15128)
## Summary
This feature has been enabled for powershell for a while now, let's get
rid of the logic

## Testing
- [x] Unit tests
2026-03-20 22:03:31 +00:00
2e22885e79 Split features into codex-features crate (#15253)
- Split the feature system into a new `codex-features` crate.
- Cut `codex-core` and workspace consumers over to the new config and
warning APIs.

Co-authored-by: Ahmed Ibrahim <219906144+aibrahim-oai@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-19 20:12:07 -07:00
Michael Bolin b77fe8fefe Apply argument comment lint across codex-rs (#14652)
## Why

Once the repo-local lint exists, `codex-rs` needs to follow the
checked-in convention and CI needs to keep it from drifting. This commit
applies the fallback `/*param*/` style consistently across existing
positional literal call sites without changing those APIs.

The longer-term preference is still to avoid APIs that require comments
by choosing clearer parameter types and call shapes. This PR is
intentionally the mechanical follow-through for the places where the
existing signatures stay in place.

After rebasing onto newer `main`, the rollout also had to cover newly
introduced `tui_app_server` call sites. That made it clear the first cut
of the CI job was too expensive for the common path: it was spending
almost as much time installing `cargo-dylint` and re-testing the lint
crate as a representative test job spends running product tests. The CI
update keeps the full workspace enforcement but trims that extra
overhead from ordinary `codex-rs` PRs.

## What changed

- keep a dedicated `argument_comment_lint` job in `rust-ci`
- mechanically annotate remaining opaque positional literals across
`codex-rs` with exact `/*param*/` comments, including the rebased
`tui_app_server` call sites that now fall under the lint
- keep the checked-in style aligned with the lint policy by using
`/*param*/` and leaving string and char literals uncommented
- cache `cargo-dylint`, `dylint-link`, and the relevant Cargo
registry/git metadata in the lint job
- split changed-path detection so the lint crate's own `cargo test` step
runs only when `tools/argument-comment-lint/*` or `rust-ci.yml` changes
- continue to run the repo wrapper over the `codex-rs` workspace, so
product-code enforcement is unchanged

Most of the code changes in this commit are intentionally mechanical
comment rewrites or insertions driven by the lint itself.

## Verification

- `./tools/argument-comment-lint/run.sh --workspace`
- `cargo test -p codex-tui-app-server -p codex-tui`
- parsed `.github/workflows/rust-ci.yml` locally with PyYAML

---

* -> #14652
* #14651
2026-03-16 16:48:15 -07:00
Charley CunninghamandCodex bc24017d64 Add Smart Approvals guardian review across core, app-server, and TUI (#13860)
## Summary
- add `approvals_reviewer = "user" | "guardian_subagent"` as the runtime
control for who reviews approval requests
- route Smart Approvals guardian review through core for command
execution, file changes, managed-network approvals, MCP approvals, and
delegated/subagent approval flows
- expose guardian review in app-server with temporary unstable
`item/autoApprovalReview/{started,completed}` notifications carrying
`targetItemId`, `review`, and `action`
- update the TUI so Smart Approvals can be enabled from `/experimental`,
aligned with the matching `/approvals` mode, and surfaced clearly while
reviews are pending or resolved

## Runtime model
This PR does not introduce a new `approval_policy`.

Instead:
- `approval_policy` still controls when approval is needed
- `approvals_reviewer` controls who reviewable approval requests are
routed to:
  - `user`
  - `guardian_subagent`

`guardian_subagent` is a carefully prompted reviewer subagent that
gathers relevant context and applies a risk-based decision framework
before approving or denying the request.

The `smart_approvals` feature flag is a rollout/UI gate. Core runtime
behavior keys off `approvals_reviewer`.

When Smart Approvals is enabled from the TUI, it also switches the
current `/approvals` settings to the matching Smart Approvals mode so
users immediately see guardian review in the active thread:
- `approval_policy = on-request`
- `approvals_reviewer = guardian_subagent`
- `sandbox_mode = workspace-write`

Users can still change `/approvals` afterward.

Config-load behavior stays intentionally narrow:
- plain `smart_approvals = true` in `config.toml` remains just the
rollout/UI gate and does not auto-set `approvals_reviewer`
- the deprecated `guardian_approval = true` alias migration does
backfill `approvals_reviewer = "guardian_subagent"` in the same scope
when that reviewer is not already configured there, so old configs
preserve their original guardian-enabled behavior

ARC remains a separate safety check. For MCP tool approvals, ARC
escalations now flow into the configured reviewer instead of always
bypassing guardian and forcing manual review.

## Config stability
The runtime reviewer override is stable, but the config-backed
app-server protocol shape is still settling.

- `thread/start`, `thread/resume`, and `turn/start` keep stable
`approvalsReviewer` overrides
- the config-backed `approvals_reviewer` exposure returned via
`config/read` (including profile-level config) is now marked
`[UNSTABLE]` / experimental in the app-server protocol until we are more
confident in that config surface

## App-server surface
This PR intentionally keeps the guardian app-server shape narrow and
temporary.

It adds generic unstable lifecycle notifications:
- `item/autoApprovalReview/started`
- `item/autoApprovalReview/completed`

with payloads of the form:
- `{ threadId, turnId, targetItemId, review, action? }`

`review` is currently:
- `{ status, riskScore?, riskLevel?, rationale? }`
- where `status` is one of `inProgress`, `approved`, `denied`, or
`aborted`

`action` carries the guardian action summary payload from core when
available. This lets clients render temporary standalone pending-review
UI, including parallel reviews, even when the underlying tool item has
not been emitted yet.

These notifications are explicitly documented as `[UNSTABLE]` and
expected to change soon.

This PR does **not** persist guardian review state onto `thread/read`
tool items. The intended follow-up is to attach guardian review state to
the reviewed tool item lifecycle instead, which would improve
consistency with manual approvals and allow thread history / reconnect
flows to replay guardian review state directly.

## TUI behavior
- `/experimental` exposes the rollout gate as `Smart Approvals`
- enabling it in the TUI enables the feature and switches the current
session to the matching Smart Approvals `/approvals` mode
- disabling it in the TUI clears the persisted `approvals_reviewer`
override when appropriate and returns the session to default manual
review when the effective reviewer changes
- `/approvals` still exposes the reviewer choice directly
- the TUI renders:
- pending guardian review state in the live status footer, including
parallel review aggregation
  - resolved approval/denial state in history

## Scope notes
This PR includes the supporting core/runtime work needed to make Smart
Approvals usable end-to-end:
- shell / unified-exec / apply_patch / managed-network / MCP guardian
review
- delegated/subagent approval routing into guardian review
- guardian review risk metadata and action summaries for app-server/TUI
- config/profile/TUI handling for `smart_approvals`, `guardian_approval`
alias migration, and `approvals_reviewer`
- a small internal cleanup of delegated approval forwarding to dedupe
fallback paths and simplify guardian-vs-parent approval waiting (no
intended behavior change)

Out of scope for this PR:
- redesigning the existing manual approval protocol shapes
- persisting guardian review state onto app-server `ThreadItem`s
- delegated MCP elicitation auto-review (the current delegated MCP
guardian shim only covers the legacy `RequestUserInput` path)

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-13 15:27:00 -07:00
Jack Mousseau 19d0949aab Handle pre-approved permissions in zsh fork (#14431) 2026-03-12 00:27:11 -07:00
Charley CunninghamandCodex f23fcd6ced guardian initial feedback / tweaks (#13897)
## Summary
- remove the remaining model-visible guardian-specific `on-request`
prompt additions so enabling the feature does not change the main
approval-policy instructions
- neutralize user-facing guardian wording to talk about automatic
approval review / approval requests rather than a second reviewer or
only sandbox escalations
- tighten guardian retry-context handling so agent-authored
`justification` stays in the structured action JSON and is not also
injected as raw retry context
- simplify guardian review plumbing in core by deleting dead
prompt-append paths and trimming some request/transcript setup code

## Notable Changes
- delete the dead `permissions/approval_policy/guardian.md` append path
and stop threading `guardian_approval_enabled` through model-facing
developer-instruction builders
- rename the experimental feature copy to `Automatic approval review`
and update the `/experimental` snapshot text accordingly
- make approval-review status strings generic across shell, patch,
network, and MCP review types
- forward real sandbox/network retry reasons for shell and unified-exec
guardian review, but do not pass agent-authored justification as raw
retry context
- simplify `guardian.rs` by removing the one-field request wrapper,
deduping reasoning-effort selection, and cleaning up transcript entry
collection

## Testing
- `just fmt`
- full validation left to CI

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-09 09:25:24 -07:00
Celia Chen 340f9c9ecb app-server: include experimental skill metadata in exec approval requests (#13929)
## Summary

This change surfaces skill metadata on command approval requests so
app-server clients can tell when an approval came from a skill script
and identify the originating `SKILL.md`.

- add `skill_metadata` to exec approval events in the shared protocol
- thread skill metadata through core shell escalation and delegated
approval handling for skill-triggered approvals
- expose the field in app-server v2 as experimental `skillMetadata`
- regenerate the JSON/TypeScript schemas and cover the new field in
protocol, transport, core, and TUI tests

## Why

Skill-triggered approvals already carry skill context inside core, but
app-server clients could not see which skill caused the prompt. Sending
the skill metadata with the approval request makes it possible for
clients to present better approval UX and connect the prompt back to the
relevant skill definition.


## example event in app-server-v2
verified that we see this event when experimental api is on:
```
< {
<   "id": 11,
<   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
<   "params": {
<     "additionalPermissions": {
<       "fileSystem": null,
<       "macos": {
<         "accessibility": false,
<         "automations": {
<           "bundle_ids": [
<             "com.apple.Notes"
<           ]
<         },
<         "calendar": false,
<         "preferences": "read_only"
<       },
<       "network": null
<     },
<     "approvalId": "25d600ee-5a3c-4746-8d17-e2e61fb4c563",
<     "availableDecisions": [
<       "accept",
<       "acceptForSession",
<       "cancel"
<     ],
<     "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
<     "commandActions": [
<       {
<         "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
<         "type": "unknown"
<       }
<     ],
<     "cwd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes",
<     "itemId": "call_jZp3xFpNg4D8iKAD49cvEvZy",
<     "skillMetadata": {
<       "pathToSkillsMd": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/SKILL.md"
<     },
<     "threadId": "019ccc10-b7d3-7ff2-84fe-3a75e7681e69",
<     "turnId": "019ccc10-b848-76f1-81b3-4a1fa225493f"
<   }
< }`
```

& verified that this is the event when experimental api is off:
```
< {
<   "id": 13,
<   "method": "item/commandExecution/requestApproval",
<   "params": {
<     "approvalId": "5fbbf776-261b-4cf8-899b-c125b547f2c0",
<     "availableDecisions": [
<       "accept",
<       "acceptForSession",
<       "cancel"
<     ],
<     "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
<     "commandActions": [
<       {
<         "command": "/Applications/ChatGPT.app/Contents/Resources/CodexAppServer_CodexAppServerBundledSkills.bundle/Contents/Resources/skills/apple-notes/scripts/notes_info",
<         "type": "unknown"
<       }
<     ],
<     "cwd": "/Users/celia/code/codex/codex-rs",
<     "itemId": "call_OV2DHzTgYcbYtWaTTBWlocOt",
<     "threadId": "019ccc16-2a2b-7be1-8500-e00d45b892d4",
<     "turnId": "019ccc16-2a8e-7961-98ec-649600e7d06a"
<   }
< }
```
2026-03-08 18:07:46 -07:00
Charley CunninghamandCodex e84ee33cc0 Add guardian approval MVP (#13692)
## Summary
- add the guardian reviewer flow for `on-request` approvals in command,
patch, sandbox-retry, and managed-network approval paths
- keep guardian behind `features.guardian_approval` instead of exposing
a public `approval_policy = guardian` mode
- route ordinary `OnRequest` approvals to the guardian subagent when the
feature is enabled, without changing the public approval-mode surface

## Public model
- public approval modes stay unchanged
- guardian is enabled via `features.guardian_approval`
- when that feature is on, `approval_policy = on-request` keeps the same
approval boundaries but sends those approval requests to the guardian
reviewer instead of the user
- `/experimental` only persists the feature flag; it does not rewrite
`approval_policy`
- CLI and app-server no longer expose a separate `guardian` approval
mode in this PR

## Guardian reviewer
- the reviewer runs as a normal subagent and reuses the existing
subagent/thread machinery
- it is locked to a read-only sandbox and `approval_policy = never`
- it does not inherit user/project exec-policy rules
- it prefers `gpt-5.4` when the current provider exposes it, otherwise
falls back to the parent turn's active model
- it fail-closes on timeout, startup failure, malformed output, or any
other review error
- it currently auto-approves only when `risk_score < 80`

## Review context and policy
- guardian mirrors `OnRequest` approval semantics rather than
introducing a separate approval policy
- explicit `require_escalated` requests follow the same approval surface
as `OnRequest`; the difference is only who reviews them
- managed-network allowlist misses that enter the approval flow are also
reviewed by guardian
- the review prompt includes bounded recent transcript history plus
recent tool call/result evidence
- transcript entries and planned-action strings are truncated with
explicit `<guardian_truncated ... />` markers so large payloads stay
bounded
- apply-patch reviews include the full patch content (without
duplicating the structured `changes` payload)
- the guardian request layout is snapshot-tested using the same
model-visible Responses request formatter used elsewhere in core

## Guardian network behavior
- the guardian subagent inherits the parent session's managed-network
allowlist when one exists, so it can use the same approved network
surface while reviewing
- exact session-scoped network approvals are copied into the guardian
session with protocol/port scope preserved
- those copied approvals are now seeded before the guardian's first turn
is submitted, so inherited approvals are available during any immediate
review-time checks

## Out of scope / follow-ups
- the sandbox-permission validation split was pulled into a separate PR
and is not part of this diff
- a future follow-up can enable `serde_json` preserve-order in
`codex-core` and then simplify the guardian action rendering further

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <noreply@openai.com>
2026-03-07 05:40:10 -08:00
Michael Bolin b4cb989563 refactor: prepare unified exec for zsh-fork backend (#13392)
## Why

`shell_zsh_fork` already provides stronger guarantees around which
executables receive elevated permissions. To reuse that machinery from
unified exec without pushing Unix-specific escalation details through
generic runtime code, the escalation bootstrap and session lifetime
handling need a cleaner boundary.

That boundary also needs to be safe for long-lived sessions: when an
intercepted shell session is closed or pruned, any in-flight approval
workers and any already-approved escalated child they spawned must be
torn down with the session, and the inherited escalation socket must not
leak into unrelated subprocesses.

## What Changed

- Extracted a reusable `EscalationSession` and
`EscalateServer::start_session(...)` in `shell-escalation` so callers
can get the wrapper/socket env overlay and keep the escalation server
alive without immediately running a one-shot command.
- Documented that `EscalationSession::env()` and
`ShellCommandExecutor::run(...)` exchange only that env overlay, which
callers must merge into their own base shell environment.
- Clarified the prepared-exec helper boundary in `core` by naming the
new helper APIs around `ExecRequest`, while keeping the legacy
`execute_env(...)` entrypoints as thin compatibility wrappers for
existing callers that still use the older naming.
- Added a small post-spawn hook on the prepared execution path so the
parent copy of the inheritable escalation socket is closed immediately
after both the existing one-shot shell-command spawn and the
unified-exec spawn.
- Made session teardown explicit with session-scoped cancellation:
dropping an `EscalationSession` or canceling its parent request now
stops intercept workers, and the server-spawned escalated child uses
`kill_on_drop(true)` so teardown cannot orphan an already-approved
child.
- Added `UnifiedExecBackendConfig` plumbing through `ToolsConfig`, a
`shell::zsh_fork_backend` facade, and an opaque unified-exec
spawn-lifecycle hook so unified exec can prepare a wrapped `zsh -c/-lc`
request without storing `EscalationSession` directly in generic
process/runtime code.
- Kept the existing `shell_command` zsh-fork behavior intact on top of
the new bootstrap path. Tool selection is unchanged in this PR: when
`shell_zsh_fork` is enabled, `ShellCommand` still wins over
`exec_command`.

## Verification

- `cargo test -p codex-shell-escalation`
  - includes coverage for `start_session_exposes_wrapper_env_overlay`
  - includes coverage for `exec_closes_parent_socket_after_shell_spawn`
- includes coverage for
`dropping_session_aborts_intercept_workers_and_kills_spawned_child`
- `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec`
- `cargo test -p codex-core --test all
shell_zsh_fork_prompts_for_skill_script_execution`


---
[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/13392).
* #13432
* __->__ #13392
2026-03-05 08:55:12 +00:00
Michael Bolin 14116ade8d feat: include available decisions in command approval requests (#12758)
Command-approval clients currently infer which choices to show from
side-channel fields like `networkApprovalContext`,
`proposedExecpolicyAmendment`, and `additionalPermissions`. That makes
the request shape harder to evolve, and it forces each client to
replicate the server's heuristics instead of receiving the exact
decision list for the prompt.

This PR introduces a mapping between `CommandExecutionApprovalDecision`
and `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision`:

```rust
impl From<CoreReviewDecision> for CommandExecutionApprovalDecision {
    fn from(value: CoreReviewDecision) -> Self {
        match value {
            CoreReviewDecision::Approved => Self::Accept,
            CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedExecpolicyAmendment {
                proposed_execpolicy_amendment,
            } => Self::AcceptWithExecpolicyAmendment {
                execpolicy_amendment: proposed_execpolicy_amendment.into(),
            },
            CoreReviewDecision::ApprovedForSession => Self::AcceptForSession,
            CoreReviewDecision::NetworkPolicyAmendment {
                network_policy_amendment,
            } => Self::ApplyNetworkPolicyAmendment {
                network_policy_amendment: network_policy_amendment.into(),
            },
            CoreReviewDecision::Abort => Self::Cancel,
            CoreReviewDecision::Denied => Self::Decline,
        }
    }
}
```

And updates `CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams` to have a new field:

```rust
available_decisions: Option<Vec<CommandExecutionApprovalDecision>>
```

when, if specified, should make it easier for clients to display an
appropriate list of options in the UI.

This makes it possible for `CoreShellActionProvider::prompt()` in
`unix_escalation.rs` to specify the `Vec<ReviewDecision>` directly,
adding support for `ApprovedForSession` when approving a skill script,
which was previously missing in the TUI.

Note this results in a significant change to `exec_options()` in
`approval_overlay.rs`, as the displayed options are now derived from
`available_decisions: &[ReviewDecision]`.

## What Changed

- Add `available_decisions` to
[`ExecApprovalRequestEvent`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/protocol/src/approvals.rs#L111-L175),
including helpers to derive the legacy default choices when older
senders omit the field.
- Map `codex_protocol::protocol::ReviewDecision` to app-server
`CommandExecutionApprovalDecision` and expose the ordered list as
experimental `availableDecisions` in
[`CommandExecutionRequestApprovalParams`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/app-server-protocol/src/protocol/v2.rs#L3798-L3807).
- Thread optional `available_decisions` through the core approval path
so Unix shell escalation can explicitly request `ApprovedForSession` for
session-scoped approvals instead of relying on client heuristics.
[`unix_escalation.rs`](https://github.com/openai/codex/blob/de00e932dd9801de0a4faac0519162099753f331/codex-rs/core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs#L194-L214)
- Update the TUI approval overlay to build its buttons from the ordered
decision list, while preserving the legacy fallback when
`available_decisions` is missing.
- Update the app-server README, test client output, and generated schema
artifacts to document and surface the new field.

## Testing

- Add `approval_overlay.rs` coverage for explicit decision lists,
including the generic `ApprovedForSession` path and network approval
options.
- Update `chatwidget/tests.rs` and app-server protocol tests to populate
the new optional field and keep older event shapes working.

## Developers Docs

- If we document `item/commandExecution/requestApproval` on
[developers.openai.com/codex](https://developers.openai.com/codex), add
experimental `availableDecisions` as the preferred source of approval
choices and note that older servers may omit it.
2026-02-26 01:10:46 +00:00
Celia Chen 16ca527c80 chore: migrate additional permissions to PermissionProfile (#12731)
This PR replaces the old `additional_permissions.fs_read/fs_write` shape
with a shared `PermissionProfile`
model and wires it through the command approval, sandboxing, protocol,
and TUI layers. The schema is adopted from the
`SkillManifestPermissions`, which is also refactored to use this unified
struct. This helps us easily expose permission profiles in app
server/core as a follow-up.
2026-02-25 03:35:28 +00:00
Michael Bolin 3ca0e7673b feat: run zsh fork shell tool via shell-escalation (#12649)
## Why

This PR switches the `shell_command` zsh-fork path over to
`codex-shell-escalation` so the new shell tool can use the shared
exec-wrapper/escalation protocol instead of the `zsh_exec_bridge`
implementation that was introduced in
https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052. `zsh_exec_bridge` relied on
UNIX domain sockets, which is not as tamper-proof as the FD-based
approach in `codex-shell-escalation`.

## What Changed

- Added a Unix zsh-fork runtime adapter in `core`
(`core/src/tools/runtimes/shell/unix_escalation.rs`) that:
- runs zsh-fork commands through
`codex_shell_escalation::run_escalate_server`
  - bridges exec-policy / approval decisions into `ShellActionProvider`
- executes escalated commands via a `ShellCommandExecutor` that calls
`process_exec_tool_call`
- Updated `ShellRuntime` / `ShellCommandHandler` / tool spec wiring to
select a `shell_command` backend (`classic` vs `zsh-fork`) while leaving
the generic `shell` tool path unchanged.
- Removed the `zsh_exec_bridge`-based session service and deleted
`core/src/zsh_exec_bridge/mod.rs`.
- Moved exec-wrapper entrypoint dispatch to `arg0` by handling the
`codex-execve-wrapper` arg0 alias there, and removed the old
`codex_core::maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode()` hooks from `cli` and
`app-server` mains.
- Added the needed `codex-shell-escalation` dependencies for `core` and
`arg0`.

## Tests

- `cargo test -p codex-core
shell_zsh_fork_prefers_shell_command_over_unified_exec`
- `cargo test -p codex-app-server turn_start_shell_zsh_fork --
--nocapture`
- verifies zsh-fork command execution and approval flows through the new
backend
- includes subcommand approve/decline coverage using the shared zsh
DotSlash fixture in `app-server/tests/suite/zsh`
- To test manually, I added the following to `~/.codex/config.toml`:

```toml
zsh_path = "/Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh"

[features]
shell_zsh_fork = true
```

Then I ran `just c` to run the dev build of Codex with these changes and
sent it the message:

```
run `echo $0`
```

And it replied with:

```
  echo $0 printed:

  /Users/mbolin/code/codex3/codex-rs/app-server/tests/suite/zsh

  In this tool context, $0 reflects the script path used to invoke the shell, not just zsh.
```

so the tool appears to be wired up correctly.

## Notes

- The zsh subcommand-decline integration test now uses `rm` under a
`WorkspaceWrite` sandbox. The previous `/usr/bin/true` scenario is
auto-allowed by the new `shell-escalation` policy path, which no longer
produces subcommand approval prompts.
2026-02-24 10:31:08 -08:00
Dylan Hurd f6053fdfb3 feat(core) Introduce Feature::RequestPermissions (#11871)
## Summary
Introduces the initial implementation of Feature::RequestPermissions.
RequestPermissions allows the model to request that a command be run
inside the sandbox, with additional permissions, like writing to a
specific folder. Eventually this will include other rules as well, and
the ability to persist these permissions, but this PR is already quite
large - let's get the core flow working and go from there!

<img width="1279" height="541" alt="Screenshot 2026-02-15 at 2 26 22 PM"
src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0ee3ec0f-02ec-4509-91a2-809ac80be368"
/>

## Testing
- [x] Added tests
- [x] Tested locally
- [x] Feature
2026-02-24 09:48:57 -08:00
Michael Bolin 7f75e74201 Use Arc-based ToolCtx in tool runtimes (#12583)
## Why
Tool handlers and runtimes needed to pass the same turn/session context
for shell and non-shell workflows without duplicative ownership churn.
Using shared pointers avoids temporary lifetimes and keeps existing
behavior unchanged while simplifying call sites.

## What changed
- Converted `ToolCtx` to store shared context handles (`Arc`-based),
including updates across shell, apply-patch, and unified-exec paths.
- Updated orchestrator/runtime call sites to consume the shared context
consistently and remove brittle move/borrow patterns.
- Kept behavior unchanged while preparing the type surface for the new
shell escalation integration in the next stack commit.

## Verification
- Validated this commit stack point with `just clippy` and confirmed
workspace compiles cleanly in this stack state.

[//]: # (BEGIN SAPLING FOOTER)
Stack created with [Sapling](https://sapling-scm.com). Best reviewed
with [ReviewStack](https://reviewstack.dev/openai/codex/pull/12583).
* #12584
* __->__ #12583
* #12556
2026-02-23 18:29:26 +00:00
viyatb-oai e8afaed502 Refactor network approvals to host/protocol/port scope (#12140)
## Summary
Simplify network approvals by removing per-attempt proxy correlation and
moving to session-level approval dedupe keyed by (host, protocol, port).
Instead of encoding attempt IDs into proxy credentials/URLs, we now
treat approvals as a destination policy decision.

- Concurrent calls to the same destination share one approval prompt.
- Different destinations (or same host on different ports) get separate
prompts.
- Allow once approves the current queued request group only.
- Allow for session caches that (host, protocol, port) and auto-allows
future matching requests.
- Never policy continues to deny without prompting.

Example:
- 3 calls: 
  - a.com (line 443)
  - b.com (line 443)
  - a.com (line 443)
=> 2 prompts total (a, b), second a waits on the first decision.
- a.com:80 is treated separately from a.com line 443

## Testing
- `just fmt` (in `codex-rs`)
- `cargo test -p codex-core tools::network_approval::tests`
- `cargo test -p codex-core` (unit tests pass; existing
integration-suite failures remain in this environment)
2026-02-20 10:39:55 -08:00
Owen Lin edacbf7b6e feat(core): zsh exec bridge (#12052)
zsh fork PR stack:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052 👈 

### Summary
This PR introduces a feature-gated native shell runtime path that routes
shell execution through a patched zsh exec bridge, removing MCP-specific
behavior from the shell hot path while preserving existing
CommandExecution lifecycle semantics.

When shell_zsh_fork is enabled, shell commands run via patched zsh with
per-`execve` interception through EXEC_WRAPPER. Core receives wrapper
IPC requests over a Unix socket, applies existing approval policy, and
returns allow/deny before the subcommand executes.

### What’s included
**1) New zsh exec bridge runtime in core**
- Wrapper-mode entrypoint (maybe_run_zsh_exec_wrapper_mode) for
EXEC_WRAPPER invocations.
- Per-execution Unix-socket IPC handling for wrapper requests/responses.
- Approval callback integration using existing core approval
orchestration.
- Streaming stdout/stderr deltas to existing command output event
pipeline.
- Error handling for malformed IPC, denial/abort, and execution
failures.

**2) Session lifecycle integration**
SessionServices now owns a `ZshExecBridge`.
Session startup initializes bridge state; shutdown tears it down
cleanly.

**3) Shell runtime routing (feature-gated)**
When `shell_zsh_fork` is enabled:
- Build execution env/spec as usual.
- Add wrapper socket env wiring.
- Execute via `zsh_exec_bridge.execute_shell_request(...)` instead of
the regular shell path.
- Non-zsh-fork behavior remains unchanged.

**4) Config + feature wiring**
- Added `Feature::ShellZshFork` (under development).
- Added config support for `zsh_path` (optional absolute path to patched
zsh):
- `Config`, `ConfigToml`, `ConfigProfile`, overrides, and schema.
- Session startup validates that `zsh_path` exists/usable when zsh-fork
is enabled.
- Added startup test for missing `zsh_path` failure mode.

**5) Seatbelt/sandbox updates for wrapper IPC**
- Extended seatbelt policy generation to optionally allow outbound
connection to explicitly permitted Unix sockets.
- Wired sandboxing path to pass wrapper socket path through to seatbelt
policy generation.
- Added/updated seatbelt tests for explicit socket allow rule and
argument emission.

**6) Runtime entrypoint hooks**
- This allows the same binary to act as the zsh wrapper subprocess when
invoked via `EXEC_WRAPPER`.

**7) Tool selection behavior**
- ToolsConfig now prefers ShellCommand type when shell_zsh_fork is
enabled.
- Added test coverage for precedence with unified-exec enabled.
2026-02-17 20:19:53 -08:00
Owen Lin db4d2599b5 feat(core): plumb distinct approval ids for command approvals (#12051)
zsh fork PR stack:
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12051 👈 
- https://github.com/openai/codex/pull/12052

With upcoming support for a fork of zsh that allows us to intercept
`execve` and run execpolicy checks for each subcommand as part of a
`CommandExecution`, it will be possible for there to be multiple
approval requests for a shell command like `/path/to/zsh -lc 'git status
&& rg \"TODO\" src && make test'`.

To support that, this PR introduces a new `approval_id` field across
core, protocol, and app-server so that we can associate approvals
properly for subcommands.
2026-02-18 01:55:57 +00:00
jif-oai 825a4af42f feat: use shell policy in shell snapshot (#11759)
Honor `shell_environment_policy.set` even after a shell snapshot
2026-02-16 09:11:00 +00:00
viyatb-oaiandCodex b527ee2890 feat(core): add structured network approval plumbing and policy decision model (#11672)
### Description
#### Summary
Introduces the core plumbing required for structured network approvals

#### What changed
- Added structured network policy decision modeling in core.
- Added approval payload/context types needed for network approval
semantics.
- Wired shell/unified-exec runtime plumbing to consume structured
decisions.
- Updated related core error/event surfaces for structured handling.
- Updated protocol plumbing used by core approval flow.
- Included small CLI debug sandbox compatibility updates needed by this
layer.

#### Why
establishes the minimal backend foundation for network approvals without
yet changing high-level orchestration or TUI behavior.

#### Notes
- Behavior remains constrained by existing requirements/config gating.
- Follow-up PRs in the stack handle orchestration, UX, and app-server
integration.

---------

Co-authored-by: Codex <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-02-14 04:18:12 +00:00
viyatb-oaiandDylan Hurd 62d0f302fd fix(core): canonicalize wrapper approvals and support heredoc prefix … (#10941)
## Summary
- Reduced repeated approvals for equivalent wrapper commands and fixed
execpolicy matching for heredoc-style shell invocations, with minimal
behavior change and fail-closed defaults.

## Fixes
1. Canonicalized approval matching for wrappers so equivalent commands
map to the same approval intent.
2. Added heredoc-aware prefix extraction for execpolicy so commands like
`python3 <<'PY' ... PY` match rules such as `prefix_rule(["python3"],
...)`.
3. Kept fallback behavior conservative: if parsing is ambiguous,
existing prompt behavior is preserved.

## Edge Cases Covered
- Wrapper path/name differences: `/bin/bash` vs `bash`, `/bin/zsh` vs
`zsh`.
- Shell modes: `-c` and `-lc`.
- Heredoc forms: quoted delimiter (`<<'PY'`) and unquoted delimiter (`<<
PY`).
- Multi-command heredoc scripts are rejected by the fallback
- Non-heredoc redirections (`>`, etc.) are not treated as heredoc prefix
matches.
- Complex scripts still fall back to prior behavior rather than
expanding permissions.

---------

Co-authored-by: Dylan Hurd <dylan.hurd@openai.com>
2026-02-10 11:46:40 -08:00
viyatb-oai 3391e5ea86 feat(sandbox): enforce proxy-aware network routing in sandbox (#11113)
## Summary
- expand proxy env injection to cover common tool env vars
(`HTTP_PROXY`/`HTTPS_PROXY`/`ALL_PROXY`/`NO_PROXY` families +
tool-specific variants)
- harden macOS Seatbelt network policy generation to route through
inferred loopback proxy endpoints and fail closed when proxy env is
malformed
- thread proxy-aware Linux sandbox flags and add minimal bwrap netns
isolation hook for restricted non-proxy runs
- add/refresh tests for proxy env wiring, Seatbelt policy generation,
and Linux sandbox argument wiring
2026-02-10 07:44:21 +00:00